bout de papier, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1992) — Winter 1992 // Hiver 1992, pp. 19–22
The Canadian Foreign Service will not survive as an effective instrument of national interest if current trends persist. After a glance at the past and a shudder for the present, possible solutions for the future are suggested.
The Past
Nostalgia has no particular usefulness in this context. Generations of participants have died and the retired have marginal responsibility. Historians cannot help much.
Since World War II, External Affairs (DEA) has been able, within reason, to promote Canada’s national objectives. It enjoyed an administrative structure which, on the whole, worked. When Canada made an enviable reputation for itself abroad, the Foreign Service was a small group who chose foreign policy as a life-long vocation. They were civil servants, but they had to be different from other civil servants in order to cope with the demands of living in foreign environments and dealing with external factors. Reflecting these unique requirements were a special entrance examination, a separate classification system, an allowance system to meet the needs of life abroad, and the principle of rotationality. However, the most important reward that members of the Foreign Service received was recognition in the form of influence in policy-making.
One of the most essential features of the Foreign Service was the separate public service classifications of its members. This once involved, for its officers, a career path from FSO-1 to FSO-10 which created a distinctive community with identifiable responsibilities and regular periods of domestic and overseas service. The result was a committed group of employees at all levels who were promoted on the basis of a system designed to ensure that individuals, whether at home or abroad, were treated equitably. Ottawa public service authorities recognized that DEA was a square peg and put it into a square hole.
Another characteristic was a departmental emphasis on the ability to use both official languages. This had two main origins. first was that this policy was considered to be an important contribution to national unity. The Foreign Service, as an exposed element of the public service in Canada and especially abroad, was expected to attain as high a level as possible in bilingual capability in French and in English and to support Canada’s French-language culture. The history of DEA reflects efforts to achieve this objective. Some were more, some were less, successful. The objective was usually there, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, when it was not present in equal measure in other parts of the public service. Secondly, the ability to use French was considered essential in most foreign service environments.
The Foreign Service was also noted for its professionalism which produced a good record in the protection of official confidences both in Canada and abroad. The political leadership of varying kinds and qualities was served without public controversy.
A recognized quality was the ability to use relatively modest administrative resources under a flexible system for determining priorities. That system relied to a large degree on ministerial statements and policy papers but was also heavily influenced by the need to adapt to rapid change. Thus the use of personnel and funding featured a reliance on ad hoc arrangements within the established government patterns. A balance was maintained between civil service advice and ministerial direction.
From its initiation until the last ten years, DEA had a sometimes decisive but always significant influence on all aspects of Canada’s foreign policy. The resources available to the Department and the support it received within government and from the Canadian public were sufficient to enable it to perform its duties in Ottawa and overseas.
The Present
Little of this past remains. The public service classification of the elements of the Canadian Foreign Service has greatly changed and now constitutes an uncertain instrument on which to build long-term loyalties. The Foreign Service officer classification now comprises two virtually separate systems: the FS and the EX(FS) categories. The objective was to enable the senior levels to move in and out of the domestic public service and to “open up” the Department of External Affairs to other departments. The result, however, has been to diminish the commitment to the Foreign Service policy process and to make a long-term career progression virtually impossible to achieve or even to imagine. At the same time, the principle of rotationality has been seriously eroded. Although strenuous efforts are made to maintain it, the fact remains that there are few assignments abroad at the FS-1 level. In addition, the promotion system no longer appears to satisfy the merit principle. Career advancement is slow. The division of the service into three (formerly four) separate streams also produced rigidities. It can be argued that a much reduced political/economic stream is the only remaining overall foreign policy instrument, while the development (until recently), social affairs and now probably the trade streams are essentially controlled by other departments.
What has happened in more recent years is that, one by one, the unique features of the Foreign Service have been either deliberately whittled away or allowed to wither. This has been due partly to a misguided effort begun in the Trudeau years to force the Foreign Service into the general civil service mold.
