bout de papier, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2001) — Spring 2001 // Printemps 2001, pp. 28–29
ROOSEVELT AND CHURCHILL: MEN
OF SECRETS by David Stafford,
The Overlook Press (2000), Peter Mayor
Publishers, Inc., Woodstock & New York,
359 pp., US $35.00
David Stafford has written a well-researched, captivating book about Roosevelt and Churchill and their deep personal interest and involvement in the conduct of the multifarious secret intelligence activities of the British, the Americans and their allies, which contributed so much to the eventual defeat of the Axis powers in World War II. Unfortunately, it also led to serious differences between Britain and the United States. The book is an important companion piece to an earlier, equally interesting book by Stafford, Camp X: Canada’s School for Secret Agents, 1941-45, published in 1986 by Lester & Orpen Dennys Ltd., Toronto, which I also reviewed for bout de papier (Vol.
The book is well written and particularly interesting because of the detail it provides concerning the unusual relationship which developed between Churchill and Roosevelt, revealing much about the characters, strengths and failings of the two leaders.
Apart from what the book demonstrates about the manner in which, at the highest political levels, Britain and the United States conducted the war against Germany and Japan, it makes clear the extent to which Roosevelt and Churchill became personally involved in the various secret intelligence activities carried out by both countries and their allies, including Canada. Canada’s considerable military contributions have been well recorded. Unfortunately, despite excellent published studies such as those by Professor Wesley Wark (Cryptographic Innocence: The Origins of Signals Intelligence in the Second World War) and Canadian Member of Parliament John Bryden (Best- Kept Secret, Canadian Secret Intelligence in the Second World War), the extent of Canada’s valuable secret intelligence operations (in wartime and thereafter) remains largely unknown and certainly unheralded.
I have in mind particularly our development of cryptography. As G. de B. Robinson expressed it in his top secret History of the Examination Unit 1941-1945, written in July 1945 when he was Acting Director; “Many have shared in the work, and it is not too much to say that the results achieved have been remarkable. From practically
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P NT nothing in 1941, Ottawa grew in three years to the stature of London and Washington in those fields (French and Japanese) on which we have worked. We have pulled our own weight in these fields and made many worthwhile contributions to the common pool of knowledge, while at the same time feeding a continuous stream of intelligence to the department of External Affairs and to the Directors of Intelligence [Military].”
Stafford enlivens the story with references to the lifestyles of Churchill and Roosevelt. For example, concerning Roosevelt; ’That summer [1944] he asked his daughter Anna, now his constant companion, to invite his mistress of thirty years before, Lucy Mercer, to dinners at the White House when Eleanor was away. The affair [had] almost destroyed his marriage and he had promised never to see her again. Yet he had, secretly, from time to time since the war began, and he glowed in her presence.” In a later reference, Stafford added: “After returning from Hyde Park Roosevelt travelled (sic) to Warm Springs, Georgia, for a two-week rest. Eleanor stayed behind and after a few days Lucy Mercer joint (sic) him… [On] 12 April 1945, as he sat with Lucy and the butler was preparing lunch, Roosevelt suffered a severe cerebral haemorrhage and died two hours later.” The extramarital affair was extensively written about by Doris Kerns Goodwin in her book No Ordinary Time, published in 1994.
Among the more intriguing aspects of Stafford’s book are his perceptive comments about the internecine warfare between the British and the Americans over intelligence operations during World War II, and immediately thereafter, when the Soviet Union and its allies became our principal enemies. In my experience, and particularly later, when I was Director General of the RCMP Security Service from 1970-73, these squabbles seemed never-ending and, given what we now know about the extent of KGB successes, they must have been well-known to the Russians. These unremitting, often bitter fights over territory, post-war intelligence strategies and political objectives in Europe, the Far East and elsewhere made Canada’s role as a partner to the Americans and the British in intelligence gathering activities difficult to maintain, without our interests becoming adversely affected. This became particularly so in areas where, for valid security reasons, the activities had to be shrouded in the greatest secrecy. I have in mind cryptography, but more especially Canada’s involvement in CAZAB (a top secret counter-espionage organization set up in the late 1960s and maintained by Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Britain and America in an attempt to counter increasing worldwide espionage activities by the Russians and their allies). For example, when influential protagonists such as CIA’s head of counter-espionage James Jesus Angleton and the head of Britain’s M.I. 5 joined battle, the fur flew with results which were often destructive and long-lasting. Because of the great secrecy surrounding these discussions, such adverse effects as they produced remained largely unknown outside the intelligence and security agencies involved and, in Canada’s case, because the Prime Minister in authorizing our participation had ruled that neither his ministers nor their officials should be made aware of CAZAB, the problems thus created were exacerbated. Ironically, these activities and the disagreements they engendered appear to have been well-known to the Russians, and their significance clearly understood and exploited by them.
I think the book is a good read and the author is to be complimented for having given the latter chapters the particular themes he pursues so skillfully. The book adds useful, intriguing aspects to the still-unfolding story of British-American intelligence cooperation in World War II and its significance in terms of the eventual outcome of the war.
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2001) — Spring 2001 // Printemps 2001, pp. 28–29. Read the rest of this issue →
