bout de papier, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2007) — Spring/Summer 2007 // Printemps/Été 2007, pp. 22–23
The Senate of Canada has been much criticized over a number of years as being of little importance and numerous suggestions have been made for its «reform,” some useful others not very useful and, in some instances, unhelpful, even bizarre.
In recent years, the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, under the tenacious, able direction of the Chairman, Colin Kenny, has done much very valuable, detailed research, aimed at providing Canadians with accurate knowledge about Canada’s activities involving the collection of “intelligence,” the machinery of government for dealing with it, while also attempting to “demystify” the matter to the fullest extent possible, without harming Canada’s security.
Over time and with patience members of the Committee have learned a great deal about the subject which is evident from their contributions to the Committee’s discussions of 30 April 2007. Their questions were subtle, astute, wide-ranging and very direct, indicating a good knowledge of matters which, until very recently, were known only to those whose job it is to carry out the sometimes difficult tasks required of their quite different intelligence and security agencies. Thus, the unclassified record of the Committee’s discussions provides a most informative and useful reference not only for the general public, but also for the myriad public servants who have to deal with these somewhat esoteric matters from time to time.
The most recent example of the Senate Committee’s careful, useful work is to be found in the “Evidence” contained in the excellent minutes of its meeting held on Monday, 30 April 2007, during which they heard from: a) Jim Judd, Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, b) Mr. John Adams, Chief, Communications Security Establishment, c) Bev Busson, Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and d) Professor Wesley Wark, University of Toronto, Fellow of the Munk Centre for International Studies and Fellow of the Institute for Research on Public Policy. The 89 pages give a fascinating and extremely useful description of the complicated work of these agencies and their interaction with one another – sensitive matters which until recently were classified Top Secret and seldom, if ever, discussed in public.
All four witnesses were very good; explaining their difficult, unusual jobs with great clarity, astonishing frankness, considerable verve and, by no means last, a lively sense of humour. Apart from that, they all demonstrated their suitability for the jobs they now hold!
Particularly useful were the comments offered by Professor Wesley Wark and especially concerning the unfortunate fact that “intelligence” has been, and perhaps still is, regarded by many Cabinet members, officials and Canadians as a joke. Something to be tolerated but not to be taken seriously. I had the encouraging impression that members of the Committee accepted and agreed with Wark’s remarks on this score.
The average reaction of Canadian politicians and public servants often has been to discount information provided through intelligence activities. My brief experiences as an intelligence officer in the Canadian Army (1940-44) suggest that those carrying out such work often were suspect. The British Army’s Intelligence Corps badge, consisting of a union rose (a red rose with a white centre surrounded by laurel leaves and surmounted by a crown), often was snidely described as “a pansy in laurel leaves.” Indeed, those doing intelligence work sometimes were viewed as doing work which kept them out of harm’s way! Tell that to those who were parachuted or flown into Nazi-occupied France to become British secret agents (e.g., some 75 members of the Canadian Army, most of whom managed to avoid being caught by the Nazi secret police by war’s end).
During my years in the Department of External Affairs, when I was variously involved in at least three of the areas about which the witnesses spoke – security and intelligence, interception of communications of all kinds and so-called “foreign intelligence,” it would have been quite impossible for me to engage in the kind of public discussions which took place in the Senate Committee at the end of April this year. Indeed, if I had done so, most, if not all, of our international partners in security and intelligence matters (mentioning only the US, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand) would have protested vigorously to the Canadian government, probably resulting in my immediate resignation.
I felt very envious that, at long last, these witnesses were able to have a sensible, almost unfettered public discussion of the kind encouraged by the Senate Committee. Indeed, I think it would have been equally difficult even to have that kind of discussion in the very private discussions which take place in a top secret international forum such as CAZAB (a highly secret committee established to exchange and discuss sensitive anti-espionage cases and operations).
Incidentally, I found it curious that nothing at all was said about the important field of photographic intelligence (now done by satellites). Today, outer space is continuously being used for these purposes. The results of these products are at least as important a source of very valuable intelligence as those derived from the interception of communications of all kinds and so-called human sources.
I found welcome and encouraging some of the observations concerning the pros and cons of whether Canada should establish a capability to commit espionage. Wesley Wark made a number of interesting observations on this score. For example, when asked by Senator Kenny for comment as to where the agency for committing espionage should be housed in the government apparatus, he replied: “The realistic road is to rewrite the CSIS act to remove the sort of linguistic roadblock of threats to the security of Canada that potentially impede CSIS’ overseas operations, and give them a mandate, initially, to develop a full service foreign intelligence capacity.
“This would be with an understanding that it would probably be a decade-long project. It would require some resources and, at the end of that period, it would be important to assess where the best institutional home for such a service would be. It has to begin with CSIS. They are the only agency in the Canadian government that has the capacity to grow such as organization and feed the information that it would collect properly into government channels.
“The question of the future institutional home would have to be left open. CSIS would have to prove over the course of developing such a capacity that it is the responsible home for it in the long term. There are other alternative homes, including the British model of housing it, at arm’s length, in the equivalent of the Department of Foreign Affairs.”
Wesley Wark may be quite right but, assuming I haven’t misunderstood Jim Judd’s remarks in the Senate Committee, I gained the impression that CSIS may not be entirely happy about taking on the unknown and a potentially open-ended, heavy burden of committing espionage world-wide. God alone knows what Canada’s targets might be and how they will be established and acted upon!
Clearly the matter is still under discussion. I would hope that the questions concerning the provision of some realistic protection for Canada’s spies which I raised in “Committing Espionage,” my article published in the Fall/Winter Issue, Vol. 22, No. 3 of bout de papier, will be taken on account when deciding the issue.
View the original scanned pages →
Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2007) — Spring/Summer 2007 // Printemps/Été 2007, pp. 22–23. Read the rest of this issue →
