bout de papier, Vol. 6, No. 4 (1989), pp. 24–26
From April 27 to May 12 a delegation of 12 Canadian academics visited Vietnam to examine conditions and prospects with a view to compiling a book on Vietnam in the 1990’s: Canadian Perspectives. They also had talks in Bangkok, Thailand before and after their visit. Two of the academics, Professor David Wurfel and Professor Bruce Burton of the University of Windsor, have written short articles on the impressions they formed about Vietnam. Looking Outward by Professor Burton is the second of a two part series. Impressions of Perestroika, Vietnamese Style by Professor Wurfel appeared in the Fall issue of bout de papier (Vol. 6 No. 3).
All the while that the protracted negotiations over the future of Kampuchea have been taking place in various world venues, Vietnamese party and government officials, journalists and academics have been engaged in ongoing discussion and analysis of their own country’s future position in the international system.
The debate has been and continues to be a wide-ranging one, encompassing strategic, economic, political and even cultural dimensions and involving Vietnam’s relations with all the major global and regional powers. It is a debate that appears to be largely conducted in pragmatic, national interest terms rather than in the language of conventional Marxism-Leninism. During our visit we heard nothing about “the international correlation of forces” or the “fundamental contradictions” in world politics.
This debate is also one in which participants frequently punctuate their remarks with the phrase “after 1990”, taking as beyond question that Hanoi will be withdrawing all its armed forces from Kampuchea by early that year, come what may. Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach was particularly adamant on this point. During the course of a lively hour-long exchange, he repeatedly reaffirmed this commitment, whatever worse-case scenarios we threw at him. He and his officials professed confidence in the ability of the “Heng Samrin armed forces” to cope with the Khmer Rouge after the Vietnamese withdrawal. In Hanoi’s view, the “Pol Pot group” is much weaker than the Afghan Mujahideen and therefore even if attacks on the government continue in a post-withdrawal Kampuchea, the security situation will become “no worse than that currently prevailing within the Philippines.”
The Vietnamese are in fact eager to be rid of the heavy burden of military losses, diplomatic opprobrium and international economic costs consequent upon their prolonged military intervention on behalf of the Heng Samrin regime. As the former Vietnamese ambassador to Canada told us, “For Vietnam, the urgent problem is how to concentrate on our economy”.
Indeed, economic rather than strategic imperatives appear to be currently accorded greater priority in both debate and policy making in Hanoi. It is not that strategic concerns are ignored. Rather, the Vietnamese have come to recognize, as have the members of the United Nations at large, that “national security” embraces much more than military concerns. Undoubtedly, many would argue that for Vietnam continuing economic underdevelopment and backwardness constitute a much greater threat to national security than even the Chinese divisions mustered along the common border or the Chinese naval task force encroaching upon Vietnamese positions in the Spratlys.
It is for these reasons that a great deal of the discussion about what happens “after 1990” is focussed on aspirations in the economic sphere. The expectations clearly are that once the military withdrawal from Kampuchea is complete and some form of coalition government is established in Phnom Penh, normalization of relations with Japan, the ASEAN countries, Western Europe, Canada, Australia, and even the United States will take place. This in turn will be followed by a steady expansion of Vietnam’s foreign trade, a significant increase in assistance from international organizations and of governmental aid from Western countries (at present, only UN agencies such as UNDP, FAO and WHO, along with France and Sweden, have substantial programmes in Vietnam), a flow of investment into Vietnam and the establishment of joint venture projects, growing economic cooperation with ASEAN countries and the steady integration of Vietnam into the mainstream of the capitalist-dominated world economy.
However, Hanoi is certainly not waiting until 1990 before taking initiatives in pursuit of these aspirations. The New Investment Law is now firmly in place, though its effectiveness has yet to be adequately tested. Delegations of Japanese, American and European businessmen are being warmly welcomed. Potential investors from Japan in particular visit in large numbers, and are by now poised at the starting gate and all set to go in 1990, or earlier, once the United States and ASEAN governments give the all clear signal. The Vietnamese have also been successfully promoting trade relations with the ASEAN countries, including such “hardline” members of the anti-Vietnamese coalition on the Kampuchean question as Singapore and Thailand, and Vietnam’s ably led embassy in Bangkok is now one of its largest anywhere.
