bout de papier, Vol. 9, No. 4 (1992) — Fall 1992 // Automne 1992, pp. 6–7
The inclusion of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney’s name on the official list of candidates to succeed former United Nations Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar during last fall’s Security Council deliberations was not the first time that a Canadian had been formally considered for the position. In 1953 Lester Pearson, then External Affairs minister, was a leading contender to replace the organization’s first Secretary General, Trygve Lie, in a contest eventually won by Dag Hammarskjold.
When Lie declared his intention to resign on 10 November 1952, Pearson was already a respected figure on the international stage. One of the chief architects of NATO, he was also highly regarded at the UN, serving as president of the 1952-53 session of the General Assembly. Pearson had been considered for the secretary generalship when Lie was first appointed in 1946 but was sidelined by the threat of a Soviet veto. The USSR argued that locating UN headquarters in New York disqualified a North American from occupying the organization’s top post.
Speculation about Pearson as a successor to Lie began shortly after the embattled Secretary General, who had run afoul of both the United States and the Soviet Union, announced his resignation. Lie was under attack in the United States because of alleged communist infiltration of the UN secretariat. The Soviets opposed him because of his support for the American-led UN operation to defend South Korea after North Korean forces invaded in 1950. Lie favoured Pearson although sceptics suggested that the Secretary General was hoping that a lack of agreement on a successor would allow him to continue in office.
By the time the minister returned to Ottawa after the General Assembly began its 1952 Christmas recess, according to Mike: the Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. L.B. Pearson, “a ’draft Pearson’ campaign was in full swing.” Pearson was much interested in the post. But, there was also a strong likelihood that he would succeed Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent as Liberal party leader when the latter decided to retire from politics. In late December, Documents on Canadian External Relations show that Pearson drafted a letter to St. Laurent, which he did not send but subsequently discussed with the prime minister, in which he said that, although the prospect of becoming Secretary General seemed remote, if the job were offered “I would not, I think, be able to refuse.”
The Secretary General is appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council. At the time the Council consisted of eleven countries, the five permanent powers: the US, the USSR, the UK, France and China, and six nonpermanent members: Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Greece, Lebanon and Pakistan. Approval of the appointment required the affirmative votes of seven members and the concurrence of the permanent powers.
Pearson, according to Mike was “careful not to become involved in any campaign for the position.” However, he did ask David Johnson, the permanent representative at the UN; Hume Wrong, the ambassador in Washington; and Norman Robertson, the high commissioner in London; to keep him apprised of developments. Britain and France strongly endorsed Pearson’s candidacy. But, it was clear that the positions of the United States and the Soviet Union would be critical in determining the outcome. China likely would follow the American lead.
Washington, which was unhappy about Ottawa’s criticism of its handling of the Korean armistice negotiations, backed General Carlos Romulo, the permanent representative of the Philippines to the UIN, although it would accept Pearson should Romulo be defeated — a likely outcome. The prospect of a favourable Soviet reaction to a western representative during the height of the cold war, on the other hand, seemed remote. But, by early 1953 there were persistent rumours that the USSR might be willing to accept Pearson, although there was no direct confirmation of this from Soviet officials. The rumours gained credibility in early February when David Johnson reported that Georgi N. Zarubin, the Soviet ambassador in Washington, had told his British counterpart, Sir Roger Makins, that the USSR would not veto Pearson if he were nominated.
American officials were sceptical of the information but, British and French officials appeared confident that the Soviets would not oppose Pearson. Pearson himself took the reports seriously enough to raise the issue with St. Laurent again on 6 February, the day after he received Johnson’s message. With other senior ministers planning to leave the government, the prime minister was unhappy at the prospect of Pearson’s departure. St. Laurent reminded Pearson that he would have little opposition should he seek the party leadership when it became available but, he agreed that if the minister were offered the secretary generalship he would have to accept it.
Gladwyn Jebb, the UK’s permanent representative, led the campaign at the UN in support of Pearson’s candidacy. As Jebb saw it, even if the Soviets vetoed Pearson in the first round of Security Council voting, he would emerge as the clear front runner making it highly unlikely that other candidates would be able to obtain the required support. Faced with a choice between Lie and Pearson, the Soviets would approve the latter.
