bout de papier, Vol. 19, No. 1 (2002) — Spring/Summer 2002 // Printemps/Été 2002, pp. 5–7
By the dav its As Pacit a site as elsewhere in the Department, had become desperate, perhaps untenable. Over-tasking, under-resourcing, e-mail insanity, deteriorating terms and conditions of employment and ever growing demands of all varieties and from all quarters had led to a disastrous mix of burn-out, rust out, and the reaming out of geographic divisions. The issues extended well beyond the recognized problems associated with retention and recruiting — even the committed were beginning to despair. Faced with a gutting of the very regional and linguistic expertise which is the basis of DEAIT’s comparative advantage, the risks of inaction had become critical. It could not go on.
Very early in his tenure as newly appointed ADM for the Asia-Pacific, David Mulroney identified the priority requirement to address these issues. He had been much impressed with the results of the Trade Commissioner Service’s New Approach@ Work and Australia’s Working Smarter initiative. In late summer 2001, he initiated a review of how Asia Branch approaches these issues, with the assurance that staff and budget would be available to do the job properly. I was asked to spearhead the initiative.
Though the events of September I intervened, at a follow-up meeting in mid- September it was agreed that a “soft launch” of the initiative would be appropriate. But first, there was the issue of finding a way to get by all of the dead weight, false starts and dashed hopes that littered the road to incipient ruin.
From PERPA Program Review …
Back in the early 1990s, in the context of the Corporate Review, John Halstead was brought back into DFAIT on a consulting contract to audit and evaluate the management of the political/economic cadre. He prepared a thoughtful assessment, suggesting that active management of the group as a group, with defined objectives and responsibilities, was lacking, and would in fact be a good idea. He maintained that damage was being sustained and that, if left unaddressed, the problems would worsen and be expressed, inter alia, in sinking morale and rising attrition. His report, which now reads like prophesy, was dismissed at the time as “unhelpful,” classified as confidential (to prevent its distribution) and quietly shelved.
A similar fate befell George Haynal’s Workforce of the Future study, a pathfinding and forward looking analysis which was the product of his years as workforce Champion 1998-99. After some fanfare, it seemed to disappear into the bureaucratic ether shortly after publication. So, too, with Paul Chapin’s expansive, insightful and carefully researched paper on the Political Officer prepared for the Evaluation Division in late 2000. Its subtle assessment, detailed analysis and fact-filled annexes were received with interest — and put on the back burner.
We would have to begin by reviewing carefully these documents, and, from that substantial base, move forward. To that end, over the summer of 2001 David Mulroney had surveyed a selection of present and past PERPA (Political/Economic Relations and Public Affairs) program managers in the Branch to get a sense of the lay of the land. Removing the names and extracting and aggregating the substantial commentary, he shared the findings.
The results were no great surprise. Respondents were near unanimous in their conclusion that the PERPA program, due to its lack of direction and definition, had evolved into a catch-all for anything that did not obviously fit elsewhere. At missions, the program served as a kind of auto-default mechanism (some have gone so far as to say “junkyard” or “garbage can”) where everything outside of better defined programs inevitably ended up.
At HQ, people were spending less time thinking strategically, analyzing or developing policy through the prism of Canadian interests, values and policies, and more time programming visits and rewriting briefs. Ministerial Letters of Instruction to HOMs — an imperfect instrument but one which had forced some degree of reflection on objectives and priorities — had disappeared, apparently by default rather than design or decision. Mission planning, where it happened at all, was a mixed bag, while business planning at the bureau and branch levels was seen as overly labour and resource intensive and in large part disconnected from activities in the field. The (uneven) results were too often forgotten soon after the toner had dried.
Unlike the Trade Commissioner Service (TCS), PERPA also lacked a dedicated management and resource base at HQ. There was nothing approaching the TCS New Approach. No Chief Political Officer. No Web site. No uniform benchmarks, standards, or agreed list of alternative service providers. No PERPA program support divisions or rapid deployment force. No systematic assessment, in reporting, of what developments in the world might mean for Canada. No time to adequately develop and maintain a network of contacts critical to advancing the mandate of the mission and the goals of the government. No repository for best practices. No software to facilitate position handovers. No real priorities — because everything was seen as important, nothing was. Perhaps most crucially, there was no rationale for just saying no.
