bout de papier, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1993) — Winter 1993 // Hiver 1993, pp. 15–17
by John Halstead
As an associate member of PAFSO and a member of RHOMA (the Retired Heads of Mission Association) and after thirty-six years’ experience in the Canadian Foreign Service, I find I still use the “we” pronoun when talking about the Department (which now goes by the acronym of EAITC). Since my retirement ten years ago, I have watched the Department from the outside with mounting concern, as it has undergone repeated upheavals and downsizings. So when I was asked, a couple of years ago, if I would be prepared to act as an outside consultant in what was called a “comprehensive audit” of the Political- Economic Relations (PER) Program of the Department, I felt a certain compulsion to take up the challenge, even though I anticipated it might be a thankless task.
It might be well to recall how this exercise began. In the wake of the Corporate Review, completed in 1990, there was a feeling among senior managers, particularly the then Under-Secretary (de Montigny Marchand) and the Associate Under-Secretary (Raymond Chrétien), that the PER Program — a core program with a major proportion of the Department’s human and material resources — was not functioning as it should and was vulnerable to possible criticism from Treasury Board, other parts of the Government, and to some extent from the public. Treasury Board was forever pressing the Department to find ways of measuring its “output” in order to justify its resources. Other parts of the Government resented what they perceived to be a “stand-offish” attitude on the part of the Department. The public and media were quick to jump on any sign of perceived “mismanagement”. But the most serious concern was that, with an increased workload but a substantial reduction in resources and with no effective structure to substantiate the resource levels it required, the Program might no longer be capable of ensuring the necessary input into Government policy-making or of protecting and promoting Canadian interests abroad.
Senior management therefore authorized a comprehensive audit of the Program to determine whether the management processes in place were such that the Program could meet its responsibilities. Two phases of the audit were envisaged: the first, concentrated at Headquarters, was to look at the two-way communications between headquarters and missions abroad, as well as relations with the Program’s “clients” in Canada; and the second, to be carried out primarily at missions, would depend on the findings of the first phase. Bill Hunter, a management consultant, and I were hired to carry out this work, with the assistance of David Tippin, under the direction of the Audit and Evaluation Division (MIV). In the course of the eight-month study, we conducted interviews with some forty officers from top to bottom at headquarters; with senior officials in most government departments (OGD’s) and two provinces (Alberta and Quebec); and with five missions abroad (three bilateral embassies; one multilateral mission; and one consulate). Our report on Phase I, which contained seven major observations and twenty-four recommendations, was presented to the new Under-Secretary (Reid Morden) and senior management in early January 1992.
Looked at broadly, the observations and recommendations fall into two categories: those which deal with management techniques; and those which deal with attitudes or philosophy. Though addressed primarily to the PER Program, inevitably, they spill over into other areas of the Department’s operations. In the category of management techniques, the report deals in some detail with three fields of importance to the Program which we considered needed attention: resource management; information management; and policy management.
The Department’s most precious resource is its people. During our review we heard echoes of the concerns which have been expressed for many years in and out of the Department, about the morale of Foreign Service Officers; about the lack of a clear sense of direction; and about the need for some effective use of available human resources. The old “hit-and-miss” approach to human resource management was no longer adequate to meet the challenges of a radically changing international environment and an increasingly demanding national environment in Canada.
Our report recommended improvements in all phases of the process of acquiring and utilizing human resources for the PER Program (recruitment, training, initial assignment and subsequent career). We recommended that the recruitment phase be based on clearer criteria in terms of skills and tasks; be shortened in time from the initial identification of successful candidates to their eventual engagement; and be more consistent from year to year in terms of intake numbers. We urged that there be a comprehensive professional training program for political-economic officers at the entry, mid-career and senior levels. There should be career planning which would make best use from the outset of officers’ knowledge, skills and experience.
Since tabling the report, there has been a major step forward with respect to training, with the foundation of the Canadian Foreign Service Institute. Unfortunately, however, the training it offers is still not part of a fully integrated human resource planning program. There is still no career development strategy to complement the training program. And the generalist/specialist dilemma has still not been resolved. There is no doubt that additional knowledge and skills are required today on top of those traditionally associated with diplomacy, but our report suggested that the way to meet this expanded requirement should be sought, not in an either-or approach but in an approach which combines the best of both worlds. Political-economic officers should be equipped at the beginning with specialist knowledge in one field as well as general knowledge and be trained in core skills common to all branches of diplomatic activity; they should be left long enough in their initially chosen field (geographic or functional) to prove their ability; they should then be given assignments which allow officers to broaden their experience and competence, and thus gradually to become generalists as they rise in the service.
We found that information management needed to be improved, both at missions abroad and at headquarters. A constant theme in our interviews was the surfeit of paper circulating in the Department – short on quality and long on quantity; short on analysis and long on description; and with too little attention paid to Canadian issues and interests.
We recommended the introduction of a monitoring process (based in the first instance on self-monitoring) to encourage meeting these defined criteria of quality — to put the material on “TRAC” (Timeliness, Relevance to Canadian interests, Analytic content, and Conciseness). We also recommended a more intensive dialogue between headquarters and missions abroad. Missions should receive regular feedback on their reporting, be informed of the policy issues which are receiving attention in Ottawa, and be given guidance on policy implementation and advocacy. Finally, we recommended that the communications network be rationalized so that one central system would effectively meet the needs of the Department, and that all users should be advised of the best means of transmitting messages.
