bout de papier, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1994) — Spring 1994 // Printemps 1994, pp. 27–29
This is an excerpt from Mitchell Sharp’s memoirs, Which Reminds Me… (University of Toronto Press, 1993,228 pp., $35.00). The memoirs trace Mr. Sharp’s career from Ottawa mandarinate in the 1940s and the 1950s to Cabinet Minister through most of the 1960s and 1970s, an astonishing career at the forefront of Canadian public policy for over four decades. He has now returned to the spotlight as a One-Dollar-a- Year Advisor on Ethics to the Liberal Government.
As Secretary of State for External Affairs from 1968-1974, Mr. Sharp has some observations on our Department and on foreign policy making which have particular relevance today. This excerpt offers Mr. Sharp’s view on integration, the Foreign Policy Review and our relations with the USA.
The Attack by Trudeau on Diplomats
Prime Minister Trudeau’s double-edged attack on External Affairs, his questioning of the conventional wisdom with respect to foreign policy and his questioning of the value of ambassadors in the modern world of telecommunications and air travel, came as a great shock. It is a tribute to the resilience and intelligence of the department under Ritchie’s firm guidance that it emerged from these initial attacks as well as it did. It wasn’t until several years later, when misguided (in my view) efforts were made to turn External Affairs from a policy-making department into a central agency, with three ministers and three deputy ministers, that real damage was done to the prestige of the department and the morale of its officials.
Those who served abroad as ambassadors, high commissioners, and in other senior positions were as aware as Prime Minister Trudeau of the changes that had taken place as a result of the communications revolution. By the time I became secretary of state for external affairs in 1968, the long, detailed despatches over which the ambassador and his or her aides once laboured mightily were no longer in vogue. Instead, ambassadors spent a great deal of time not on dispatches but in advising visiting Canadian ministers, helping visiting Canadian businessmen, and attending a proliferation of international gatherings, which were also the result of the communications revolution. I therefore regarded the Prime Minister’s comments about learning as much from newspapers as from diplomatic dispatches as superficial and unfair, and I was pleased when, after he had been in office for some time, he did not repeat them. His early comments may have served, however, to remind senior officials in External Affairs that they were not exempt from the public scrutiny and criticism that was accepted as normal by officials of other departments.
Two other developments affected the organization of External Affairs in those early years of my incumbency. One was the appointment by the Prime Minister in 1969 and 1970 of several senior officials of External Affairs as deputy ministers to other departments. This in itself was a tribute to the competence of External officials and, although it deprived the department of talent, it also opened the way for promotion of younger officers. When it happened, I recalled an off-hand comment made to me many years before by Norman Robertson, that it was a pity the government had devoted so much talent to foreign affairs and so little, relatively speaking, to federal-provincial affairs. Some of those who left later returned after seasoning, including three deputy ministers, Basil Robinson, Allan Gotlieb, and Derek Burney.
It also became necessary for the department, because of budgetary restraints at the beginning of the Trudeau regime, to reduce the number of personnel. This was done by eliminating a few smaller posts abroad and by reducing the number of personnel at most embassies and high commissions. It was a painful process, particularly for the undersecretary, who was responsible for the implementation of the cutbacks. My impression was that the department emerged leaner and trimmer and without impairment of any essential programs except, regrettably, its promotion abroad of Canada’s cultural image. Cultural activity, at home and abroad, is always the first victim of such economy drives.
Before becoming secretary of state for external affairs, my experience both as official and minister had been in economic affairs — trade, foreign investment, international finance, and so forth. This proved to be useful in my new job, since Canada is far more important in economic than in political terms. I also recognized that our posts abroad should be headed by ambassadors, high commissioners, and consuls general who understood the importance of promoting Canada’s economic as well as its political interests. I did not, however, believe that the Trade Commissioner Service should be absorbed into the Department of External Affairs. It was my opinion then — and still is — that trade commissioners should come under the discipline of the head of post while serving abroad, but should continue to report to the department that can provide the necessary back-up and support at home and direct contact with exporters, namely a department concerned with industry, trade, and commerce.
