bout de papier, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1989), pp. 5–6
I would like to offer two postscripts to the piece on Victor Odlum’s evacuation planning (Vol. 6 No. 4). While it is true that the famous evacuation plan never had to be carried out, Odlum did organize a safari of Embassy locally-engaged staff to create a series of petrol dumps along a prearranged escape route all the way from Ankara in Anatolia to Iskenderun on the borders of Lebanon. A driver who participated in this odyssey described it thus —
The Embassy work party, aboard a caravan of embassy cars and station wagon laden with the 4 gallon gasoline tins, would stop every 25 kilometres or so, excavate a hole under the direction of General Odlum, and proceed to bury a cache of 5 tins. But the hilarious denouement of this heroic plan is that the Embassy cavalcade was being pursued just over the horizon by a ragtag and bob-tail of Turkish peasants in a battered truck, who methodically were digging up the precious gasoline almost as fast as it was buried!
I do not know whether the ambitious project was in fact carried out all the way to the Levant; I do know that there would not have been an ounce of gasoline to sustain Odlum’s carefully planned evacuation scheme, had it been necessary.
Regarding the “emergency food rations” to which the good General referred in his despatches, there, too, there is a postscript. When he finally was persuaded to leave Ankara in the late summer of 1952, one of his last acts was to brief me, as the one who would be in charge until a new Ambassador was appointed, on the details of his emergency planning and to coolly inform me that I owed him $4,000 for the food supplies piled high in the Embassy garage! – a fortune in those days. Still, almost all our food had to be imported anyway, so I reluctantly agreed. Only after the General had gone did we discover that all of the tinned hams were spoiled, most of the biscuits had weevils and the wax wrapper had melted into the cereals, etc. I say “we” because the very understanding American Ambassador. George McGee — a Texas oil millionaire — when he learned of the burden that had been thurst upon me, generously bought half of the emergency stores, sight unseen. We learned together of their sorry state.
Ross Campbell
Editor’s Note: Ross Campbell was Ambassador to NATO and Chairman of Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. He is currently a Partner with InterCon Consultants in Board of bout de papier Ottawa and a member of the Senior Editoria
Dear Editor,
I was intrigued by Ed Whitcomb’s article in the most recent issue of bout de papier, which points out that some of the blame for what he describes as the recent stagnation of the foreign service lies with the group itself, particularly in our reluctance to claim adequate compensation for the extra hours we put in. Actually, the problem is more than contractual — it lies in the very ethos of the foreign service group, which is rooted in Edwardian ideas and is hamstrung by a very narrow definition of the term “professionalism”. Many seem to take the term to mean complete negation of one’s own needs and the needs of one’s family in order to serve the Canadian government.
The FS contract now has provisions for overtime, yet many will not claim it. Why? One reason is simply that of the dynamics of the power relationship between manager and employee, especially at post. The wording of the contract is such that it gives an inordinate amount of discretionary power to the manager, which seems to me to indicate that management does not have any faith in the ability of foreign service officers to use their own professional judgement in determining when extra time needs to be put in, usually for specific functions or crises.
Moreover, one’s ability to advance in the system, despite what personnel people may tell us, is still to a great degree determined by the degree to which one gets on with one’s manager. Advancement in the Foreign Service is based on an antiquated, authoritarian process. Evidence for promotions is based solely on appraisals, which are themselves mostly subjective judgements: the process gives few effective rights to the person being appraised. In this situation, one’s ability to claim overtime is actually (although not officially, of course) dependent on the manager’s attitude toward overtime. If the manager and the employee are at loggerheads over the issue, the loser will be the employee, because a vindictive manager can use the appraisal to get even with the employee, even if the issue over which the two have clashed is not itself mentioned in the appraisal. Given the overblown writing that goes into appraisals in External Affairs, a simple “fully satisfactory” in one or two places, combined with one or two oblique comments, is enough to ensure that promotion will never take place, especially as the promotion process does not allow for an employee to respond in person to whatever allegations have been made in an appraisal.
The answer is a more objective, job-specific promotion process — one which includes an interview with the candidates being considered. This is a hassle, I know — but then again so is most progressive change.
The problem, too, is more far-reaching than even Mr. Whitcomb allows. It is rooted in the blinkered conservatism of the FS group, an attitude which bout, in its own way, continues to foster. For example, doesn’t the title “The One-Man Post” strike you as being sexist? It does me, as do the ongoing references to “Our man in…”. Even the Trade Commissioner Service, which is increasing number of women in officer positions. Some are getting promoted, and some are now heads of post. Would you call Mary Vandenhoff “Our Man in Helsinki”?
In short, the FS group, if it wishes to meet the needs of the 1990s and beyond, needs to change many of its attitudes; this need is also apparent in the approach and editorial policy of bout itself.
Phil Calvert Foreign Service Officer
(on Leave Without Pay) Department of History University of Washington Seattle, Washington
Dear Editor,
It is not only diplomats and public servants who owe a debt to the late John Holmes but also that “unofficial” part of the establishment – the media.
John was unfailingly helpful in advising journalists who would regularly pester him for advice on Canada’s role in the world – on arms control, the United Nations, defence strategy, trade.
He had a soft spot for reporters and was thrilled by the relatively recent expansion of Canadian newspapers’ foreign bureaux and in the widening coverage of international affairs on radio and television.
He knew the importance of a specifically Canadian window on the world and would patiently suggest, in his own characteristically gentle way, what reporters should look for and question.
He believed passionately that the Canadian public did have a thirst for events outside the country and he worked to foster that thirst by often calling media people to offer ideas.
To me, John Wendell Holmes, will always be “Mr. International Affairs, Canada Inc.” He was a witty and good-humoured lunch and dinner companion. In age terms there were four decades between us but he was a man dedicated to the future who did not dwell in the past. He was equally at home among teenage students as among retired ambassadors and other worthies.
Certainly, he was proud of Canada’s diplomatic past, particularly the role the country played in the founding of the United Nations — a role he contributed to. But John was also interested in the future and Canada’s contribution to that.
John was immensely helpful to me when I began researching a six-part series in 1982 for The Globe and Mail on Canada at the U.N. I began the first article with a quote from the venerable Holmes:
“Canada’s role in the United Nations is to accept the world as it is while seeking to change it; to do what can be done rather than abandoning a cause that is less than perfect; creating a world order from the ground up rather than from the heaven down; refusing to let the best be the enemy of good; and working like hell all night in a committee rather than hollering hellfire from the rostrum.”
That quote sums up John’s effective and pragmatic approach to diplomacy.
He will be sadly missed.
Michael H.C. McDowell CBC Washington Bureau
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1989), pp. 5–6. Read the rest of this issue →