While there will certainly be increasing emphasis on diversification of Vietnam’s economic relationships, there is no suggestion that the pursuit of this diversification will lead to a Vietnamese exit from the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. The integration of Vietnam within the COMECON framework is already too advanced for any major reversal to take place. Moreover, we were assured that close political, economic and military relations with the Soviet Union are going to remain “a cornerstone” of Vietnamese foreign policy. Soviet economic assistance, with all its drawbacks and deficiencies (and in informal conversations we heard plenty about these!), constitutes the major source of foreign aid, and continuance of the comprehensive military assistance received from Moscow is regarded as crucial in the face of ongoing uncertainty about future Chinese policy towards Vietnam.
From the perspective of Hanoi, it is indeed China that is seen as posing the main longterm problem for Vietnam, and not the United States or ASEAN or even Japan, despite the concern expressed by some officials about that country’s rising military potential. Geographical proximity ensured that in the past Vietnamese language, literature, religion and traditional political and social organization were all heavily influenced by the Chinese model and that until the 1960s the Vietnamese communist movement had closed links with the Chinese Communist Party. Such propinquity, however, also meant that on many occasions before the French colonial era, the Vietnamese rose against Chinese imperial rule or had to defend their political independence from China on the battlefield. (“Sixteen Chinese invasions – and every one defeated!” one Foreign Ministry official exclaimed to us.)
When China invaded Vietnam in 1979, within less than four years of the withdrawal of American military and political power from Indochina, all the old fears and animosities were reinforced, and the recent clashes in the Spratlys have stirred them up once again. Hanoi currently believes that, even “after 1990”, Beijing will do little to moderate its hostile policies unless the Vietnamese accept Chinese hegemony without question. “How to cope with China?” and “How to live in peaceful coexistence with, and yet independent of, such a large, threatening neighbour?” are questions that are likely to preoccupy Vietnamese elites for some time to come. And since Canada is regarded as having had some useful relevant experience, Canadian visitors should not be surprised if asked, as we were: “How do you deal with your big neighbour?”
The interest in Canada extends beyond its possibilities as a role model for handling relations with the local great power. There clearly is the hope that Canada might be willing to play some part in a future international peacekeeping or monitoring force in Kampuchea. We did of course explain why such an idea might not necessarily be greeted with unbridled enthusiasm in Ottawa. However, ours must be one of the few countries whose participation in such a force would be welcomed both in Hanoi and Bangkok. As Foreign Minister Thach put it, “History has brought Canada into the region and history could bring Canada back in.”
Whether or not Canada agrees to become directly involved in the Kampuchean peace process, our discussions with government officials clearly indicated that the regime would welcome a renewal of official Canadian developmental assistance after 1990. At the moment, the Canadian presence is limited to a small handful of Canadian NGOs, such as the Mennonite Central Committee and Fraternité Vietnam, who are offering some modest unofficial developmental and humanitarian assistance. What can be achieved by even a modest outlay of funds is impressively illustrated by the M.C.C. aided drainage and irrigation project at Tan Xuoi in Vinh Phu province. (Any visitor from Canada is assured of a cordial reception from this rural Vietnamese community!)
It is difficult to assess the post-1990 prospects for the development of Canadian trade and investment relationships with Vietnam. Canadian businesses, with one or two notable exceptions such as Petro-Canada, do not yet appear to be following the example of their Japanese, European, Australian, and American counterparts and undertaking exploratory visits to the country. Partly as a consequence of this, even southern Vietnamese entrepreneurs have no clear idea of what Canada has to offer by way of a market for exports and as a source of imports and investment.
There is, however, one segment of Vietnamese society that has clearly identified what it would like to receive from Canada — and other Western countries. Vietnamese scholars are eager for more contact with the West. They would of course ultimately like to be able to visit universities in the West, but their more immediate concern is to have access to recent Western books. Because of Vietnam’s acute foreign exchange shortage, university and research institute libraries in both Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City are unable to purchase such works. The only post-1975 English-language books and journals available in these libraries are those published in Moscow. The availability of French-language material is a little less unsatisfactory only because of exchange agreements with certain academic institutions in France. This situation perpetuates Vietnam’s dependence on the Soviet bloc and hinders diversification of its international and cultural relations. Donations of English or French books to the country’s impoverished academic libraries would contribute in a modest but constructive way to change in Vietnam.
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 6, No. 4 (1989), pp. 24–26. Read the rest of this issue →
