bout de papier, Vol. 20, No. 4 (2004) — Spring/Summer 2004 // Printemps/Été 2004, pp. 22–29
In early 1967, there was a series of incidents along the border between Israel and Syria, which had escalated to a tank battle and clashes between their air forces, ultimately leading to the shooting-down of six Syrian MIGs in early April. With signs of a possible Israeli invasion of Syria and pressure from Arab states to match his rhetoric with action, President Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt mobilized the Egyptian army and expelled the United Nations Emergency Force (including Canadian troops) from positions along the frontier between Sinai and Israel. Egypt subsequently occupied Sharm el Sheikh and closed the Gulf of Agaba and the Straits of Tiran to Israeli ships as well as those supplying Israel — measures which Israel had warned in advance that it would regard as “acts of war.” In late May, amid frantic international diplomatic efforts to avert war, Nasser in successive speeches called for a “united front around Israel” and declared that Egypt and its allies were prepared for military action “to restore the situation to what it was in 1948” (that is, before the creation of the State of Israel).
On the morning of 5 June, Israeli warplanes effectively destroyed the Egyptian air force. Within twenty-four hours, Israel had gained complete air superiority in the region with the destruction of the air forces of Syria and Jordan. On the ground, Israel swept the Egyptian army from the Gaza Strip and Sinai, while it captured the Golan Heights from the Syrian Army and seized the West Bank from Jordan. The sudden triumph of Israeli forces prompted the conflict to be dubbed the “Six Day War.”
Canada’s Ambassador to the United Arab Republic (as Egypt was formally known, though its union with Syria had been dissolved in 1961) was John Starnes, who had presented his credentials one year before the war broke out. A veteran of the Second World War, he had held various posts in Ottawa and abroad. Immediately before his appointment to Cairo, Starnes had served as Canada’s Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany and Head of the Canadian Military Mission in Berlin.
The original texts of the following messages were printed entirely in upper case. As well, some passages were difficult to read from the copies available so that there may be slight errors in transcription. For clarity, most abbreviated words have been reproduced in their entirety, obligatory duplication of negatives in such messages has been eliminated, some passing references and identities of individuals have been explained in square brackets, and indications of the repetition of the messages to other posts have been omitted. The declassified documents were provided to bout de papier by their author (and a distinguished member of the magazine’s board as well as a regular contributor), John Starnes, to whom FM CAIRO JUN8/67 SECRET TO EXTER 710 IMMED ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
Astonishing speed with which Israelis have taken Sharm El Sheik and approaches to [Suez] canal make it clear that if they wish to do so they probably could continue west towards Cairo itself. Presumably their first objective of cutting off and destroying main body of Egyptian Army has all but been accomplished. [General Moshel Dayan [Minister of Defence of Israel] appears to have said that Israeli forces have no further objective but if U[nited]A[rablRlepublic] continue to refuse to accept cease fire Israelis may decide to continue air and ground attacks. From canal to Cairo along axis of Ismailia Road is about eighty miles and provided they have personnel and ammunition would not be beyond their capabilities to achieve and especially with almost complete air superiority they seem to enjoy. However, I would expect them to use this latter advantage at first rather than attempt technically difficult canal crossing. However, the obvious political advantages of pushing on to Cairo must be very tempting.
2. However, even if Israeli forces decide only to hold present positions in front of canal political effect on Nasser’s regime of the devastating military defeat they have inflicted upon Egyptians will be considerable. I have suggested in earlier reports that when public becomes conscious of magnitude of their defeat this could result in further attacks against USA and British personnel and installations (and possibly others as well). It could also manifest itself in demonstrations against regime which unless checked could lead to conditions of anarchy and particularly in’this city which by last count was well over five million.
3. All this is speculation, of course, and apart from demonstrations in Cairo and sacking of USA and British consulates in Alexandria and Port Said which we have reported, there has been relative calm. Should population decide to turn on government, however, situation could become chaotic. There is added danger, of course, that if Israelis were to push on to Cairo widespread panic could take place with [finally?] unpleasant results.
