bout de papier, Vol. 18, No. 2 (2001) — Summer 2001 // Été 2001, pp. 34–39
In a recent issue of bout de papier, we reprinted correspondence from Lester B. Pearson about the response to a speech that he delivered in April 1951. In that talk, Pearson had predicted that “the days of relatively easy and automatic relations with our neighbour are, I think, over.” That this was not simply a glib aside is evident in the files of the Department of External Affairs, which include numerous appraisals of a series of specific irritants in bilateral relations that were prepared as background for the minister’s address.
At this time of reviews and/or updates, bout readers will be interested to learn that there was also underway at mid-century a more comprehensive “Re-Examination of Canadian Foreign Policy” at the request of the minister and under the direction of the brilliant and indefatigable deputy undersecretary of state for external affairs, Escott Reid. Before he left on posting to New Delhi in the autumn of 1952, Reid had initiated 14 “policy papers” by departmental authors and these studies were in varying states of completion (or not) by then. Associated with this undertaking was a “history of Canadian foreign policy over the past six years” by EH. Soward. Neither project was finished. After surveying the bulky files, George Glazebrook, then head of both Historical Division and Commonwealth Division, advised Reid on July 30, 1959, “that, given the appalling scarcity of officers in Ottawa, it is not likely that any further large exercise along these lines can be undertaken.”
The third paper in this projected series was an assessment of Canadian-American relations by J.F. Grandy, who had also surveyed “recent and current questions in the relations between Canada and the United States.” Grandy completed a draft before he was posted to Canada House in the summer of 1951. Though some other papers were distributed to posts as “circular documents” at that stage in the process, the document reproduced below was not.
[Department of External Affairs, Policy Paper # 3] [J.F. Grandy] “A Survey of Relations Between Canada and the United States,” Top Secret, June 20, 1951.
1. To analyse the nature of current problems in the relations between Canada and the United States is largely to study their underlying causes. This is an attempt to do so and to consider how improvements might be made in our relations Since this paper is mainly concerned with difficulties it does not give a true impression of the general nature of the relations between Canada and the United States. Taken by itself it gives an exaggerated impression of the area of difficulty and understates the degree of agreement and firm friendship that exists. The very brightness of the background of friendly relations causes some of these topics to appear as shadows. On the whole, the objectives of both countries in international affairs are substantially similar, and on the great issues we stand together. But the cordial friendship that still exists between the two countries is, as Mr. Wrong pointed out in Baltimore, “the product of hard work, mutual understanding, and tolerant respect for national feelings and national prejudices. to be taken for granted”, The examination, from time to time, of our outstanding difficulties is a necessary step in the continuing process of nurturing the friendship and understanding that have been built up over many years. Until the Second World War most problems in Canada-United States relations were of a kind that would arise between any two countries with a long common boundary whatever their relative power. There were numerous disputes for example about the location of the boundary, the use of boundary waters, fisheries, smuggling and tariffs. Since 1939 however and particularly since 1945 the range and depth of affairs involved in our official relations have increased enormously. The chief reasons for this are: A. the repudiation by the United
States of the policy of withdrawal and aloofness from world affairs and the consequent assumption by the United States of a position of leadership commensurate with its strength;
B. the emergence of a new series of problems of the highest importance since 1946 when it became apparent that the hope of peaceful cooperation with the Soviet Union was in founded C. the operations of the United
Nations, which require the governments of both countries to interest themselves in, and take public positions on, many matters in which hitherto their international responsibilities had only been indirectly involved, if at all;
D. the increasing area and complexity of the operations of both governments, which make necessary intergovernmental contact on many matters previously left to private enterprise — a factor of special importance at the present time because of the necessity of building up the defences of the free world; and E. the danger to the security of North
America, which has made it necessary for the two governments to collaborate in the wholly new field of continental defence.
The result of this is that the problems that arise between the two countries today are naturally more numerous than before the war, but are often different in character too. Problems which derive from the disparity in the relative power of the two countries or from the nature of United States leadership of the free world cannot necessarily be dealt with in the same way as border questions.
PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE LEADING ROLE AND SUPERIOR POWER OF THE UNITED STATES
6. The United States has been a powerful country for many years, but it is only recently that the growth in its power has been accompanied by the shouldering of responsibility for the leadership of the Western world. This affects Canada in two ways – first, because of Canada’s geographical proximity to the United States, and secondly, because Canada is one of the countries which must look to the United States for leadership in world affairs.
Geographical Considerations
7. Canada’s geographical position is such that if we were to permit it to become a power vacuum, so that the United States could be attacked across Canadian territory, we could expect it sooner or later in effect to be occupied by the United States for its own defence; unless of course, there was a general feeling of security and peace. Moreover, since Canada is geographically an air corridor between continental United States and Alaska and between the United States and the whole Eurasian land mass, we could scarcely refuse the United States the use of facilities in Canada, or overflight of Canadian territory, in the event of a major war, and possibly could not avoid commitments in advance of a major war. This raises for us the extremely delicate problem of maintaining our autonomy, which involves a series of intractable problems: e.g., the status of the United States defence installations and personnel in Canada; whether the United States should be permitted to take offensive action from its bases in Canada without the concurrence of the Canadian Government; the problem of command for defence of Canadian territory, especially the Newfoundland area; how far we should be prepared to participate abroad while at the same time permitting United States forces to be stationed in Canada, etc. Since Canada and the United States are a geographical unit, our economy has always been dependent to a significant degree upon certain supplies from the United States. The most notable of these is steel. Inevitably, in this period of industrial mobilization, there has been some concern in Canada lest the supply of scarce materials from the United States be restricted. While there have been some minor difficulties in this respect, Canada has on the whole been very well treated. Our economic relations have remained particularly good, especially where conducted directly with the United States rather than through such international organizations as the International Monetary Fund.
Aspects of United States Leadership
9. The nature of United States leadership of the Western world (which has been largely undertaken through the UN and NATO) has given rise to a number of problems between the United States and its much less powerful associates and allies, including Canada. Many of these problems result from the not unnatural desire of the United States to obtain the support of other countries for its policies, and from a lack of sophistication in the methods employed. This in itself would not be too serious if Canada and other countries could always be convinced of the soundness of the policies proposed (and very often imposed) by the United States. If there had been no fundamental divergence of views on such issues as the support of Nationalist China or the attempt to negotiate with the Chinese Communists, the methods which seem to us at times to be rather crude and which have been adopted by the United States to bring its allies and associates into line would have been avoided. O. Our difficulties of this kind in the UN and NATO have been shared with other allied or friendly nations. Our views on the Formosan issue, on the attempt to negotiate a settlement of the Korean war, and on the danger of strengthening the association between the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union have been more or less the same as the views of virtually all Commonwealth and NATO countries, with the exception of the United States. When our doubts about United States policies are shared by other important nations they can sometimes be more effectively impressed upon our powerful neighbour. We have found that in the UN we can assume a leading position in a group including Commonwealth countries, Western Europeans and sometimes Southeast Asians, if we wish to do so. We and our associates can, if necessary, hold over the head of the United States delegation the ultimate possibility of voting against them on an important issue, leaving them with little support outside Latin America. Even if we chose never to do this, the mere possibility may carry some weight with the United States representatives. But this is a dangerous game If it becomes apparent that it is an empty threat its force will disappear. Sometimes we can get better results in private negotiations with the United States, even on issues that concern a number of countries.
11. The fact that the leadership of such a group may occasionally fall to Canada is likely to put an unfortunate strain on Canada-US relations, a greater strain than if another country led and Canada followed. Canada tends to be pushed into the forefront of this group partly because of our traditionally close and friendly relationship with the United States, and partly because we do not need Marshall Aid or Military Defence Assistance.
12. The United States has a more dominant position in NATO than in the UN. The differences that have arisen within NATO between the North Atlantic Allies have chiefly been those of tactics and timing. When and how should Germany be re-armed? Should Spain or Turkey or Greece be associated with the Alliance? Should the question of Spanish association be mentioned at all at this stage? Strains on the Alliance are not caused solely by problems that arise within its organization; the greatest strain has probably resulted from the Far Eastern crisis (because of the danger that a general war in Asia would leave Western Europe defenceless). One of the intentions of those who framed the United States constitution was to discourage “entangling alliances”. Today the accommodations that are required by alliances are very difficult for the United States to make. Concessions to the views of allied countries are not easy for a country which was able to isolate itself so successfully for 150 years.
