bout de papier, Vol. 4, No. 3 (1986) — Fall 1986 // Automne 1986, pp. 29–30
John Halstead on: Canada and the
Conference on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe, edited by Robert
Spencer, Centre for International
Studies, University of Toronto Press,
1985, 440 pp.
Last year marked the tenth anniversary of the culmination of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) with the signing of the Final Act in Helsinki. The occasion was marked with the publication of a volume entitled Canada and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, authored by nine prominent Canadian academics and edited by Robert Spencer, then Director of the Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto. It is by far the best work on the subject to appear in this country and one of the best anywhere. Based in large part on careful research into departmental files hitherto untouched by scholars and on many interviews with Canadian officials who were personally involved, it offers a dispassionate but by no means detached analysis of both the Helsinki process and Canada’s role in it.
It is too bad that this book has not received more public attention than it has, for the story it tells is essential to a correct appreciation of the evolution of East-West relations in the 1970’s and hence to an understanding of where we are now. It is a story which was largely ignored at the time by the media, at least in North America, which did not wake up to its implications until the U.S. administration decided to unfurl the banner of human rights and the Soviet Union and Eastern European governments cracked down on the dissident groups which the Final Act had spawned.
Even in academic circles it evoked surprisingly little interest and what was written about it was often superficial and simplistic. A popular impression was fostered that the Final Act involved a deal whereby the West gave the East recognition of the post-World War II frontiers in Europe in return for Eastern acceptance of certain human rights commitments, and that it was a bad deal for the West because recognition of the frontiers was a once for all concession of substance, whereas the human rights commitments taken on by the East were so general as to be meaningless and were in any case not honoured
As will be clear from a reading of Canada and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, this impression is a caricature of the facts. The book notes that the Soviet preoccupation at the conference was with security questions and that the main objective of the Soviet Union was to consolidate its hegemony in Eastern Europe, while the emphasis of the West was on translating detente into practical measures for the freer movement of people, goods and ideas, with the aim of trying to open up the closed communist societies. But it also explains that there is nowhere in the Final Act any recognition of frontiers, only recoanition of the principle of “non-violability” of frontiers. In other words, frontiers are not to be changed by force, which is no more than is enshrined in the U.N. Charter. Moreover, the Final Act explicitly acknowledges the principle of “peaceful change”, according to which frontiers can be changed, consistent with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement. This falls far short of the “immutability” of frontiers which the Soviet Union was after. At the same time the book demonstrates that the West was able, by stubborn and skilful negotiation, to extract from the Soviet Union and its allies acceptance of the principle that human rights are a legitimate subject for international debate and negotiation and have a direct bearing on the quality of East-West relations. Apart from the question of observance of specific human rights commitments, this was in itself an enormous concession by the Soviet Union in comparison with its hitherto traditional stand
Canada and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe makes a valuable contribution in at least two other important respects as well. For one thing it makes clear that the problem of managing East-West relations arises not only out of the incompatibility of two contending political and social systems but also out of the difficulty of reaching agreement on clearly defined Western goals. For there are two differing conceptions in contention in the West: one is described in the book as the “messianic” approach (perhaps “ideological” would be better), which argues that East-West confrontation is inevitable unless and until the nature of communist society changes fundamentally; the other is the “pragmatic” approach, which argues that the best way to move from confrontation to cooperation is to promote incremental mutual adjustments by a combination of incentives and reassurances which would convince the communist regimes that they would have more to gain than to lose from cooperation.
Another contribution of this book is to reveal the by no means negligable role played by Canada in the CSCE and the motives behind it. Canadians themselves are generally unaware that their country was among the most active and effective of the participants, took a substantive part in the preparation for the negotiations, helped with the coordination of Western consultations among the nine European Communities and the 15 of NATO, and was more than once instrumental in furnishing ideas to guide the negotiations or to break an impasse. Admittedly the circumstances were unusual in that this was one international forum where the United States chose, up until the signature of the Final Act at least, to strike a low profile. But the Canadian role was also based on solid considerations of enlightened Canadian interests. It was based on a recognition of the indivisibility of Canadian security and European security. It was based on the aspirations of Canadians for a more stable, open and cooperative East-West relationship. And it was based on a wish to strengthen Canada’s independence by fostering a greater diversification of relations outside North America.
For those of us who were directly involved in this operation, a reading of Canada and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is likely to be a rather nostalgic experience. It revives memories of a period of remarkable movement in East-West relations, a time when new paths were being explored and new guidelines laid down, a time of realism but also of hope. We did not ignore the reality of the communist system. Indeed I think we bargained harder and more successfully than in any East-West negotiations before or since. But the hope of establishing a framework in which the seeds of a better East-West relationship could take root and grow was soon dashed, at least in the short run, on the rocks of renewed ideological confrontation.
A lot of polemical water has gone under the detente bridge since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. Indeed some would say that the bridge has all but been swept away by the torrent of mutual recrimination which has come to characterize East-West relations in the intervening years, including the follow-up meetings in Belgrade and Madrid. And yet the institutions established at Helsinki and the Helsinki process have endured, because no one is prepared to turn his back on them. And the search for a more stable, open and cooperative East-West relationship goes on, as it must, in spite of the set-backs and disillusionments of the past, because there is no realistic alternative that offers hope for the future.
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 4, No. 3 (1986) — Fall 1986 // Automne 1986, pp. 29–30. Read the rest of this issue →
