bout de papier, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2006) — Summer 2006 // Été 2006, pp. 25–28
Sixty years ago, the defection of a cypher clerk from the embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Ottawa focussed world attention on Canada in an early and dramatic episode of what became the Cold War. Documents and testimony from /gor Gouzenko revealed the existence of Soviet espionage rings operating in Canada and elsewhere. When news of the revelations had leaked out, the government of W. L. Mackenzie King established a Royal Commission under two Justices of the Supreme Court of Canada, Robert Taschereau and R. L. Kellock, to investigate the allegations. Most of those named by Gouzenko or mentioned in the documents were detained, without access to counsel or family, in the Rockcliffe Barracks of the RCMP, until they appeared before the inquiry.
Though few still dispute the importance of the revelations, the procedures employed to detain, to question and later to prosecute those alleged to have made unauthorized disclosures of “secret and confidential information to agents of a foreign power” have remained controversial in light of the violation of fundamental rights and liberties of Canadian citizens and British subjects. As indicated in the exchange of letters reproduced below, between John Holmes, who was then Second Secretary in the Canadian High Commission in London, and Hume Wrong, then Associate Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, these issues troubled Canadian diplomats and some of their allied counterparts as well as members of the public in Canada and abroad.
For the King government, this was an unfamiliar and difficult problem, with understandable anxiety and uncertainty about how best to proceed, particularly given the nature of the evidence. The various aspects of the Gouzenko affair have been examined in Amy Knight’s How the Cold War Began: The Gouzenko Affair and the Hunt for Soviet Spies (Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart, 2005) and in a collection of essays edited by J. L. Black and Martin Rudner, The Gouzenko Affair: Canada and the Beginnings of Cold War Counter-Espionage (Manotick: Penumbra Press, 2006). The letters come from the Records of the Department of External Affairs (RG25) at Library and Archives Canada, Volume 2620, File N-1.
John Holmes to Hume Wrong, 25 February 1946.
TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL.
Dear Hume,
You may be interested in a few rambling and ill-digested comments on the impressions which seem to have been produced in this country since you left by the espionage reports from Ottawa.
In the first place I must say that I have been worried many times lest the whole thing turn sour on us. It does not as yet seem to have created a profound impression and I am beginning to doubt if it will, even when the full reports are published. Hitherto I have attributed this almost entirely to commendable hesitation to comment on a matter which was sub judice and which, furthermore, was being exploited in the worst possible way by the popular press. However, even the Soviet Note, which revealed a good deal, does not seem to have shaken anyone particularly.
What seems to me particularly unfortunate is that people cannot refrain from considering this as a Canadian move in the general problem of relations between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union. Inglis did an excellent job in pointing out in “The Times” Jesterday the domestic problem with which the Canadian Government are faced, and a “News Chronicle” report from Ottawa this morning helps somewhat to explain that the Canadian Government was primarily interested in the betrayal of secret information by Canadians rather than in the Soviet Government’s connection with the business. Reuters told Cam Moody [sic: Campbell Moodie, Press Attaché, Canadian High Commission, London] they thought the matter had been badly handled in Ottawa, there had been no guidance and no way of stopping the rumours. I had the same from The Sunday Times. I presume Inglis had some guidance – and very good guidance.
I have been surprised by the number of intelligent people who have strongly criticized to me the action of the Canadian Government in not handling this matter through diplomatic channels. They do respond to explanations, but the Editor of “The Spectator” seems to be the only person who has yet pointed out in print that in a country like Canada civil servants cannot be dismissed without some explanation. This critical attitude has been taken by a number of Canadians in London, as well as by people like Alex Halpern (whose information I respect a great deal more than his judgment).
