bout de papier, Vol. 25, No. 1 (2010) — Spring 2010 // Printemps 2010, pp. 15–20
Readers of bout de papier will recall that we earlier reprinted messages from John Starnes, when he was Canada’s Ambassador in Cairo, about the outbreak of the “Six Day War” in June 1967. Eric Bergbusch, who recounted his travels to the Middle East with John Diefenbaker in an earlier issue, has kindly provided a copy of his attempt to analyze the origins of that conflict in light of the troubled history of relations between Israel and its neighbours, particularly focussing on the two decades prior to the war, and to draw tentative lessons from that analysis. His memorandum and its annex are reprinted below (with a few editorial insertions in square brackets to provide identifications or brief explanations of terms or individuals for modern readers).
As readers will know, the concern expressed at the conclusion of the memorandum was justified by events, as another Arab/Israeli conflict (the “Yom Kippur War”) took place in October 1973.
CONFIDENTIAL, June 6, 1969.
TO: File 20-Arab-1-3-Isre
FROM: African and Middle }
E.J. Bergbusch
SUBJECT: The Origins of the Ar
June, 1967.
The J{oint]I[ntelligence]C[ommittee] paper on the Middle East prepared in 1965-66 did not estimate that an Arab/ Israeli war was likely in the years immediately ahead. The general tenor of the paper was that things were likely to continue more or less as they were, with intermittent clashes along Israel’s borders but no large-scale hostilities. Many of the dangers in the situation were correctly identified, but what was not foreseen when the paper was drafted was the manner in which various factors making for instability and conflict were to interact in 1967. Nor was sufficient importance attached to El Fatah and the persistence of terrorist attacks on Israel, although El Fatah was identified as posing the “greatest single threat” to peace in the region. (This was, of course, well before the Israeli raid on Samu in November, 1966.) What was also missing from the paper was any suggestion that Nasser might, in certain circumstances, take bold and decisive action, and risk the consequences. The importance of these factors becomes clearer if one examines the genesis of the 1967 war against the pattern of Arab/Israeli relations during the two previous decades.
It has often been asserted that the Arab-Israeli 2 @ dispute is at base a clash of cultures: that Israel, however civilized and humane, is an alien intrusion into the area, based on exclusiveness, and contemptuous of its neighbours; that the Arab states, obsessed with their backwardness and past humiliations, are fearful of Israel’s (European) competence, expertise and modernity, qualities which challenge their abilities and the worth of their culture. Little has been done, however, to show how this “clash of cultures” impinges on Arab/Israeli relations. Perhaps some connections between the two may be found in the origins of the 1967 war.
For descriptive purposes the course of Arab/Israeli 3 @relations prior to the June war may be divided into four phases, the first from 1949 to 1953, the second from 1953 to 1957, the third from 1957 to 1964, and the last from 1964 to 1967. The first phase — from the signing of the Armistice Agreements to President [Gamal Abdel] Nasser’s assumption of office following the revolution in Egypt — was comparatively calm, as Israel and the Arab states adjusted to the Armistice regime and explored its implications.
After 1953, things changed. The dynamic element ê. e President Nasser introduced into the government of
Egypt also found expression outside the country, notably in the organization of fedayeen attacks on Israel. From 1955 to 1956/7, conditions of life in southern Israel became less secure as the fedayeen raiders pursued their attacks, some of them penetrating to the outskirts of Tel Aviv — Jaffa. Tension gradually mounted as Israel organized intermittent reprisal raids. Infiltration, clashes, and reprisal raids also increased along the Jordan and Syrian borders. The Israeli government finally decided to put an end to this harassment by launching its invasion of the Sinai in 1956. One of the obvious aims of this attack was to bring about the downfall of Nasser, whom the Israelis saw both as the author of their immediate troubles and as a major obstacle to an Arab/Israeli settlement. In the event, Nasser was not turned out of office but augmented his prestige and raised his standing in the Arab world (because of his diplomatic victory over Britain, France and Israel).