4. Apart from feelings of general public there is increasing evidence of uneasiness and disillusion among Egyptian officials. Certainly lack of wisdom of attempting to accuse USA and Britain of aiding Israel with aircraft on such flimsy evidence must be obvious to more intelligent officials in the regime. STARNES
FM CAIRO JUN9/67 SECRET TO EXTERL 721 IMMED DEFEAT OF THE EGYPTIAN ARMIES
When [David Gulick] Nes USA Chargé came to say goodbye to me today he told me of interesting information he had been given last night by Senard, Counsellor French Embassy. Member of Russian Embassy told Senard yesterday that Russian authorities were irritated at and fed up with Egyptians. It appears about 2 weeks ago Russians sent a high level military delegation to Egypt for express purpose of offering advice to Egyptians on their military preparations. There was no suggestion of course that these preparations were for anything but defence of Egypt in event of an Israeli attack.
2. According to Senard’s Russian interlocutor, Soviet military experts had been critical of the dispositions made of Egyptian air and ground forces. Specifically they had criticized (a) lack of dispersement of UAR air force units, (b) placing UAR armoured units too far forward and bad siting of artillery. Egyptian military commanders had not been disposed to accept advice. In view of Soviet experts Egyptian military commanders were arrogant and ignorant.
3. There seems no reason to disbelieve this story. Certainly if Soviet advice concerning dispersal of fighter and bomber aircraft had been taken it might have made quite a difference to the course of Sinai battle. One reason advanced by Egyptians for not dispersing aircraft was difficulties this would create for servicing them at alternative air fields. Thus Egyptians had most of their fighter forces concentrated on a few airfields while UAR bomber forces were neatly drawn up on one or two other air fields. In addition no attempt was made throughout fighting to discontinue normal broadcasting programmes with result Israelis were provided with excellent reference points for navigation which they obviously used to advantage. STARNES FM CAIRO JUN10/67 CONFD TO EXTER 727 IMMED NASSER
“Then my soul stirred, wondering what men would say who saw this monument after many years and spoke of what I had done …” (inscription on obelisk of queen Hatshepsut at Karnak):
2. lUAR President Gamal Abdull Nasser’s address to the nation last night was a fascinating performance. Not surprisingly Nasser’s mood was sombre and his style muted. There was none of the sparkle and effervescence usually associated with his public appearances but for this very reason it made a deep impression. You will have read the text so there is no point in dwelling on it except to note that although he did accuse Britain and the USA of intervening on behalf of Israel he did so without conviction and his comments on this score were not particularly vituperative.
3. His account of events leading up to the present situation if not strictly truthful was poignant and I am sure that in Arabic it was a tear-jerker. He was frank, he was apparently subdued (but not humble), he accepted full responsibility and he resigned. He did not say he would step down conditionally nor did he offer excuses. He resigned and appointed as his successor Zakaria Mohieddin [Prime Minister of UAR, 1965-66]. His performance was superb and all the more so because it had about it an air of sincerity. It also had about it a haunting resemblance to Queen Hatshepsut’s memorial. However, like so many of Nasser’s moves it was shrewd and cunning and quite as likely to result in a massive popular demand for him to stay on as it is to result in Mohieddin’s confirmation in office.
4. That Nasser’s resignation was a smart move was quickly proved. Not long after his speech ended huge crowds shouting “Gamal Abdul Nasser” surged through Cairo’s blacked-out streets giving a hint of the internal struggle to come. The blackout and air-raid warnings during and after the speech had the effect of keeping things under control, and, since the “cease-fire” already has taken effect, it can only be assumed air-raid warnings are being used by the authorities as a device for keeping the mob in check. So far so good, but what happens after first light and when the pretence about air raids no longer can be kept up? Certainly it is a strange experience to be listening to the magisterial proceedings of the Security Council on Voice of America broadcasts against the background of street mobs chanting “Gamal Abdul Nasser” and the spurious fire of Egyptian anti-aircraft guns.