Yesterday I had a talk with [Thomas] Brimelow, the quite able and intelligent young man who looks after Russian affairs in the Foreign Office. He was polite, but I think undoubtedly considered that the Canadian Government had not handled this matter in the wisest manner. I doubt very much if he knows the whole story, and I certainly did not assume he did. I do not mean to suggest that he accepted the Russian explanation or considered that Canada should have accepted the whole situation. He was afraid, however, that we had given the Russians an opportunity to deploy their most unscrupulous methods of propaganda. He told me that [Frank] Roberts [Minister, British Embassy in Moscow], in a telegram from Moscow, had expressed some uneasiness about the similarity of the Russian strategy in this case to their strategy in connection with the Katyn murders. In the latter case the injured party, Poland, had immediately been attacked and placed on the defensive. Neither Brimelow nor I think Roberts wanted to press the analogy too seriously, but they considered there were some grounds for uneasiness. Brimelow said frankly that they were naturally worried about the way in which responsibility for this matter had been attributed to them. I am not sure whether he was not under the impression that we had acted without consultation, but I did not feel I should tell him anything he didn’t know. When I pointed out that the Russians were at the moment so intent on blaming Britain for everything I did not think that anything we could do could alter this intention, he expressed agreement. He told me that the Foreign Office poliey, or at least the policy which was being put up to Ministers, was to ignore entirely Pravda’s comment about [Ernest] Bevin’s alleged initiative. They are obviously bent on conciliation at the moment.
It is a little difficult, however, for me to find out what the Government’s policy is in this regard, because I assume that only the Foreign Secretary and a few others know of the background.
You may be interested to know that one cause of difficulty for the Foreign Office is that they are under great pressure at the moment from the Royal Society to invite a group of Soviet scientists to England for some Newton Memorial celebrations. You will remember the painful incident last June when a group of British scientists were about to leave for Moscow and the atomic specialists were taken off the ’plane at the last moment. The Foreign Office considers this a most inopportune time for a return visit, but they do not know whether they can beat off the demands of Professor A[rchibald]. V[ivian]. Hill [co-winner of the Nobel Prize for medicine in 1922 and Foulerton research professor of the Royal Society], who incidentally is the leading spokesman of the view that Soviet espionage in Canada can be blamed entirely on the refusal to give up atomic secrets. Brimelow said it was their view that they did not wish to embarrass us by allowing Soviet scientists of all kinds to come on a goodwill mission at the present time. However, if they attempted to handpick the invitations and pointedly omit the atomic energy specialists, the Russians would probably not accept and there would be a great howl of protest.
The point of all this is, I think, that the sooner the whole story can be published the better it will be understood in this country. In making this remark I am not suggestion [sic] that every effort is not being made to speed things up or that I am arguing something of which you are not already convinced. I do hope that when a full statement comes out it will be possible to make clear:
(a) why the matter could not be hushed up;
(b) why it was not possible to make diplomatic representations to the Soviet Embassy well in advance of a public statement;
(c) that although the Canadian Government accepts full responsibility for acting on its own initiative, nevertheless it did not act irresponsibly and without consulting the United Kingdom and United States authorities, who might be involved in its consequences;
(d) that the time of the announcement was dictated by the totally irresponsible action of an American racketeer.
I see that the Herald Tribune (Paris) also takes the line that spying is a recognized convention and Canada should not kick up such a fuss. This is the view which is harder to combat, I think, because it appeals to objective minds. What we have to do is make clear that the issue involved is not the age-old question of the ethics of espionage, but the crucial problem presented to the modern democratic state by the refusal of members of the Communist Party to accept loyalty to the nation state.
This is a rush note dictated in a hurry. Please don’t take it seriously except as a reflection of thinking in London. I don’t mean to suggest that I think the Government could have acted in any other way.
Yours sincerely, Hume Wrong to John Holmes, 1 March 1946.
IOP SECRET AND PERSONAL
My dear John, I have just received your letter of February 23rd giving your comments on the impressions produced in the United Kingdom by our espionage investigation here. I was very glad to get this and I shall pass on some of your observations to the proper quarters here.
I can, perhaps, make a few comments of my own which might be helpful to you in conversation.
