bout de papier, Vol. 4, No. 4 (1986) — Winter 1986 // Hiver 1986, pp. 36–38
by Peter C. Dobell, Canadian Institute
of International Affairs, Toronto, Ont.
I haven’t read all the books written about the period while I was in the Cabinet. But I read this one as a former actor would read the review by a leading critic of his stage appearances years before – with some trepidation. It covers two of the six years while I was SSEA — 1971-1973.
I enjoyed reading it, which implies that I thought Peter Dobell wasn’t too tough on my performance. I commend it, however, not for that reason but because of the thoroughness of the coverage of events and the clarity, grace and objectivity of the writing.
Volume XVII will become the standard that authors of future volumes of the CIA series will strive to attain. Already, I turn to it as a reliable reference work when trying to recollect events of the early 1970’s.
In writing this book, Peter Dobell had the advantage of being at one time an External Affairs official, but, even more important, of being actively associated, since October, 1968, as head of the Parliamentary Centre, with the activities of Parliamentary Committees studying Canadian foreign and trade policy. On every page is evidence of his understanding of the process of policymaking and of his objectivity as an informed, outside observer. Although it is not without flaws, it is a first-rate piece of work, credit for which Dobell shares with staff of the Parliamentary Centre.
Anyone who attempts to write about Canada’s participation in world affairs has to contend with the fact that there are two spokesmen for our foreign policy; the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs. And there were times when Mr. Trudeau and I did not say the same things, although we agreed on the essentials. Canada’s attitude to the Commonwealth was a case in point, to which Dobell draws attention. I went with the Prime Minister to London in 1969 to attend the first Heads of Government Meeting since the general election of 1968. I did not attribute great importance to his meeting in terms of Canadian foreign policy. Quite frankly, I expected the Prime Minister to share my view. But he didn’t. He was much more enthusiastic, principally because it gave him an opportunity to have frank discussions -a form of personal diplomacy – about world affairs with leading Third World figures likes Nyerere of Tanzania, Kaunda of Zambia and Lee of Singapore.
So I differ with the conclusion that Dobell reached when he said “Compared to his light-hearted, sceptical approach to his first meeting of prime ministers in London in 1969, Mr. Trudeau’s subsequent statements and actions, and more particularly the evident commitment of the government to the 1973 Ottawa conference, revealed a major conversion.” Publicly, Mr. Trudeau may have said something that could be considered light-hearted and sceptical about that 1969 meeting. He didn’t convey that attitude to his fellow delegates or to me. Mr. Trudeau’s conversion, if there was one, was well underway in 1969. I remained of the opinion throughout my term as SSEA that the Commonwealth was not central to Canadian policy though it “is an excellent place to have discussions about world problems” particularly North-South relations
This was the only Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting that I attended except, of course, the 1973 meeting in Ottawa. I remarked to Mr. Trudeau at the 1969 London meeting that “one of us is superfluous and I know which one it is”
Dobell deals in some detail with Mr. Trudeau’s influence on Canadian foreign policy and I agree with his conclusion that “no previous Canadian Prime Minister devoted as much personal attention and effort to international questions.” I add only this, that his attention and effort varied from time to time as urgent domestic matters competed with international questions for his consideration.
As to Dobell’s assessment of my performance as Secretary of State for External Affairs, I am sensitive on only one point, namely his reference to the NATO review which resulted in a reduction in the number of Canadian troops in Europe. Dobell says I was overruled in that 1969 decision. This is not so. After all, Canada decided to stay in NATO and with troops in Europe, I was quite reconciled to a major reduction in our European contingent and so was Leo Cadieux, the Minister of National Defence. We were overruled only on the timing of the announcement. We wanted to delay the announcement until we had had an opportunity of informing our allies and explaining that the reduction did not mean any diminution in our support of the Alliance. In view of the European and U.S. reaction to our blunt announcement, and the later evolution of Canada’s attitude towards relations with Europe, it is a pity our advice on timing was not accepted
There were four distinct strands in the efforts made by Canada to strengthen our relations with the European Community during the early 1970’s. First, to affirm to the EC that Canada had interests separate and distinct from those of the United States; second, to promote trade particularly with the Federal Republic of Germany which was expanding so vigorously; third, to try to establish machinery for regular bilateral consultations between Canada and the EC to which Britain adhered in 1973 (resulting eventually in the establishment of the contractual link); and fourth, to improve relations with France, which had been badly damaged during the Presidency of General de Gaulle.
All of this is well described in Dobell’s chapter “Canada looks again to Europe” add one anecdote that confirms the change in the attitude of the French Government. In April 1970, I went to Paris to open the Canadian Cultural Centre attached to our Embassy. Although he was under no obligation to do so, Maurice Schumann, the French Foreign Minister, met me at the airport and hosted a lunch in my honor at the Quai d’Orsay. After lunch, he took me to his office for the ostensible purpose of showing me a pen that had belonged to Talleyrand. He showed me the pen but added that was only an excuse to tell me privately that President Pompidou was determined that France should have better relations with Canada.
