bout de papier, Vol. 9, No. 3 (1992) — Summer 1992 // Été 1992, pp. 46–47
Faith and Fear: The Free Trade Story by
G. Bruce Doern and Brian W. Tomlin,
Stoddart Publishing Company, Toronto,
1991, 340 pp. $29.95
In the Spring 1992 issue of bout de papier, Michael Hart concentrated his considerable firepower on two books by Linda McQuaig and Mel Hurtig claiming that the 1988 Canada-US Free Trade Agreement represented the abdication of Canadian independence, the seduction of Ottawa by US big business, and the betrayal of the people by politicians. An antidote to these unjustified complaints, Hart briefly suggested, was to be found in Bruce Doern and Brian Tomlin’s Faith and Fear, a book about which he promised there would soon be more in these pages.
This is the “more” and my conclusions do not differ from Michael Hart’s. Faith and Fear is an important journey for all Canadians, examining complex events and phenomena with clarity and balance, and demythologizing a document the Carleton University authors say will change Canada forever. The book is part description of the origins of and forces contributing to the FTA; part analysis of the contents and potential consequences of the deal; and part rattling good story-telling (based on extensive interviewing) about the negotiation of the agreement and the election during which its fate hung in the balance.
Sometimes, it is true, the parts get in the way of the whole. The first chapters quickly survey the long and controversial history of free trade in Canada, and move at a sprightly pace from Liberal trade minister Gerald Regan’s sectoral initiative in 1983 through the gathering political and business enthusiasm for a comprehensive deal in the first Mulroney years to the opening of the talks with Washington in 1986. But the authors then offer a summary and preliminary assessment of the FTA, long before their narrative has produced an accord. Two thematic chapters on the role of business and the provinces follow before the negotiation resumes. This mixture of approach, which is repeated in the section dealing with the election of 1988, is fine theoretically, but it makes for an overlapping of material and disappointing interruptions in the book’s momentum.
Too much should not be made of this. The repetitions can be helpful, and the reader is probably well served by an early glimpse at the final agreement. The authors always write lucidly, and sometimes, as in “Weekend in Washington” ’, with the flair and pace of the best political writing. The book derives some of its interest from the notion that people and personality make a difference; the sketches of the principal players are wonderfully evocative. What is more, and to their credit, Doern and Tomlin seldom resort to the jargon of their social scientists’ trade. One of the few lapses: “The plainest truth may be simply that the 1988 election supplied a mandate for the FTA congruent with the norms of parliamentary democracy in a multi-party system”
A good deal of the book is inevitably about deal-making. There were two phases; the period from May 1986, with Simon Reisman and Peter Murphy facing, or pulling faces at, one another, and the final early October 1987 spurt in Washington, when Treasury Secretary James Baker III and Mulroney Chief of Staff Derek Burney and their teams managed to cobble together an agreement just under the US fast-track wire. In the first phase, Murphy thoroughly frustrated Reisman by refusing to dance in the latter’s own words, “drawing you out, getting you to undress while they were sitting there looking you over to see whether they were interested”. The Canadians, well endowed with commitment and resources, were apt to attribute this to lack of competence and preparation, and consequently to be dismissive of their adversaries. This was a mistake: Doern and Tomlin are certain that Murphy was pursuing a deliberate and effective strategy.
Although the authors praise Reisman for his broad vision and tenacity, they argue that he played into Murphy’s hands by continuing to beat his head against the wall right up to the end and by not being flexible enough to shift his goals or to consider pulling up stakes altogether much earlier in the process. In particular, they claim that Reisman might have stopped focusing his efforts on finding ways to nullify the effects of US trade remedy law, an area where little movement was likely, and might have travelled on to to other, more fruitful areas of negotiation. By the time the Americans were willing to talk, it was too late to get substantial concessions or to assemble the elements of the big deal Ottawa wanted. The last-minute solution to the trade remedies impasse, the creation of binational panels to review their application, was not the major breakthrough that had been hoped for, and a lot of energy and concessions had to be expended to get there.
But how realistic was a different outcome? I am inclined to think, on the basis of the evidence in the book, that the authors are too hard on Reisman and too kind to Murphy, whose stance led after all not to success but a Canadian walkout. The Canadian negotiating position, as Doern-Tomlin made very clear, was always relatively weak. There was a huge disparity of power between the two countries, and Canada was the demandeur in the negotiations, the party most anxious for an agreement and with the most to lose. That had been evident from the beginning, and no alternative negotiating strategy was going to change the basic facts. The authors suggest that the Canadian side was outpointed in the substance of the talks — they are very good on “gains” and “losses” — but that they did achieve a very considerable improvement in access to the American market for Canadian producers. A guaranteed path had been Mulroney’s central goal, but it was an impossible dream.
Doern and Tomlin are quiet free-traders, and they are critical of opponents who have not really considered the alternatives. They conclude from a careful review of the FTA that the agreement does not substantially reduce Canada’s ability to do business or to make its own policy, and that in some areas that capacity has been enhanced. They do urge, however, that the agreement is no panacea, and is no substitute for systematic thought about the future. Canadians, they say, must move on to confront the very serious economic, social and political challenges that the country now faces.
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 9, No. 3 (1992) — Summer 1992 // Été 1992, pp. 46–47. Read the rest of this issue →
