bout de papier, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1993) — Winter 1993 // Hiver 1993, pp. 6–7
by Daryl Copeland
The Government of Canada’s ability to respond creatively to changes in the international environment is seriously constrained by the need to reconcile burgeoning demands against the constraints imposed by diminishing resources. Within External Affairs, talent and money previously available for the formulation and delivery of foreign policy have been reallocated to cover a shifting set of interdepartmental and ministerial imperatives, many of them short term. As the needs of the Government have grown, the Department’s traditional centres of analysis, the geographic bureaux, divisions and missions abroad reeling under an enormous operational and administrative burden, have become so thinly stretched that they are now ill-equipped to deliver. With the levels of political and economic reporting reduced — the lamentable result of cuts in Canada’s presence abroad — the problems of analysis have become acute. In a professional foreign service, trying to make policy in the absence of quality analysis is like driving at night without headlights.
As Departmental preoccupations have shifted elsewhere, much of the responsibility for the analysis of international affairs has devolved — more by default than design — to the Foreign Assessments Bureau. This transfer carries important implications which have yet to be fully appreciated. Long accustomed to operating with minimal scrutiny under the pretext of maximum security, the Bureau has now parted with its Cold War past and, figuratively at least, come out from behind closed doors. In recalibrating its focus from “intelligence” to “analysis”, and by moving a few years ago from a reliance on highly classified material to “all-source” assessments, the Bureau has, in effect, gone retail. Improved quality and exposure to a wider audience have been accompanied by useful innovations in handling procedures, presentation and marketing. Still, it is interpretive excellence and the Bureau’s unique access to sensitive and covert source material that remain the distinctive “value-added” dimensions on the operation. An emphasis on these elements in addition to a concerted effort to release unclassified versions to interested parties in the media, business community, and universities, and an active reinforcement of the Bureau’s ties to the Privy Council Office could help to ensure survival in the even leaner times to come.
The mission of the Foreign Assessments Bureau is to “…provide the Government with intelligence and independent analysis of world events and issues relevant to Canadian foreign policy interests”. In carrying out this task, the Bureau must not only produce cogent analysis but must strike a balance between the concerns of the customer and the integrity of the product. Vigilance against pressure to use analysis in the service of other, often conflicting, goals must be constant.
If intellectual engagement, cerebral ability and psychological drive are the obvious prerequisites to analytical success, then the nature of the professional working environment is at least equally crucial. The lack of an adequate travel budget, shortage of support resources, and wavering confidence in the product have contributed to a disturbing sense of drift and, more corrosively, to growing doubts about the commitment of management at all levels to the analytical enterprise. In addition to a clear understanding of objectives, responsibilities, and performance targets, analysts must be provided with the creative space and research tools necessary to get on with the job. To sustain concentration, those at the working level need some degree of protection against the slings and arrows of bureaucratic fortune and adequate shelter from the inevitably high levels of static and interference which come with the territory. The last thing an analyst needs is a supervisor who prefers not to deflect incoming missiles, but to climb aboard for the ride. Analysts cannot expect to be shielded from all assaults or diversions, but a rudimentary anti-ballistic defense is essential.
The formulation of policy requires intensive consultations, extensive consensus, and, frequently, an indication of political acceptability. Not so with analysis, which is more heavily dependent on the organizational skills, writing abilities, knowledge and expertise of the analyst. Consultation is certainly desirable — with posts abroad, divisions at headquarters and other government departments — but is not the sine qua non.
The central task facing the analyst is to keep on top of key briefs, to establish an effective network, and to find an appropriate entrée into the policy mainstream while avoiding capture by it. This formula enables the analyst to remain constantly aware of both relevant developments and the official line. In moments of crisis, when getting it right really counts, analysts must avoid becoming mired in an elaborate consultative process over which they can exercise little, if any, control.
In the information-saturated precincts of contemporary public administration, even the most prescient, convincing assessment will have little impact unless it is short, sharp, and issue-oriented. Superior analysis crackles when read, as old assumptions are reconsidered and new perspectives are revealed. The best analysis is disciplined, precise, and pledged to accuracy. Its purpose is not to bless established truths or to celebrate the righteousness of received wisdom, but to probe, to identify and to synthesize. The road to oblivion is paved with bland intentions. Genuine analysis eschews propaganda, refuses ritual anointment and has no pre-ordained destination; instead, it often points the way into uncharted territory. Analytical collegiality tends mainly towards the production of tired, cautious, caveat-ridden homilies to the virtues of running with the herd. Analysis which is worth the effort to produce can be lively and balanced, persuasive and non-prescriptive, without being reduced to lowest common denominator mush. Analytical integrity requires that the evidence be followed relentlessly wherever it leads … all of which makes for tough travelling.
Dedication to analytical rigour can make the promoters of doctrinal certitude uncomfortable. Long-standing Departmental norms notwithstanding, the free play of conflicting views inside the institution are not only healthy, but necessary if the decision-making process is to function properly. Like bad habits, old paradigms die hard. Unlike voting patterns at the UN, analysis is dependent neither upon good company nor desirable outcomes. It exists not to please but to prod. If relevance, timeliness and connection to Canadian interests can be taken as given, then the highest vocation of political assessment is to question, to weigh and to judge. In the world of ideas, the path of least resistance is a dead end.
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1993) — Winter 1993 // Hiver 1993, pp. 6–7. Read the rest of this issue →
