bout de papier, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2014) — Spring 2014 // Printemps 2014, pp. 14–16

Note de la rédaction : bout de papier se penche sur la diplomatie d‘entreprise, sa base comme son tableau d’ensemble. À l’échelle micro, dans le prochain numéro, Joya Donnelly profile trois entrepreneurs membres de la collectivité du service extérieur qui sont passionnés et résolus à concrétiser sur le plan commercial une idée brillante — ils font exploser l’image du bureaucrate barbant. À l’échelle macro, Louis Delvoie ci-dessous dissèque le document clé du gouvernement sur la politique étrangère en vue de redéfinir le ministère des Affaires étrangères, son « Plan d’action sur les marchés globaux ». Il y constate plus de morgue intéressée que de substance et soulève des questions troublantes.

Le document donne à entendre que nos diplomates polyvalents seraient mal placés, sinon non productifs, dans la défense et la promotion des intérêts économiques du Canada. Et pourtant, c’est sensiblement au même cadre que l’on doit trois des plus grandes réalisations de la fin du XX° siècle, soit l’Accord sur les pluies acides avec les É.-U. (et les énormes incidences économiques qu’il aurait eues si l’on n’avait jamais réglé les dommages afférents en matière d’environnement), l’ALE et l’ALENA, ainsi que d’innombrables autres contributions à notre bien-être économique. Delvoie estime que le problème est ailleurs, que la politique étrangère du Canada à l’heure actuelle est plus calculée de manière à aliéner des partenaires étrangers qu’à les convaincre. Il fait valoir que l’abandon de la diplomatie publique a grandement nui au Canada. Pour Delvoie, le Plan d’action réduit dangereusement l’accent de la diplomatie canadienne et réaménage ce qui a déjà été fait, qu’il est une façade, peut-être, pour dissimuler et rationaliser l’évidement constant de la capacité internationale du Canada en général. Il semble dire : « Show me the (new)

In a phrase that has lasted over 200 years, the Emperor Napoleon once derisively dismissed Great Britain as “a nation of shopkeepers”. He could not have been more wrong. Marshalling all of the resources at its disposal, Britain became Napoleon’s most formidable adversary, and its naval and military might sealed his fate. And, of course, the Emperor died as a prisoner of the British on the island of St. Helena.

Napoleon’s phrase sprang to mind on reading the Harper government’s latest foreign policy statement. The document was published on November 23, 2013 and is entitled the “Global Market Action Plan’’. It is both a rather conventional piece of work and a rather curious one.

There is nothing new in the idea that the government will continue to improve Canada’s access to certain markets through the negotiation of free trade and investment protection agreements. These are standard trade policy objectives and have been for years. Similarly the notion that the government will concentrate its trade promotion activities in select countries which offer the best prospects for the sale of goods and services is not original. Focussing on key markets and on product lines in which Canada has recognized strengths has been the hallmark of Canadian trade promotion activities for decades. Moreover, the idea that Canadian diplomats will play an important role in the advancement of Canadian trade objectives has been around for a very long time. (When the author was ambassador to Algeria over 30 years ago, he spent 40 per cent of his time on trade files. What is more he did so enthusiastically and with gratifying results.) Far more to the point is whether the government will allocate the financial and human resources necessary to convert its words into action. The document strikes two rather curious notes, one more disconcerting than the other. For a government statement it is unusually self-congratulatory in tone. It vaunts the wisdom of the Harper government’s economic policies and suggests that these account for the fact that Canada is doing so much better than other G-7 countries. The statement is also larded with quotations from a variety of leaders of Canadian business associations and lobby groups. These all praise the government and “applaud” its initiatives. There is an unpalatable element of hubris in this.

Of greater import is what the document has to say about the conduct of foreign policy. It states in part that the Action Plan “will entrench the concept of ‘economic diplomacy’ as the driving force behind the Government of Canada’s activities through its international diplomatic network…

Under the plan, all diplomatic assets of the Government of Canada will be marshalled on behalf of the private sector.” In his introduction to the document, the Minister of International Trade, Ed Fast, states that “This new focus represents a sea change in the way Canada’s diplomatic assets are deployed around the world.”

Now trade policy and trade promotion have always been important components of Canadian foreign policy, and they always should be. After all, the prosperity and well-being of Canada and Canadians are highly dependent on the successful implementation of this policy. What is less evident is the desirability of the “sea change” being proposed for the conduct of that policy. Taken in conjunction with other initiatives launched by the Harper government, it represents a singular narrowing of the focus of Canadian foreign policy and a departure from policies and practices which have served Canada so well for so long.