5 Three important factors in Arab/Israeli relations were
@ demonstrated in the course of these events:
A. Israel’s extreme sensitivity (within its narrow
borders) to fedayeen attacks which disrupt and endanger normal civilian life. The domestic pressure on this issue reflected its central importance
for the economic and political viability of the state. B. Israel’s deep fear of Nasser as the one figure in the
Arab world capable of uniting the neighbouring
states against Israel, and of taking decisive action. C. Nasser’s impulsive character and sensitivityto Arab
criticism. Nasser showed in connection with the organization of the fedayeen raids, the Aswan/Suez Canal issue, and the purchase of arms from the Soviet Bloc that, in certain circumstances, he was prepared to take bold action without much regard for the consequences — that he would not brook
affronts and real or perceived humiliations.
The third phase in Arab/Israeli relations, from 1957 8 @to 1964, saw the nearest approach to a stable equilibrium between Israel and the Arab states. During the earlier part of this period, Nasser was deeply involved in inter- Arab affairs and Arab/Israeli difficulties were relegated to second place. By the early sixties, though border clashes occurred periodically (quite as much from Israeli expansion and provocation in the Demilitarized Zones and in No-Man’s land as from Arab aggression), a relative calm prevailed and it appeared that a secure modus vivendi might have been found between Israel and the Arab states — especially following the break-up of the Egyptian/Syrian Union [Egypt and Syria formed the United Arab Republic in 1958, with Nasser as President; Syria withdrew from the union in 1961, but Egypt continued to identify itself as the UAR until 1971] in 1961. Border incidents were pretty well confined to exchanges of fire in the Demilitarized Zones; the UAR-Israeli border was totally quiescent. Terrorist attacks had virtually died away after the Sinai Campaign in 1956. It seemed possible that if this state of comparative tranquillity could endure, an amelioration of the fundamental hostility between the two sides might gradually take place.
What disturbed this balance? What turned Nasser’s
@attention from the Yemen and other inter-Arab issues back to Israel? If one can identify one trigger, one single cause, that led to the subsequent deterioration, it would seem to be the Jordan Waters issue, and specifically Israel’s decision to divert the un-used waters of the Jordan for industrial uses and irrigation.
For the Israelis, nothing could have seemed more 8 @natural and reasonable. The water was not being used.
It was needed for Israel’s development. The depletion of fresh, underground sources was already limiting Israel’s economic growth and inducing dangerous saline inflows. Israel had co-operated with Eric Johnston’s efforts [as President Dwight Eisenhower’s Special Representative, 1953-6] to work out a joint or agreed development plan [the Jordan Valley Unified Water Plan, which was rejected by the Arab League, contrary to the advice of its experts, though Israel and Jordan agreed to abide by its allocations for usage]. It had moved the point of in-take from the River Jordan to Lake Tiberius at some cost to itself. What more could be expected of it? (For further comments on Israel’s motivation, see the Annex.)
For the Arabs who had refused to agree to a shared 9 @ development scheme and had no plans afoot to utilize the Jordan waters, the Israeli project was, however, a public affront, a challenge to the principle that the natural resources of the Arab World should not be exploited except, with the consent, and for the benefit, of Arabs. The Israeli action reminded them of their comparative backwardness and of their long subjection to foreign rule. It challenged their common myth that Israel was neither a legitimate creation nor a permanent fixture in the region. The issue would have attracted less attention if only one Arab state had been involved or if the Palestine refugees in their host countries had not directed attention to it. The UAR itself had no direct stake in the outcome. Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, however, were directly involved [as riparian states]. Because they were themselves divided by mutual distrust, the dispute over the Jordan waters inevitably became an issue in inter-Arab politics.
Israel’s diversion of the Jordan Waters together 10 @with the hostile Arab reaction may thus be seen as the start of a train of events that led to the hostilities in 1967 during the fourth phase of Arab/Israeli relations, from 1964 to 1967. To maintain his position of leadership in the Arab World and to contain Syrian militancy on this issue, Nasser convened an Arab Summit Conference in January, 1964. A competition had developed among Arab governments, and particularly between Syria and the UAR, as to which would win the highest plaudits of the Arab community by opposing the Israeli project most staunchly. The inauguration of the diversion project was imminent (water began to flow through the pipes to the coastal plain in May, 1964). Nasser was determined, for inter-Arab reasons, not to be left behind.
