bout de papier, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1986) — Spring/Summer 1986 // Printemps/Été 1986, pp. 18–19
Canada: by Peter St. John
E sach of Canada’s major airports is an international crossroads, daily handling dozens of flights and thousands of passengers from every corner of the globe.
Each is also a potential battleground for disputes half a world away.
This ambiguity does not seem to have penetrated the consciousness of Canadians or the authorities responsible for the safety of Canadian airports.
The year just past was one of greatly escalated international terrorism and hijacking worldwide and it came as a rude surprise to Western governments, which had counted on the phenomenon simply fading away. But 1985, the Year of the Terrorist, instead left us with memories of TWA 847, Air India 182, Egyptair 648 and the December attacks on airports in Rome and Vienna.
What these events made clear was that the first skin of airport security had been decisively broken. This fact emerged from the rash of international hijackings after 1968 which took the West completely unaware and which was only brought under control with President Nixon’s order, in 1973, to make American airports safe. The result was the now-familiar segregated passenger areas, security guards and x-ray machines, which were implemented first in North American, then in Western European airports.
For more than a decade, these measures worked well as a deterrent. But the time has now come for a new and stronger second skin of airport security to deter a much more experienced and determined generation of terrorist. The members of this new generation are able to evaluate the security at individual airports. They are also familiar with the internal workings of commercial jets. And most frighteningly, in many cases today’s terrorist does not care whether he lives or dies in carrying out his mission. This is particularly true of Islamic Fundamentalists.
The second skin of airport security must therefore mount a much more determined and far more sophisticated system of deterrence.
For the first time since the onset of this modern era of transnational and network terrorism, Canada has become a victim and a target both at home and abroad. Yet Canadian politicians and government officials have steadfastly refused to take seriously the possibility of terrorist attacks on Canadian airports and commercial aircraft. Airport security is outdated, technology is inadequate and often not in working order and security personnel are jaded and poorly trained.
In short, Canadian airports are an open provocation to international terrorists. Nevertheless, with Americans, we continue to share a fond delusion that no one will attack us in our safe North American homeland.
U. nfortunately, the reality is quite different. On June 23, 1985, the disintegration of Air India 182, 110 nautical miles off the coast of Ireland, brought Canada fully and inextricably into the vortex of air terrorism. Everyone aboard that flight, 369 Canadians, mainly of East Indian descent, were killed by the explosion of a terrorist bomb, which had been planted in Canada. The day might have ended with a double devastation, had not a CP Air flight arrived at Tokyo’s Narita Airport ahead of schedule, thus saving the lives of those aboard. As it was, three Japanese baggage handlers died when a suitcase, unloaded from the CP flight, exploded. Canadians, and others, died as a result of terrorist action in Canada. Lax security at Canadian airports allowed both explosions to take place. Both tragedies could have been avoided with proper security attitudes and properly-functioning sniffer technology.
On November 24, 1985, hijackers seized an Egyptair Boeing 737 and forced it to land at Valletta, Malta. After some hours, Egyptian troops stormed the plane, killing 58 people in an abortive rescue attempt. Among those who died was a young Canadian mother, Valinda Leonard, and her infant son. Canada’s reaction was one of horror and sympathy at what seemed to be an incident of random fate. But there are indications the deaths of the Leonards were no accident. In the hours before the army assault, many women of other nationalities were freed, but the lone Canadian, along with Americans and Jews, were singled out to remain on board. This is a clear indication that being Canadian will not, in future, be enough to exempt us from terrorist activities.
On December 27, 1985, near-simultaneous attacks on airports in Rome and Vienna in the area of the ticket counters claimed the lives of 19 people, including five Americans, and wounded 120 others, demonstrating the arbitrary nature of terrorist violence. The attacks also proved the flying public is not safe from terrorist action anywhere within the perimeter of an airport.
There have been other warning signals. In September and November, European intelligence sources twice warned that 400 Islamic Fundamentalists intended to board Western planes and blow them up with dynamite hidden in carry-on briefcases. The only defence against such a threat is to greatly increase airport security measures and this is precisely what European authorities were forced to do, in considerable haste and at even greater expense. At London’s Heathrow, armoured cars and troops were called in to secure the airport. Nearly three-quarters of the world’s air traffic passes through or originates from North Canadian authorities decided to ignore the threats. This, despite the fact that America. It wasn’t until mid-January, when Canada’s airports were targetted with a threat that a Libyan bomb had been placed on board Canadian planes bound for the United States, that the government reacted. Its response was termed a full security alert at Canada’s international airports. In reality, however, it was considerably less than that. Only four of the nation s international airports were put on any sort of alert at all, while a number of others, including Winnipeg, Calgary and Edmonton, were ignored
These hastily-enacted measures reportedly cost Canadians $1 million. And though the threat was ultimately determined to be a hoax, security even during the height of the alert was so ineffectual, it’s doubtful it would have acted as a deterrent had the crisis occurred. Indicative of the loopholes in the system was the January 18 domestic hostagetaking incident at Winnipeg International Airport, which coincided with the emergency measures. Battling for custody of a child, a man parked his van, loaded with an arsenal of weapons, in front of the terminal building. Police finally arrived on the scene more than an hour later and had he been a serious terrorist, rather than a distraught father, they probably would have been just in time to mop up the blood
No one is more concerned about the lamentable state of airport security than those most closely involved, the pilots and flight attendants of Canadian airlines, many of whom have survived the more than 20 hijacking incidents which have taken place in Canada. Through their national associations, both groups have been consistently calling for sterner measures at all Canadian airports.
Despite all these warnings, Canadians continue to act like the proverbial ostrich, whittling away the precious lead time they now have in which to develop the desperately important second skin of airport security.
Such a skin would involve physical, technological and human changes in airports and would be costly. But not as costly as the alternatives. The original measures in 1973 only added a few cents to the cost of each air ticket and gave valuable protection for many years. The cost of the measures now warranted ought also to be weighed against the pricelessness of human lives, the enormous value of facilities and resources to be protected and the wasteful alternative measures to which Canada is forced to resort when she responds in haste.
Whether we like it or not, the airport has become a symbolic stage for both domestic protest and international grievances. The ultimate question is whether the government of Canada will plan carefully now for a clearly-perceived present and future threat or will it continue to respond in a disorganized, ineffective and costly manner – the traditional Canadian reactive response – to crises as they arise
The decision may well determine whether Canada’s airports will continue to be peaceful international crossroads or battlefields for disputes half a world away.
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1986) — Spring/Summer 1986 // Printemps/Été 1986, pp. 18–19. Read the rest of this issue →
