bout de papier, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1999) — Spring 1999 // Printemps 1999, pp. 41–43
Fifty years ago, on Monday April 4, 1949, the Canadian Ambassador to the United States, Hume Wrong, signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington on behalf of Canada. That role was singularly appropriate as Wrong had been involved in the negotiation of that accord from the beginning and his personal contribution to the successful conclusion of the defence pact was considerable. “Without your skillful and experienced help,” his minister, friend and former colleague, Lester Pearson, observed, “we would certainly not have had as satisfactory a Treaty as that which you will be signing for Canada.” In his reply, Wrong shared the plaudits with two members of his staff, Tommy Stone and Louis Rogers.
Wrong and Pearson had participated in the highly secret tripartite (United States, United Kingdom and Canada) talks in March 1948 (when Pearson was still Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs) that preceded the formal negotiation of the treaty. When the minutes below were written, however, there was still considerable doubt about how the United States Government would commit itself to the defence of Western Europe. To avoid alienating Congress, the tripartite talks were kept under wraps (though a British participant, Donald Maclean, undoubtedly informed the anticipated adversary, the Soviet Union) and the draft outline of a treaty was attributed to the State Department. Eventually, on 11 June 1948, the U.S. Senate approved by a vote of 60 to 4 a resolution sponsored by the Republican chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Arthur Vandenberg, which endorsed “association” by the United States with “ such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security. “ As Wrong warned Ottawa afterward, the passage of the Vandenberg Resolution still left significant and unfortunate room for interpretation and qualification in the months which followed. Even so, it was a vital political milestone on the road to the North Atlantic Treaty. While this often obscure process for developing bi-partisan support for the pact was under way, Wrong exchanged views with some of the key participants. The minutes would then be used by Wrong and his staff as the basis for messages to Ottawa, which kept Pearson and a few others there informed of the twists and turns in American policy (including questions within the State Department). The various stages in the negotiations have been covered in some detail in volumes 14 and 15 of the series, Documents on Canadian External Relations.
Wrong and Pearson had both taught history at the University of Toronto before joining the foreign service in the late 1920s. In addition to representing Canada at the League of Nations, Wrong had twice served in Washington before succeeding Pearson as Ambassador to the United States in September 1946. In addition to negotiating the North Atlantic Treaty for nearly seven momentous years Wrong dealt ably with issues as varied as bilateral free trade, assistance for the reconstruction of Europe, the Korean War, North American defence co-operation and numerous other questions. Though historians and other scholars identify Hume Wrong most closely with the definition of the ’functional principle for the representation of Canada in international organizations, his involvement in the elaboration of the North Atlantic Treaty was arguably more representative of his approach to international relations and of his diplomacy. The documents are from the Hume Wrong Papers at the National Archives of Canada.
Hector Mackenzie Minute (to Thomas Stone) by Hume Wrong, [Wednesday] 5 May 1948. Top Secret.
My conversation on the Atlantic Pact with [John D.] Hickerson [Director, Office of European Affairs, Department of State] was for the most part conducted on the understanding that I should not even make a note of what he told me. I said that I would only record the general impression.
He made light of any differences inside the State Department, saying that they could deal with them and that they should not be regarded seriously. He commented that both [George F.] Kennan [Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State] and [Charles E.] Bohlen [Counsellor, Department of State] thought that the signature of a formal pact would have very little effect on the Kremlin on the ground, that they were always signing themselves mutual assistance pacts and so on to which they paid little attention. They both believed that the adoption of selective service here and the beginning of staff talks with European countries would be much more deterrent.
They have, however, encountered difficulties in working out a program for rapid action with the congressional leaders, and Hickerson said that in his judgment it was unlikely that they would be prepared to enter into an Atlantic Pact until after the presidential election. In the interim Senator Vandenberg is expected shortly to introduce a resolution in the Senate which would in effect promise aid by the United States to those in Europe which resisted further aggression by the Soviet Union and would include references to Article 51 of the Charter. The President [Harry S. Truman] would issue a statement endorsing this resolution. In the meantime, discussions with some of the Western European countries could take place, but no invitation to a conference was to be expected nor was it likely that there would be an early meeting between [Ernest] Bevin [Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, United Kingdom], [Georges] Bidault [Minister of Foreign Affairs, France] and [George C.] Marshall [Secretary of State, United States].
I gathered that the slower timetable was caused by political jockeying in an election year rather than by any firm objection to the conclusion of a treaty of alliance. Hickerson is still strong for the Atlantic Pact and regrets the delay. He thinks, however, that the price of preventing it becoming a partisan issue is to delay action.
You are, I think, preparing a letter to Pearson, and you might incorporate in this part of this note.