5. Nasser’s choice of Mohieddin is interesting and no surprise, although it suggests a sharp struggle for power is going on behind the scenes. It has been clear for some time that Mohieddin has represented a nucleus of opposition to Nasser’s policies within the regime. Indeed, you will recall that when I saw Nasser on December 11/1966 he said as much (PARA4, MYTEL 954 DEC12/66). Subsequently we continued to receive reports that Mohieddin was out of favour, and possibly even under house arrest for a time. Certainly, Mohieddin’s common-sense approach to Egypt’s economic problems and his more liberal ideas were one of the principal reasons for his dismissal as Prime Minister. If Mohieddin were to be confirmed as President (by no means certain) and if Nasser were completely to withdraw from public life as he proposes I would expect changes in the government’s present foreign and domestic policies, not immediately perhaps but in time. On the basis of his past performance I would expect Mohieddin to address himself first to the task of putting the country’s economy on a firmer basis and with this in mind I imagine he would attempt gradually to restore good relations with the USA and Britain and to improve the UAR’s relations with all western countries. He is reported to have no love for Ali Sabri [former Prime Minister of UAR and later in the month Deputy Prime Minister and head of the Cabinet Committee for Foreign Affairs] and the Arab Socialist Union while he is supposed to be popular with the army and knowledgeable about the workings of IBEA security services. If this is correct no doubt he would attempt to use the latter organizations against the ASU but the struggle would not repeat no be easily or quickly won. The ASU is strongly entrenched and unlikely to give up its relatively new-found powers and influence without a fight. [In fact, when Nasser reorganized his government on 19 June 1967, he assumed the additional duties of Prime Minister and Secretary General of the ASU, Egypt’s only political party.] His most pressing task, however, and perhaps the one which is most likely to determine whether he can succeed concerns the UAR’s relations with Israel. How Mohieddin would approach a settlement of the UAR’s differences with Israel would be all important to his political success as the second President of the UAR.
6. Since this message was drafted at an early hour last night hundreds of thousands of persons demonstrated throughout Cairo in favour of Nasser continuing in office and the demonstrations are continuing this morning with many thousands milling about centre of town in the vicinity of the Canadian Embassy. Expressing himself as “deeply moved” by these popular manifestations in his favour Nasser said he would reconsider his position today in the National Assembly and “before our people”. My guess would be that Nasser will “bow to the will of the people” and remain. However, I would doubt that Vice-President/FM|First Deputy Vice-President of UAR and Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Field Marshal Abdel Hakim] Amer or Minister of War [Shams-ad-Din| Badran will be offered a similar reprieve. [According to a later report from Cairo, both Amer and Badran were imprisoned on 25 August 1967 as part of a sweep by Nasser against those who had opposed his continuation in power.]. It will be intriguing to see what happens. However, whether or not Nasser eventually holds on to power it seems certain that his “Ka” will live and his Aswan pyramid will endure. STARNES
FM CAIRO JUN12/67 CONFD TO EXTER 729 IMMED REF MY DESP 363 AUG5/66 FUTURE VAR-CDN RELATIONS
I find it very difficult from this vantage-point and in the present circumstances to offer you an objective opinion on UAR-Cdn relations. Therefore, what I say on this score probably should be considered in this light. I find it hard to have much sympathy for the Egyptians in their present plight. They have in a very real sense brought it upon themselves.
