bout de papier, Vol. 30, No. 2 (2017), pp. 45–48
Later this year, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau is expected to make a formal apology for past persecution of gays, including not only the criminalization of homosexual acts but also the notorious “gay purges” from the public service of Canada, which persisted even after the long overdue revision of the Criminal Code championed by his father. This issue and its broader context, particularly its implications for the Foreign Service, are addressed by Mark Allen in this issue of bout de papier.
During the cold war, particularly after the disclosures of espionage by Igor Gouzenko, the security services of Canada and its principal allies worried about “character weaknesses” in public servants that might leave them vulnerable to blackmail and therefore to recruitment for espionage. The most successfully exploited motivations or vulnerabilities — marital infidelity, debt, greed — and the most common incentive, ideology, were difficult to prove (especially in advance of a treasonous act). It involved lengthy and complicated investigations with no assurance of a successful outome. In fact, most disclosures of such entrapment or betrayal came about as a result of revelations by defectors, laborious scrutiny of communications or simply indiscreet behaviour by traitors that raised suspicions. In other words, it was almost impossible to predict the targets for recruitment, as well as why and how individuals would respond.
In that context, one of the perceived “character weaknesses,” homosexuality, soon rose to eclipse all others as a focus of attention. Because homosexual acts were still illegal under the criminal code, gays whether inside or outside the public service could be coerced into informing on others by the security services — as the document below blandly states, “the homosexual, irrespective of employment, was the most productive source in identifying and providing information on other homosexuals employed in or by the government.” As the document indicates, the net was soon cast so wide that the sensitivity of the current work of the public servants involved ceased to be a determinant. In fact, as point (d) under the “Second Priority” indicates, the sub-committee of the Security Panel favoured research “to identify persons with homosexual tendencies” not only to deal with actual employees but also to screen new recruits.
What is remarkable about this document and the rationale it provides for the “gay purges” is the absence of evidence of betrayal or compromise of national security to justify this focus — instead, it proceeds from an assumption derived from a malign caricature of those not conforming to a heterosexual stereotype to categorize all others as suffering from character weakness, as vulnerable to blackmail and thus to entrapment for espionage purposes, and consequently all as threats to national security, without regard to individual cases or conduct. As paragraph 3 indicates, the Security Panel, advised against more distinct treatment of “ideological beliefs” as opposed to other forms of “character weaknesses, including homosexuality.”
This document, declassified in response to an Access to Information and Privacy (ATIP) act request, was first published in 1998 in a preliminary research report by Gary Kinsman and Patrizia Gentile, “In the Interests of the State: the Anti-gay, Anti-lesbian National Security Campaign in Canada”, which anticipated their book, The Canadian War on Queers: National Security as Sexual Regulation, which was published by UBC Press in 2010. That volume is an invaluable source on the gay purges.
Memorandum from the Security Panel
During the past few months a special committee of the Security Panel consisting of the Secretary to the Cabinet [R. B. Bryce], the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission [ Justice Samuel Hughes], the Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police [C. W. Harvison], and the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs [N. A. Robertson], have been considering means of minimising the risks to the national security arising through homosexuality on the part of government employees in positions where their weakness might be effectively exploited for intelligence purposes. It has been the purpose of the Committee to determine, in the light of recent experience, how our present policies and procedures might best be adapted to meet the problem.
The existing policy statement on this matter, as set out in Cabinet Directive No. 29 of December 21, 1955, is as follows:
“Tt also remains an essential of Canadian security policy that persons who are unreliable from a security standpoint, not because they are disloyal, but because of defects in their character which may lead to indiscretion or dishonesty, or may make them likely subjects of blackmail, must not be employed in any position where they have access to classified information. Such defects of character may also make them unsuitable for employment on grounds other than security.”
It will be recalled that, at the Prime Minister’s direction, a lengthy study was made early in 1959 to determine whether it was possible to modify existing policy in order to draw a clearer distinction between cases involving character weaknesses, particularly homosexuality, and those involving ideological beliefs. On the basis of information and advice available at that time, the Security Panel concluded that it could not recommend any useful change in the policy as set out in Cabinet Directive No.
During 1959, the R. C. M. Police accelerated their program of investigating public servants about whom allegations of homosexuality have been made, and obtained Ministerial authority to proceed with investigation in both sensitive and non-sensitive departments and agencies. As part of these investigations, known and suspected homosexuals were interviewed by the R. C. M. Police, and in the process the names of other known or suspected homosexuals were obtained. The Commissioner of the R. C. M. Police has explained that for a number of reasons the scope of these investigations was further expanded to include the investigation of homosexuals who were not employed in the government service on classified work or who were
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employed outside the government service entirely. In the early stages it became evident that the homosexual, irrespective of employment, was the most productive source in identifying and providing information on other homosexuals employed in or by the government.
Employees not having access to classified information were included in the expanded investigation on the assumption that they could gain access at some future date through promotion or change of employment. Homosexuals outside the government service were investigated and interviewed because existing security screening policies were interpreted as precluding any extensive interviewing of homosexual government employees on the grounds that as the subject of a security investigation they, as individuals, should not be made aware of the reason for any subsequent action taken against them. Another reasons for investigating homosexuals outside the government service was based on the possibility that they could be used by a foreign intelligence service to identify and perhaps otherwise assist in the compromising of homosexuals employed in the government on classified work.