In short, no discipline, no shape, drift.
… to DFAIT transformation …
When I replied to the PERPA survey, I made the case that Canadian political and economic diplomacy had not sufficiently or effectively entered the information age. The program was formless, with no deliberate focus on public diplomacy or concerted effort at branding Canada as a dynamic, diverse, competitive, cosmopolitan, sophisticated, and innovative partner in bilateral, regional and global affairs. Joint ventures and strategic partnerships with like-minded groups, organizations and corporations, a cornerstone of the public diplomacy/soft power approach, occurred but only episodically.
Officers were spending an inordinate amount of their scarce time servicing host governments, and especially on MFA calls executed in large part for purposes of going through the old-style, Westphalian diplomatic motions rather than for the probable advance of Canadian interests. Attendance at purely ceremonial functions, national day celebrations of non-priority countries, and hospitality events with obscure connections to identifiable clients was common. Officers were arranging cultural programs and organizing artistic tours without a clear sense of how they fit — or did not — into a broader picture. Too much time was being spent responding to requests for information (usually, though not always, about Canada) when it was available elsewhere — to an increasing extent, on-line. Staff could communicate with anyone, anywhere, anytime, but sifting through endless queues we could no longer distinguish between a formal message and a note from a friend.
quipped with his wealth of
Idition to the of the earlier in a position to hit the ground running.
There were no shortage of issues to be addressed.
To summarize, the PERPA survey made clear that the program was in desperate need of recasting from the ground up to take into account globalization, the need to project a contemporary image of Canada in the world, the creative possibilities associated with the new media, and, above all, the requirement to focus on the pursuit of Canadian interests. At a time of diminished resources and spiralling demands, the workload had to be reduced and refined, the objectives clarified, the goals — and goal posts — identified and recalibrated.
Equipped with this wealth of information, in addition to the fruits of the earlier research, we were in a position to hit the ground running.
… is a long, hard road
Feeling a combination of anticipation and trepidation, in roughly equal measure, we sought out a variety of associates from across the Department, shopped the idea around and pitched them on participation. There was some inevitable cynicism and understandable skepticism, but by and large the idea was well-received. As a hook, we circulated a document setting out some possible outcomes. Interest grew. The initial party of would-be reformers got together in early October for a preliminary exchange; the Ginger Group developed from this disparate crew.
From the start, the Ginger Group was horizontal, democratic, open and organic. It defined its own mandate to oversee the whole and coordinate the work of specialized working groups and subcommittees. While it started small, many have come forward to volunteer their time since, while others have made their particular contribution and moved on. To date, subcommittees have defined core clients and services for the PERPA program, identified alternative service delivery mechanisms, articulated best practices and developed a high-end intranet site and e3 logo. In the Branch, we have worked smarter through this year’s Branch plan, and created an e3 support unit (Avril Pigott, Owen Teo, Hillary Thompson) to coordinate the initiative, solve problems and provide advice. They are busy pursuing that brief. A new, relaxed dress code is on offer in the Branch, and a protocol for meetings stipulates that they must be held between 10:00 and 12:00 or 2:00 and 4:00, last no more than one hour, and feature an agenda distributed at least 24 hours in advance. The team is working on guidelines for briefing books, reporting, e-communications and airport meets. Evaluation and performance measurement, templates for visits planning/management and position handovers, and the development of a process model for regional and mission strategic planning are next.
With the help of the Ginger Group, organizational change consultant Norman Ballie- David, the e3 unit and the determined leadership of the ADM, the believers are pressing forward. Under the e3 rubric, stones are being turned in a search for ways to restore the work-life balance, identify and focus on priorities, and pursue quality. There have been some early successes, and the consultative loop is being widened through conference calls with mission representatives in the field. More is in train to build on these achievements. Though much remains to be done, the beginning has ended. A huge front-end push has created momentum.