At about the same time as we were promoting our interests in the European Community, I published in October 1972, under my name as SSEA, a study on relations between Canada and the United States which became known as the Third Option paper. This study stimulated the effort to diversify trade and thus to reduce our vulnerability to developments in the United States (the application by Secretary Connolly of a tax on imports from Canada in effect ended the special relationship). But as those who have read the study are aware, trade diversification was only one way of achieving that goal. In the future, when I am asked by students and journalists to explain the Third Option, as I have been asked so often in the past, I shall begin by referring them to Chapter 3 of Volume XVII of the CIA series. Not that Dobell gives me or the government high praise for the way in which the paper was published. He doesn’t. Nor because he believes the acceptance of the Third Option had much effect upon government policy. He doesn’t. I commend the chapter as an honest and objective attempt to describe and analyse the contemporary circumstances that led to the development, publication and acceptance by the Government of the Third Option. Whatever view one takes about the appropriateness of the Third policy option,
– and its principles are enjoying a modest revival now that Canadians are facing up to the implications of a free trade agreement with the United States – the paper itself constitutes an “articulate and logical approach to the problem of dealing with the enormously complex bilateral relationship” thanks mainly to Klaus Goldschlag, who was the principal draftsman. The Second Option was integration with the United States, including a free trade agreement. Within the Government there were doubts about the wisdom of adopting the Third Option. Many preferred a pragmatic approach, which is the First Option. It is significant, however, that I cannot recollect there being any support at that time within Cabinet or among the senior civil servants for the Second Option, which is now being pursued as one possible outcome of the current trade negotiations with the United States. Before the period covered by this book, Canada had established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China. This was an example of the Prime Minister and the SSEA each making his appropriate contribution to the formulation of Canadian foreign policy. In the election campaign of 1968, Mr. Trudeau had announced the aim of the government to recognize the People’s Republic of China government as soon as possible and to enable that government to occupy the seat of China in the United Nations, taking into account that there is a separate government in Taiwan, a statement that I had helped to formulate as SSEA.
This was an ambiguous statement since it seemed to imply separate representation at the United Nations, and separate recognition by Canada for the Nationalist government in Taiwan. When the negotiations got underway with the Chinese, it soon became evident to the Department of External Affairs and to me that if we were to exchange diplomats we had to accept the full implications of recognition and abandon any ideas of a two-China policy, or a one China, one Taiwan policy. Cabinet accepted our recommendations and agreement was, in due course, reached for the exchange of Ambassadors.
Dobell describes how recognition led to a change in our attitude towards the replacement of the Nationalist Chinese by a delegation from Beijing in the China seat at the United Nations. In some respects, this was a painful episode for me personally because I had to explain to William Rogers, the U.S. Secretary of State, that Canada no longer considered this an important question, that is, one that required a two-thirds rather than a simple majority, as we had in the past. When he asked me why, I did my best to explain that although the question was still an important one in the normal sense of the phrase, our recognition of the People’s Republic as the government of China required us to support its occupancy of the China seat and thus to vote for a clear and simple resolution and against one that required more than a majority vote of approval. He looked at me sadly and said “Mitchell, I hope I’m not around when you make that explanation.” Our Permanent Representative, Yvon Beaulne, in New York did the job for me.
I liked Rogers, whose term as Secretary of State more or less coincided with mine as SSEA. He performed quietly and well. It is a pity he was so overshadowed by the more dramatic Henry Kissinger, operating from the White House.
Which reminds me of an exchange that has nothing to do with Dobell’s book, but may entertain the readers of bout de papier. At one regular meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Brussels, it happened that I was the first speaker and, as such, had to welcome the foreign ministers who had taken office since last we met. After doing so, I remarked on the rapid rate of turnover of foreign ministers and added that although I did not consider myself a veteran, I was surprised to find that I had been in office longer than any of those in attendance. When it came Roger’s turn to speak, he disputed my seniority. (I had in fact taken office a short time before him.) Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the former British Prime Minister who became Foreign Secretary for the second time, intervened: “Far be it for me to insert myself in this dispute between the Canadian and American foreign secretaries, but: do resurrections count?”
Another minor quibble with Dobell’s book. He describes my talks with the Chinese Foreign Minister when I was in Beijing in August 1972. Surprisingly, he does not mention the three hours I spent with Zhou En Lai, which to me was the highlight of my official visit. The Chinese Premier opened our conversation in French, but quickly reverted to Chinese and the use of an interpreter. At the beginning, we exchanged views on a number of issues and then, seizing upon some remark I made, Zhou launched into a bitter monologue against the Soviet Union lasting a full hour and detailing China’s grievances item by item, year by year.