We also found that there was room for improvement in policy management. The main problem was policy coordination at the ministerial level (made harder by the fact that the Department has three ministers to serve) and a process of consultation which was often carried on by telephone, without written confirmation, and with a high risk of misunderstandings or mistakes. We suggested that better communication between the Department and the “central agencies” would help, with particular reference to finding a more systematic and reliable way of passing on policy decisions from the political level to senior management.
We also recommended a more formal arrangement to strengthen the Department’s position as the focus of foreign policy development and implementation.
Above all, we found that resolution of the problems besetting the PER Program lay in changing attitudes and philosophy. Three main points came to light in the course of our study.
The first was that a combination of reduced resources and increased workload has been pushing the Department more and more into a reactive operation, leaving little time or energy for proactive policy formation. We did not find it possible to measure quantitatively the increase in workload, since both the quantity and the quality are essentially subjective, but we found convincing evidence that the tasks of the PER Program had been increasing substantially. Some would say that the Department has always been issue-driven and crisis-responsive, but it is a matter of degree. The point has now been reached when political-economic officers at headquarters, even with best efforts, are barely able to cover all the bases in normal circumstances (not to mention a crisis), while those abroad are expected to cover a growing breadth of subjects and to assist an increasing number of visitors. In other words, the urgent is driving the important off the Department’s agenda, with repercussions for the quality of service provided to the Department’s “clients.” The trouble is that the real risks of having to operate in this way have never been evaluated by the Government or by senior management. The cumulative effect is to exacerbate longstanding problems for which the solution has become critical. Care as it does
The second point was that there was a lack of clear definition and management focus for the PER Program, in spite of its key importance for the Department as a whole. This contributes to the loss of a sense of direction among the officers in the Program, and to the Department’s inability to identify resource requirements or to set and revise priorities for the Program in terms of the relative importance of issues and countries. The result is that what should be a core program has become a residual program, which receives only what is left over after other more precisely defined requirements have been met, and which on the other hand has to carry out any remaining responsibilities which have not already been clearly assigned to other programs (eg. trade or immigration). In the process, political-economic officers, particularly those in missions abroad, are left with the impression that their core work is of discretionary importance, with no clear place in the Department’s or the Government’s set of priorities. They are often expected to carry out non-PER duties simply because these are not specifically assigned to other programs. In our opinion, the proposed remedy must first include a more precise definition of the PER mission. On this basis, tighter teamwork could be built up for a common purpose. Priorities could then be set and revised in a more purposeful way. On this basis, too, a clearer sense of the individual’s role could be developed, along with the skills, training and criteria for excellence which should go with it.
As a starting point, we suggested the following mission statement for the PER Program, derived from the Department’s mission statement, which when revised by managers and officers of the Program, could serve to develop a detailed description of their roles and responsibilities:
1. To provide timely reports concerning international developments (particularly analyses) in terms of Canadian interests, necessary for the formulation and management of Canadian foreign policies;
2. To carry out diplomatic activities (including negotiation, representation, advocacy and public diplomacy) necessary for the effective implementation of those policies, both bilaterally and multilaterally; and 3. To provide the communications and liaison necessary to ensure that the international activities of other departments of the Canadian Government and of the provinces are concerted within the overall framework of Canadian foreign policy. The third question of attitude had to do with the relationship between external and internal affairs. It is a distinction which is becoming increasingly blurred as a result of growing globalization and interdependence. We found insufficient recognition in the Department that one consequence should be to treat relations with the Department’s domestic “clients” (the OGD’s, the provinces and the private sector with as much care as it does relations with its external “clients” (the foreign governments and international organizations with which Canada has relations). We have been chided for giving too much credence to (or at least for failing to evaluate) the criticisms expressed by the OGD’s in this respect. Our position is that, whether or not the views of the OGD’s are entirely objective or well-founded, their perceptions have to be treated as the Department’s realities.
Looked at in another way, there are three kinds of “disconnects” which we identified in the comprehensive audit: those between headquarters and missions abroad; those within headquarters, between senior management and Foreign Service officers; and those between External Affairs and OGD’s in Ottawa. These still need major correction, through clearer definition of the PER Program and its priorities, through improved internal communications, through better integration of the operations of headquarters and missions abroad, and through more careful attention to serving OGD’s.
The picture is by no means totally gloomy. The Department’s chief resource, its people, is overwhelmingly of high quality and strongly dedicated to giving the best, provided individuals know what is expected of them. They are equipped with an extensive information and analytical network, and they have better technology at their disposal than ever before. But technology itself does not ensure effective communication; nor can talented officers ensure effective policymaking and implementation unless they are fully integrated into a well articulated team concept.
None of the problems addressed in our comprehensive audit is really new, and some of them were identified during the Department’s separate Corporate Review. Indeed, a Political-Economic Program Review Group made recommendations at the time but, for some reason, these were omitted from the final report. The problems therefore persisted and they will continue to persist until there is a change of attitude. Unless and until responsibility for the PER Program is clearly assigned and exercised, there is unlikely to be much improvement in the way the Program operates, and the whole Department will continue to suffer. Surely it is time to invite an open discussion of these problems.
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1993) — Winter 1993 // Hiver 1993, pp. 15–17. Read the rest of this issue →