In terms of French language and culture, DEA is following the pattern of other Government departments under which bilingualism is given a priority that can be easily overridden by other perceived program requirements. The recognition of the importance of French as an international language has been diminished. DEA, acting on its own, cannot defend bilingualism. An even more significant change, however, has been the reduced priority of French language and culture in Canadian foreign policy. The national unity objective has not been given emphasis in the public development of foreign policy. Canadian uncertainties regarding national unity deeply affect the foreign policy expression of Canada’s interests, whether we admit it or not. Foreign governments will be paying greater attention to our current domestic problems.
The tradition of loyalty to political leadership is still being maintained. (However, see the conclusion of the Al-Mashat case). During their study of the Trudeau years, Granatstein and Bothwell said that they had tried to determine whether there was any tendency toward undermining his policies within the Department. They were unable to find evidence to this effect. One should read Basil Robinson’s book on Diefenbaker to see the way in which DEA resolutely carries out the decisions of the Canadian political leadership. Some may regard this as a lack of individual integrity, but it is good democratic practice.
On the administrative and resource fronts, DEA has absorbed a long series of draconian cuts. As a result of integration, its current size is much greater than was that of the former External Affairs, but consolidation has not brought notable efficiencies or coordination. The focus and the thrust of Canadian foreign policy have been reduced. The capability of the Department to respond to its overall responsibilities is in question. It is true that, at the present time, DEA is still able to respond to major crises as they arise. However, it is done by drawing from non-crises areas and by neglecting core training and policy work. A comparison could be made to a business in financial danger using desperation measures to juggle its accounts. Furthermore, as a result of pressures from the central agencies (and External never was one and should not have tried to be one) and the swings of the pendulum of centralization and decentralization, administrative requirements have risen. Substantive capacities are reduced. There are statistics available to demonstrate that the cuts which have been made to the overall DEA establishment, when adjusted for the addition of the trade component, have produced real losses in the capability of the Department to develop foreign policy.
The particular difficulty the Department faces at the moment is that it has not been able to shed functional or area responsibilities as resources are reduced, resulting in “the Department which cannot say no”. The negative experience with closing posts abroad for budgetary reasons has meant that some operate with skeleton staff, sometimes below effective levels, but these missions still have to be maintained. The reasons for this inability to adjust priorities lie in a peculiarity of the Canadian political process. If there is virtually any domestic political constituency for almost any special interest, DEA must currently maintain at least, in theory, the capacity to respond. An example might be the decision to join the Organization of American States, while simultaneously reducing the long-term personnel and financial resources required to fulfill the commitment to Latin America. Heavy pressure has developed on existing staff to fulfill objectives far beyond their capacity to achieve.
A further problem exists in terms of priorities. Noble studies have been made of the Department, notably the recent Corporate Review. Enormous effort was put into an analysis of all aspects of the Department’s role which produced exemplary recommendations. Regrettably, these recommendations have floundered for the lack of available resources and for the fact that the Department continues to be cut in precisely the same way as have all other elements of the Public Service. Have additional resources been made available from the centre to enable the Department to prepare for the long-term requirements of Middle East changes?
It can be argued that the Department has become efficient and effective in supporting its Ministers and in enabling the Prime Minister and the Government as a whole to present foreign policy developments in the best possible public light. This is a commendable achievement. Proof of success lies in the fact that foreign policy is not a controversial aspect of the current Canadian governmental reputation. There have been successes in managing domestic media relations, but this is not at all times the same as influencing international foreign policy realities.
At the same time, however, mainly because of the reduction in human and financial resources, the Department’s role in many foreign policy areas has significantly declined. Aid policy, which is now one of our most important element in relations with the expanding Third World, is currently managed and controlled by CIDA. Since DEA cannot produce foreign policy studies, CIDA has begun to contract these out for itself. There are other fields in which this same decline is obvious. These include multilateral relations policy, immigration policy, security and intelligence policy. There is an essential Departmental training program under preparation, but it is hard to believe that other priorities will not prevent it from being implemented as originally planned.