The Summit Conference realistically decided that] l @the Arab States were in no position to mount a military response and that they would not be in such a position for some years to come; 1967 was cited as the magic date. The Conference therefore decided on a political riposte: an Arab project to deprive Israel of the Jordan waters by diverting them at source; a joint fund to pay for the project; the creation of a “United Arab Command” to protect it; and a revival of the moribund Palestine Liberation Organization (or PLO). More ominously, the Syrians pressed for “direct action” and the UAR responded by sponsoring a “Palestine Liberation Army” (PLA) under the aegis of the PLO (which it largely controlled). During 1964/65, the PLA mounted a number of clumsy and ineffective raids on Israel from Jordan where it was based. It never became an important threat.
] A rival organization soon emerged. It was @based in Syria, operated through Jordan and Lebanon, and proved more dangerous — El Fatah. The formation of El Fatah seemed to reflect two forces: Syrian determination not to be outdone by Nasser and the — justified — scepticism of extremist Palestinians of the effectiveness of a PLA which remained under the aegis of the UAR. After a brief lapse of time, El Fatah’s exploits completely overshadowed those of its rival. The PLA virtually disappeared from the scene. Meanwhile, El Fatah had a fair degree of success; from 1965 onwards, its terrorist raids unsettled civilian life in Israel and called forth Israeli reprisals.
By these actions, Syria and the UAR had taken l 3 @steps which, under the pressure of Arab dissension and rivalry, were to bring them to war with Israel. The Summit Conference system soon ran into difficulties — no further meetings were held after 1965 — and the “co-ordinated Arab response” to the inauguration of the Israeli water project degenerated into what was even more dangerous, uncontrolled competition among the Arab states neighbouring Israel.
14 From 1964, through 1965/1966, and into 1967, a ta escalation of violence took place. Israel contributed to it by its increasingly harsh acts of retaliation. Although the Arab diversion scheme would have taken years to complete, the Israeli authorities were determined that it should not make any headway; behind that determination lay the conviction that any joint Arab action against Israel under Nasser’s leadership posed a threat to its security and had to be stopped before it gathered too much momentum. The Israelis did not raise the issue in the Security Council; instead, they hit the Arab project repeatedly with artillery fire and by air to bring it to a standstill. The use of air power in 1964 and subsequently was an act of escalation; counter-escalation, if one takes the Arab project and Arab terrorist attacks into account; or counter-counter-escalation if one starts with the Israeli diversion project.
l Although the Jordanian and Lebanese govern- @ments, under pressure from Israel, took steps to control and limit the activities and operations of El Fatah on their territories, Israel deemed these efforts to be insufficient and mounted a series of raids — mainly into Jordan but also into Lebanon — in order to induce the ‘host countries’ to take stronger measures against El Fatah. Israel did not strike against Syria although Syria provided the main inspiration, training and material support for El Fatah. By 1966, that organization appeared to have a fairly extensive network in Jordan and Lebanon by which it could mount terrorist — mainly mining — attacks against Israel. These continued fairly steadily. While they caused little loss of life or damage to property in Israel, they did create a sense of insecurity in border areas.
l A key point, at this stage, was that the UAR, still @deeply embroiled in Yemen (and protected by U[nited]N[ations]E[mergency]F[orce] in the Sinai), took no part in the exchanges in 1965 and 1966. At the same time, it gratuitously attacked Jordan and Lebanon, through its propaganda organs, for opposing and hindering the activities of El Fatah: it sought to justify its isolation from these events by violent words. Consequently, having helped to create the momentum which led to extensive Arab/ Israeli clashes in 1964-66, the UAR now had no easy way to keep them in bounds. Neither, for that matter, did Israel: its leadership saw no ready way to secure a de-escalation of violence. Their reaction was to hit ever harder at Jordan in the vain hope that this would lead to suppression of the Syrian-based fedayeen operating within the Palestinian community on the West Bank. By 1966, the Israeli counter-raids into Jordan — aimed at El Fatah — had demonstrated to Arab and particularly to Palestinian activists and extremists that terrorism was effective. By contrast, nothing could, in their view, be expected from Arab governments, with the possible exception of Syria.
