bout de papier, Vol. 16, No. 4 (1999-2000) — Winter 1999-2000 // Hiver 1999-2000, pp. 43–44
THE MITROKHIN ARCHIVE: THE KGB IN
EUROPE AND THE WEST by Christopher
Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, Penguin
Books Ltd. England, 1999, Vol. I, 996 pp.
$45.00
The book is a quite extraordinary historical record of Soviet espionage activities over a period of several decades directed against countries in the west, including Canada. Based on secret KGB archives it represents an authentic, unique work of reference which historians, foreign policy analysts, espionage buffs, journalists and many others will find invaluable. As one of the authors puts it, ’he believes that the KGB’s worldwide foreign operations form an essential, though often neglected, part of the history of twentieth-century international relations’
The very massiveness of this first volume (over nine hundred pages) could be daunting for the average reader; however, it is so well researched, documented, illustrated, written and organized that many readers will find it instructive as well as entertaining. Some of the stories, based as they are upon extracts from the hitherto top secret files of the KGB and the SVR (the organization which replaced it), are far more exciting reading than most of the best spy fiction written in the last century. Even readers with little interest in the minutiae of espionage will find the book interesting, if for no other reason than the stark manner in which it sheds light on the East-West conflict and its impact on international relations in the twentieth century.
The story of how all this sensational information came into British hands in 1992, eventually enabling Christopher Andrew in consultation with Vasili Mitrokhin to write the book, is no less interesting and exciting than some of the stories of Soviet espionage it reveals. In 1956 Mitrokhin became the KGB officer placed in charge of the archives of the First Chief Directorate (FCD), the foreign intelligence arm of the KGB. As such he had unrestricted access to all the files and, over a period of about twelve years, proceeded at great personal risk to copy material from these files which he successfully managed to smuggle out of the buildings of the First Chief Directorate in Moscow, undetected. Among the copious notes he was able to transcribe was material from directorate S responsible for running ’illegals’ — KGB officers and agents, mainly of Soviet nationality, working under deep cover disguised as foreign nationals. These KGB records are among the most closely guarded in the country.
Mitrokhin’s principal motive for his dangerous actions stemmed from his complete disillusionment with what the files revealed about the leadership of the Soviet Union, the Communist Party and most particularly the KGB’s activities in Afghanistan. Quite unknown to the various leaders of the KGB and their senior associates Mitrokhin became a secret dissident, a fact he managed to hide successfully over a number of years.
After retiring in 1984 Mitrokhin continued to work on his notes and began thinking of ways in which he might transport his secret archive to the West and publish it there. Towards the end of 1991, when the Soviet Union was beginning to break-up and frontier controls at the new borders of the Russian Federation were unusually lax, he saw a possible way of getting his material out of the country. He boarded an overnight train from Moscow to the capital of one of the newly independent Baltic republics. In a bag he hid samples of his notes underneath clothing, food and drink, ostensibly intended for friends. The day following his arrival he made his way to the British Embassy unannounced asking to speak with ’someone in authority’ Lady i luck was with him; he found himself
– received by a ’young, attractive and sympathetic female diplomat’ fluent in Russian. From this fortuitous encounter began the delicate, dangerous business of having the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) arrange his eventual exfiltration and that of his family to Britain along with his precious secret archive. This was accomplished in 1992 after which, once in Britain, he was able to work steadily on his archive, sorting out and typing up his handwritten notes. In 1995 he had his first meeting with Christopher Andrew to discuss the preparation of the book. Many of the stories deal with KGB espionage operations in Canada. Indeed, as the book makes clear, Canada was an important staging ground for Soviet plans to carry out sabotage and espionage against targets in the United States but, ’it also was an important target in its own right. The book should be an eye-opener to the not inconsiderable number of Canadian politicians, senior officials and journalists who, even after the sensational revelations of Soviet espionage activities in Canada made by Igor Gousenko in 1945, remained sceptical about the reality of Soviet espionage activities. These misguided critics simply were unwilling to believe the scale and rapacity of Soviet intelligence operations in North America or to acknowledge their impact on international affairs. In a chapter dealing with the “Andropov era’ the book mentions the defection in London in early 1971 of a KGB agent called Oleg Lyalin, a member of the KGB’s Department V, who provided the British with hair-raising details of contingency sabotage plans for operations in Britain and elsewhere during periods of international crisis. The plans were to be implemented by illegals, local agents and intelligence groups who would infiltrate each target country. In the same context mention also is made of a decision by the British government to expel ninety KGB and GRU officers stationed in London under official cover and another fifteen on leave in the Soviet Union. The British gave effect to their decision on 24 September 1971 when 105 Soviet intelligence officers were declared persona non grata.
I recall that on the morning of this event, shortly before a 2.30 p.m. scheduled meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence, the RCMP Security Service received an urgent top secret message, sent in high-grade cypher, giving us advance warning of the British government’s intentions and the reasons thereof. Before the meeting began, with the Prime Minister’s agreement, I told the committee of the startling development. There was little or no reaction from ministers or officials except an expression of concern that the British initiative might interfere with a long-planned visit to the Soviet Union by Trudeau!
I discovered that I was able under the provisions of the Access to Information legislation to obtain a completely unexpurgated copy of the minutes of the meeting (classified secret), the principal purpose of which was to consider a memorandum by the Solicitor General entitled ’Royal Canadian Mounter Police Activities on University Campuses’ suggesting changes to the decision of Cabinet on this matter dated 23 December 1970. Given the provenance of the information about Soviet intelligence activities in Britain (M.I. 5 & M.I. 6) and the top secret classification given it by the British no mention is made of the matter in the minutes.
M
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 16, No. 4 (1999-2000) — Winter 1999-2000 // Hiver 1999-2000, pp. 43–44. Read the rest of this issue →