In the international trade field, the Department had, until now, been able to maintain a significant role in bilateral and related trade negotiations because of its clearly established mandate, and considerable authority on international economic issues. Dispersal of authority over international trade policy to regional authorities has concurrently reduced effectiveness at a time of unusual international economic and commercial danger. The void created by the reduction in international trade capability in other federal departments has, to some extent, been filled by the Department. DEA has less influence than it should have on international financial policy whether at the IBRD and the IMF or in other more general contexts. However, even this comparatively positive record has been jeopardized by the Cabinet changes of 21 April, 1991.
The Future
There may be some agreement on the above assessments about the past and the present condition of DEA. There will be less agreement on the prospects for the future described below and on the remedial measures proposed.
The Foreign Service is now structured on terms which may make it impossible to maintain a professional career Foreign Service of the kind required. In the distant past, when individuals were asked if they would consider transfer to some other government department, there was a general tendency to refuse. (If Cadieux could speak!) It is hard to imagine that there would be many officers at any level in the present Department who would resist such offers today. There is a danger now that there will soon not be available the kind of experienced overseas representation at all levels which Canada’s national interest will require. There is even a revived support for the threadbare thesis that the development of modern communications and improved media coverage mean that there is less requirement for experienced foreign policy representation both abroad and in Ottawa. If anything, the latest Middle East crisis reveals that Canada requires its own distinctive representation abroad if it is to avoid being manipulated by other powers or taken for granted. Current classifications and career patterns have to be changed.
A particularly dangerous situation arises in terms of the relationship between French language and culture in Canada and national unity. The requirement for bilingualism in the Foreign Service is greatly increased, not decreased, by the tensions developing within Canada. Representatives abroad are exposed to major public and private pressures as national unity problems increase. Thus, a declining recognition of the importance of French language and culture to national unity is a special danger to the Canadian Foreign Service. The need for French as a second working international language remains, of course, as acute as it always has been. In DEA, there must be a renewed concentration on French language capabilities, notwithstanding cost or domestic uncertainty.
It is still possible to predict that the Canadian Foreign Service will continue to support loyally whichever political party comes to power. However, as professionalism and commitment change, new attitudes could develop that would be less favourable to this tradition. Foreign Service, like military service, continues to have for Canadians distinctive characteristics but, like modern business ethics and medical traditions, they are eroding with time. There is more cynicism in DEA now than is healthy. Thus, in times of reduced resources, those facilities which protect and encourage staff and which foster professional pride should not be neglected by government.
If resources continue to be spread thinner and thinner, minor errors will be made and as time goes by, major errors will be committed. If administrative resources continue to be increased while policy formulation resources are reduced, the effectiveness of DEA will be jeopardized. A bitter controversy arose over cuts to the CBC. A similar debate for DEA is hardly possible given the sensitivities of the foreign policy process. If there were to be a CBC-like public discussion on External cuts, it would feature, in part, issues like the abandonment of many missions abroad, a wholesale reduction in service to the travelling public and to Canadian business interests, and a major decline in immigration and refugee responses. A concentration of Canadian effort in a few regions and subject areas might have to be made. While such a CBC-like debate is unthinkable, we may be dealing with the situation by relying on quiet desperation, willful obfuscation, dignified confusion and enforced inertia.
The difficulty with foreign policy, however, is that careful reviews (including the recent departmental Corporate Review) are outdated the moment they are completed. No one in any country fully anticipated the nature of developments in Eastern Europe. No one anticipated the way the Middle East has changed. No one could have anticipated the way in which our relations with China have developed. No one could have anticipated the way our relations with the USSR have altered. No one planned for the Kurds.
Foreign policy is not susceptible to the kind of orderly management which can be applied (more or less) to other Canadian government situations. DEA should now be making a major effort to train greater numbers of officers in a wide variety of non-traditional languages. If these resources are not made available, we will have to live with the adverse consequences.
The politicization of the Canadian Foreign Service along the lines of that in the USA, in contrast to the British and French patterns let alone Canadian traditions, must be resisted. Minister’s offices have greatly expanded as has domestic political involvement in all aspects of DEA life. Within the Department there is now probably more tendency to tailor foreign policy recommendations to what the government is known or believed to want than there has been in the past. It may now be necessary to insert arbitrarily into policy papers a section for rejected options so as to record alternative or unpalatable views. It is necessary to revive independent thought and relatively fearless recommendations inside the foreign policy process by deliberate measures, if they do not flourish on their own. There is thought of uniting the foreign policy intelligence effort and the policy planning functions. This could reduce the objectivity of intelligence work in a way which has brought danger to other countries.
