bout de papier, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1994) — Summer 1994 // Été 1994, pp. 44–45
THE GENERALS, THE CANADIAN ARMY’S
SENIOR COMMANDERS IN THE SECOND
WORLD WAR by J.L. Granatstein, Stoddart,
370 pages, $35.00.
Reviewed by Jack Hyatt
This book provides a remarkable group portrait of Canadian army senior leaders during the Second World War.
The first chapter — a brief essay titled “The Old Army” — summarizes Canadian military history during the interwar period, and provides a synopsis of the state of military preparedness in Canada in 1939. Granatstein describes the Permanent Force (PF), a ludicrous army of 446 officers and 4,169 all ranks, and the Non-Permanent Active Militia (NPAM), a force with an actual strength of perhaps 25,000 which soldiered one evening a week. For both, the most important source of officers was The Royal Military College of Canada. The path to success for PF officers was to pass the entrance examination for the British Army Staff College and the Imperial Defence College. In the militia, the keenest officers sought to graduate from the Militia Statt Course. Despite the dedication of these officers, Granatstein shows that both the PF and the NPAM were desperately weak in all respects. Nonetheless, the tiny PF produced “fighting, technical and staff officers” as competent as Crerar, Simonds, Foulkes, Vokes, Murchie, Burns, Stuart, MacQueen, Pope and Spry, a fact which the author describes as “a miracle of biblical proportions.” In an “equally miraculous fashion” there emerged from the ranks of the NPAM officer the likes of Hoffmeister, Keefler, Letson, CSL Hertzberger, Walford, Fenwick and Montague.
Granatstein looks carefully at “The Old
Brigade,” that group of officers in charge
44 bout de papier Vol. in Canada at the beginning of the war. Many were incompetent and several were relieved as a result of the intervention of General B.L. Montgomery, in Granatstein’s words, “the great housecleaner,” and known in the British Army as the “nasty little shit.” Majors-General Pearkes and Price, Brigadiers Potts and Ganong were only the early selections to be sent home or relieved as a result of Montgomery’s interventions. His descriptions of their weakness in private letters narily right in his judgements, and his methods and comments were every bit as harsh on British officers.” Among old brigade officers from the NPAM Major General Victor Odlum “exemplified the best and worst of Canada’s militia system.” Odlum had an excellent record in the First World War, but by 1939 he was long out-of-date militarily. What he still possessed was considerable energy and political influence, which resulted in his appointment in April 1940 as commander of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division. By April of 1941 everyone was looking for a way to ease the still-feisty Odlum to a position with lower potential for damage. Finally he became Canadian High Commissioner to Australia, the beginning of a decade long diplomatic career which took him to China and Turkey. “The tragedy of the Canadian Army at the cers in the militia were so weak that “Odlum was probably as well qualified as any” for a divisional commander’s job. Granatstein concludes that “it was fortunate indeed that Odlum, at once impetuous and firmly in a rut, did not have to lead his 2nd Canadian Infantry Division’s gallant charge against a German invasion of Britain.”
There follows four chapters each mainly devoted to one of the four major Canadian Generals — McNaughton, Crerar, Burns and Simonds. For each of these figures Granatstein’s analysis is penetrating, his insight devastating, his judgement perceptive and his conclusions balanced and fair. Andy McNaughton was “a great man, highly intelligent, a compelling personality, one who did well in every single endeavour he took on — except as Commander of the First Canadian Army.” McNaughton’s successor, Crerar, had “less original genius than McNaughton, he was a far abler field command and national representative in an Allied war effort where Canada was but a junior partner. Humane as he usually was in his dealing with ordinary soldiers and junior officers, his flaws in character and his overweening ambition made Crerar a less attractive human being than the equally ambitious McNaughton.” Of the three most important Canadian commanders in the war, Guy Simonds was unquestionably the most militarily brilliant. “Simonds stands head and shoulders above every other Canadian commander as a skilled tactician, as a general unafraid to try new approaches to the horrific battlefields of the Second World War.” Yet this master of the battlefield had no human touch. Nor did the equally interesting but less talented Tommy Burns. Surely the only Canadian General to publish articles in H.L. Menken’s American Mercury, Burns was also suspended from duty and sent back to Canada in July 1941 for security “indiscretions” written to a lady friend in Montreal. Reduced in rank and punished with a strictly administrative position, Burns was given a second chance when he was promoted Major-General in 1943. Granatstein has probably written the definitive account of Burns promotion to command of the Ist Canadian Corps and the series of crises which led to his dismissal. In Granatstein’s view, Burns “ ’defects of personality, his dour manner, his sarcasm, his diffidence, had done him in. He was … an ’example of a good man in the wrong appointment? Burns was a staff officer by nature, not a field commander.” In the end Burns was replaced by Charles Foulkes, who was Guy Simonds’ arch rival. At the end of the war Simonds expected to become Chief of the General Staff in Canada, but the position went to Foulkes. Charlie Foulkes had “a knack of impressing senior officers and politicians; Guy Simonds frightened them.” Foulkes as “a Harry Crerar writ small [who] had risen on the basis of his knowledge of men’s weaknesses and strengths as much as on his talents as a commander.”
Granatstein examines all sixty-eight officers who held the rank of major-general, and a great many more who were Brigadiers. He explores the absence of francophone generals, and “the utter lack of charisma” among Canadian generals. He never forgets that victory “undoubtedly owed more to the common soldiers than to the generals. It always does.” In my judgement, Granatstein presents the best account of military leadership, and the most persuasive case for developing military leadership ever written in Canada.
Because this book tackles a broad and important issue which touches directly or tangentially on all the most important questions associated with Canada’s participation in the Second World War, many will insist that the author should have written a differently weighted book – presumably one which deals with the reader’s (or reviewer’s) particular interest. Some will insist on more battle narrative, others will want greater consideration of political or diplomatic issues. More appropriate attention to the virtues or iniquities of the prewar militia, the permanent force, The Royal Military College, Canadian politicians or common soldiers may all be demanded. However, it is impossible to read this book without mentally wrestling with the author and coming away from the encounter stimulated, better informed, and — it must be said — thoroughly entertained. The research on which the book is based is astonishingly broad. If the book fails to be a finalist for a Governor General’s award, either Canada will have enjoyed its greatest year in nonfiction writing or Canadians should seriously look at the nomination and selection process for the prize.
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1994) — Summer 1994 // Été 1994, pp. 44–45. Read the rest of this issue →