13. There is not sufficient understanding in the United States of the problems which now confront it as the leader of the free world. The United States needs to see its immediate problems in the perspective of its own history and of the history of other countries which have been similarly situated in the past. Many Americans do not realize that the problems the United States faces as the leader in the North Atlantic Alliance are problems which have arisen in every alliance in the past. The leader of the free world has always felt over-burdened and misunderstood. This was certainly the feeling of the United Kingdom in the nineteenth century: “The weary Titan.. staggering on to her goal, bearing on shoulders immense, Atlantean, the load, well-nigh not to be borne, of the too vast orb of her fate.”
14. Mr. Kennan, in the introduction to The United States in World Affairs 1949, has pointed out how unprepared the American people were for their novel role: They were unaccustomed to the sense of national insecurity. They were unprepared for the ordeal of sparring indefinitely and inconclusively with a force committed to the destruction not only of their own national power but also of the only sort of international context in which their ideals could be realized. Finally, they were reluctant to believe that there could be major international problems to which there would not be incisive and final solutions, if their policy-makers could only find them – problems, in other words, which had to be lived with instead of solved It fell to these American people to acquire suddenly the art of being patient and conciliatory without showing weakness, and conversely of maintaining strength, and using it, without being rash or provocative. This brings us to what is really the fundamental problem in the current relations between Canada and the United States. This is our underlying fear that the Americans will not be patient enough, especially as their military strength increases; that they are more inclined than we to believe that war is inevitable or almost inevitable; that for this reason they may be too willing to run risks. We and the United States Administration agree on the need to build up our collective military power in order to be in a position to bargain as well as to defend ourselves if war should come. Our ditferences are largely of emphasis and of timing, but these can be very important.
BORDER PROBLEMS
15. The most numerous border problems have been boundary waters questions. The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 made a notable and important contribution to the future good relations between the two countries. The International Joint Commission which it set up has dealt with a great many issues and has prevented them from becoming disputes. It is probably true to say that in the settlement of these questions the United States has not often by reason of its superior power obtained better bargains than Canada.
16. Recently there has been an element of strain in our relations in IJC matters. In the first place, the United States has not been unwilling to make use of the IJC for reasons of local domestic politics. The Passamaquoddy Reference and the proposed Lake of the Woods Reference are examples of this. Secondly, we have had to resist a proposed reference on a Yukon River power project. In the third place, the Commission has had to deal with the Waterton-Belly Reference, perhaps the most contentious in its history.
17. Other border problems have arisen from time to time in the economic and consular fields, although the United States has always dealt generously with Canada in these matters. At the moment, one problem in which the United States considers itself the aggrieved party is the sale across the border of highly speculative securities by Toronto brokers, many of whom are United States citizens enjoying immunity from extradition.
18. The St. Lawrence Waterway represents another form of border problem – one in which our “dispute” is not with the United States Government but with certain sectional interests in the United States who have been able to hold up Congressional approval.
AGGRAVATING FACTORS
19. While most problems in Canada-United States relations are aspects of our geographical position or of relative power, or both, they are often aggravated by differences in the form of government of the two countries and differences in national character and temperament.
Differences in Form of Government
20. The form of government of the United States differs markedly from that of other important Western powers. Its nature is a perpetual source of difficulty in foreign relations. The separation of power between the Administration and two Houses of Congress, the lack of Cabinet responsibility and the lack of party discipline make it very difficult to pursue, particularly in the short run, consistent and informed policies. The recurrence every two years of elections, preceded by lengthy political manoeuvring, casts a shadow of uncertainty over the scene. The unrepresentative composition of the powerful Senate often frustrates the aims of the Administration. In general, the system puts a premium of irresponsibility among the legislators; their votes are too often based upon sectional rather than national (not to speak of world) interests. These tendencies are mitigated (and complicated) to some extent by the idealism, imaginative outlook and generosity of the American people. They can also be partially overcome by a very strong Administration.