I pointed out to Hickerson that the present agitation in Congress for the revision of the Charter so to make the United Nations more effective for preserving peace could easily be used to support the conclusion of a treaty under Article 51 embracing the Atlantic powers. I said that a pact of this sort seemed to be gaining a great deal of popular support and that it would be a pity not to make the most of this. He agreed that this was the case, but still stuck to his point that the politics of a presidential year created too many difficulties for them to succeed in getting a formal commitment. Perhaps the explanation is that the popularity of the idea is itself an obstacle to its being put into effect, since each party might wish to claim the credit for itself and not to share it with the other party.
If you are getting something ready, we might send it up in Saturday’s bag as I should rather like to go over it with you Saturday morning.
Minute (to Thomas Stone) by Hume Wrong, [Wednesday] 19 May 1948. Top Secret.
I talked briefly with Hickerson yesterday about the Vandenberg resolution and security pact. He said that [Robert A.J Lovett [Under-Secretary of State, United States] had been before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Vandenberg resolution, and that it is expected that the Committee will report the resolution today. He thinks it is a good resolution, the adoption of which and its endorsement by the President should help to keep the issue out of party politics.
I commented that I was concerned over the slow rate of progress, and referred to the military discussions in London between the Defence Ministers of the parties to the Brussels Treaty reported in [Maj.- Gen. Georges P.] Vanier’s [Canadian Ambassador to France] telegram 295 of May 15th. He agreed that progress abroad was satisfactory and appeared to approve of the results of these talks.
I then said that I was more convinced than ever that a formal commitment by the United States was necessary if the object was to be achieved. I was glad that he cordially agreed with this. He said that this was still the aim of the Department of State. It was, however, essential that the pact should be kept out of domestic politics, and this involved considerable delay before any conference could be called or public announcement made. Probably it would have to wait until after the election, although he thought that there was some possibility that when the conventions were over and the candidates chosen the candidates might agree to go ahead before the elections. They intend in the State Department to try to bring the candidates together soon after the nominations in the hope that during the campaign there will not be a serious divergence on questions of foreign policy. I remarked that if Vandenberg was the candidate it should not be impossible for Truman and him to agree on the convocation of a conference of the Atlantic powers this summer.
In any event, he said that the preliminary talks envisaged in the Pentagon proposals could go on after the adoption of the Senate resolution and its endorsement by the President. I have some doubts about this myself, since these talks must envisage the negotiation of a treaty and a leak would bring the danger that the issue would be injected into inter-party politics.
Our conversation was hurried as Hickerson was tied up in connection with the Stalin-Wallace open letters [a highly publicized exchange between Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and former American Vice- President Henry Wallace]. I am sending this note to you as you may be able to get more out of [T.C.] Achilles [Chief, Division of Western European Affairs, Department of State] before we submit a report to Ottawa.
Minute (to Thomas Stone) by Hume Wrong, [Wednesday] 19 May 1948. Top Secret.
In continuation of my note of this morning, I discussed with Kennan today the advantages of an Atlantic Pact, saying that I was firmly convinced in my own mind that a formal commitment was necessary fully to achieve the purpose in mind. He said that they were still debating this in the State Department, and left me with the impression that he was opposed to a formal commitment. He argued that the United States would inevitably be involved from the first in war against the Soviet Union if there was Soviet aggression anywhere in Western Europe. The only exception he would admit was the possibility that they might not be involved from the beginning in the defence of Italy against an attack by Yugoslavia, provided that the Yugoslavs left the Trieste territory alone. He thought, therefore, that the same results would be achieved whether or not there was a pact.
I opposed this view on two main grounds. I said that many people in the European countries and also in Canada would not be content with a unilateral assurance of U.S. policy, which might be changed if there was a change in the Administration. They wished something to build on which would span a presidential term at least. Even if it were true that they were as much assured of U.S. support now as they would be under an alliance, plenty of people would not think that this was the case, and would therefore refrain from running risks which it was in our interest that they should run. This was a political rather than a military argument, but I was sure it had political validity.
My second point related to the position of Canada. I said that it would be far more difficult for Canada to collaborate in planning defence against Soviet aggression on the basis of a unilateral U.S. assurance than it would be if both countries were parties to an Atlantic agreement. Furthermore, under such an agreement the joint planning of the defence of North America fell into place as part of a larger whole and would diminish difficulties arising from fears of invasion of Canadian sovereignty by the U.S. It would become easier to advocate a policy of Canadian aloofness if the present state of affairs was maintained. An Atlantic pact would go a long way towards curing our split personality in defence matters by bringing the U.S., the U.K. and Canada into regular partnership.
Kennan said that he was much impressed by this latter argument, which had not occurred to him before, and that he would think it over carefully. He admitted that there was some force in my first argument, but seemed to think that this might be met by measures short of a treaty commitment. He was rather more optimistic than Hickerson about the prospects of getting on with discussions with the Brussels powers, and thought that there was a real possibility that, if the pact idea was maintained, progress might be made after the nominations, by agreement between the candidates.
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1999) — Spring 1999 // Printemps 1999, pp. 41–43. Read the rest of this issue →