2. However, my feelings aside, it seems clear that our relations with this country have suffered badly and could become worse. Now that the British and the American presence has been almost completely withdrawn we are quite likely to attract the unwelcome attention which up until now they have received. This certainly will be the case if we hold to our view that Israel should have the use of the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba and give publicity to it. As I see it, however, the principal question is whether we wish to challenge the Arabs on the right of Israel to exist. I think this question is central to any attempt to reach a settlement. In my view the right of Israel to exist must be maintained. However, if we are prepared to maintain our stand on this score I believe we should be clear that it may mean that our relations with the UAR and presumably with other Arab countries will worsen and could even cease to exist. There is no doubt in my mind that Nasser’s real aim before the Egyptian forces suffered such a resounding defeat in Sinai was the elimination of Israel. As you know from my earlier reports there are reasonable grounds for believing that if the Egyptians did not actually begin: hostilities they set out deliberately to provoke them. I have no doubt the elimination of Israel remains Nasser’s aim and if, as I suspect, he will now attempt to keep the struggle going rather than accept a settlement (MYTEL 719 JUN 1I) any efforts by Canada and others to stabilize the situation or to bring peace and order to the area will be regarded as “unfriendly” and with suspicion.
3. There is a strong temptation for Canada to adopt an isolationist attitude towards Egypt and the Mideast generally. Certainly I would not be surprised if such feelings were to grow strong in the USA and perhaps in Britain. To the extent that it means cutting ourselves off completely I think it would be foolish although admittedly no vital Canadian interest would be affected if we were so to do. However, for the very reason that the USA and the British no longer have an effective presence in the area I believe we should be prepared to maintain one.
I think, however, we should examine carefully the kind of presence we wish to maintain.
4. Recent experience and the course which affairs in Egypt are likely to take would seem to suggest we might with profit reduce our present establishments, both in the interests of safety and economy, and for other practical reasons. I would suggest, therefore, that for the next year or two we close down completely our immigration activities, our cultural and information activities and leave our commercial section at its present strength, i.e., without Canadian based staff. We could with profit maintain the present numbers of officers from DEA and the office of the Canadian Forces Attaché (indeed one can make a good case for an assistant for the Canadian Forces Attaché) with possibly some reduction in the general supporting staff of the Embassy after other adjustments have been effected. As I see it there will be little or no opportunities for normal trade or commerce with Egypt, in the near future. Indeed, given the situation I think a case can be made for actively discouraging such ties.
Correspondingly I see little or no opportunity in the conditions prevailing and which are likely more than ever to be determined for the Ministry of the Interior, for useful immigration activities. Given the atmosphere I believe it would be only realistio to recognize that any information or cultural work we may be able to perform would be far out of proportion to the effort we would have to put into it, e.g. UAR participation in Expo [the 1967 World’s Fair in Montreall. This is now a relatively minor aspect of our work in any event.
5. The fact is that in Arab eyes Canadian policies seem to be slanted in favour of Israel and if this includes questions such as the right of Israel to exist and Israeli rights to use the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba then no doubt the Arabs are right. Moreover, and perhaps in a way more important, Arabs seem to sense that consciously or unconsciously the Canadian government and the Canadian people, if not anti-Arab probably are pro-Israeli. If this is correct I think we should recognize the fact and fashion our approach to the Arab world accordingly. The UAR, despite the recent pitiful showing of Egypt’s armed forces, is still the most important Arab and African country. We should maintain a strong listening post here but accept the possibility that it may not last and that our other activities here are unlikely to be worth the expense of continuing them. We must also accept, I think, that our influence will be negligible. In addition, I think we must acknowledge that participation of Canadians in any future peacekeeping or UN observers activities is unlikely to be acceptable to the UAR government, in the apparently unlikely event such a role were to be created again on the UAR’s frontiers with Israel.
