bout de papier, Vol. 13, No. 4 (1996) — Winter 1996 // Hiver 1996, pp. 17–20
In the autumn of 1996 and as part of the broader restructuring exercise, all of DFAIT’s geographic bureaux were reorganised in such a way that the distinction between General Relations and Trade Divisions was erased. Easier said than done. With China or Japan, the bilateral relationship is of such dimensions and importance that all the formerly scattered officers can, indeed, be conveniently grouped under one Director and fashioned into a more or less cohesive unit. But what happens when the country in question formerly occupied, say, one-tenth of a political officer’s time and one-tenth of a trade officer’s? Three hands-on practitioners of the Country Desk approach ponder this and related questions — the Country Desk clearly has many virtues but it’s no magic panacea.
À l’automne de 1996, comme partie intégrante de l’exercice de restructuration générale, tous les bureaux géographiques d’AECI ont été réorganisés de manière à supprimer la distinction entre les divisions des relations générales et les divisions du commerce. Plus facile à dire qu’à faire. Avec la Chine ou le Japon, l’ampleur et l’importance des rapports bilatéraux sont tels qu’il peut être effectivement commode de grouper tous les agents autrefois dispersés sous un seul directeur et les agencer en un service plus ou moins cohérent. Toutefois, qu’arrive-t-il lorsque le pays en question occupait, par exemple, le dixième du temps d’un agent de politique et le dixième de celui d’un agent de commerce? Trois praticiens de première ligne de la démarche des bureaux-pays se penchent sur cette question et des questions connexes — le bureau-pays possède de toute évidence de nombreuses vertus, mais il n’est pas une panacée.
The Asia-Pacific Branch — Dawn of the Country Desk
For much of the past fifteen years, we have been grappling with how to integrate foreign and trade policy. First in 1982, the trade component of Industry, Trade and Commerce was merged into the Department of External Affairs. Soon after that, the Department consolidated some of its trade functions into the geographic bureaux. So-called “relations” divisions, dealing with mainly political questions, and “trade development” divisions would report to a common Director General.
In the early 1990s, someone had the idea that the real “comparative advantage” of the Department was its knowledge of foreign countries. The key to maximizing this advantage would be to strengthen that geographic vocation by integrating political and trade functions even further. I was asked to become an ex-officio delegate at a working group looking at the idea — one element of the “Corporate Review” exercise then under way in the Department.
The proposition put to the group was that the process of integration should be moved downward – to the division director and even, for some smaller countries, to the desk officer level.
There was a lot of intrinsic appeal. It could be seen as a rationalization of either what should happen or what was already happening. In some bureaux, indeed in the North Asia Bureau where I worked at the time, relations sections frequently worked more closely with their trade development geographic counterparts than they did with other relations sections of their own divisions.
There were concerns with the concept however. Many in the group wondered if finding the sort of “renaissance officer” needed was realistic. Much early discussion focussed on whether such officers existed. If none were on the shelf, what levels of additional stress and workload would eventuate until learning curves were mounted and training was made available? It was a wide sweep. We weren’t just contemplating a meld of trade promotion and political work. At that time, even some aspects of immigration were part of the Department’s geographic functions and, in Asia Pacific, we did a large share of our own public affairs work as well.
We heard later that senior management had decided to put the idea on ice for a while. Some questions raised in the group had not achieved closure. There was a sense that the core functions of trade and political were converging, but again what kind of officers did we have and what form would that necessary reorganization take?
Flash forward to 1994-95. By the summer of 1994, the great experiment in boundary-less, or at least less boundary, offices was well under way in the Asia Pacific Branch. Its focus was very much along the original lines of the country desk concept.
All divisions in the Branch had now become “country desks” with trade and political functions reconciled at least at the Director level, rather than the Director General. Some divisions have elected to maintain “trade” and “relations” sections. Others have moved down further by reconciling at the desk level with the director and/or the deputy to provide backup to officers on more complex trade or political issues.
This has enhanced the work package for some, I would say most. Without doubt it has created daunting problems for a few others, less able to adapt to the “other stream’s” experience, its routines and the nature of its client demands. On the other hand, it has brightened the scope for those (younger officers in particular) who welcome the chance for broader, more interdisciplinary responsibilities without the old and increasingly artificial divisions.
With the gradually greater interchangeability of skills that it induces and the flexibility of operation it requires, the country desk concept in the Asia Pacific Branch has facilitated allocation of workload, at least in busy periods. With new technology, country desks have eased the production, integration, and therefore improvement, of “products” such as briefing materials and speeches.
It may have helped streamline and make more coherent policy and operational messages to our missions abroad. Most refreshing is the fact that tiresome and self-defeating questions of “turf” rarely surface anymore and greater commonness of purpose is encouraged.
Country desks have helped us tackle “cross-sectoral” policy development challenges. They help in developing “country strategies” and in providing answers on how we relate to emerging regional institutions, how we deal with the aid program or what we do with science and technology and public affairs. Greater flexibility of function can, in the hands of good (and sensitive) Directors, help to meet a host of corporate-driven demands.
Country desks are not a panacea. Their creation doesn’t mean that all the work that needs to be done is accomplished more quickly. For individuals (and this was a concern of the original working group), the jury is still out. Some pluses have been mentioned above but whether the new-age CVs they produce for officers impress promotion boards and assignment officers is a matter of conjecture. On a more day-to-day level, country desks may help absorb the pressures of a high level visit, but there is no evidence (yet) that they insulate line officers better from mounting workloads generated from within or from increasing demands from ministers’ offices or the “centre”
Some of the original argumentation that regarded country desks as a means of enhancing the comparative advantage the graphic expertise) has now been put to the Department possessed (i.e. that of its geo-test in the recent Departmental reorganization. It is uncertain to what extent this will affect the character or quality of policy input or the career development prospects of officers who find themselves with more geographically defined resumes.