The Foreign Policy Review
Prime Minister Pearson and Paul Martin, his secretary of state for external affairs, had authorized a review of foreign policy before they left office and, when Trudeau and I succeeded them, the Department of External Affairs produced the resulting report, prepared by Norman Robertson, a former undersecretary of state for external affairs who was widely regarded as the foremost mandarin of his day. Trudeau rejected it as inadequate. He wanted a fundamental review that examined even such far-out alternatives for Canada as neutrality and non-alignment.
The review proceeded along two lines: one, which took precedence, centring on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); the other consisting of a series of papers, prepared by officials of External Affairs in consultation with officials in other interested departments. These papers were eventually approved by the government and published under the general title Foreign Policy for Canadians.
Although officials were involved, the debate within cabinet about NATO centred on the differing views of ministers, some of whom — especially Marchand, Pelletier, Macdonald, and Kierans — wanted Canada to withdraw from NATO or, if that was not acceptable, at least to bring back our troops from Europe. The Prime Minister presided over the debate, which took place at the outset in the Priorities and Planning Committee and, at the end, in the full cabinet. Trudeau cross-examined, raised questions, and challenged officials and officers of the Armed Forces to defend their opinions, but kept his counsel. I am uncertain to this day what policy Trudeau would personally have preferred at that point in time. All he made clear was his determination not to be satisfied with the conventional wisdom and to shake up the establishment.
The debate in cabinet committee went on for weeks. We examined and rejected all the alternatives to membership in NATO, such as neutrality, non-alignment, and a defence arrangement with the United States alone. These alternatives being rejected, a continuation of membership in NATO seemed to be accepted and the debate shifted to the extent of our participation. Should we have troops in Europe and, if so, how many?
’Foreign Policy for Canadians’ Never before 1968 had any Canadian government tried to express Canadian foreign policy in a single set of public documents. Until then, the content of Canadian foreign policy was to be found in ministerial speeches, in occasional documents, in the annual reports of the Department of External Affairs, and in papers and books written by academics. Nor, until then, had any Canadian government tried to place foreign policy within a consistent framework of Canadian interests and objectives. Foreign offices in other countries were astonished at our rashness.
At the time, I had some doubts about the value of publishing Foreign Policy for Canadians. Of necessity, it was full of generalities and was bound to raise controversy. Mr. Pearson looked upon these papers as an attack on his record. Yet, many years later, when the Mulroney government undertook the same initiative, I came to realize how thorough our review had been in the early 1970s and how relatively clear and precise had been the descriptions of our policy, both the overall policy and the policies in relation to Europe, Latin America, foreign aid, the United Nations, and the Pacific, the subjects of the subsidiary pamphlets. So quickly did the world change that it wasn’t long, however, before these papers became outdated and largely irrelevant.
The main criticism of Foreign Policy for Canadians was that it did not include a separate pamphlet on relations with the United States — rather like Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. This was not an oversight. We had concluded, perhaps wrongly, that so pervasive were Canadian relations with the United States that the main paper was to a very large extent a discussion of Canada’s relations with our southern neighbour.
The Third Option
Curiously, the biggest change in our approach to foreign policy came about not as a result of the Foreign Policy Review or Foreign Policy for Canadians. It occurred, instead, when the U.S. government decided to bring its continuing foreign-exchange crisis under control.
As I mentioned earlier, the decision in 1971 of John Connally, U.S. secretary of the Treasury, to apply a surcharge on imports from Canada effectively ended the special relationship between our two countries. I was directed by cabinet, as secretary of state for external affairs, to undertake a special study of Canada-U.S. relations. My department prepared an inventory of outstanding economic issues between our two countries that was kept up to date and circulated among the ministers. Concurrently, arising out of a suggestion that I made, Klaus Goldschlag, a senior official in External Affairs, drafted a paper discussing three options for Canada’s economic policy in relation to the United States.
– Canada can seek to maintain more or less its present relationship with the United States with a minimum of policy adjustments;
– Canada can move deliberately toward closer integration with the United States;
– Canada can pursue a comprehensive, long-term strategy to develop and strengthen the Canadian economy and other aspects of its national life and in the process to reduce the present Canadian vulnerability.