The influence of DEA within the Canadian Government could decline further. This would be an adverse development given the fact that Canada is ever more dependent on developments in international affairs than almost any other country. We are especially dependent for our economic welfare on international economic conditions. Our geographic and strategic location make foreign policy matters unusually important for Canadian national interests. Unless the resource picture changes, External’s reputation and influence within Ottawa will continue to decrease with increasingly negative results.
Why has this decline occurred? There is envy at the fact that External personnel are required to proceed on foreign assignments and to undertake foreign travel to a much greater extent than any other part of the Government. There is, of course, no alternative but to undertake these assignments in the Foreign Service but they are fundamentally resented by those who would like, or think they would like, to be so required. There is also an assumption that members of the Foreign Service living and working abroad do so in luxury and in a style to which the average Canadian would like to be accustomed. These attitudes are ingrained and cannot be expected to change except, perhaps, by widespread exposure to overseas conditions. There are many who cannot distinguish between Hong Kong as a tourist stopover in the best seasons and Hong Kong as a place of work or home for a family with limited resources on a multi-year assignment. Within central agencies in Ottawa, there is a wide-spread view that “DEA is fat” and that additional responsibilities can be met by redeploying resources. DEA has no allies amongst the current interdepartmental power centers in Ottawa.
To date, these pressures have been absorbed without causing major Canadian domestic political discomfort but, in the future, the assignment of new functions to DEA, without additional resources, will almost certainly produce controversy. It is possible in 1992 to go into the Department at any level and find elements so greatly reduced in person-years and funds that they cannot function adequately. Because of the necessity to protect the confidences of other governments, even if we are not concerned to protect our own, there is little of the foreign policy process to privatize. For the same reason, DEA will not be able to contract out as much of its work as can other departments. If it did so, the government would end up being dependent for national security policy on resources outside its direct control.
Not only are human resources spread too thin, but additional administrative demands are being put on those remaining at the expense of the substantive work. It may be difficult to argue that resources for DEA should be increased at a time when they are being controlled or reduced elsewhere through the public service, but that is no reason to abdicate. Recent debates in the media and the House of Commons, however, have emphasized again and again the importance of continuing diplomacy as an alternative to war. What “continuing diplomacy” means in the Canadian context is that we must maintain and support an efficient, well-managed, well-financed, and professional Foreign Service. A public constituency must be developed.
At the present time, signs are against the maintenance of an effective Foreign Service. It is, of course, for the Government to decide what it wants and how its priorities are to be adjusted when resources are declining and economic conditions are worsening. Nevertheless, perhaps even more in such conditions than in times of prosperity, there is an urgent requirement for effective performance in the bilateral and multilateral foreign policy fields in Canada and abroad. There should be a reassertion of DEA authority in areas in which it appears to be rapidly abandoning to others responsibilities mandated by Parliament. There is also a requirement, within Ottawa and within Canada, to rise above ill-informed envy and unreasoned prejudice.
In sum, the following factors, many of which were highlighted during the Al-Mashat Affair, illustrate the thesis of this paper. There has been a failure of ministers and some senior public servants to respect Canadian traditions of ministerial and public service responsibility; a breakdown in cooperation between political elements in ministerial offices and public service elements in the same offices; a disaffection between the political level and the public service generally in Ottawa; a loss of DEA employees having senior experience in Ottawa and abroad; an inadequacy of channels to ensure interdepartmental coordination at the policy and the operational levels; an excessive crisis pressure for too long on understaffed departmental resources; uneasy relations between External, PCO and PMO; and growing reductions in public service, morale and self-confidence. Unless resolved, these factors do not portend a long or healthy future for the Foreign Service role in Canada.
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1992) — Winter 1992 // Hiver 1992, pp. 19–22. Read the rest of this issue →