21. Some of the defects of United States Far
Eastern policies can be traced to the pressure of certain elements in Congress. The attempt to bolster Chiang’s position in Formosa is largely a result of Congressional charges that the State Department gave China away to the Communists. In this and in other matters the Administration has adopted some of its critics’ proposals in order to prove itself free from Communist influence. This expedient of rolling with the punches can be carried too far.
22. One serious result of the United States form of government is that American policy in the United Nations tends to be inconsistent and sometimes unpredictable. There is often lack of agreement among United States Government spokesmen. This can be traced to the separation of powers, the lack of collective Cabinet responsibility, the very size of the governmental machine and the employment of personnel from the opposition party. We have often accepted the views of the State Department, which frequently are close to ours, only to find that the President or the Military or General MacArthur was pursuing a different policy. Last summer we were more than once embarrassed by overtures by the United States Ambassador in Ottawa at a time when consultation on the same subjects was already under way in New York or Washington. The United States Mission in New York, which is under the direction of a Republican Senator, not infrequently gets its own way in the end, and its way is by no means always the way of the State Department.
23. The disproportionate influence of local political considerations often leads the Administration to put forward proposals in which it does not itself believe. (This is a device not restricted to Washington.) There have been several examples of misuse of the International Joint Commission in this way. The proposal for a British Columbia-Alaska Railway illustrates the same point.
24. The difficulty of getting legislation passed to carry out the Administration’s policies is too well known to need emphasis here. Certain of our problems are directly due to this. The St. Lawrence Deep Waterway is an example; so is the failure to implement some provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The failure effectively to control inflation with the United States is due in part to the unwillingness of Congress, faced with the pressure of special interests, to vote high enough taxes. Some of our military procurement difficulties result from certain provisions in Acts of Congress which it would be difficult to alter.
25. The constitutional separation of powers between President and Congress, however, not only involves the familiar and frequent contrast between executive aims and legislative endorsement, but also influences the whole process of the formulation of policy from the mental attitude of the party precinct leader to the vital decisions of the President. The influence of the separation of powers is a much more subtle and far-reaching thing than can be summed up in any phrase such as that the President proposes and the Congress disposes.
26. One aspect of the Canadian form of government — the division of powers between the Federal and Provincial Governments — is partly responsible for two border problems between Canada and the United States: the sale of speculative securities across the border, and the question of trucking in bond across Western Ontario.
National Characteristics
27. It is easy to talk nonsense about national characteristics; it is particularly easy for a Canadian to do so when speaking of the Americans whom he so closely resembles. Nevertheless there are differences which are general enough to have significant effects on problems in Canada-United States relations. How these differences have arisen is perhaps not strictly relevant; what matters is that they exist. It is worth mentioning however that national character is conditioned by the form of government among other things, and that the United States’ political system has a very pervasive influence in this respect.
28. Many Americans take a more impulsive and sometimes a more emotional approach than Canadians to questions of foreign policy. This is another cause of the inconsistencies in United States policy which were remarked above. There is — this has been particularly true in recent years — some consistency in the long-range pattern of United States policy, but their tactics shift dizzily. They not infrequently turn upside down in a matter of a week and make the position of their friends more difficult by the self-righteous enthusiasm with which they defend each position they occupy. This was particularly evident in the closing days of the United Nations Assembly last autumn when Mr. Dulles denounced an attempt by the Soviet representative to postpone discussion for a few days of the item dealing with alleged United States aggression in Manchuria. Within a couple of days the United States delegation was insisting that this item give way to another item on the agenda. Almost every day for a fortnight there was some new American decision on the line to be pursued. The United States’ attitudes toward Formosa and Korea have undergone radical change. The Administration made it clear to the world that neither country was within the United States’ defensive perimeter. After the attack on the Republic of Korea this position was reversed with regard to both countries. Had the United States indicated earlier that it would act in defence of the Republic of Korea the aggression against that country might not have taken place.