In the first place, the Commission’s report should show anyone of reasonably good judgment why this matter could not be handled through diplomatic channels. It was obvious to us from the first that, unless we were to pretend that we had not received the information which we had, there would have to be an enquiry involving publicity in order to enable the removal of those involved from their positions in the Government Service. Consideration was given to a prior diplomatic approach to the Soviet Government but it was apparent that such an approach might well entail the failure of our domestic housecleaning through warning in advance the Canadians concerned in the conspiracy. I am surprised that so many people in England seem to have been impressed by the Russian complaint that we did not tell them first before investigating what our own people had been up to. Incidentally, they have not yet told us, except in this same statement, that they have recalled their Military Attaché [Colonel Nikolai Zabotin], although we know that he left Canada early in December. This is, however, a minor point.
Secondly, I think that many people’s judgments are distorted by the overwhelming anxiety which now prevails, particularly in the United Kingdom, about the course of Soviet foreign policy. They probably feel that matters were going sourly enough without adding a new complication of this sort. They presumably do not realize that what we have stumbled on here is only a small sample of the practices going on in other countries and that while the Soviet Government follows these methods there is a very serious obstacle to the maintenance of harmonious relations. Public exposure here may well lead the Soviet authorities eventually to change their methods on the ground that they do not pay, and this would be an all round advantage in achieving a better working relationship with the Soviet Government.
Thirdly, quite apart from the normal ethics of espionage, this case – and I presume the Royal Commission’s Report will make this clear – involves a subversive technique analogous to that used by the Nazis through the Bund organizations in various countries. This technique is to create, and employ for subversive purposes, divided loyalties among elements in democratic states. We have, of course, not been able to say anything publicly on this score.
Fourthly, with regard to the argument that the Canadian Government is kicking up too much fuss, it is not the Government but the press eager for sensations that has created the real fuss. I entirely agree that most of the press stories have been misleading. Ottawa has been invaded by a considerable number of outside correspondents, including several from the United States; who are here solely to write their daily story. We have seen some examples of modern journalism at its worst. We cannot give a great deal of guidance to the press at this stage because to do so effectively in the actual conditions involves indicating the line which the investigation is taking. The Commission will soon be issuing some interim reports and charges will probably have been laid against some of those involved before you can receive this letter.
The final and complete report, however, cannot be forthcoming for some little time. Such guidance as we have given to the press has been to emphasize the domestic housecleaning aspect, and so far we have not felt inclined to reply to the Soviet statement and its elaborations in Pravda and Isvestia.
Finally, I have felt from the first that it was very important in the long-run to show that we were not afraid of the Soviet Union: They must have been quite certain that we had the information at least as long ago as when they recalled the Military Attaché. Those who maintain that the affair should have been hushed up seem to be playing right into Soviet hands. Such a course would surely create an impression in Moscow that they could get away with nearly anything.
I think it clear from what you say of Brimelow’s views that he does not know the full story. I doubt that Roberts in Moscow knows more than a general outline.
Yours sincerely,
(Hume Wrong)
P.S. You have probably gathered that at present the main domestic criticism of the Government’s policy is derived from the civil liberties angle. This is causing us a good deal of anxiety. Fortunately, the Government’s record in this respect is good and there is little tendency in Canada to accuse the Prime Minister of starting a Red hunt.
One of the more distressing aspects is the narrowness of the line which divides the genuine revolutionary idealists on the margin of the case from those who consciously allowed themselves to become agents of a foreign power. Some of this latter guilty group started from motives which, though mistaken, were idealistic and one is afraid that there may be a lack of discrimination in the outcome between foreign agents in particular and Communists in general. We shall do our best to see that a proper distinction is observed but, as I have said, the dividing line is at times pretty obscure.
John Holmes to Hume Wrong, 18 March 1946.
TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL.
Dear Hume,
I was most grateful for your letter of March Ist clarifying my mind and enlightening me on Canadian policy concerning the espionage case.
