bout de papier, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1996) — Summer 1996 // Été 1996, pp. 35–37
On 25 June 1950, North Korea launched a sudden “all out offensive” against its southern neighbour. Eager to meet this Communist challenge to the Western posi- tion in Asia and determined to demonstrate the UN’s capacity to respond to aggression, the United States President, Harry S. Truman, made American air and naval support available to South Korea. At the same time, he agreed to deploy the 7th Fleet under General Douglas MacArthur in the Taiwan (Formosa) Strait to prevent an outbreak of renewed hostilities between Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist forces and the Communist government in Peking.
When informed of Truman’s action on the morning of June 27, Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent, and his Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson, reacted cautiously. During the next six weeks, while Canada and its Western allies wrestled with the strategic and logistical implications of creating a UN force to assist South Korea, the threat of a direct confrontation between the US 7th Fleet and Communist China seemed to hover just beyond the horizon.
Alarmed by MacArthur’s provocative activities in and around Taiwan, Pearson and Norman Robertson, the clerk of the Privy Council, travelled to Washington in early August to meet Dean Acheson, the United States Secretary of State. Acheson reassured the two Canadians that the United States would not jeopardize the Western position in Europe by allowing itself to be drawn into a conflict with China. Pearson’s misgivings quickly returned the following week when MacArthur paid a highly publicized trip to Taiwan. After embracing Chiang Kai-shek, the American commander declared that “the defence of Formosa was the defence of free peoples everywhere.” Pearson, who had in the past enjoyed close relations with his American counterpart, decided to approach Acheson again. The following exchange of letters is extracted from Volume 16 of Documents on Canadian External Relations, edited by Greg Donaghy of the Historical Section in the Department’s Corporate Communications Division, which was published in March 1996. The letters have been slightly edited for length.
Ottawa, August 15, 1950
Secret and Personal
Dear Dean (Acheson),
Ithink that any Inar, har arch Alam-
(Robertson) and I appreciated the talk we had with you a short time ago about Korea and other matters. It was good of you to give us so much time when you were harassed with so many pressing matters.
In the light of recent developments I have been thinking over what we said that night about Formosa and the Chinese Communists, and I should like to put before you some of the apprehensions which I still have over this question. I do so in a personal letter, because it is easier to “get things off one’s chest” this way. It will also be easier for you in reply (if you care to reply) to tell me I am off the beam and to stop bothering you!
I wonder whether the possibility of an early attack on Formosa has not been increased by the preventive military measures being taken by the National Government of China against Communist concentrations along the mainland invasion coast, while Formosa itself is “neutralized;” as well as by statements reported to have been made by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, following General Mac Arthur’s recent visit, concerning United States-Chinese “military cooperations” and “the joint defence of Formosa.” That visit, incidentally was made by one who is a United Nations as well as a United States Commander. Who is suffering from schizophrenia?
Military conflict between the forces of the United States and Communist China, which could hardly be restricted to the Straits of Formosa, would be a disaster from which only the Soviet Union would profit. Such a conflict would create grave difficulties for members of the United Nations, and at the time they are becoming more keenly aware, as a result of the Korean aggression, of the menace of Soviet imperialism and of the use by this imperialism of Communist parties abroad. I am aware that the United States Government has assumed on its own the responsibility for the defence of Formosa. Nevertheless, the involvement of other friendly nations is, in reality, implicit in this action. If United States warships, for example, were to becum engaged against Communist Chinese vessels, or if it were considered necessary, during the course of operations, for United States aircraft to bomb Chinese bases on the mainland, the sure result would be a charge of aggressions in the Security Council brought against the United States by the Soviet Union. This would confuse the issues of Korea and Formosa, as a consequence of which some nations would be under considerable embarrassment as to how to state their positions in public.
It seems to me that of other unfortunate results of an armed clash between the United States and Communist China over Formosa, the most important are these: the draining of resources which are now urgently needed elsewhere; the possibility of the latent tensions which exist between Communist China and Soviet imperialism becoming active; increasing danger of the involvement of Communist China in the Korea conflict.