The large-scale Israeli action against Samu
17. Jordanian-controlled village on the West Bank]
in November, 1966, transformed the situation. For the first time in years, Arab (Jordanian) armed forces were engaged in large numbers by Israeli forces and suffered considerable casualties [this raid was the largest Israeli military operation since the Suez Crisis of 1956]. The prestige of the Jordanian army was affected; El Fatah’s case was strengthened. King Hussein [bin Talal] could not, for the time being, press El Fatah unduly. To answer UAR gibes about the ineffectiveness of the Jordanian forces and about the repressive measures Jordan had taken against El Fatah, Jordan and then Syria asked the fateful question: where was the UAR air force during the Israeli attack? Why did the UAR not assist? Was Nasser content to hide behind UNEF? Jordan and Syria gave the lie to Nasser’s (the UAR’s) claim to lead the Arab world, a claim to which Nasser attached the first importance for domestic and pan-Arab reasons. Henceforth, the Arab/Israeli dispute was subsumed in an inter-Arab quarrel.
From 1966 onwards, Nasser’s standing in the Arab l 8 @ World was thrown into question. It must have been shortly after the raid on Samu that the UAR began to examine what steps it could take to counter the threat of another punitive Israeli military action against Jordan or into Syria. Whether the results of that examination were shaped by false optimism as to Arab military capacity or a conviction that Israel would not fight — and would accept some sort of diplomatic set-back — is unknown. What seems plausible is that Nasser was toying with the idea of a new gamble (after those of 1955/56) which, if successful, would restore his standing in the Arab World.
l Another consequence of the Samu raid, to which @ no great weight was given at the time, was that the UAR entered into a new defensive alliance with Syria (in November, 1966). Such ad hoc alliances had been made before and had not lasted long. This one seemed to have only a marginal effect on Syrian-UAR relations. It might, however, have been seen as a danger-sign that Nasser felt it necessary to take this step.
2 What followed early in 1967 seemed to have a @ fortuitous quality about it at the time, though the rising tension during those months was evident to all. In January, the U[nited]N[ations]T[ruce]S[upervision] O[rganization] Chief of Staff reported to the Secretary- General that there was a heavy build-up of military equipment on both sides of the line between Israel and Syria. As this was related to Israel’s cultivation within the Demilitarized Zone and resulting exchanges of fire, a regular occurrence at this time of year, it did not cause exceptional concern, although the possibility of an Israeli raid into Syria — following the raid on Samu — was on people’s minds. It was assumed that the build-up of equipment on the Israeli side was to protect the agricultural activity in the Demilitarized Zones from Syrian fire. It was generally agreed that Israel would require little or no prior build-up to launch a limited attack on Syria.
What did cause concern was the possibility of 2 l @a major Israeli assault on Syria in response to continued Arab terrorist attacks. In January, 1967, our ambassadors in Tel Aviv and Beirut were instructed to make representations to Israel and to Syria, respectively, in order to express Canadian concern at the developing situation. During the interview in Jerusalem, Israel’s Foreign Minister, Mr. [Abba] Eban, told our ambassador that the Arab terrorist attacks on Israel posed the real threat to peace in the area — the problems in the Demilitarized Zones were of secondary importance. In Damascus, the Director-General of the Syrian Foreign Ministry disclaimed any responsibility on the part of Syria for the fedayeen raids. A Memorandum to the Minister in January, 1967, reporting on these conversations, compared these circumstances to those before the war in 1956: “a disquieting parallel to the present situation can be seen in the fedayeen raids from Egypt before the Sinai campaign…”
UNTSO made a special effort to address the 22 e situation. In order to deal with the problems in the Demilitarized Zone, it tried to convene an extraordinary meeting of the Israeli-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission (ISMAC), which did not ordinarily meet. This effort continued from January to May, 1967. At one stage, Israel agreed to refrain from cultivation while a solution was sought, an unusual step for the Israelis. The Syrians, for their part, agreed to participate in the proposed extraordinary meetings, despite their long-established boycott of ISMAC. The three meetings held did not, however, yield any worthwhile results.