6. In time (and I think it will take a long time) as the full impact of the Arab defeat is felt in the Mideast and outside it I expect the Canadian position vis a vis the Arabs will become more normal. After all we are thousands of miles distant from the area and almost totally removed from its problems, its politics, its culture and its principal religion. Our greatest, although not our sole political interest in the countries of the area, has been and is to preserve peace between them. No doubt this will become accepted again and especially as the yeast created by Israel’s astonishing military victories begins to work among the different Arab countries and they go their different ways. STARNES
FM CAIRO JUN12/67 CONFD TO EXTER 730 PRIORITY VAR-GENERAL SITUATION
An atmosphere of complete unreality seems to reign at moment in UAR as government continues to make desperate efforts to put off day when Egyptian people must become aware of extent of defeat suffered by Arab forces: No mention whatsoever has been made of UAR casualties or materiel losses and no reports have been published during past 3 days re military situation in Sinai. Quite the contrary. Only news published concerning war deals with “the heroic resistance of Syrian Army whose equipment and morale remain intact”. Propaganda line taken by UAR government is that victory secured by Arabs in convincing Nasser to stay in power completely overshadows “temporary setback” suffered by Arab forces at hands of tripartite alliance of Israel, USA and Britain. Constantly recurring theme is paraphrase of DeGaulle’s famous call to arms of June 18, 1940, “Arabs have lost a battle, Arabs have not lost war”. UAR news media all suggest that victory will eventually be won on economic grounds since Arabs control oil resources and Suez Canal which are vital to the West. They do not, however, exclude possibility that hostilities may soon be resumed and that Israel may yet be crushed militarily.
2. It is difficult to tell how long this brave facade can be maintained. There are limits to the number of gimmicks which can be used to paper over the truth. Theatrical speeches, mass demonstrations, breaking diplomatic relations, dismissals of generals and exposing other scapegoats will soon wear thin and lose their efficacy as camouflage: There already are indications that Egyptian people are becoming increasingly aware of real situation. When this realization becomes widespread, governmental stability in UAR may be seriously jeopardized if it is not already threatened by struggle for power within regime itself. STARNES FM CAIRO JUN 13/67 TO EXTER 748 PRIORITY IS MIDEAST PEACE SETTLEMENT POSSIBLE?
Israeli leaders have said they would like to seek permanent settlement by direct negotiation with Arab states. From Israeli and certain western points of view, it is apparently envisaged that Israel would withdraw her forces from some positions now held, e.g., Sinai, though not from all conquered areas (excluded might be Sharm el Sheik, Gaza Strip, Jordanian Jerusalem and possibly even large part of West Bank) in return for recognition from Arabs of her right to exist, freedom of navigation, end of terrorist activities and guarantees for a lasting peace. These objectives, somewhat like schemes devised fortnight ago with aim of persuading UAR to open Straits of Tiran, seem like wishful thinking in face of present Arab attitude. In same category may be put suggestions we have heard that because Nasser is strong he is the one Arab leader who can lead people to acceptance of inglorious peace in keeping with Israeli victory. Arabs as indicated in OURTEL 730 JUN
12, do not consider they have been defeated; Israelis in spite of their obvious successes and heavy losses imposed on Arabs nevertheless have not advanced far enough either in Jordan, Egypt or Syria to impose kind of settlement suggested above on their adversaries who regard results of last week’s battles as mere “setback” in terms of long term struggle. While they may regard it as UN responsibility to see that Israeli forces withdraw from recently occupied territories, left to their own devices they would probably choose to forego temporarily a return to Sinai and even West Bank rather than give impression they were submitting to Israeli demands for peaceful coexistence. (This may partly explain Israeli insistence upon direct negotiations.) Nasser said he accepted cease-fire “in view of assurances given in Soviet draft resolution to Security Council and of French declarations that no one will be allowed to achieve regional expansion on basis of this latest aggression”. Arab states consider that they are still at war with Israel.
2. Arab attitude is demonstrated in actions of Algeria and to lesser extent Iraq and Kuwait who apparently have still not accepted UN call for ceasefire. President [Col. Houaril Boumedienne [Prime Minister and Minister of Defence of Algerial went yesterday to Moscow it is thought on behalf of several Arab states to demand from Soviet leaders an answer on extent of support they may expect during next and future phases of armed struggle against Israel. Iraqi press is reported to have called for “second round” of battle. Proposed Arab summit meeting, if confronted with two alternatives described to me by [Foreign Office Under-Secretaryl E1 Feki (MYTEL 719 JUN 11) seems much more likely to opt for continuation of war, if necessary by “unconventional” means rather than accept humiliating peace settlement.