Jebb thought that the likelihood of a Soviet veto would be minimized if Pearson were nominated by Pakistan. The Pakistani government was willing to do so provided that it received assurances that he would not be vetoed by the USSR. When the Soviet delegation would not reveal Moscow’s intentions, Denmark undertook to put Pearson’s name forward.
The Soviets appeared to tip their hand a short time later. The New York Times of 18 February reported that Zarubin had said that the USSR would agree to Pearson’s appointment as a last resort in order to get rid of Lie. But, new confusion was created when the Soviet permanent representative, Andrei Vishinsky, launched a sharp attack on Pearson in the First Committee in early March. Despite Vishinsky’s remarks, the belief that the Soviets would not oppose Pearson had become so strong in Ottawa that the under-secretary of state for External Affairs, Dana Wilgress, himself a former ambassador to the USSR, observed in his papers that “before the end of the month is out Mike (Pearson) will no longer be a member of the Canadian government.”
When the Security Council met to consider the appointment on March 11, three names were put forward: Romulo, who was nominated by the US; Stanislaw Skrzeszewski, the foreign minister of Poland, proposed by the Soviets; and Pearson, offered by Denmark. Having been assured by the American permanent representative, Henry Cabot Lodge, that the United States would not pressure its allies to support Romulo, Jebb sought an immediate vote when the Security Council held its next meeting two days later. The Soviet representative asked for a postponement and threatened to oppose Pearson if pressed for a quick decision but the Council went along with Jebb’s request. Although Pearson received 9 votes, making him by far the leading candidate, he was vetoed by the Soviet Union. Lebanon abstained, reportedly because of Pearson’s role in the partition of Palestine six years earlier. Romulo was supported by five members: the United States, China, Colombia, Greece, Lebanon. The Soviet Union and France voted against. Only the Soviet Union favoured Skrzeszewski; the United States, the United Kingdom and France being opposed.
Jebb’s scenario seemed to unfold as anticipated. Renewed consultations brought other names forward without agreement being reached. With no successor in sight, Lie let it be known that he would be willing to stay on. The Americans indicated their support. The Soviet Union, along with the United Kingdom and France, showed no enthusiasm. The Soviets also made it clear, however, that they would not reconsider their veto of Pearson. The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn state that Jebb, acting on the assumption that “a Scandinavian had, in principle, a better chance than most of being acceptable to all,” then suggested to his French colleague, Henri Hoppenot, the name of Dag Hammarskjold, a little known but highly regarded Swedish diplomat. Hoppenot readily agreed to put his name before an informal meeting of the permanent powers on March 30. With unexpected speed the Security Council approved Hammarskjold the following day. He was confirmed by the General Assembly a week later.
Jebb was criticized in some quarters for having forced the early Security Council vote over the USSR’s objection. It is evident, however, that the optimism about Pearson’s candidacy had been, as the Canadian delegation’s report on the appointment put it, “largely based on the assumption that the Soviet Union, manoeuvred into a position where it would have to choose between Mr. Pearson and Mr. Lie, would have chosen Mr. Pearson.” But, the report observed, the Soviets “were never faced with this choice because by the time the votes were taken it was clear that a number of delegations … were about as anxious as the USSR to see Mr. Lie go.” A more direct indication of Moscow’s thinking was provided shortly after Hammarskjold’s appointment. A Canadian official reported to Pearson that a Soviet member of the UN secretariat, in conversation had “volunteered without being asked that the reason his government had vetoed your nomination … was that despite their regard for your abilities they thought that your intimate association with other international organizations such as NATO made it unlikely that you would be able to see issues in as neutral a light as someone who had not been so involved. Then he laughed and added ’At least Mr. Pearson would have been a big improvement on Mr. Lie!’
Hammarskjold’s appointment indicated that as long as the cold war continued, it was unlikely that a representative of Canada would be a candidate for the secretary generalship. This proved to be the case for a Canadian did not emerge as a prominent contender again until 1991, after the cold war had ended.
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 9, No. 4 (1992) — Fall 1992 // Automne 1992, pp. 6–7. Read the rest of this issue →