East since 1948. Following tank and artillery exchanges with the Syrians, the Syrians enjoying the advantages of terrain, Israel brought in air strikes to silence the gun emplacements on the Syrian heights. In the course of the ensuing air battle, six Syrian aircraft were shot down. One aspect of this clash not given enough weight at the time was that it exposed Nasser once again to the charge of inaction — of hiding behind UNEF while other Arab states carried on the struggle with Israel. The Syrian reproaches with respect to UAR inaction were all the sharper — and presumably all the more galling to Nasser — because their bilateral defence pact had been signed only four months earlier. The UAR had stressed that the defence pact would only come into effect if Israel launched a major ground offensive and occupied Syrian territory. Nevertheless, in the eyes of the broader Arab public, that did not exempt the UAR from the charge that Nasser was prepared to sign treaties but not confront Israel: that he had not lived up to his commitments.
24 The level of tension arising from these develop-un. caused enough concern in the Department of External Affairs, in April 1967, for it to consider a formal approach to the Security Council in conjunction with other countries. The aim would have been to empower the Secretary-General to take such steps as he deemed necessary — through UNTSO and in consultation with the parties — to defuse the situation. The instruction to the Permanent Mission in New York noted that the United States’ preoccupation with Vietnam and British concern about Aden “cast doubt on … [the possibility] of organizing effective, concerted action in [the] Security Council”. It noted, as well, that the action contemplated might dampen down the situation in the Demilitarized Zones but would do little to meet Israeli complaints about Arab terrorism. The latter, it said, was much harder to come to grips with. In the event, nothing came of this initiative either in New York or in talks with friendly governments.
Later in the month, Israeli armour which had been 2 5 @ brought into the Defensive Area and Demilitarized
Zone on the Syrian border was withdrawn in order to make way for a proposed UNTSO sweep of the border area. Owing to persistent differences between Syria and Israel regarding the terms of the sweep, it was never carried out. Nevertheless, by the beginning of May, it seemed that the worst might be over. The Syrian/Israeli border was comparatively quiet. One could reasonably hope for increasing calm as the period of cultivation came to an end. The intensity and extent of the military exchanges had been unusual; the level of tension remained fairly high owing, in part, to the fear that a further terrorist attack would precipitate an unduly robust Israeli response. It was thought unlikely, however, that the UAR would become involved if Israel mounted a new reprisal action against Syria.
Two developments followed. Rumours began to 26 @circulate that Israel had concentrated a military force in the Galilee. While these rumours were about, Prime Minister [Israel Levi] Eshkol and Foreign Minister Eban reiterated earlier warnings, but in stronger language, that Israel would hold Syria responsible for further fedayeen attacks on Israeli territory. In mid-May, the Soviet Union. openly cited the reports of new Israeli troop concentrations along the Syrian armistice line by way of a warning. Its motive was, presumably, to prevent an Israeli attack on its most devoted ally in the region by crying wolf. Although the reports of military concentrations were denied by Israel (our Military Attaché in Tel Aviv confirmed they were not true); although UNTSO confirmed that there were no Israeli concentrations or movements near the Syrian line; although the Soviet ambassador declined all invitations to see for himself that no military preparations were in train: although there was all this evidence to the contrary, these reports were apparently believed in Cairo. It must be said in mitigation that the proposition that Israel was planning to attack Syrian was not of itself implausible. It is possible that Soviet intelligence had picked up information about a possible strike against Syria (for which no extensive preparations would be required) and that the Soviet Union publicized it as a preventive measure.