3. President Nasser clearly is unrepentant. He acknowledged June 9 that his gamble had not paid off, that his forces had not been strong enough to prevail against enemy as he expected they would. Nasser has withdrawn from battle a little ashamed but not unduly concerned over victims of this futile exercise – Arab sons who at any rate have been sacrificed to highest cause. Nasser shows more interest in weapons still available to him and how these might be used in future. Principal mistake in Nasser’s view was not miscalculation of his adversary’s armed might but rather the Arab failure to use all means available to remove last traces of imperialism from the area before the battle began so as to “leave Israel alone”. Nasser appears still to imagine that western countries cannot live without the Suez Canal and Arab oil and that by threatening to deny them access to these invaluable Arab resources, western countries can be made to submit and to withhold their support from Israel. It is the failure to make best use of these two key weapons that Nasser regrets most. Thus he imagines he is still in driver’s seat.
4. In view of number of statements in recent days suggesting time has come to seek permanent solution for Mideast problems it seems necessary to sound word of caution lest it be assumed that Arabs are in contrite mood and likely to be prevailed upon to accept terms inimical to their chief aim in life which remains the liquidation of the State of Israel. If transit of Israeli flag in Gulf of Aqaba and elsewhere was as described by Nasser “unbearable” to Arab pride before recent hostilities, it is no less so now. Arabs may be expected to follow same dangerous and futile course so long as Nasser is their leader and until such time as conditions are created whereby new leaders can step forward who have strength and courage necessary to chart a bold new course for Arab world. Present indications are that six day Mideast war has not provided means for a volte-face in Arab policy.
5. This is a gloomy prognostication but I believe realistic. As I see it the only hope of a lasting settlement being reached which both sides can accept is if USSR and the USA can work together. This however has become immeasurably more difficult to achieve with breaks in Arab-USA relations, and Soviet-Israeli relations and involvement of Soviet Union in humiliating Arab military defeat. I was told by USA Embassy a few days ago they are satisfied Soviet assessment of impending Israeli attack on Syria : which was passed by Soviets to UAR authorities in Moscow and triggered off Nasser’s actions in Sinai was based on faulty and exaggerated intelligence reports. Thus USSR not only backed wrong horse but they appear also to have fired the starting gun for the race. Both Arabs and Russians have lost face. In circumstances I think it is important for the USA government to avoid a situation developing where the Soviet Union has little or no room for manoeuvre in extracting itself from its difficulties. Thus I would hope USA authorities will not yield to the temptation to cash in on Israeli territorial gains as hinted at in WASHDC TEL 2225 JUN9. One of few matters upon which Soviet Union and USA are likely to be able to agree in present situation is principle of “territorial integrity of all nations in the area” declared earlier by USA government. It seems to me important in terms of USA-Soviet cooperation as well as future Arab-USA relations that the principle be jointly affirmed by USA and USSR although clearly modalities of applying it to Israel’s frontier swill form a vital element of whatever negotiations can be arranged. If the USA can bring itself to support USSR in this matter a way may be opened for further joint action without which I see little prospect of bringing either Arabs or Israelis to heel. STARNES
FM CAIRO JUN13/67 CONFD TO EXTER 749 IMMED UAR-CDN RELATIONS AND SETTLEMENT OF ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE
I had a thirty-five minute talk last night with Dr [Mahmoud] Fawzi, deputy PM for foreign affairs. Meeting which was arranged at my request several days ago had to be postponed three times before it could take place. There also was present a Foreign Office official and a note-taker. Presence of these others was not without interest since in past we talked alone. I had impression Fawzi was being very careful and perhaps was not entirely free in expressing his views. However whether or not my impression was correct he was as charming and as courtly as ever. Not surprisingly he was tired and showed his years.