29. The impulsive methods of the United States sometimes show up in a willingness to apply a long-term solution to a short-term problem. The Americans were prepared last September, during the preparation of the United Action for Peace resolutions, to alter a good deal of the structure of the United Nations because of the exigencies of the moment. Americans are inclined to disregard historical precedents when dealing with subjects in which they have no long tradition. Their approach to a problem is often based upon a rather rigid formula or set of principles, but their choice between formulae and therefore between different ways of approaching a problem tends to be pragmatic. This sometimes makes it very difficult for friendly countries to avoid unnecessary differences of opinion with the United States.
30. Another characteristic of many Americans is a certain degree of intolerance. In 1835 de Tocqueville spoke of the “tyranny of the herd” and wrote, “I know no country where there is so little true independence of mind and freedom of discussion as in America”. This was surely an exaggeration even in those days; yet it contains an unpleasant element of truth. There is a regrettable tendency on the part of many Americans and sections of the press to be intolerant of those who hold unpopular ideas. Internally this often results in pressure on the Administration to follow an incautious or ill-considered policy in foreign affairs; externally it often seems to take the form of a reluctance to give serious consideration to ideas put forward by friendly countries which do not coincide with those of the United States Government.
31. The mass information media are more powerful, more influential and noisier in the United States than elsewhere. This leaves its mark on the foreign relations of that country. It contributes, of course, to the characteristics of United States policy that have just been described – impulsiveness, inconsistency and intolerance. It makes possible the inexcusable policy of conducting internal conflicts over policy in the newspapers, through planted articles, leaks and counter-leaks. It makes it difficult for secrets to be kept within the United States Government; this often results in the premature airing of half-formulated plans. The early negotiations in NATO on German re-armament for example were fully reported in the press at the time when publication could do nothing but harm. The United States proposal that Greece and Turkey should enter the North Atlantic Treaty was similarly made public prematurely.
32. Certain Canadian characteristics also make for difficulty in our relations with the United States. The most important is probably our very cautious nature. We prefer not to make commitments we are not reasonably certain we can carry out. For this reason we frequently have no definitive policy on a question until almost the last minute. This makes it difficult for our representatives to engage in discussion with the Americans before American policy has become too firm to be altered. It means too that we often do not get credit for the contributions we make because we cannot announce them early enough. We did not promise troops for Korea until we knew what we could make available. As a result, there is less awareness in the United States of our contribution than of the much smaller Australian contribution.
33. Despite what we have done and are planning to do in North Atlantic defence and in Korea, many Canadians have a somewhat unconscious feeling that we may not be doing our full share. This puts us on the defensive in our dealings with Washington and leads us to adopt what may be an unduly sensitive attitude.
CAN INDIVIDUAL PROBLEMS BE TREATED SEPARATELY?
34. To what extent are problems in Canada-
US relations interrelated? It is clear enough that major issues of policy cannot usually be kept isolated from each other. It is not so clear whether difficulties in this field have adverse effects on the settlement of minor issues such as border problems. It is logical to suppose that they do, although evidence of this would naturally not be easy to find. The United States’ decision not to contract for aluminum from the new Kitimat plant in Canada appears to have influenced the Canadian attitude towards the Yukon River power and aluminum project. Presumably there are similar interrelations on the United States side
35. One reason for doubting that issues of one kind can be kept from influencing those of the other kind is that the same people must often deal with both kinds of problem. We have some evidence that some State Department representatives in foreign countries are strongly resentful of Canadian policies on the Korean affair. It is impossible to say how widespread this feeling has become. If it were to become extensive within the State Department, the approach to the discussion of questions of any kind would be likely to be influenced by it in some degree.
36. On the other hand, both countries stand to lose or gain more or less equally on border issues taken as a whole. The United States is hardly likely to use its superior power as a lever to obtain an unduly favourable settlement of border questions unless the more important relations between the two countries deteriorate very considerably.
POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
37. How are Canada-US relations likely to change in the future? Differences on major issues of foreign policy need not necessarily increase in number or in severity. The events of the past year must have taught both sides something of how to deal with these issues more smoothly. There is, however, one danger that we must anticipate. As the United States builds up its military power it may become even more willing than at present to run the risk of a major war. This danger is heightened by the fact that a bitter presidential election campaign will take place next year. For the first time in many years foreign policy will probably be the major issue. Each party is likely to try to outdo the other in the firmness of its attitude to the USSR and China, and in such circumstances “firmness” may easily be transformed into provocativeness.
