bout de papier, Vol. 8, No. 4 (1991) — Fall 1991 // Automne 1991, p. 5
The lack of an established channel through which dissenting analysis might reach decision-makers has been highlighted repeatedly in the recent past, most strikingly, in the wake of the Gulf crisis. While it is clearly important that the Department, and indeed the government, speak publicly with one voice, it is equally important that that one voice be informed by the best possible selection of fact and argumentation. In a highly structured organizational environment buffeted by a variety of political and administrative influences and imperatives, however, it is inevitably the case that the best recommendation is not always that which goes forward
The Department of External Affairs, not unlike other agencies of government, has at times shown itself unwilling or unable to make difficult decisions, to offer unpleasant advice or to risk the consequences of bearing bad news. Elaborate consultations can result in collectively-held conclusions which, with uncanny uniformity, are framed to calm, soothe and sedate senior readers. As pressure mounts, so too do the pressures to close ranks around an agreed line. Reality, however, remains unruly. The “groupthink” approach is not an appropriate model for excellence in public administration generally, or research and analysis in particular. At the end of the day, neither the civic nor the political interest is well served.
To promote diversity of opinion and to bolster the intellectual integrity of the product, the establishment of a channel for dissenting advice and assessment would be helpful. Too many Departmental products emerge unnecessarily bland, and often blunted as a result of compound editorial scrutiny by levels of management often less familiar with the nuances of the issue than the author: Semantic and substantial precaution-taking well beyond that required for quality control is frequently imposed in favour of formulating an organizationally acceptable line. In all too many instances, provocative, independent, and incisive thought is systematically removed through repeated review. What remains is little more than intellectual pablum which, while easily digested, is readily forgotten.
Independent thought was never done well in bureaucratic settings. Ideas at odds with the prevailing paradigm are rarely warmly received by the custodians of the institutional perspective. Worse still, in international affairs, the “conventional wisdom” which is to say the mainstream view, is frequently wrong. Examples are legion, and contemporary history provides a rich selection: the Shah of Iran, Batista and Marcos faced no long-term threats; Manuel Noriega and Saddam Hussein were worthy of sustained support; the ground war in Vietnam was winnable; a Red “menace” threatened Western interests world-wide.
Specifically Canadian policies have not been without parallel. Can Canada, for example, continue to enjoy its reputation as a generous and humanitarian donor in the Third World as it simultaneously reduces aid disbursements and insists upon the imposition of socially costly structural adjustment programs? Can we reasonably expect to retain an independent voice in foreign affairs as we enter ever more deeply into institutional and economic arrangements which foster political integration with the United States? How has this affected our commitment to multilateralism? Can we credibly promote peace while making war and selling arms? Have these questions been closely examined? If so, what kind of treatment has led to such judgments?
Prevailing wisdom is often incorrect because it is reached by consensus following an extended period of consideration. In an organizational setting, this process necessarily involves compromises and a negotiated inter-relation of forces. At the end of the day, those burdened with responsibility for choosing an acceptable course of action may be offered dated or incorrect advice which reflects influences in addition to those directly related to the subject at hand, including the careers of the principals involved. In most cases, it is preferable to verify and bless past positions than to recommend a departure from familiar paths.
To mitigate such impediments to informed decision-making, it is necessary to institutionalize, if not require, dissenting assessments on major issues. Under such a regime, more pertinent analyses (including possible downside or negative implications) would be freed from systematic subversion. To succeed, the process would have to enjoy a sufficiently high degree of institutional legitimacy that participants could stick out their necks comfortably without having to worry about an effect on their career prospects.
Many of these problems are as old as hierarchy itself, and there exist compelling examples of effective remedial action. In the US State Department, there has long been an officially sanctioned “back channel” into which contrary assessments and prescriptions can be directed. In the Australian Foreign Service, provision exists for the editorial protection of the desk officer’s assessment — supervisors can append comments, but the piece arrives at its destination otherwise intact. In other contexts, dissenting reports are often prepared by members of Parliamentary and Congressional Committees on matters of political interest, and by Supreme Court justices on divergent interpretations of law.
There is every reason that similar arrangements should be put into place in the Department of External Affairs. Once established, assessments which might otherwise be considered, for whatever reason, overly “controversial” or “impolitic”, would reach decision-makers with a minimum of delay. The advice would stand (or fall) on its merits but at least differing views would be on the record. A pilot project could be implemented immediately, perhaps within the geographic branches, with a view to evaluating its suitability for application across the Department and extension to posts abroad.
At a minimum, this Department is capable of producing more than tired homilies, or simply an anodyne salve designed to ease the pain of decision-making. Reforming our analytical and management processes will encourage constructive dialogue and debate, and will expedite the exchange of informed opinion. The active encouragement of interpretive diversity can only benefit the quality of public policy. What are we waiting for?
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 8, No. 4 (1991) — Fall 1991 // Automne 1991, p. 5. Read the rest of this issue →
