bout de papier, Vol. 18, No. 4 (2001-2002) — Winter 2001/2002, pp. 23–25
INTELLIGENCE IN THE COLD
WAR: ORGANISATION, ROLE AND
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, Lars
Christian Jenssen and Olav Riste, eds., Oslo:
Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies.
197 pp.
SECRETS OF SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE
DURING THE COLD WAR AND BEYOND,
Matthew M. Aid and Cees Wiebes, eds.,
London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001. 350 pp.
THE WARNING SOLUTION: INTELLI-
GENT ANALYSIS IN THE AGE OF
INFORMATION OVERLOAD, Kristan J.
Wheaton, Fairfax, Virginia: AFCEA
International Press, 2001. 89 pp.
The paradigm shift which occurred on September I has led to a new reality which will likely have an enduring impact on the way foreign policy is conducted. During the last half century there have been a number of watersheds when foreign intelligence, or the absence thereof, was seen as vital to the policy decisions which were taken. One such instance was the terrorist attacks in the United States in September and the counter-terrorism measures which followed. Obvious others occurred during World War Il when the decrypting of German Enigma communications almost certainly affected the duration of the war. The absence of properly evaluated intelligence on the eve of Pearl Harbor was another milestone. Similar examples, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, abound during the Cold War.
The events of September will almost certainly re-write the way in which foreign intelligence is used in policy-making. This review is not a cri de coeur for a Canadian foreign intelligence service. It does, however, underscore the importance of foreign intelligence to Canada and the way in which it has and can be used
These three books illustrate different facets of foreign intelligence. For two of the books, which are compendiums of historical articles on a host of subjects relating to intelligence, the emphasis will be on the chapters relating to Canada. One book, Intelligence in the Cold War, captures the foundation of Canada’s foreign intelligence program in an article prepared by Canada’s leading scholar on intelligence. A second book, Secrets of Signals Intelligence, includes a chapter which updates part of the earlier story by looking at Canada’s SIG- INT efforts during the Cold War, and was prepared by an Ottawa academic. The last book, The Warning Solution, a short book emerging from inside the American intelligence community, looks at how intelligence is used as a foreign policy tool.
The three books, or at least the relevant chapters, provide a short introduction to an important facet of Canadian foreign policy. Although the material is an ’easy’ read, be warned that these are not books found in the ’What’s New in Non-Fiction’ sections of most book stores. That is too bad. The books are important to an understanding of an element of foreign policy-making which is likely to impact us all for years to come.
“Creating a Cold War Intelligence Community: The Canadian Dilemma” by Wesley W. Wark, of the University of Toronto, appears in Intelligence in the Cold War. Dr. Wark is very familiar with Canada’s postwar foreign intelligence efforts, having studied his subject from an academic perspective while maintaining close ties and entrée to the Canadian intelligence community.
Wark provides an excellent snapshot of Canada’s wartime intelligence organizations and focuses on the organizational dynamics which followed the war. Wark underscores what he sees as a paramount failing in Canadian foreign intelligence; the inability of Canada to move beyond the many little specialized units which all performed admirably during the war but created the impression of no one being in charge of Canadian foreign intelligence.
The wartime experience, in his words, “failed to produce … [a] centre for intelligence policy-making”. Wark proceeds by summarizing the struggle between the civil and military factions over organizing a postwar intelligence organization. To some extent, the debate in Canada over a postwar foreign intelligence capability very quickly became polarized. There were those who favoured a CIA-type organization structured along lines of complex interconnectivity with all lines leading to the Cabinet. This model, put forward by the Canadian military, would make full use of the many little military intelligence organizations which had come into being during the war, many of which still existed at the end of hostilities and were now looking for a ’home.’ This can be described as the American model.
The other extreme was represented by the (then) Department of External Affairs. Wark views External Affairs as conservative and hostile to a formal structure, much preferring the informality of casual cooperation and overlapping structures made to work by a mandarin class which moved easily within the corridors of power. This was the British model. External Affairs won out in the end and Canada embarked on a cautious road towards establishing a national foreign intelligence community for the postwar world.