Canada has been blessed over the years with a long line of distinguished foreign ministers. The list includes Louis St. Laurent, Lester Pearson, Paul Martin Sr., Mitchell Sharp, Allan MacEachen and Joe Clark. These were all men who had a real understanding of Canada, of its interests, of its values and of its place in the world. They also understood the realities and complexities of the international system. They knew that to be successful in the world Canada needed to engage with a wide variety of entities in a wide variety of enterprises. Some of these enterprises might be purely self-interested while others might be somewhat more altruistic. They were, however, complementary in ensuring Canada’s place on the international scene and thus consolidating its ability to pursue its core interests.

This outward-looking approach to foreign policy and to foreign economic policy was summarized in a few words by Louis St. Laurent in his Gray lecture at the University of Toronto in 1947. He said: “Our geography, our climate, our natural resources have so conditioned our economy that the continued prosperity and wellbeing of our own people can best be served by the prosperity and well-being of the whole world. We have thus, a useful part to play in world affairs, useful to ourselves through being useful to others.” It was this combination of self-interest and generosity which inspired Canada’s constructive role in the creation of the United Nations, of the Food and Agriculture Organization, of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, of the modern multiracial Commonwealth, of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and of the Colombo Plan, all within five years of the end of the Second World War. These and a host of other institutions have served Canada well over the last 60 years and have been valued by successive Canadian governments whether Liberal or Conservative.

Those same governments made a point of engaging positively with as many foreign countries as possible. This involved not only establishing diplomatic relations with governments, but also fostering people to people contacts in a variety of spheres. Academic exchanges and the promotion of Canadian studies in foreign universities helped to cement relationships between scholars and students. Tours by symphony orchestras and theatre troupes helped to enrich relationships in the cultural sphere. The founding of Canadian cultural centres in major cities such as New York, London and Paris carried this work forward. All of these activities served to raise the Canadian profile abroad and to project a positive image of Canada among political and economic decision makers in other countries.

Unfortunately all of these tried and tested policies and programmes have been turned on their head by the Harper government. The Prime Minister himself has chosen to snub the United Nations and to boycott the Commonwealth. He has also seen fit to unburden himself of sanctimonious lectures to European leaders on the shortcomings of their economic policies. He gave China the cold shoulder for three years before finally being convinced by Canada’s business community that China was an important trade and investment partner for Canada. He and his foreign minister John Baird have alienated numerous Arab and Muslim countries by proclaiming their unquestioning and uncritical support for anything and everything done by the current Israeli government. Most recently Baird managed to alienate some of Canada’s closest friends and allies (the United States, Great Britain and France) with his comments about the agreement which they had concluded with Iran over its nuclear programme. So much for the fine art of making friends and influencing people — is it any wonder that Jeffrey Simpson of the Globe and Mail entitled one of his columns on the Harper government’s foreign policy “Truculent moralizing for a domestic audience”?

The Harper government has also seriously diminished Canada’s ability to conduct a robust foreign policy. A long series of budgetary cuts inflicted on the Department of Foreign Affairs have resulted in a decrease in Canada’s diplomatic presence abroad and in the virtual gutting of its programmes for public and cultural diplomacy. Cuts to the budget of the Department of National Defence will have the effect of diminishing the capabilities of the Canadian Forces as an instrument of Canadian foreign policy. The Harper government has already reduced Canada’s contribution to NATO, and Canada’s proud record as a major contributor to UN peacekeeping operations is now but a fond memory.

The elimination of the Canadian International Development Agency is hardly likely to enhance Canada’s reputation and profile among aid donors and aid recipients alike. Nor will the statement in the Global Markets Action Plan that the government intends to “leverage development programming to advance Canada’s trade interests”. And, of course, at a more symbolic level the Harper government has reduced Canada’s presence abroad by selling off some of its more prized diplomatic assets: Macdonald House on Grosvenor Square in London was sold to an Indian real estate developer.

Under the Harper government the focus of Canadian foreign policy has been seriously narrowed. Many of the country’s international relationships have been compromised as a result of foolish postures and statements. And the instruments for the conduct of foreign policy have been seriously weakened. None of this bodes well for the defence and promotion of Canada’s interests in an ever more competitive world. Napoleon was wrong on Britain, but was he prescient on Canada? Are we destined to become “a nation of shopkeepers”?

Louis A. Delvoie is a retired Foreign Service officer and Fellow at the Centre for International and Defence Policy at Queen’s University, Kingston. A graduate of Loyola College, the University of Toronto, McGill University and the National Defence College of Canada, he served as Ambassador to Algeria, Deputy High Commissioner to the U.K. and High Commissioner to Pakistan. He was also DG for International Security and Arms Control at DFAIT and ADM (Policy) with DND. After retiring he became Adjunct Professor at Queen’s University and RMC. He has authored many op-eds for the Kingston Whig-Standard on foreign policy and defence issues.

Note: An earlier version of this op-ed appeared in the Kingston Whig-Standard and was adapted for bout de papier.

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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2014) — Spring 2014 // Printemps 2014, pp. 14–16. Read the rest of this issue →

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