bout de papier, Vol. 12, No. 4 (1995-1996) — Winter 1995–96 // Hiver 1995-1996, pp. 42–43
THE PERFECT ENGLISH SPY (SIR DICK
WHITE AND THE SECRET WAR 1935-90)
by Tom Boyd. William Heinemann Ltd.
London. 426 pp., $45.99.
Chock full of information about security and intelligence operations, mostly British and American, this book provides extraordinary insights into Dick White’s unique stewardship of MI5 and MI6 over many years. It does not capture, however, White’s complex personality nor does it provide a good understanding of the unusual framework within which he had to work. One has the impression that the author suffered from an embarrassment of data and too many contradictory opinions from the large number of persons he managed to interview.
I came to know Dick White while head of the security and intelligence organization in External Affairs and while Director of Communications Security, Communications Branch, National Research Council in the late 1950s and early 1960s and subsequently as the Director-General of the RCMP Security Service.
My contacts with White were infrequent and Canada was but a bit player in some of the bizarre events described by Boyd. However, I had sufficient dealings with him over many years, to form a clear, favourable opinion of him and of his worth. I had a soft spot for White since he went out of his way to be kind and helpful at a time when I had assumed new and to some extent unknown responsibilities for security and intelligence activities in External Affairs at the height of the Cold War.
White is portrayed as very influential, charismatic with a lively sense of humour but he also comes across as weak, indecisive, devious and self-serving. I believe these are unfair criticisms. Whatever shortcomings existed were due to the flawed nature of the F British system for handling security and 4 intelligence matters.
The flaws are painfully evident from the litany of ill-conceived operations which often failed because of bureaucratic squabbling and sometimes inexcusable political interference with the manner in which the security and intelligence agencies were used. Significantly, many of the failures were also due to the successful, longtime penetration of MI5 and MI6 by the Russians. Yuri Modin’s recent book Philby, Burgess, Maclean, Blunt, Cairncross: My Five Cambridge Friends brilliantly makes the point. The British achieved some remarkable intelligence successes most of which eventually were nullified by the treachery of Philby, Burgess et al.
In the 1980s, White initiated a series of conversations with journalists he respected and trusted. From there he chose Andrew Boyle, author of “The Climate of Treason” as his biographer. Following Boyle’s death, a colleague, Tom Boyd, inherited his research material and notes of his interviews with White. Boyd makes clear that latterly White had begun to doubt the wisdom of some of the basic assumptions underlying the British system.
Dick White and I had not been in contact for several years but in 1992, when I learned he was dying of cancer, I wrote to him. His handwritten reply, dated 13 November 1992, alluded to his doubts about the British system. On this score he wrote, “I remember you and Norman Robertson very well. From what I knew of the further developments of your former interests I realize that you have been ahead of the rest of us in limiting secrecy and becoming accountable. So with my greetings and thanks I send you also my warmest congratulations”
Perhaps due to insufficient research and sloppy editing there are factual errors. Not serious mistakes, but so unnecessary as to cause one to wonder if there are not other, more important errors of fact. For example, on page 79 it states … “the research development team developing the atomic bomb in Chalk River, near Montreal”. Chalk River is nowhere near Montreal being about 400 kilometres northwest of it.
On page 360 Boyd states that on a worldwide farewell tour in the late 1960s, “after a dinner [in Ottawa] given by Norman Robertson, Canada’s permanent secretary for External Affairs, White flew to Washington…”. My appointments book for the period indicates I attended the dinner which apparently took place on 15 January 1968 (during a raging snowstorm). Marcel Cadieux, as the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs was the host, having succeeded Robertson in the job on 7 May 1964 almost four years earlier! My notes indicate that the next day I also attended a lunch in White’s honour given by the Commissioner of the RCMP. I no longer have a recollection of the event. It is quite likely, however, that White flew to Washington in an RCMP aircraft since in those days commercial flights to the US capital were infrequent.
My dealings with White were infrequent. At the “working level”, however, Canada’s relationships with British intelligence agencies were constant and sometimes close. I believe we got more out of the relationship than did the British except perhaps in the field of Signals Intelligence where our unique geography facilitated the collection of useful electronic emissions and radio signals (mainly Russian). Certainly, on numerous occasions the British provided us with valuable information concerning penetration of our diplomatic service by unfriendly intelligence services (usually KGB and GRU) and the unacceptable activities in Canada of “illegal” foreign intelligence agents.
On one of White’s rare visits to North America, probably in the early 1960s, it was thought a meeting between White and Howard Green, then minister in charge of External Affairs, might be beneficial. Norman Robertson was unenthusiastic, in part because, while Green was familiar with the relationship and occasionally benefited from it, e.g. British intelligence material concerning nuclear proliferation, he was generally naive and quite unsophisticated about this aspect of his department’s responsibilities. Robertson’s misgivings were well founded. In professional terms the meeting was a disaster. Green did not have any notion about much that White talked about and this became painfully apparent as the meeting progressed.
I thought the meeting successful since eventually it had the effect of discouraging MI6 from suggesting ways we might assist their efforts which obviously would have required Green’s approval and support, for example, the creation of a Canadian secret intelligence service modeled on MI6.
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 12, No. 4 (1995-1996) — Winter 1995–96 // Hiver 1995-1996, pp. 42–43. Read the rest of this issue →