38. In the field of joint defence we may anticipate, in the years ahead, serious difficulties as a result of United States requests and large joint undertakings on Canadian soil.
39. Border issues will probably not change much in number or in character if our general relations continue to be good.
THE IMPROVEMENT OF OUR RELATIONS 40. What are the best ways for us to try to influence United States policies? How, at the same time, can controversy and friction between Canada and the United
States be kept to a minimum?
41. Consultation will, no doubt, continue to be the most useful means of influencing United States policy. The time to influence it, after all, is when it is in a formative stage; later it becomes too rigid to be changed without strain. The risk of becoming committed through the process of consultation must be countered by a frank explanation that Canada will not consider itself committed to the United States plan unless any Canadian objections are properly met. Nevertheless, we cannot expect to enjoy the benefits of consultation without paying any price, nor without giving anything in return. If we expect to be consulted we will have to give up some of our freedom to act independently at least as long as consultations are continuing. Perhaps as the United States gains more experience in giving leadership to a coalition of friends it will learn, as the United Kingdom learned long ago, to consult its friends without considering them rigidly committed thereby.
42. We must try to develop our views earlier than we do, and provide expressions of opinion and counter-appreciations, even if they are only tentative, to the Embassy in Washington for their use in discussion with the Americans. Opportunities for consultation need to be developed and a pattern of frequent and early consultation needs to be established. Much of this should be done at the so-called working level and on a purely informal basis. One thing to be explored is the possibility of establishing liaison with the lower levels of the Pentagon. This would require on our side an able military officer with good political sense and experience in political work. :3. We should not refrain from pressing our views merely because we are told there is no chance of the United States’ position being modified. In the Truman- Attlee talks, the United States insisted that any negotiations which might take place with Communist China could not include such items as Formosa and Chinese representation in the United Nations. A month later, under pressure from their allies, they reversed their stand. Now they show a tendency to reverse it again!
44. Sometimes what occurs is that the faction in Washington which agrees with the allies is strengthened enough by allied pressure to prevail in the end. This points to another lesson. We should watch the relative strengths of those in Washington who support opposite approaches to a problem and try to press our views at the most opportune moment. (This is another reason for entering into discussions at an early stage.)
45. Pressure can also weaken the faction that agrees with us. Whether it does so will usually depend upon the state of public opinion in the United States and upon whether our point of view is pressed privately or in public. It is not always desirable to announce our views in public when we are trying to bring about a change in United States policy, if our position is likely to be unpopular with the American public. Representa tions in public often have the opposite effect on the American people to that intended. (The left wing of the British Labour Party must have made it much more difficult for Mr. Truman to dismiss General Mac Arthur!)
46. It is important that we take care not to nag Washington unnecessarily. If we are to be effective on the issues that really matter we should hold our fire until it is most needed.
47. Our voice is sometimes stronger in the UN and in NATO than when we face the United States alone on some problem. This suggests that we should do whatever we can to ensure that these bodies continue to work as successfully as possible. This is not to say that these bodies should always be used. We can sometimes make more progress in bilateral discussion with the United States. The best approach to each problem has to be judged on its own merits.
48. For similar reasons it is worth considering whether we should try to foster a strengthening of the Commonwealth association. The efforts made by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers to bring about a cease-fire in Korea during their last meeting in London was an instance of joint action by all members of the Commonwealth on an important question of policy. We cannot assume, however, that most members will normally be as substantially agreed as they were on that issue.
49. To what extent should we try to get together with other countries and present a united front to the United States? There does not appear to be any simple answer to this question. It would probably always be desirable to sound out other countries and find out what area of general agreement existed. It is likely to be harmful, however, to give the appearance of “ganging up”. No doubt this is a tactic that should be reserved for issues of the greatest importance if it is to be used at all.