?. Our conversation began by Fawzi apologizing that he had been obliged to put off our appointment on so many occasions. He was sure however I would understand reasons. I thanked him for seeing me at all in such circumstances. I said my purpose was to seek his views on new and worrying problems with which all countries were confronted in Mideast and to benefit from his great experience and wisdom in dealing with such matters. At time I had first asked to see him I had been very concerned about unfavourable comments about Canada and Canadian government policies which had appeared in the Arabic press and which had been otherwise voiced. It seemed clear to me that these comments had been based on misunderstandings of our position and of our motives. I hoped these misunderstandings were now behind us. As Fawzi well knew Canadian people and Canadian government were not anti-Arab nor “unfriendly”. We were interested principally to preserve peace in area and we had tried sincerely always to be impartial in Arab-Israeli dispute.
3. Fawzi said he hoped Canadian position was as I described it. Arab peoples however would tend to judge us by our actions. He hoped that Canada would be able to demonstrate that it still viewed problems of Mideast “fairly”. He referred at this point to important statement in House of Commons on June 8 by [Canadian Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson|. Among other things Fawzi said this indicated we had taken a political position on question of Gulf of Aqaba which was a juridical matter. I said he had advantage of me since our communications with Canada had been interrupted for five days and only a few hours earlier had been restored by UAR Ministry of Communications. Thus I had to rely upon Arabic press and radio to know what Pearson had said. Fawzi countered by saying that as a diplomat I must be used to relying on press for information about my government’s policies. I said my government had a position on freedom of access to Gulf of Aqaba which must be well known to UAR government. This was primarily a juridical view. Fawzi said UAR also had a view on matter and one which had been supported by many countries and many experts in international law, including the international law commission. However this was a matter for settlement in UN or courts and could not be decided by force as Israel was attempting to do.
4. I asked Fawzi what in his view was next step. A cease fire had been established but clearly this was a transitory stage. Presumably a withdrawal of forces should be one of next phases although there seemed little sign at present that this could be accomplished soon. Did Fawzi see any basis existing for a settlement of Israeli-Arab differences? For example did he believe Arabs would accept right of State of Israel to exist? This seemed to me to be central to problem and if agreement could not be reached on this question then there seemed little chance of negotiating any lasting or meaningful settlement. Fawzi replied that as I well knew question of right of Israel to exist had been raised many times over many years. Arabs had never accepted concept of an alien state in their midst. As to question of withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories they had acquired by aggression it should be clear that their withdrawal was considered by Arabs as a “condition préalable” to any discussions leading to a settlement. I said that within such a framework however clearly question of Israeli access to Gulf of Aqaba at once would arise. Could Strait of Tiran question not be referred to International Court while a settlement was being worked out? Fawzi said Arabs would never agree to this question being decided under duress. I replied I only had in mind referral to court as part of a process of eventual adjustment leading to a general settlement of some of the major problems presently dividing both sides.
5. Fawzi said Arab countries, and I believe he was thinking especially of Egypt, no doubt were faced with exceptionally difficult problems. Way ahead would be much more difficult than it had been before Israel’s aggression. Arabs had suffered serious reverses which would have their effect on all aspects of their development. However Arabs had thousands of years of history behind them and they could wait ten twenty a hundred years to achieve their aims. In the end Arabs would prevail perhaps long after either of us were alive. (It is to be hoped that before my grandchildren and yours are afflicted with the cursed dispute biological advances will have done something to change the nature of man, starting I suggest with the Israelis and Arabs).
6. I said I recalled that President Nasser had said to me when I saw him before end of last year that perhaps some accommodation with Israel would be possible if it were to cease being a Judaic state. President had suggested to me that acceptance in Israel of Arab refugees would bring about such a change. Fawzi said important word was “perhaps”. (Perhaps Fawzi may have had in mind that with recent acquisition of so many Arab refugees Israel’s population must be now about 40 percent Arab). I said I realized President had been speaking in hypothetical terms, nevertheless it was concepts of this kind which must be considered if any negotiations leading to a settlement seriously were to be begun. Clearly refugee problem had become much more acute as a result of recent events and must be considered as an important element in any settlement.
