bout de papier, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1994) — Spring 1994 // Printemps 1994, pp. 48–50
SEIZE THE DAY: LESTER B. PEARSON
AND CRISIS DIPLOMACY by Geoffrey A.H.
Pearson, Ottawa, Carleton University
Press 1993 $17.95.
Students of Canadian foreign policy, members of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, and former colleagues of Lester Pearson already owe a considerable debt to Geoffrey Pearson for their appreciation of his father’s life and his role in Canada’s international relations. Since Lester Pearson’s death in 1972, his papers have been made available for research in a manner that is consistent with his attitude and spirit. His heirs authorized and facilitated an award-winning biography by John English that is worthy of its subject and a model for such works. Last year, the family generously donated the medal and scroll for the Nobel Peace Prize of 1957 to the Department for display in the building which so appropriately bears his name. Now, Geoffrey Pearson has contributed his unique perspective to our understanding with a fine account of his father’s diplomatic record as Secretary of State for External Affairs from 1948 to 1957.
For this analysis, Geoffrey Pearson has examined a series of topics or episodes that confronted his father during this period: the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty, the initiation of the Colombo Plan (and the Canadian contribution thereto), the Korean War, American nuclear policy, Indo-China, relations with the People’s Republic of China and, of course, the Suez Crisis. Though the title and sub-title convey a dramatic sense of preoccupation with immediate crises, most of the chapters are devoted to more persistent problems resolved, or not, through deliberation, negotiation and compromise. These accounts are framed by two preliminary chapters on the setting in 1948, when Lester Pearson moved from being the official head of the Department of External Affairs to being its minister, and a concluding commentary on the notion of a “Pearsonian consensus.” Throughout this remarkable book, the tone is understandably sympathetic and familiar, yet analytical. To the departmental files, some of which he returned to the Department from the Pearson Papers, the author has added insights from his own recollections as well as from his father’s letters. What results is a well-written assessment that sheds additional light on the attitudes and approaches of Lester Pearson and his associates to a variety of issues.
The introductory sketch of Pearson conveys ably and succinctly his relations with his colleagues in the Department and, after 10 September 1948, in the Cabinet. Foremost among these, of course, was his partnership with Louis St. Laurent, who respected and trusted the advice of the Secretary of State for External Affairs (and former Under-Secretary) on questions of foreign policy, though he was less likely to defer on the political consequences of commitments. There had been no such understanding with Mackenzie King — as Geoffrey Pearson puts it, “Pearson would not have wished to serve in a Mackenzie King Cabinet.” Given that Pearson had few friends in the Cabinet, with the exception of Brooke Claxton and Paul Martin, the relationship with the Prime Minister was critical for political support of any diplomatic initiatives. Understandably, Norman Robertson and Hume Wrong feature prominently among senior members of the Department but Geoffrey Pearson also reminds readers of the personal and professional qualities that made Arnold Heeney and Escott Reid so important.
The author effectively evokes the mood of the “Canadian crusade” for what became the North Atlantic Treaty, as well as the lingering, sometimes forlorn, hope for the United Nations. The context of the Cold
War, he argues persuasively, contributed to a consensus in favour of internationalism in Canada. Opposition to Communism as an ideological force was an important factor in Canadian attitudes.
The “Canadian crusade” anticipated a British initiative. Though it may be true that, after the breakdown of the Council of Foreign Ministers in December 1947, the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, did not believe that war was imminent (p. 31), Bevin’s articulation of his fears to Mackenzie King one month earlier influenced Canadian acceptance of a peacetime alliance, whether or not it was cloaked in the mantle of “community.” Naturally enough, in discussing the negotiations leading to NATO, Geoffrey Pearson focuses on the part played by his father, whose participation was more direct when he was Under- Secretary, with less attention to political approval for the pact. Lester Pearson’s frequent reminders to Mackenzie King in the spring of 1948 that the talks were not binding provided an example of the finely honed political skills that served him well in his later political incarnation. When negotiations resumed in early December 1948, Pearson was away, but the flow of cables testified eloquently to his personal role in decision-making. That trans-Atlantic traffic also indicated that his advisers felt more comfortable with him than with the acting minister, Claxton. What emerges from these pages is a reasonable presentation of the views of Pearson and his associates as well as a balanced assessment of the Canadian contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty. However, the crises that played important parts in stimulating the process and carrying it forward — the coup in Czechoslovakia and the attempt to blockade Berlin — receive only passing mention (p. 46), though Pearson’s response to these events was quite revealing.