50. Canada-US relations during the past nine months would have been much better if there had been more able and influential United States representation in Ottawa. We have now learned to make some allowance for the clumsiness of the United States Embassy, but if the quality of its reporting to Washington is no better than the quality of its approaches to us, Washington must receive very poor appraisals of the state of opinion in government circles in Canada and among the Canadian public. Good United States representation in Canada could help the United States just as good United Kingdom representation in Washington helps that country. One of the most striking examples of what can be done was the very effective telegram Sir Oliver Franks sent to London last July explaining the reasons why the American public would feel deserted and let down if the British did not send land forces to Korea. The appointment of Mr. Mason Wade as Public Affairs Officer at the United States Embassy in Ottawa is an encouraging sign that the United States Government may be trying now to increase the quality of its representation here.
51. The Canadian Embassy in Washington may need a larger staff if the amount of discussion with United States officials is to be increased. One possibility we might examine is that of having one officer devote most of his time to liaison with Congress.
52. It would be helpful if government officials and the public in each country could become better informed about the state of opinion and the special difficulties facing the government in the other country. The surprise occasioned in the United States by the Minister’s Toronto speech would not have been nearly so great if there had been adequate reporting in leading American newspapers of the state of opinion in Canada. The New York Times and other United States newspapers ought to have more competent representation here.
53. There are problems which will face any Canadian government in dealing with the United States which need to be appreciated by Americans. There is first of all a latent anti-American feeling in Canada which means on the one hand that a Canadian administration is subject to the temptation to pull the Eagle’s feathers in order to get more support in Canada, and which means on the other hand that the freedom of action of a Canadian government in dealing with the United States is limited by the fact that if it goes too far in deferring to the United States, it would lose a substantial measure of support in Canada. (This is a bargaining counter which we can usefully use from time to time in negotiations with the United States, just as the United States, in bargaining with us, often argues that it would be glad to do what we ask but that there would be no point in acceding to our wishes since any resulting international instrument would not be supported in Congress.) There is also in Canada an ever-present envy of the higher standard of living in the United States. This means that the Canadian public is often tempted to feel that it is not unfair that a disproportionate burden of the common defence effort should be borne by the United States. Similarly, there is the still present feeling that since the United States had lesser sacrifices in the First World War and entered the Second World War two years after we did, it is only just that they should be in the van in the present emergency.
54. The repercussions in the United States to Mr. Pearson’s speech in Toronto in April demonstrate that a considerable section of the American people still believe that, when Canada differs from the United States on a major issue of foreign policy, it does so because it is a United Kingdom satellite. This view was also held during the Far Eastern crisis last November, December and January by Mr. Bliss, the United States Minister at the Embassy here. This may be partially dispelled if at some time we should find ourselves compelled to disagree in public with both the United States and the United Kingdom on an important issue.
55. It hardly needs to be said that there is a similar lack of understanding of United States problems and aims on the part of the Canadian public, although because of the much greater cultural influence of the United States upon Canada our ignorance of American problems is much less extensive.
56. It is to be hoped that Mr. Wade’s appointment means that the United States Government is considering how its relations with Canada and other countries may be improved. Perhaps the following extracts from Mr. Paul Hoffman’s book, Peace Can Be Won, may be taken as an indication of the attention that some thoughtful public men are giving to this question in the United States: If we are to lead effectively we must work with the rest of the free world on a basis of partnership and unity, founded on respect for views and interests other than our own. This is a matter of elementary psychology – an operating principle just as valid for heads of state as for the men in the street The men who determine the policies of the other free nations are, without exception, eager to work with us; almost without exception they would resent dictation from us. I learned this well during my time as ECA Administrator. More often than we realize we engage in maligning other free nations or spreading propaganda about them. When we do, we give emphatic aid to Soviet attempts to turn us against each other.
57. The fundamental problems in international relations today cannot be solved on the purely governmental level alone. Public opinion is the most important determinant of foreign policy. The greatest need is to ensure that it is informed opinion and not mere emotion. In this field the organized pressure groups such as the trade unions, the churches, chambers of commerce and similar bodies could do much more than they are doing.
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 18, No. 2 (2001) — Summer 2001 // Été 2001, pp. 34–39. Read the rest of this issue →
