bout de papier, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1993) — Spring 1993 // Printemps 1993, pp. 7–8
The following article was adapted from informal remarks made on 19 January 1993 in Ottawa by David T. Jones (Minister-Counsellor for Political Affairs, American Embassy) to the PAFSO Professional Committee.
I am certainly not an expert on the US transition. Far more qualified than I would be the political counselor at the Canadian Embassy in Washington who, doubtless, has been watching developments closely. Likewise, the two hundred-some members of various transition teams assigned to Washington agencies would be able to give you detailed insights. The following are my personal impressions.
The transition is almost over. Or, depending on your point of view, it is just about to begin.
An Extensive Process: Under the American system of government, we have approximately ten weeks between the Presidential election (4 November) and the inauguration (always on 20 January). Our transition also reaches much deeper into the bureaucracy than a Canadian government transition as some five to eight thousand officials (according to news reports) are subject to replacement by the incoming administration.
I cannot really say when transition planning began. We will have to await the insider studies of the election to read that six months ago or nine months ago, a “transition cell” or something of a similar nature, was set up within the Clinton campaign team to begin transition planning. What we do know is that quickly after the election, on 6 November, the President-elect named Vernon Jordan, a long-time civil rights leader, and Warren Christopher (Mr. Christopher was subsequently nominated to be Secretary of State), former Deputy Secretary of State, as overall heads of the transition process. Mr. Christopher indicated that his “first priority is an orderly process for selection of Cabinet officers and other key appointments”
By 25 November, all nine “cluster” coordinators had been named for the transition.
Each of these “clusters” had teams assigned to specific agencies to prepare for the transition: to do, in effect, a reconnaissance on the ground, identifying problems and prospects. I will list these “clusters” for your information and general background, but then ignore all except that related to the Department of State. In any event, the “clusters” are State Department and National Security Affairs; Economics and International Trade; Transportation; Science, Space and Technology; Natural Resources; Education and Labor; Health, Human Services and Housing; Justice; and Government Operations.
Concerning the specifics relating to the Department of State, equally quickly after the election, on 6 November then Acting Secretary of State, Larry Eagleburger, issued a directive naming Under-Secretaries Kanter and Rogers to coordinate the transition. Under-Secretary Kanter would handle the policy aspects and Under-Secretary Rogers would deal with management concerns.
The Eagleburger directive stated inter alia that there were to be no new policy initiatives during the next two months; that there would be no official travel by State Department officials at the rank of Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) or higher without his personal authorization; and that written communications (eg. briefing papers) between working levels in the Department of State and the transition team should pass through the office of the Executive Secretariat (S/S). Finally, the directive emphasized that while the State Department would “share all relevant information” with the transition team, it was “not part of the foreign policy decision-making process”
A week after the overall transition coordinators were designated, Samuel “Sandy” Berger was named as head of the State Department and National Security “cluster”. Berger, who qualifies as a “FOB” (friend of Bill), had served as deputy director of State’s Policy Planning Bureau under President Carter. He has two deputies, Leon Fuerth, a former State Department FSO (Foreign Service Officer) and foreign affairs advisor to Senator Gore, and Nancy Soderberg who spent much of the transition period based in Little Rock (Mr. Fuerth and Ms. Soderberg were later named to the National Security Council staff). Although this “cluster” also handled the transition at the Pentagon and the National Security Council, I will focus on the work at State.
State Department Transition Team: Brian Atwood headed the transition team assigned to the Department of State. Atwood (Mr. Atwood was nominated to be Under Secretary for Management at State), a former FSO and subsequently an Assistant Secretary of State under President Carter, brought a small, six-to-seven person team with him to State. Several of those on this team were either former FSOs or had worked closely with State. The group was provided office space and secretarial support and assigned a number of young FSOs to assist their work. Partly due to personalities and partly to circumstances, the transition team was regarded as “friendly” to State.
A Velvet Transition: Such a smooth transition, however, is hardly the rule. This occurred primarily because 1992 was not an election over foreign policy issues. To recall the now famous phrase, it was an election about “the economy, stupid”. Although citizens are supposed to “vote their pocket books” or lunchpails, many of our recent elections have been foreign policy driven. Some obvious examples were those in 1964, 1968 and 1972 involving Vietnam policy. For three elections, the issue of USA involvement in Vietnam (i.e. getting in; staying the course; and getting out) generated maximum politico-social bitterness. The most recent foreign policy election took place in 1980, with “America Held Hostage” playing nightly on TV. This served to focus widespread antagonism against President Carter’s foreign policy.