7. Fawzi said he had proposed three years ago that a plebiscite be taken among Arab refugees to determine how many of them wished to return to their homeland or to remain where they were. None of the countries outside area had responded to his suggestion and it had been rejected out of hand by Israel. I said that we all deplored plight of Arab refugees and that countries like Canada had done what they could through UNRWA [United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East] and other agencies to help. Although Canada’s total contribution perhaps was small, by comparison we had done a great deal more than many other countries. After all it should be remembered that Canada was thousands of miles from the Mideast and it was not to be wondered that Canadians generally might not be especially knowledgeable about or possibly even interested in the Arab-Israeli dispute except perhaps insofar as it impinged on world peace. Thus considerable contribution Canada had made to assist the peoples of area and to keep peace were quite remarkable and certainly could not be said to be motivated by partisan feelings. Fawzi did not seem to like suggestion that Mideast was remote for us since he replied that problems of area were important to whole world in this age of interdependence.
8. We covered the following additional topics. (a) Refugees in Gaza Strip Fawzi said that despite Israeli propaganda about their efforts on behalf of Gaza refugees they were in fact attempting to force them out of the area.
(b) Cease Fire
Apart from minor violations Fawzi said cease observed. He said there were still considerable
UAR forces in the Sinai.
(c) Security Council
VAR planned no immediate initiatives in Security Council.
(d) USA-VAR Relations
Fawzi’s only reference to USA-UAR relations was trip he and Vice President Moheiddin were to have made to USA on June 7 which had been overtaken by Israeli aggression on June
5. He said President [Lyndon Baines] Johnson lof the United States] had proposed to send Vice President [Hubert] Humphrey to Cairo but as a gesture of goodwill UAR government had decided instead to send a delegation to Washington DC. Fawzi never once mentioned USA or British involvement in fighting. I was careful not to mention matter and I believe omission may have been his way of indicating he did not approve of allegations or of break in relations.
9. I had impression from Fawzi that Egyptians are still stunned by their defeats and uncertain how to proceed. Only policy which seems to be emerging is a continuation of struggle. Fawzi said every Egyptian was ready to give the gallebia off his back (about all many of them have to give) to continue the fight. This was the will of the people and no leader could ignore such deep-seated feelings. At one point Fawzi made interesting comment that he had heard suggestion made before Israeli attacks on Egypt that worst thing for Israel would be a clear military Israeli victory. It would create more problems for Israel than it would solve and it would tend to mobilize world opinion against them. (MYTEL 659 MAY31)
10. Fawzi ended conversation by asking me to convey his good wishes to PM and to Mr [Paul] Martin [Secretary of State for External Affairs]. He hoped that Canadian government would approach problems of Mideast in a spirit of “fair play”. He recalled that Canada like many other members of UN had paid lip service to implementation of general armistice agreement. He hoped we would show a more positive approach towards Arab cause than we appeared so far to have adopted in present crisis. Peace in the area was in all our interests but it must be based on justice and a condemnation of use of force.
I1. I took little comfort from our talk. Fawzi has always been one of the senior members of regime with pro-western leanings and a reasonable approach to problems. There was no sign in his comments of any desire to compromise or even to discuss possibility. Struggle would go on indefinitely-it was nobler to die than to accept defeat. Israelis were totally in the wrong and all those who supported them were enemies of the Arabs. More important I suspect that Fawzi and others who might share his views are not likely any longer to be able to influence policy and are obliged to go along with the line he expounded to me. STARNES 3
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 20, No. 4 (2004) — Spring/Summer 2004 // Printemps/Été 2004, pp. 22–29. Read the rest of this issue →