Much of this can be scoped on the e3 Intranet site, which over time will become the central point of reference and a virtual exemplar of the e3 environment. Those who have access to the Department’s Intranet site can check out http://intranet.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/e3 for details.
Getting there …
Where to now? In order to begin to restore and, more importantly, retain some semblance of balance between personal and professional lives, e3 will need a longer-term strategy. In geographic divisions, for starters, it will be necessary to identify and consult widely on key priorities. These will need to be incorporated into divisional and mission plans, which in turn can be plugged into regional schemes and, ultimately, Branch business plans and a DFAIT priority setting exercise. At that point it may be possible to coherently assess performance — of HOMs, managers, desk officers — against results achieved, to tighten up operationally, and to fend off unreasonable or off-base demands.
Will all of this work? On verra. DFAIT is a conservative institution, hierarchic, topdown and control-oriented, highly resistant to change. It is not difficult to understand, and even to explain, how that kind of culture developed. But in the current environment, change is manifestly preferable to, and demonstrably more appropriate than, resistance. The old ways — of devotion to making your boss look good at the expense of those below you, of kiss-up, kick-down — are giving way gradually to contemporary values and ethics. From opacity to transparency, from personalismo to professionalism, from secrecy to openness, the march — the long, difficult march — is on.
The team has tried to keep the process out of the ditch, to widen its ambit and applicability to all DFAIT employees, to communicate internally and to consult broadly. We have tried to ensure that this venture does not become a parody of itself. It must remain horizontal, participatory and inclusive, a self-selecting collective rather than a management-driven directive. To create something enduring and universal, e3 will have to come up with more than just better ideas. Changing culture means developing new structures and new behaviours, new channels and new mindsets. Transformation of this magnitude takes time, and these are early days yet.
As e3 moves from the Asia Pacific Branch to the wider Department, some of the challenges, such as the creation of a Central Services Unit designed to remove some of the oppressive drudgery from desk officers, will require much more than goodwill. This kind of outfit, which would assist by providing scale economies in the handling of visits logistics, briefing book production, the physical preparation of ministerial and cabinet papers, and related functions, would likely involve significant incremental resources. The pay-out, however, would be tremendous. I think that we need to look carefully as well at developing the virtual desk, which would use technology to connect parties drawn from across the country and around the world who share an interest in countries, regions and issues, to create and sustain a network which unites a coalition of the willing. The virtual desk could consist of DFAIT officials, former diplomats, academics, civil society and NGO reps, business people, OGD types, journalists. Different parts of the desk would be engaged at different times and on different issues.
Why not establish, at the most senior level, a new unit headed by a Chief Innovation Officer, whose responsibilities would include the assessment of leading-edge developments in all aspects of governance and public management and who would be accountable for passing the ideas on and tracking implementation? Why not implement upward feedback, from bottom to top, and link it to pertormance assessment?
The best thing about starting from so far behind is that the field is open for all kinds of new thinking.
… hopefully
He redeployed his resources in support of emerging priorities. But he still ended up with his head on the end of a pole, his position in the end overrun by el Mahdi’s tribal warriors. Though his needs were ultimately recognized, Kitchener’s reinforcements arrived two days too late, in large part because of dithering in London.
Which is just to say that at a certain point, no amount of tactical savvy, strategic brilliance, inspired reallocation or enlightened management is enough to save the day.
is that the field is of new thinking. BUT OUTSIDE DI THE CUBE
To do more, to do better, or even to do less, intelligently, at the end of the day you may well need more.
Last word?
The alternative to this kind of enterprise, inaction, is riskier by far than the embrace of change. The status quo is the real source of jeopardy, because the costs associated with the present course cannot be sustained Implosion is a worst case scenario, but there are a growing number who believe that in DEAIT today the circumstances are sufficiently dire that it cannot be dismissed out of hand. There must be a fundamental change in orientation and direction.
e3 has been a good news story, designed at the outset to be both of and for the many. While no panacea, it certainly merits more than the willing suspension of disbelief.
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 19, No. 1 (2002) — Spring/Summer 2002 // Printemps/Été 2002, pp. 5–7. Read the rest of this issue →