Thus, the Carter-Reagan transition of 1980-1981 was more of a hostile takeover. Members of the incoming administration were bitterly opposed to Carter’s foreign policy and determined to reverse it. This was also a period when the SALT II treaty had been popularly characterized as “fatally flawed”; when the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and installation of INF missiles threatening Western Europe and Asia would lead to the USSR being labeled the “Evil Empire”; and the Sandinista takeover in Nicaragua and guerrilla movement in El Salvador were regarded as illustrating a rising threat to Central America at a minimum. President Carter and his foreign policy team were attacked as, at best, naive and incompetent. Thus, the Reagan transition came to State seeking not only to reverse the policies, but also to remove those associated with them.
As a result, the Reagan transition at State was a period of considerable tension. Entire forests died producing briefing books crammed with papers on every subject which career mid-level managers hoped might be of interest to the Reagan team or at least would explain why the policy decisions had been taken. As no one really knew what was wanted, and when elements of the transition team were perceived to be hostile to State, activity stagnated and morale plummeted. It was viewed with considerable relief when Secretary Haig largely dismissed the transition team members and its recommendations.
Instead of such hostility, however, the current aura is one of a “velvet transition”. There will be of course differences between President Clinton’s foreign policy and that which would have been followed by President Bush. Throughout the election campaign, however, these differences were muted and during the transition, the President-elect moved closer to the Bush administration policy on China and Haiti.
Game Rules of the President-elect: Governor Clinton also eased the transition process. He made it clear from the beginning that there was one President and that he would best be served by bureaucrats continuing to carry out Administration policy. He did not want to be consulted on foreign policy decisions, but to be advised on devel-
›ments. There was to be no “silence ’ocedure” for implicit approval of Bush Iministration decisions.
The Mechanics of the Transition rocess at State: The handful of transition am members clearly could not be assigned le to a bureau; so each had to cover a num-er of areas. One, for example, covered the uropean Bureau of the Politico-Military Affairs Bureau. As a first order of business, each bureau was directed to prepare papers on no more than five issues for Secretary-designate Christopher. Next, individual bureaus were invited to submit additional issue papers. Finally, further papers were drafted to prepare Secretary-designate Christopher for his Senate confirmation hearings. Individual drafting officers struggled with the double burden of attempting to be creative and innovative while still adhering closely to existing Bush Administration policy. Often innovation lost.
Throughout the transition, team members met and spoke extensively with officials at all levels throughout the Department. The only restriction remained the requirement that any formal taskings be made and responded to through the Executive Secretariat. While transition team members largely kept a low profile, there were occasional meetings with foreign dignitaries who were urgently seeking points of contact with the incoming Administration. Indeed, one transition team chore was to discourage systematically those proposing an early meeting with President Clinton or suggesting that their presence in Washington for the inauguration would provide a convenient rationale for such a meeting.
Briefing the President-elect: A major aspect of the transition team’s work was providing briefing material to the President-elect and assuring a full discussion of impending foreign affairs issues. As you might imagine, Governor Clinton had intensive briefings and discussions on Yugoslavia, Haiti, Iraq and Somalia. Such discussions, I understand, were detailed and exhaustive, including extensive reviews of options and alternatives.
Protracted Transition: If history is any guide, there can be a period of up to six-to-twelve months before much of American foreign policy has a clear “made-by-President Clinton” stamp. Many of the State Department’s senior officials are still to be named and most of these officials will have to be reviewed and confirmed by the Senate. If policy is controversial, it will have to be reviewed, at times painstakingly, by many members of the Washington interagency community. For example, in mid-1989 the START negotiations were relatively close to completion. It was, however, almost a year following the election of President Bush and the ensuing policy review until negotiations in Geneva were again operating at full speed.
Such delays are not axiomatic; but “patience” rather than speed will be a better watchword over the next few months.
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1993) — Spring 1993 // Printemps 1993, pp. 7–8. Read the rest of this issue →