If a collision with Communist China over Formosa is threatening, what can be done to avoid it?
Might there not be some advantage in an early consultation among the principally interested Western powers, in an effort to reach agreement on ways of reducing friction between themselves and Communist China; or at the least, on tactics which would make it clear who would be to blame for the resulting fire? Consideration should first be given, I believe, to possible ways of dissuading the Chinese Communists from attacking Formosa during the Korean operations. Perhaps a move in this direction might be taken by some public assurance that the military strength of the National Government forces will be increased by outside aid during this period beyond the minimum strictly required for defence of the island, and that the mainland Chinese will have an appropriate voice in the peaceful determination of the future status of Formosa.
You may reply that the only effective way to prevent an attack on Formosa is to convince the Chinese Communists that if they do attack they will be defeated and destroyed. Is it not pretty certain, however, that an attack — whether doomed or not — is exactly what Moscow, and the extremists in Peking, want, and are we not playing into their hands if we give them any unnecessary excuse for it? Maybe I’m wrong in this, but I’m right surely in thinking that the political result of armed conflict between the United States and Communist China would be disastrous.
There is, of course, another aspect to this problem, namely, Chinese representation on the Security Council. It is too bad that at this moment Chiang’s delegate should be representing China there. That, of course, also plays into the hands of the Soviet. If, as I believe, the Soviet leaders would welcome the involvement of the United States in war with China, if this, in fact, is one of the present major aims of Soviet policy, then the Soviet Government, while posing as Peking’s champion, may really wish to keep Communist China away from the Security Council, in order, not only to isolate China from anything in the nature of normal relations with the Western world, but also to be able to present the United States to the Asians as the villain of the piece. In this case, the seating of Communist China in the Security Council might contribute to the upsetting of Soviet calculations. You will probably reply that it might contribute also to the upsetting of Mr. Acheson!
I realize, of course, that in attempting to formulate any policy designed to bring about an easing of relations with Communist China, all of us would have difficulty with some sections of our public opinion and that, in this respect (to put it mildly), there is a special problem in the United States. If however, we could come to some general agreement on a course of action in this regard, it would be easier for us to meet public opinion. May I commend to your attention in this connection — if you have not already seen it — the leading article in the current Economist, “Mr. Malik’s Manoeuvres”
If I venture to write you so frankly and at such length on this subject, it is only because of my worry over the danger of the present Chinese situation weakening, and indeed even breaking, the unity which we should show against Soviet Communism. That worry has been increased by the new confidence and assertiveness of Chiang Kaishek and his people, resulting, at least in part, from General MacArthur’s visit, as well as by the strident efforts of the Luce- Hearst-McCormick axis to bring about open, armed conflict between the United States and the Communist China. In that conflict, a great many of the United Nations would do their very best to stand aloof. That division, I’m afraid, would then reflect itself in fields other than China. There could hardly be anything worse than this. Possibly, once again, our enemies will save us from it!
L.B. Pearson
Washington, September 8, 1950
Secret and Personal
Dear Mike (Pearson)
I am most grateful for your letter of
August 15, 1950 and welcome the spirit
of complete frankness with which you discussed problems relating to China. Since reading your letter I have been turning over in my mind your comment and the thoughts which they provoke. I shall not attempt to give you a somewhat fuller outline of our thinking on the general problem than was possible when you were here.
Let me state at the outset that we are very much aware of the dangers inherent in our position respecting Formosa and of the desirability of finding some formula which, without disregarding essential security elements, would lessen the misgivings of our friends. I have already had a preliminary exchange of views with Mr. Bevin through Oliver Franks and I expect that considerable attention will be given to this problem in discussions with Mr. Bevin and Mr. Schuman before the meeting of the General Assembly.
The President’s statements of June 27 and July 19 and his letter to Ambassador Austin of August 27 remain firm lines of United States policy respecting Formosa during the present crisis. I am sure that you will understand this although, unfortunately, other less well acquainted with the United States may have found recent developments somewhat confusing.