During the course of these investigations, the R. C. M. Police have identified some 460 public servants as confirmed, alleged or suspected homosexuals. Of these, about one-third have since left the service through resignation or dismissal. [714 lines of text not declassified]
There have been two other cases, one quite recent, in which the Soviet intelligence authorities have attempted to blackmail Canadian officials or their close relatives, again at our posts in Iron Curtain countries. [7% lines of text not declassified
As a result of this intensive program of investigation, a number of problems have arisen and have been discussed in detail by the Committee. The R. C. M. Police, who consider it important to continue these investigations and interviews both within and outside the public service, have found that the program has placed a very considerable strain on their investigative facilities. In addition the Force has been faced with the difficult question of deciding whether or not to report to departments and agencies allegation of homosexuality made about persons who are not employed in sensitive positions. They consider that, if such allegations are not reported to the employing department when they are made, the department may later be embarrassed should the employee be promoted to a senior or sensitive position prior to a security check being made. Other members of the Committee, however, considered it unnecessary, and probably damaging to the employee, to report such allegations where the employee was not in a sensitive position. They considered that, in cases of promotion to a senior or sensitive position, it was the department’s responsibility to have a security check made beforehand, at which time the R. C. M. Police would forward such information as they had, and the department would decide whether or not the promotion should be made.
A further difficulty which the Committee foresaw in the extensive investigations being made at present lay in the probable public and public service reaction were it to become known that such widespread investigations were being made. It was considered that the resultant misunderstanding, scandal, distorted publicity and demands for prosecution could result in serious criticism of the government and its security policies, as well as of the R. C. M. Police. Conversely, a passive attitude towards this character weakness could also lead to criticism directed at the government, existing security policies and the R. C. M. Police.
Bearing in mind these and other related problems inherent in present policy and procedure, the Committee set out to determine arrangements which could be directed more specifically to the purpose of minimizing risks to the national security, without placing an undue administrative burden either on the R. C. M. Police or the departments and agencies concerned, or unnecessarily interfering with the careers or reputations of the individual employees involved. After detailed discussion of all aspects of the problem, the Committee arrived at the following general conclusions:
(a) that our investigations of homosexuality should not
be widespread, but limited to those persons who were vulnerable to effective exploitation by foreign intelligence services, except in cases where further investigation was necessary to establish the validity of information
concerning employees in vulnerable positions;
(b) that there did not appear to be a security objection to
informing persons whose security status was being questioned on grounds of homosexuality that the
inquiry was related to security;
(c) that the most careful consideration should be given in
each case to the nature and timing of informing departments whose employees were involved, and to assessing the validity and significance of the information, in view of the possible effect on the employee and on the
service;
(d) that the government be asked to give the R. C. M. Police
a clear directive to the effect that, where security was not a factor, the R. C. M. Police were not required to report allegations of homosexuality to the employing department; and (e) that, in cases where continued investigation was essential
to establish the validity of allegations, but where it was also necessary to inform the department concerned, the Secretary of the Security Panel [D. F. Wall of the Privy Council Office] might ask the department to withhold action until the investigation was completed.
10. Based on these general conclusions, the Committee agreed that Ministerial approval should be sought for the following proposed courses of action:
First Priority
(a) that the Security Panel ask those departments with
missions abroad to classify according to risk those positions whose nature and location is such that their incumbents might be subjected to pressure for
intelligence purposes;
(b) that these departments, with whatever assistance the
R. C. M. Police are able to provide, make a careful study of the incumbents of these positions to ensure, insofar as possible, that they are not susceptible to blackmail, either through homosexual activity or other
indiscreet behaviour;
(c) that, concurrent with this study, the incumbents of the
vulnerable positions be made fully aware of the nature of this threat, both to themselves and to the security of
their departments;
(d) that, in cases where the incumbent of a vulnerable
position is found to be a homosexual, departments be asked to consult the Secretary of the Security Panel
before any action is taken concerning the employee;
(e) that, should any case come to light in which there are
indications of any employee with any character weakness, being subjected to blackmail or other method of compromise for intelligence purposes, the R. C. M. Police should inform the Secretary of the Security Panel, who would request the department to take no further action concerning the employee other than that required to avoid an immediate breach of security, and to turn the case over to the R. C. M. Police for such further
investigation as they deem necessary;
(f) that, in cases where security is not a factor, the R.
Police will not be required to report allegations of
homosexuality to the employing department; and
(g) that, in cases where continued investigation is essential
to establish the validity of allegations, but where it is also necessary to inform the department concerned, the Secretary of the Security Panel ask the department to withhold action until the investigation has been completed.
(a) that the special group of the Security Panel working on
this subject, in consultation with the departments and agencies concerned, consider the extent to which positions other than those abroad are vulnerable to
this kind of exploitation;
(b) that efforts be made to improve the present system of
having employees report to their security officers the nature and extent of their social contacts with Soviet
Bloc officials;
(c) that consideration be given to setting up a program of
research, with appropriate psychiatric assistance, with a view to devising tests to identify persons with homosexual tendencies. It is hoped that such tests might aid in the identification of homosexuals already employed in the government service, and eventually might assist in the selection of persons who are not homosexuals for service in positions considered vulnerable to blackmail for intelligence purposes. (The Commissioner of the R. C. M. Police feels that these tests should be extended to prevent, where possible, the initial engagement of 11. A separate but related problem which arose during the Committee’s discussions concerned the question of a possible public scandal resulting from the government’s appointing to a senior post a person who was eventually found to have engaged in homosexual activity. The Committee felt that this was a problem of policy which would require the government’s consideration quite apart from the question of security.
12. The Prime Minister [ John G. Diefenbaker] and the Minister of Justice [E. Davie Fulton] are asked to consider the conclusions and recommendations set out above, with a view to discussing them with the special committee considering this problem. R. B. Bryce Chairman of the Security Panel
Privy Council Office January 26th, 1961.
Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 30, No. 2 (2017), pp. 45–48. Read the rest of this issue →