This paper in its final form became known as the Third Option. It was discussed at length and over several months, in both the Priorities and Planning Committee and in cabinet, between February and its publication in the fall of 1972. Although I favoured the Third Option, I made it clear to my colleagues that its adoption as government policy would involve difficult decisions, greater Canadian control over Canadian economic activity, and improved industrial efficiency and competitiveness.
The ministers concerned with economic matters, at Finance and at Industry, Trade and Commerce — and, in particular, their deputy ministers, Simon Reisman and J.F. Grandy — didn’t favour showing our hand to our opponent while negotiating with the Americans. In general, they favoured a reactive, pragmatic approach; in other words, a continuation of the first option. Prime Minister Trudeau participated actively in the debate and strongly favoured publication of the Third Option paper as evidence of the determination of the government to maintain Canadian independence.
No minister or official favoured the second option, closer integration with the United States or the negotiation of a free-trade agreement with our great neighbour. Some who participated in the 1971 discussions — notably Donald Macdonald and Simon Reisman — changed their view on that issue in the late 1980s. I didn’t.
I continued to be opposed to free trade with the United States and, many years later — in the late 1980s, when the Mulroney government negotiated an agreement — I spoke out against it.
My opposition to the FTA was not based on economics. I am an advocate of freer trade. I strongly supported various rounds of multilateral tariff reductions in the GATT, which played a central role in the expansion of world trade and in lowering trade barriers between Canada and the United States, thereby contributing to rising living standards in Canada. I spent a large part of my political life fighting the economic nationalists and protectionists within and outside the Liberal Party.
What I considered a deplorable error in terms of national policy was to shift from a multilateral or international approach to a continental approach, to accord better treatment to trade with the United States than to trade with Europe and Japan. Until then, we had done what we could to resist the overwhelming influence of the United States in our economy, our culture, and our politics. By entering into an exclusive free-trade agreement designed to integrate the economies of our two countries, we were not only abandoning our resistance, we were deliberately inviting ourselves to be overwhelmed.
To the proponents of the FTA who put economics first and down played the threat to Canadian independence, identity, and freedom of action, I responded by pointing out that if the primary goal of national policy is, as they contend, to ensure more and better jobs for the people who live north of the forty-ninth parallel, there is a better and more effective way than free trade to go: why did they not advocate joining the United States!
I digress. Let me return to 1971. The cabinet, after long and detailed discussion, approved the Third Option strategy.
I favoured and was authorized, as secretary of state for external affairs, to publish the paper on Canada-U.S. relations over my own signature, but not as part of Foreign Policy for Canadians. I did so in the publication International Perspectives in the fall of 1972. Whatever the purpose of this subtle
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Admissions, Albert College 160 Dundas St. West Belleville, Ontario K8P 1A6 Tel: (613) 968-5726 Fax: (613) 968-9651 differentiation may have been, the Third Option came to be accepted as government policy. Moreover, the Third Option came to be invoked enthusiastically by the government and by others to support policies that were far more nationalistic than my paper had proposed, a consequence that I deplored.
Did the Third Option government to give stronger support to national institutions the Canada Council, and to bilingualism.
I intended the Third Option not only as an alternative to pragmatism on the one hand and integration with the United States on the other, but also as a preferred alternative to the more extreme kinds of nationalistic measures that were being advocated in some quarters at the time.
Did the Third Option succeed? For years after the publication of the options paper in October 1972, I was asked this question by journalists and university students writing essays or theses. It did succeed, I think, in prompting the government to give stronger support to national institutions like the CBC and the Canada Council, and to bilingualism, all of which helped to define and support Canadian culture and identity. On the economic side, the government did devote a good deal of effort to the promotion of overseas trade during the 1970s and 1980s. Nevertheless, the proportion of our total trade — exports and imports — that we did with the United States continued to increase. The Third Option had contemplated the adoption of policies to alter the industrial structure of Canada so as to diversify and strengthen our industries and thereby reduce our independence upon the United States as an export market and as a source of imports. This was never really seriously attempted and, in retrospect, was probably far too difficult an undertaking for any federal government of Canada, given the crucial role of the provinces with respect both to resources and industry.
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1994) — Spring 1994 // Printemps 1994, pp. 27–29. Read the rest of this issue →