In taking the measures outlined by the President in his statement of June 27, the United States sought to neutralize Formosa militarily during the present threat to the peace of the West Pacific. It has carefully stated that these measures were taken without prejudice to the question of long-term political status of the Island. We believe that this question should be settled by peaceful negotiation. Our measures to bring abut the miliary neutralization of Formosa, far from being directed toward a forcible solution of the question, operate, in fact, to prevent a solution by force and to permit a settlement by negotiation. Our willingness to have the Security Council take up the question of Formosa should, I think, provide convincing evidence of this.
In stationing our naval forces in the vicinity of Formosa, we of course accepted a calculated risk that our forces might become involved in active hostilities with Chinese Communist forces. We accepted this risk to avoid what we judged to be the greater risk of leaving Southeastern Asia open to Communist military aggression and permitting a dangerous, hostile flank to be opened at a time when available United States and other friendly forces were, under the auspices of the United Nations, heavily engaged in containing and throwing back the Communist aggression in Korea.
We have sought to minimize the risk of active hostilities with Chinese Communist forces by introducing the concept of neutralization of Formosa. In accordance with this concept the Seventh Fleet was directed to assure the cessation of air and naval operations by Chinese Nationalists forces on Formosa against the mainland as well as to prevent attack upon the Island. We had hoped that by making clear that the measures taken by us were for the purpose of neutralization, and that those measure were undertaken without prejudice to the long-term political status of Formosa, a truce in the Formosa fighting might be enforced with minimum danger of a Chinese Communist attack on US force.
These measures were not motivated by a desire to support any Chinese political group. As you know, there were much broader considerations relating to security in the Western Pacific and bearing directly upon a successful conclusion of the Security Council’s aims respecting Korea. Specifically, our measures should not be interpreted as a stepping-stone toward our entry into mainland China or toward the return of the Nationalist Government to the mainland with our support. We have entered into no political or military commitment with the National Government in this regard and contemplate none, although we would have to examine this question again should the Chinese Communists embark on a course of military aggression in Korea or elsewhere in Asia. We are aware of the dangers of permitting the National Government to associate the measure which we have taken with their own political cause and are constantly endeavouring to counter such moves on their part without, however, giving aid and comfort to the authorities on the mainland.
As you know, the Chinese Communists have rejected the concept of neutralization. In view of this and the heavy engagement of our forces in Korea, we are finding it necessary to consider providing a limited amount of military materiel which the Chinese forces on Formosa might need to reduce the possibilities of direct hostilities between the two force without interfering with legitimate defensive measure of the Chinese National Government on the islands they now hold.
I believe that the three immediate problems confronting us respecting Formosa are (1) finding means to dissuade a Chinese Communist attack, (2) finding a basis for wider support of the United States if such an attack is made and (3) assuring that questions affecting Formosa be settled by peaceful means. I hope our readiness to have the Chinese Communist charges against us investigated by the Security Council may contribute something to the solution of these problems. Furthermore, we have been considering the feasibility of proposing that the General Assembly appoint a commission to examine all aspects of the Formosa problem under conditions where all parties would be obligated to refrain from the use of force while the matter is under consideration.
A word about the matter of Chinese representation in the UN. We cannot in good conscience alter our present opposition to seating the Chinese Communist representative. We would not wish to see the question of Chinese representation, about which there is considerable disagreement among the non- Communist countries, brought to the forefront while the Security Council is occupied with urgent matters relating to the aggression in Korea. After a solution of the Korean crisis, we should be quite willing to have the question considered on its merits. In our view, the heart of the matter is not our opposition to the Chinese Communists, but rather the fact that many members of the UN obviously have the same doubts and misgivings respecting the Peiping regime as do we.
I am most grateful that you have given me your views on one of the most complicated problems now facing us. I hope that you will continue to let me have the benefit of your comments and suggestions.
Cordially,
Dean (Acheson)
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1996) — Summer 1996 // Été 1996, pp. 35–37. Read the rest of this issue →
