bout de papier, Vol. 30, No. 1 (2017), pp. 46–48
In past numbers of bout de papier, we have printed extracts from papers in the major project spearheaded by Escott Reid, a “Re-Examination of Canadian Foreign Policy (1951-S2).” The intent of the series was to provide reference works as overall guidance for posts and divisions at headquarters. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this ambitious scheme collapsed of its own weight, though there are drafts of fourteen papers in various stages of completion in the departmental files at Library and Archives Canada. Though these studies never fulfilled their original purpose — and the departmental authors treated their assigned tasks with varying degrees of commitment — the texts make interesting reading as an indication of how each aspect of Canada’s international relations was seen by officers in the department (often specialists in the subject), particularly as drafts were frequently circulated for comment and input. John Holmes played a leading part in the preparation of the document from which an extract is printed below.
The relationship with Britain and the Commonwealth was sufficiently important at this time that it was a key topic for analysis (it had also been stressed by Louis St. Laurent in the famous “Gray Lecture” in January 1947).
This document may be found in RG 25, volume 4132, file 6133-40 at LAC.
General considerations.
At present the principal advantage to be derived from Commonwealth membership is the broader grasp of world movements which results from constant intercourse with the other members. The close contact with the Asian members is particularly valuable, both in counteracting any tendency to insularity on the part of the Western members and in enabling them to explain their points of view to the Eastern members. Further, the Commonwealth is useful under present circumstances in providing a loose skein which enables Australia and New Zealand to add their strength, in a sense, to the North Atlantic alliance, even though they are not signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty. Moreover, the Commonwealth organization introduces a modification or shading between the United States on the one hand and the rest of the non-Communist world on the other. United States policy at times displays a disturbing tendency to try to break down all links throughout the non-Communist world except those that have their head and centre in Washington; the United States attitude, on various occasions in the past, towards the sterling area might be taken as an example of this. It is useful to maintain the Commonwealth connection as a check on such tendencies.
No doubt there are certain disadvantages, too, in the connection. Membership in any international organization carries with it some danger of being talked into doing things that are not altogether in the national interest, though Canadian delegations usually resist such temptations fairly well. The risk of being legally committed to a war by another member has been done away with by the established right to neutrality, but the Commonwealth connection still makes it more difficult to hold aloof from a war of a localized character in which other Commonwealth members are engaged than from a war involving mere foreigners. A special hazard of the post-war Commonwealth is the probability of incurring the ill-will of both parties to any dispute by observing a strict neutrality between them, or, alternatively, of making an enemy of one by indicating that the other appears to have the better case. However, the advantages to Canada of membership in the Commonwealth appear to outweigh considerably the disadvantages.
In the years when the present structure of the Commonwealth was being determined, Canada, while trying to guide its development in a direction consistent with Canadian national ambition, acted on the whole as a moderating influence between those countries which would have preferred some degree of centralization and those which were uncertain about staying in the Commonwealth at all. There is still room for the exercise of such an influence. Among the new Asian members, Pakistan seems to favour a more closely organized Commonwealth, India would doubtless be as much opposed to this as Ireland used to be, and Ceylon’s attitude is uncertain. The knowledge that the United Kingdom is no longer a great power of the first rank has, during and since the Second World War, given rise to various proposals for restoring her to her former position by consolidating the Commonwealth under her leadership. It is probably true that if the United Kingdom could speak to the Soviet Union and the United States on terms of military and economic equality, it would make for stability throughout the world. But the dream of accomplishing this by turning the Commonwealth into a single state for international purposes is, under present conditions, so clearly impracticable that it does not deserve serious suggestion. This idea is, consciously or unconsciously, at the root of suggestions for a permanent Commonwealth council of ministers, for central or decentralized Commonwealth secretariats, or for more formal defence commitments, which keep cropping up. That does not mean that some of these suggestions may not in themselves require careful consideration. The world is far from being the same place that it was when the present structure of the Commonwealth was being worked out, and any proposals by which it is hoped to increase the security of the member nations of the Commonwealth must receive adequate thought and discussion among them. In general, however, the existing organization of the Commonwealth as a group of independent nations cooperating in matters of common concern seems best adapted to the realities of the situation.
Because of the rapid and remarkable change in the relative power and prestige of the United Kingdom and United States in the world, Canada need no longer fear domination from Whitehall, but we are increasingly aware of the overwhelming influence, and sometimes pressure, of Washington. In this situation the Commonwealth connection may serve as a useful counterpoise to the one-sided pressure exerted on Canada by the United States. Several times in recent months we have felt that the policy of the United Kingdom, especially in the Far East, was wiser than that of the United States. This mature conduct of foreign affairs by the United Kingdom can sometimes serve to offset the uncertainties and emotional aspects of United States foreign policy.
