bout de papier, September 1983 // Septembre 1983, p. 3
Napoleon called history a fable agreed upon, Voltaire thought it was tricks we play on the dead. To Henry Ford it was bunk. To others, tradition and precedent became a ball and chain hindering progress. Such views on the usefulness of history found no adherents in External Affairs. In the Canadian Diplomat Marcel Cadieux advised those seeking a career in the foreign service to acquire a familiarity with political economy, international law and “above all, history”. Following the teaching of Herodotus and Francis Bacon, Cadieux and his generation believed that young diplomats had much to learn from the study of history. In developing an historical consciousness they would learn that an understanding of the past was essential to making sound decisions about the present and future. History, of all disciplines, gave the generalist the best possible training and overview of the world. Certainly anyone who has been posted abroad can appreciate the importance of knowing Canadian history as well as that of the host country. For the purpose of this article I shall narrow the focus to Canadian diplomatic history and international relations in general.
The father of the Canadian foreign service, Dr. Skelton, had been trained as a political economist, but his research interests were in the field of history. Indeed, it had been his analysis of the past that had brought him to the prime minister’s attention. His foreign service examinations reflected that preoccupation with history. Those who had not studied history soon learned under his tutelage how to write good historical analyses of contemporary issues. Personal maturity was developed from a reflection on past events. Sound diplomacy and good diplomatic practices would rest on the fulcrum of historic knowledge à la Skelton. When the recruiting of young male officers was suspended during the Second World War Skelton, and later Norman Robertson, instinctively turned to university history departments for help. At first they asked for their best female graduates and then as the need for more middle management evolved they took on history professors as special wartime assistants. “It was the historian’s Babylonian captivity”, remarked one visitor to the East Block in 1944, as these historians attempted to apply the lessons learned during the thirties and the war to the challenge of creating a new world order. Under the leadership of Hume Wrong, the associate under-secretary and historically trained son of the chairman of the History Department at the University of Toronto, studies of the past became the basis for post-war planning. Reviewing the file became a sine qua non for any decision or memoranda. At the conclusion of the war the vast majority of these professional historians opted for a diplomatic career. As historians like Pearson, Massey, Wrong, Glazebrook, Riddell, and MacKay, among others, became successful diplomats, their reputation helped in turn make the study of history more popular in the universities.
In the 1960s, however, the study of diplomacy and international relations came to rely less on history and fewer recruits were actually drawn from that discipline. While their foundation in the humanities and social sciences left them with a healthy respect for history, the quickened pace of international events and the speed of telecommunications left little time for extended research into the antecedents of a policy or event. At the same time postings were shortened thereby reducing the opportunity to develop and sustain an expertise over any substantial period of one’s career. Thus, it became more difficult for officers to transform the snapshots acquired at postings, conferences, and desk assignments, into an overall understanding of the wider picture. Too often the urgent seemed to supplant the important that required reflection on the past. Moreover, promotional trends among senior public servants accentuated the benefits of tours of duty in several departments. Management techniques seemed to be more important than a familiarity with past policy developments in reaching the top echelon of the department. Without having an opportunity to develop a full contextual framework, it became more difficult to assess major trends, shifts in direction, or areas of concern. In such a situation there lurked a danger that the institutional memory would not be used to make future directions clearer but would be regarded as a deterrent to advancement, hence irrelevant.
In today’s world there are admittedly many situations we face in External Affairs for which history has little or nothing to say. There are no precedents or remotely similar situations. On the other hand enough of the thread of human nature continues to wind its way through the past into the present to make it worthwhile examining some of the uses to which the department’s history has and can be put.
While it is readily acknowledged that decision-making in a vacuum is a dangerous procedure, more than contemporary political, bureaucratic and international factors need to be understood by our foreign service officers. Decisions require a context or a point of reference in order to justify a change or continuation. Both the Stanfield enquiry into the possible relocation of our embassy within Israel and the Royal Commission on Conditions of Foreign Service needed an historical point of reference. Without a comparative base, recommendations could not be properly evaluated. When you put a picture of history into the viewer alongside one of a similar event of today you are better able to judge the value of current proposals.
An understanding of history may also be important to the development of long term strategy. While history never repeats itself its lessons are capable of wide application. We must, as Jean Jaurès, the French statesman and philospher said: “take from the altars of the past the fire — not the ashes.” In this way history will provide us with new ideas and forward momentum. It would be a misreading of the past if our history was ever used to impede progress or unnecessarily circumscribe our actions.
A knowledge of our past also contributes to open-mindedness. It leads us to see that there is value in other opinions, that a purpose may not be altogether altruistic or that calamity may not be altogether deplorable.
On the promotional side, our history has always had a role to play in the production of material for a display, a commemorative article or a speech. Post anniversaries and retirement parties have and will continue to be occasions for reflecting on the past. Much of the Canadian public’s understanding of the department and foreign policy has come from our explanation of the past. The department is fortunate in having a history that it can be proud of. Why not advertise it?
Finally, history can be used to give officers themselves a sense of pride in the institution’s heritage and an esprit de corps. Skelton’s recruits were seized with a vision for what Canada could do in the world. Are today’s FS-I(D)s motivated by a similar vision? There is nothing more powerful than a knowledge of and pride in a common past to spur us on in a diverse future.
When records of past activities are allowed to be used for the above purposes, they became a valuable living resource. “Once managers recognize the value of the corporate past,” wrote the authors of a recent article in the Harvard Business Review, “they can enhance their ability to diagnose problems, reassess policy, measure performance, and even direct change.”
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Originally published in bout de papier, September 1983 // Septembre 1983, p. 3. Read the rest of this issue →