Pearson’s tactics in seeking approval from the Cabinet for the Colombo Plan, particularly his private letter to St. Laurent on the eve of the crucial meeting, contrasted to an earlier misjudgement (pp. 56-58). Similarly, the narrative on the Canadian response to the Korean War demonstrates how Pearson applied his political and diplomatic skills to the development of support in Cabinet and at the United Nations for a less bellicose position than the Americans seemed disposed to adopt. In the latter instance, there is still a tendency, as in other Canadian accounts, to presume that our diplomats and politicians spoke for the best interests of the United Nations, even when a majority of its members disagreed. Perhaps we will always have a tendency to see ourselves as keepers of the Covenant.
Though bilateral issues with the United States (and economic questions generally) do not figure prominently in this study, the interplay of Canadian with American policy was a consistent concern of Pearsonian diplomacy. Especially given the part that the issue of nuclear weapons would play later in his career, Pearson’s response to American nuclear policy provides some fascinating glimpses of anxiety about American use of the “ultimate weapon” as well as ambivalence about its value as a deterrent. As Geoffrey Pearson notes, this book pays greater attention to Asia than a modern reader would expect, though there was always an American dimension to the Canadian interest. The peculiar story of Canada’s participation in the control commissions for Indo-China certainly illustrates that theme. Similarly, the various issues associated with China, from recognition to the off-shore islands, loomed greater on the Canadian horizon because of the Far Eastern policy of the United States.
The chapter on the Suez Crisis most closely conforms to the model implied in the title and the story is inextricably linked with Pearson’s reputation. However, Geoffrey Pearson still manages to explain it in a way which helps readers understand his father’s actions and responses in their contemporary context. As he illustrates, the Middle East was low on his father’s agenda and that of the Department before 1956, more likely to attract attention for prospective arms sales than diplomatic opportunities. The intervention of Canada and its foreign minister at the United Nations was late and sudden, with a predictable preoccupation with the implications of conflict for the North Atlantic alliance. As this account makes clear, authorship of the specific wording of the resolution, which has sometimes distracted historians, was less important than the diplomatic efforts to secure its acceptance, for which Lester Pearson was justifiably honoured the following year. It also provides a salutary reminder that the best foreign policy or triumphant diplomacy may not be the most popular or politically successful course of action. When he received the Nobel Prize, Pearson was already sitting on the Opposition benches in Ottawa and the diplomatic period covered by this volume had come to an end
As Geoffrey Pearson states, the political consensus which was so vital to his father’s diplomacy was a by-product of the Cold War, not simply a gathering around an internationalist ideal. Before the Suez Crisis, Canada’s participation in international affairs was sustained by national political support. In contrast to the Mackenzie King era, foreign policy under St. Laurent and Pearson was a unifying factor in Canada. Both national unity and a “Pearsonian consensus” in international affairs would be elusive when Pearson returned to power in 1963, but that is another story.
In his preface, Geoffrey Pearson acknowledges “the risk of filial piety” in embarking on such a project. There is no evidence of such a fault in this excellent examination of Lester Pearson’s performance on the world stage. With clarity and conviction, this book adds to our understanding of Lester Pearson’s outlook and his effectiveness as Canada’s principal representative in a decade of challenge and opportunity.
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1994) — Spring 1994 // Printemps 1994, pp. 48–50. Read the rest of this issue →