2 Whatever the case may be, Nasser, in Cairo, evi- @dently decided — recklessly and over-optimistically — that he could not afford further reproaches for failing to assist his Arab brothers. He seems to have calculated that he could at the very least inflict a diplomatic defeat on Israel and that placing his forces in a defensive position in the Sinai would enable them to block an overwhelming Israeli victory, as in 1956, if they were attacked. He therefore first moved his forces into the Sinai and then sent them into sectors occupied by friendly elements in UNEF (the Yugoslavs and Indians) along the UAR/Israel demarcation line. From that point onward, neither Nasser (for inter- Arab and domestic reasons) nor the government of Israel (for security and domestic reasons) felt it could pull back. In the absence of forceful and concerted intervention by the international community (and it is open to question whether such an intervention was possible), each would persist till the other gave way, or till war broke out.
2 8 The simplistic view is that the Six-Day War was the @inevitable result of Arab hostility to Israel. This review of the train of events from 1964 to 1967 — which disrupted the equilibrium of the previous years — suggests that both sides took steps which traced the path to war and that it was the interplay between them that precipitated the conflict. If Israel had not diverted the Jordan Waters unilaterally, pursued a policy of harsh retaliation (Samu in 1966, Lebanon and the air strike against Syria in 1967), and issued stark, far-reaching threats in response to terrorist attacks, there might have been no war. If it had taken the Arab diversion project or the general question of terrorism to the Security Council, the result might have been different. If the Arabs had not dramatized the Israeli diversion project and thus compelled themselves to respond to it, if Jordan and Egypt had opted out of the anti-Israeli competition fostered by Syria, if they had had the confidence to pursue their own interests rather than pan-Arab chimeras, if they had mastered their sense of inferiority and refrained from extravagant gestures (as in the Sinai), the catastrophe of 1967 might have been avoided. If Nasser had calling the 1964 Summit Conference which set in train so much of the inter-Arab rivalry that triggered the war — that drove Israel to war.
The role played by the Palestinians in stoking Arab 2 9 @ hostility to Israel and reckless action by Arab governments was probably more important than was realized at the time. Through these years, the Palestinians kept the issue of Israel’s existence in the public eye, they focussed attention on its diversion of the Jordan Waters, and they were directly involved in the renewed fedayeen harassment of Israel.
If peace is to be achieved, both sides will need +) 0 @to amend their ways. The Arab states will need to adopt a more pragmatic course with respect to Israel and one another, and Israel will need to show a better appreciation of Arab concerns and sensitivities.
ANNEX
The Jordan Waters Issue
It may be argued that Israel could have avoided a confrontation with the Arabs on this issue by holding its project in abeyance in the face of Arab opposition to it. For instance, one might contend that with the funds available to it from abroad, Israel could have utilized its ground waters more effectively or turned to the more expensive alternative of desalination. While these options would have inhibited Israel’s economic growth, it may nevertheless be argued that it would have been to Israel’s long-term advantage to accept the costs involved and a lower rate of growth rather than to pursue a course that was deeply offensive to the Arabs: only by refraining from steps which undermined the existing balance could Israel hope to foster Arab tolerance of its existence and eventually come to terms with its neighbours.
The flaw in this line of reasoning (however plausible on its face) is that it would have been impossible, or virtually impossible, to persuade Israel’s leaders and informed Israelis generally to look at the situation in this light. First, the Israelis have what — for lack of a better term — might be described as a sacramental, even obsessive, attitude to the development of ‘eretz Israel’, the land of Israel. Zionist rhetoric is believed. To have failed to use the Jordan Waters would have seemed to many as a dereliction of national/religious duty. Second, and perhaps more important, the political and military viability of Israel was and is dependent on maintaining a high rate of economic growth. Expansion, experiment, a rising standard of living: these are needed to pay the cost of defence, to attract support and assistance from abroad, to maintain an influx of immigrants and, indeed, to prevent emigration. (The fall in immigration in the sixties, before the war, was a major concern.) In short, to oppose the diversion of the Jordan Waters would have been to call into question, in some measure, the logic of Israel’s existence.
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 25, No. 1 (2010) — Spring 2010 // Printemps 2010, pp. 15–20. Read the rest of this issue →
