bout de papier, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1995) — Summer 1995 // Été 1995, pp. 42–43
PHILBY BURGESS MACLEAN BLUNT
CAIRNCROSS: MY FIVE CAMBRIDGE
FRIENDS by Yuri Modin, Alfred A. Knopf
Canada, 281 pages, $29.95
Reviewed by John Starnes
Not only has Yuri Ivanovich Modin written a valuable book but one which perhaps is unique in spy literature. It provides an unusual view of the inner workings of the KGB by the professional intelligence officer who directly controlled Burgess, Blunt and Caircross. It also complements in interesting ways the seminal work about the KGB, first published in 1990, written by Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky (the senior KGB officer who also worked as a British spy).
Modin tells his story with verve, a delightful sense of humour and good prose (the translation by Anthony Roberts is brilliant). The introduction by David Leitch, the co-author with Phillip Knightley and Bruce Page of Philby, the Spy Who Betrayed a Generation (with a preface by John Le Carré), is interesting, informative and appropriate.
It is fortunate that Leitch and Modin collaborated in producing the book. The reader benefits from the good match between the two men; Modin, the long-time professional KGB officer and Leitch, the journalist and author who was able to counsel the Russian in the subtleties of English society and in how to interpret its many eccentricities.
During World War II Modin became the desk officer in KGB headquarters in Moscow eventually responsible for overseeing the activities of all five Russian spies and, after 1948, while he was a member of the KGB rezidentz in London, directly controlled Cairncross, Blunt and Burgess. He is in an extraordinary position to provide unique insights into the minds and characters of the Cambridge Five and of senior officials and politicians in the Soviet government. He comes up with some surprises which do much to dispel some of the myths about the members of what probably was the most successful and influential spy ring of its kind. For example, I found it surprising that Modin considers Burgess and not Philby the real leader of the group. “(Burgess) held the group together, infused it with his energy and led it into battle…. He was the moral leader of the group.”
No less interesting is Modin’s assessment that Cairncross was responsible for the most significant intelligence coup when, at a very early stage in World War II, he informed the Russians “that the Americans and British had been working since late 1940 on the joint manufacture of an atomic bomb.” Cairncross revealed that the Allies were capable of producing a nuclear device based on uranium 235.
In 1939 Cairncross became secretary to Lord Hankey, chairman of the British Scientific Consultative Committee. As such Cairncross became privy to all manner of secret documents and copied literally thousands of these for transmission to Moscow.
Modin makes no revelations of obvious connections between the espionage activities of the Cambridge Five and Canada but the information given the Russians by Cairncross about the American-British decision to jointly manufacture an atomic bomb would have been verified by the spying activities of Klaus Fuchs, Allan Nunn May and Pontecorvo, all of whom had Canadian connections. Canada, of course, was actively participating in the project to manufacture an atomic weapon through its membership in the Combined Development Trust and the Combined Policy Committee and by supplying uranium ore.
Modin also refers to the Venona project. Venona being the codename given to a discovery by an American cryptanalyst, Meredith Gardner, of a serious mistake made in 1942 by a Soviet coding clerk at the Soviet Embassy in Washington in sending a message to Moscow. Burgess told Modin about the American deciphering project who immediately reported it to Moscow. This was a serious development for the KGB since it meant that it could lead to the unmasking of a number of secret agents throughout the world, including some or all of the Cambridge spies. Providentially for the KGB, Philby, who was the British Secret Intelligence Service representative in Washington at the time, made the acquaintance of Meredith Gardner, gained his confidence and subsequently was able to follow the progress being made in deciphering the Venona traffic. He reported his findings to Moscow on a regular basis.
Chapter 7, “The End Game” provides the clearest description of Venona and its importance which I have seen. Venona was one of the reasons why Prime Minister Pearson gave his approval to the secret participation of the RCMP Security Service in CAZAB, a concerted effort by the security and intelligence services of the USA, Britain, Australia, Canada and New Zealand regularly to consult and to exchange information concerning espionage activities carried out against their respective countries (mainly by the KGB/ GRU and their east European allies).
By design or unintentionally, Modin portrays a fascinating picture of himself. Superficially, he comes across as a self-effacing, middle-rank member of the KGB trying to further the best interests of his country despite the stupidities of his peers and superiors and • the eccentricities of his charges. His relationships with other members of the KGB otten appear to have been difficult and, given the length of his service, it is extraordinary that he survived at all let alone as a 73 year-old living in retirement in Moscow. His ability to “bond” with his agents, his sensitivity, intelligence, extraordinary memory and intuitive skills marked him as an outstanding “controller”. He appears to be “square” in his attitudes to social behaviour diverging from the normal but this did not prevent him from forming friendships with Burgess, Blunt, Philby, Cairncross and Maclean and of writing with genuine affection about all of them. Clearly, Modin was a most valuable Russian asset. It is understandable that he has attempted to extol the moral virtues of the Cambridge Five and to portray them as brave patriots (albeit Russian) who refused to accept financial gain from their espionage activities (something which the KGB and the few politburo members in the know viewed with great suspicion). However, I cannot see how the Cambridge Five, and all the many others who spied for the Soviet Union, whatever their motives, were anything but traitors to their country. By any definition and especially in the precise terms by which Modin describes their espionage activities, these men were traitors. No matter how beguiling their espionage exploits, nor how stupid their various opponents are made to appear, these five men do not deserve accolades from those they betrayed. The book should help correct the view of some Canadian academics, politicians, public servants, journalists and others that espionage activities directed against Canada are not, and never have been, a serious threat and should be treated accordingly.
View the original scanned pages →
Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1995) — Summer 1995 // Été 1995, pp. 42–43. Read the rest of this issue →