It is considered that the Canadian Government should now be prepared to modify slightly its attitude towards attempts to have the Commonwealth speak with one voice in world affairs. Itis unlikely that such attempts will be made frequently, but there may be occasions on which it will serve our purpose to have the Commonwealth take a united stand on an issue. Thus, at the meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers last January there was a joint approach to the question of Chinese intervention in Korea, which was perhaps able to exercise a greater moderating influence on the United States Government than if the viewpoint had been separately expressed by a number of Commonwealth countries. At that time we did not inhibit our action by the old fear of ganging up on someone else, and the joint approach served a good purpose. Generally, however, we should sidestep attempts to achieve a single voice on foreign policy and resist any effort on the part of one Commonwealth member to speak for some or all of the others, either on a special question or in relation to some particular region. We can of course, on occasion, expressly authorize another Commonwealth member to speak for us, or we may find joint representations desirable. Usually, however, our objective should not be a single voice, but unison of harmonizing voices. While we will not be able to achieve a sustained common foreign policy, it should frequently be possible, after careful consultation, to pursue similar policies in common. It may well serve Canada’s interests to increase the influence and prestige of the Commonwealth association by active cooperation in foreign affairs. Canada has traditionally been cautious towards proposals for new Commonwealth organizations and suggestions for Commonwealth conferences. Our hesitation may have had a rational basis but has often been founded as well on old habits and apprehension of possible domestic criticism. Canadians should now be prepared to take a calm and practical approach to such suggestions. Certainly, we will not be enthusiastic about “improving” the machinery of consultation and cooperation and setting up new organizations which may duplicate the functions of existing Commonwealth, regional, or international bodies. We should continue to oppose machinery for its own sake, and indeed take the initiative to remove any obsolete existing machinery which overlaps more effective machinery of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies, but we should always be prepared to consider changes in methods of consultation. It would be a mistake to assume that the existing flexible and informal machinery has reached a stage of unchanging perfection. Proposals for changes should be judged on practical, functional grounds. On nearly all occasions in recent years when we have been invited to a meeting of Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers, or other cabinet ministers, Canada has been dragged unwillingly to the conference table. Frequently, however, we have, in the end, felt that the meeting was well worthwhile. This would seem to mean that we should now revise our customary attitude to the holding of Commonwealth conferences. We would not wish to see a substantial increase in their number, because of the multiplicity of other regional and international conferences, but frequently we could take a more cooperative and helpful attitude from the outset. Canada has, for long, opposed any suggestions that the mutual obligations between Commonwealth countries, whatever they may be, should be formalized and defined as specific commitments. Attempts to do so have, fortunately, become much rarer in recent years, particularly as it has become more widely appreciated that the Commonwealth countries have few special interests which are exclusive to the Commonwealth and not shared, at least regionally, with other countries. It is not suggested that this attitude calls for any basic change. We have, however, made a substantial alteration in our attitude to formal commitments by becoming members of the United Nations and parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. We are happy to see the United States showing a willingness to incur specific security guarantees to Commonwealth countries such as Australia and New Zealand, as well as to certain foreign countries, and it may well be that we should not be unalterably opposed to all ideas of security pledges to countries not fortunate enough to be in the North Atlantic area. Canada would, of course, be reluctant now to increase her already extensive commitments. Furthermore, it must be recognized that because of the geographical dispersal of the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth association cannot be regarded as a major instrument for the security of its members.
It has now become almost a platitude to declare that one of the greatest values of the Commonwealth, as it is constituted today, is to provide a bridge, almost the only bridge, between the West and Asia. Certainly, the very nature of the Commonwealth has been fundamentally altered by the addition of three Asian countries to its membership, and the contact with them has been valuable to Canada and the other Western members in removing suspicions and misunderstandings and giving us a wider picture of the world today. The Commonwealth is, however, such a loose organization that it would be dangerous to assume that such a bridge automatically exists and will continue. On the other hand, it should not, pessimistically, be regarded as a temporary link which the Asian members are disposed to question from time to time and which they will inevitably sever. It calls for deliberate action to keep it under repair and make it serve useful purposes of intercourse. On the part of Canada this means that we should make conscientious efforts to consult the Eastern members, to exchange information with them, to meet them around the conference table, to befriend them in their endeavours to establish stable, democratic, parliamentary forms of government, and to help them in concrete ways. The Colombo Plan for economic development and technical cooperation is clearly one means of strengthening the bridge. It may be that Canada has a special role to play in preserving this link with the East. The United Kingdom, because of the memories of the Raj and perhaps because of the persistence of old habits and attitudes in dealing with Asians, although official policies have changed, may have certain handicaps in handling its relations with the Asian Commonwealth members. South Africa clearly can play no useful part because of its racial policies, and even Australia suffers from the self-consciousness of its much-proclaimed White Australia policy. The present Indian Government has placed a good deal of confidence in Canadian leaders. Likewise relations with the Pakistan Government have been close and friendly, partly because of the successful operation of our mission in Karachi. It is too soon to say whether there is a permanent basis to these relationships, but it appears that Canada may be in a position to influence and strengthen the link with the Eastern Commonwealth countries.
One difficulty which Canadian governments have in the past had to contend with in dealing with problems relating to the Commonwealth is that substantial groups of Canadians were unable to consider these problems in terms of the national interests of Canada. Instead, their opinions were dominated by an emotional approach to the Commonwealth or to Great Britain — an emotion of affection or dislike. During the past generation, the number of Canadians who find it difficult to think rationally about Commonwealth problems has substantially diminished. There are, however, still a few, and it is possible that one of the main reasons why these people find it difficult to take a rational and realistic view of the Commonwealth is the continued existence of vestiges of the old colonial status of Canada — the fact that no Canadian has ever been Governor-General and even the very title of this office, the necessity of going to London for amendments to important parts of the Canadian constitution, the King’s title, and also perhaps the continued difficulties over a national flag and a national anthem. If these vestigial remnants of the old colonial status help to cause confused thinking in Canada about the nature of Commonwealth relations, they may have to be changed in order to make it easier for the Canadian Government to pursue, with respect to the Commonwealth, policies which serve the national interests of Canada. It must of course be recognized that there is no obstacle outside Canada to making these changes, except that any change in the King’s title requires the consent of other members of the Commonwealth.
Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 30, No. 1 (2017), pp. 46–48. Read the rest of this issue →