The Interim Reports of the Royal Commission have undoubtedly helped greatly to put the case in better perspective. There is some educational work to be done and a constant watch must be kept on the diversionary tactics of both Communists and soft-headed liberals, not to mention the friendly advances of honest-to-goodness reactionaries. I had dinner last week at Lady Listowel’s where I was surrounded by a company of Old Danubians who treated me with the greatest deference as representative of that great crusader; Mr. Mackenzie King – a man who, they are obviously coming to think, must rank with [Jan III] Sobieski [King of Poland in the 17th century who was a leader of the military expulsion of the Turks from Europel and General [Wladyslaw] Anders [Polish commander prominently involved in the government-in exile after the Second World War]. Vous l’avez prévu!
There is still so very little comment on the subject in serious journals in this country that it is difficult to estimate public opinion. However hard I try to provoke frank comment from people I meet it is always difficult to persuade them to be candid about the actions of the Canadian Government. One of the major difficulties to a real understanding, I think, is the lack of knowledge of the temper of Canadian politics. Only those with close experience of Canada and its Prime Minister are quite without suspicion that there is something of a witch-hunt about present proceedings. The educated public has built up such a strong resistance to spy stories that it can scarcely be persuaded to appear to take them seriously. When one attempts discreetly to suggest that the problem raised by developments in Canada has much wider implications than would the discovery of a few conventional and professional spies at work in a country of middle importance the answer given is usually that the activities of Communists are well-known, and have been for some time. Whether they believe that it can’t happen here, or have not got round to facing the facts, I am not sure.
I have had some interesting discussions on this subject with Roger, who pointed out one factor which had not occurred to me, and that is the good, but for these purposes bad, reputation of the Mounties. You may have seen the “Punch” cartoon which celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the cinema by showing a couple of technicolour Mounties pursuing on horseback a train on the back of which stood a bewhiskered Bolshie carrying an atom bomb. The fact that the R.C.M.P. is a sober and serious organisation like Scotland Yard is not realised. Mr. Arthur Rank was not very helpful when he decided to bring to Leicester Square a new film called “Night Boat to Dublin”, which was concerned with atom bomb spies, shortly after the first announcement from Ottawa. In no time the only reference to the Canadian case appeared in the film reviews, which had great sport on the subject.
This letter, I should make clear, is intended to comment upon a few vagaries of thought I run across, and is by no means intended to describe public opinion in the United Kingdom as a whole. There is an increasing realisation, I think, that the press is responsible for the “spy scare”, and that the Canadian Government is tackling an unpleasant job with caution and restraint. The liberals, however, need watching here, as I presume they do at home. They can so easily allow their eyes to be diverted from the ball by a red herring (if I might mangle two metaphors). The unfortunate necessity of using extraordinary methods to hold the persons charged may easily attract more attention than their sins Fortunately this aspect has not been mentioned as yet to a great extent here, but we have received one threatening letter from a lawyer in Bournemouth reading us out of the British Empire because of the Gestapo tactics used on poor unfortunate people in the R.C.M.P. barracks. We are continuing informal liaison with the United Kingdom authorities, which I think is mutually helpful.
I hope that you were not too much upset by the statement in paragraph 2 of our telegram No. 629 of 5th March to which reference was made in your telegram No. 589. We did not deny that the local arrest had anything to do with the events in Canada. We simply indicated that any enquiries about an arrest of this kind which took place in the United Kingdom should be made to the Home Office. Enquiries of this kind were, of course, answered for the most part by our Information Officer, who of course knew nothing about [British atomic scientist Dr. Alan Nunn] May’s arrest. The United Kingdom authorities were particularly anxious themselves to make no statement which would imply a connection between May’s arrest and events in Ottawa, lest it prejudice the trial [at which May was convicted of violation of the Official Secrets Actl, and we took our clue from them. I am sure, however, that you do not need to worry about our having said anything which might prove embarrassing if later a connection between May’s arrest and the Canadian enquiries is made public.
Yours sincerely,
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2006) — Summer 2006 // Été 2006, pp. 25–28. Read the rest of this issue →