It was during this conversation that, much to my surprise and the surprise of the officials who, like me, had been reluctant to raise such a mundane matter with the Prime Minister of China, Zhou En Lai referred to the Ming Sung ships, originally delivered to the Nationalist government but still afloat, and offered to pay for them.
When I was in China last year, I had the privilege of an interview with Li Peng, one of the rising political stars in modern China and an “adopted” son of Zhou En Lai. I referred to my interview of 13 years ago and asked the Deputy Prime Minister about the state of relations between China and the Soviet Union today. Improved, he replied, but there will be no return to the situation that prevailed when the Soviet Union and China were allies.
In earlier published books in the CIA series, attention was concentrated – and rightly so — on the activities of the Prime Minister, the SSEA and the Department of External Affairs in world affairs. Volume XVIl is much broader in its coverage. As Dobell points out, “since the 1960’s the number of government departments and agencies actively involved in external relations has grown dramatically.” As SSEA, I was acutely aware of that fact and from time to time of the lack of consistency in Canadian external policy. We tried hard to improve co-ordination, but, as one retired Ambassador is quoted by Dobell as saying: “External Affairs has responsibility without matching authority.”
I do not know the answer to this problem, which continues to grow in complexity. The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs should not, in my view, be burdened with the administrative responsibilities which result from treating External Affairs as a central agency. I felt great sympathy for Ed Ritchie when he had to chair the Interdepartmental Committee on External Relations (ICER) in addition to acting as my principal adviser on policy.
The present government is trying a different approach by the three-pronged structure consisting of the SSEA, the Minister for International Affairs and the Minister for International Trade, which at least brings trade policy formally within the ambit of external policy, although to an outsider the structure appears clumsy and complex. Even so, it leaves outside some of the principal Ministers engaged in external relations, such as the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources.
Those were the years when Canada began to play an increasingly influential role in the international discussions on the Law of the Sea and the pollution of the environment. I cannot add anything significant to the account given by Dobell of these activities. I feel, however, that I made my personal contribution by ensuring that Alan Beesley remained as Legal Adviser of the Department of External Affairs. The Department of Justice did not acquiesce readily in the arrangement whereby External Affairs appointed its own legal advisers, rather than accept advisers from Justice, as was the practice with respect to other departments. Beesley defended his turf with great energy against intrusion from the Department of Justice and threatened, in writing, on more than one occasion, to resign because of what he considered interference. Fortunately, for Canada, I managed to persuade Beesley to stay.
It is seldom that a Canadian SSEA is long enough in office to be at the beginning of an international operation involving Canada and to see it through to completion. this opportunity with respect to Canada’s participation in the second Control Commission in Viet Nam. When the invitation came at the end of 1972 to participate in that Commission, my departmental advisers were unenthusiastic; some were strongly opposed. I myself had described the first Control Commission which was still in existence when the invitation came to join the second, as a “farce”. So we established conditions for our participation and when experience demonstrated that these conditions were not observed we withdrew, having helped in the supervision of the withdrawal of United States forces, which was in itself worth doing.
We had agreed originally to participate for 60 days. As the date for our withdrawal approached, the pressure to postpone our departure was intense, not only from the United States government but from our NATO allies and from Japan: So we agreed to stay for another 60 days. We kept our friends informed of our intentions and just before I was to make a final statement announcing our withdrawal, I received a call from Henry Kissinger in the White House asking me to delay the announcement. I did not accede to his request but did offer to extend our participation in the ICCS for an additional 30 days. When, on May 29, I did finally make the announcement of our withdrawal, there was no international pressure for us to continue. Dobell remarks that the issue died domestically; so it did internationally. Many years later, in a casual conversation with Kissinger, he made comments to the effect that he agreed with our assessment of the ICCS and did not question our decision to withdraw when we did. He was puzzled as to why the Iranians should have agreed to replace us. So was I. When Canada withdrew, our Michel Gauvin, the head of our mission ceased carrying out our open-mouth policy of public reports. Nothing more was heard of the ICCS until its members had to scramble to get out of Saigon before the collapse.
In his preface, Dobell says that Volume XVII is forbiddingly long. It is long – over 400 pages of text plus notes and index. I suppose it could have been shortened by, for example, dropping chapters on Parliament and the role of the provinces in international affairs. Serious students of Canadian foreign policy should be happy that Dobell opted for comprehensiveness, because I can testify as the SSEA at that time, that Parliament and the provinces did, during the years 1971 to 1973, make important contributions to the evolution of Canadian policy: I encouraged Parliament to do so. I didn’t encourage the provinces, but I had to learn how to accommodate their interests in the formulation and execution of our foreign policy.
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 4, No. 4 (1986) — Winter 1986 // Hiver 1986, pp. 36–38. Read the rest of this issue →