At only about a dozen pages, Wesley Wark’s quick look at the founding of Canadian foreign intelligence provides a short overview of a complex issue. Many of the important details are missing. Given the space constraints it could not be otherwise. The article provides an excellent summary for those who want to get a bit of the flavour of the times during the founding of the Canadian intelligence community. Reading the article is time well spent. Nine additional chapters on the early history of intelligence add to an understanding of the way in which Canadian allies conduct intelligence and provide some context to the environment in which Canada made some critical decisions during the period immediately following World War II.
Martin Rudner, of Carleton University, authors “Canada’s Communications Security Establishment from Cold War to Globablization” in Secrets of Signals Intelligence during the Cold War and Beyond. Rudner takes the story of Canadian foreign intelligence collection to the next stage, giving some background to the founding of CSE and discussing its SIGINT mandate in the context of the Cold War. This is a very good summary of a very complex issue and Dr. Rudner does credit to the subject.
Canada’s postwar SIGINT agreements continue to be shrouded in secrecy although the rudiments of the story are, by now, well known. Rudner recapitulates the postwar SIGINT story and places Canada’s involvement in context. It is a story which should be better known and perhaps this article will go some way to address the shortcoming. Rudner describes Canadian SIGINT collection outside Canada. This is a difficult story to relate creditably since the Canadian government has never released any archival material on what Canada has done, what the national policy on the issue is, or what the challenges were which had to be overcome. For this story Rudner relies on a single source to describe the “Pilgrim” operation, which was the codeword for the collection of SIG- INT outside of Canada using Canadian missions abroad as intelligence platforms. The facts of the story cannot be credibly assessed against the historical record — since none is yet available. To his credit, Rudner, in using the single source available on this matter, has ignored some of the more egregious allegations which have been made by the source and which test the limits of logic. Rudner does allude to the more fanciful aspects of the story in a footnote.
Those seeking a quick insight into the dark world of SIGINT collection, and the role which Canada plays, are well advised to read Rudner’s chapter: In about 30 pages, he sets out clearly the issue, the mechanics, and the international relationships which exist, and gives a good idea of what SIGINT, as a foreign intelligence tool, means to Canada.
Like the previous book, Secrets of Signals Intelligence includes a further nine chapters providing insight to the SIGINT activities of a number of Canadian allies, including some who are not players in the UK-USA intelligence alliance of which Canada is a partner. The chapters are well worth reading not only for what they tell about some of our friends but also because of the opening chapter by Matthew Aid and Cees Wiebes. This is one of the best summaries in print explaining what SIGINT is and why it is important to us. One particular phrase seems quintessentially Canadian: “SIGINT involves relatively little political or physical risk”. “ Perhaps this single phrase may capture why SIGINT seems to have been the foreign intelligence collection of choice in Canada.
The last book, The Warning Solution, highlights the dilemma of today’s intelligence analyst: information overload. What happens when there is so much foreign intelligence made available to analysts that coping with the volume is physically impossible? Wheaton’s book is about strategic intelligence, the kind that provides longer-term, big-picture insight into future events; it’s the kind of intelligence which in 1980 would have foretold the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Using a format of theoretical presentation followed by a relevant case study, Wheaton sets out to present an original approach to intelligence analysis. What Wheaton attempts to do is to explain something which is like social science mixed with elements of gypsy fortune-telling.
Wheaton defines the ’Warning Problem’ as a delicate dance between the analyst and the decision-maker and how they come together and move towards a solution. Much of what he presents are conventional truths: the problems of mirror-imagings, the need to carefully — and fairly — define the problem, and the need to limit oneself to an appropriate level of detail. He does not, in the end, depart much from conventional truths about the challenges confronting intelligence analysts.
What Wheaton does provide the reader, in roughly the final 30 pages of a short book, is an easily readable presentation as to what intelligence analysis is and how one does it. He doesn’t resolve the uncertainty which is associated with intelligence analysis but he does show some of the pitfalls that exist, lists the methodological process, and attempts to show when it is time to get on with it and just start analyzing. The book is worth a read. For those with limited time, the last thirty pages or so will suffice.
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 18, No. 4 (2001-2002) — Winter 2001/2002, pp. 23–25. Read the rest of this issue →