In the realm of integrating effort, nonetheless, the start is encouraging. In the Asia Pacific region, if not in other regions, Canada’s success — whether in business development or in carving out a regional role — depends not on the conquest of each brief individually but in building a dynamic interaction between the two. That is the agenda and the country desk represents a beginning towards achieving it.
De l’exotisme polycentrique en Europe
Avant d’entamer la dégustation d’une bière «Belle Gueule» (produite par une micro-brasserie du Québec), vous noterez qu’en début d’étiquette on y définit les mots «belle» et «gueule». Cela donne un avant-goût de la préparation. De la même manière, avant de commencer l’ingestion de cet article (produit par une applicatrice au quotidien), je vous conseille de vous pencher sur la définition des mots «exotisme» et «polycentrique».
Exotisme : caractère de ce qui sort du
commun Polycentrique: qui a plusieurs centres de direction
Ces deux termes décrivent fort bien mon impression lorsque j’ai entamé la mise en application de la nouvelle approche adoptée par le secteur de l’Europe il a de cela un an. C’est d’abord cet exotisme de REO qui m’a envoûtée. Ce sigle aux lettres magiques n’évoque-t-il pas le célèbre RIO (situé non loin du lieu de prédilection en Amérique du Sud où je venais de réaliser ma première affectation)? Puis, la dimension «polycentrique» est venue s’ajouter au défi qu’il me plaisait bien de relever. S’occuper des dossiers politiques, économiques et commerciaux portant sur l’Espagne et le Portugal était loin d’être dénué d’intérêt.
Un peu d’historique
Inspiré par l’expérience fructueuse menée par le secteur Asie-Pacifique et par souci d’accroître l’efficacité du secteur de l’Europe il a été décidé au cours de l’année 1994 de procéder à une réflexion sur le fonctionnement du secteur. Cet exercice avait pour but de mettre de l’avant une proposition de restructuration qui allait refléter davantage la nouvelle réalité européenne.
La force centrifuge de l’unité
Il s’agissait donc, par conscience historique, «d’unifier» l’Europe en notre sein et de faire tomber, à notre tour, la désuète division est-ouest. Un nouvel amalgame de molécules devait jaillir de ce «remue-méninges». L’idée ayant germé, une option fut retenue: celle de regrouper les pays autour de grands pays cibles, en fonction de leur situation géographique et géopolitique. On allait re-découper la carte de l’Europe en ensembles géopolitiques se formant autour des pays européens des G-7 et P-8. Ainsi, s’alignèrent la France (Ouest), le Royaume-Uni (Nord), l’Italie (Sud), l’Allemagne (Centre) et la Russie (Est) selon des notions tout à fait cardinales. Les pays satellites de ces 5 grands se fusionnèrent en famille autour des modules polycentriques.
Des unités mixtes
Un deuxième pôle d’attraction allait d’ores et déjà prendre forme autour d’unités mixtes dans leur composition (agents politiques et commerciaux) mais homogènes dans leurs objectifs géographiques. On brisait ainsi un autre clivage et ce, au niveau des groupes de travail d’une même direction. C’est ainsi qu’afin d’atteindre la cohésion des noyaux créés et de favoriser l’intégration des experts d’une même équipe, agents commerciaux et politiques formèrent à leur tour des ensembles. Qui plus est, le souci d’intégration dans les noyaux polycentriques allait pousser encore plus loin l’application de la théorie. Il fut ainsi décidé de donner à certains agents (méritoires!! — du moins je l’espère puisque je suis du nombre) une charge complète, politique et commerciale. Je croyais au début que le nombre de ces agents allait être assez important, mais au fur et à mesure de ma cohabitation avec mes collègues «européens», je me suis rendu compte que seuls deux agents (en bonne et due forme) avaient accepté de se prêter à ce défi. Certes, au niveau des directeurs et des directeurs adjoints (provenant d’une filière ou de l’autre), la globalisation fonctionnait sur une base bien établie, quoique parfois, parmi les directeurs adjoints, elle avait été négociée de manière raisonnée ou tout simplement conviviale entre experts d’un même sous-groupe.
En plus des 5 noyaux mixtes de base, la réalité d’une Europe dont aujourd’hui la plupart des pays se retrouvent regroupés sous la bannière de l’Union européenne allait également nécessiter la localisation chez nous d’une unité à l’image de cette nouvelle donne. Ainsi, une autre direction
(aujourd’hui REU), traitant de tous les dossiers relatifs à l’Union européenne et aux autres institutions en Europe, devait être créée. Elle s’occuperait autant des questions commerciales que politiques dans lesquelles le Canada est impliqué tant en matière d’échanges, de liens transatlantiques qu’en termes de politiques commerciales avec l’Union européenne.
Pour que le tableau soit complet, il fallait que de nouveaux services communs viennent parfaire les besoins du secteur au niveau de la planification des politiques, des communications et de la promotion commerciale. Une sous-direction totalement dédiée à la coordination des communications de la région européenne allait prendre forme. Cette entité serait responsable d’évaluer les besoins en communications du secteur et de coordonner l’ensemble de ses activités dans ce domaine. Deux autres sous-directions, celle des «foires et missions» et celle de «l’investissement, science et technologie», permettaient de circonscrire les besoins et de faire la promotion des programmes spécifiques de la région. Bien sûr, les services d’administration allaient poursuivre leurs tâches. La nouvelle structure allait aussi permettre de créer au besoin des groupes d’intervention spéciale (Task Forces) pour répondre aux diverses crises pouvant survenir.
Par souci d’efficacité
Afin d’en arriver à un fonctionnement optimal dans des délais raisonnables, le secteur de l’Europe tenait à mettre en application le fruit de ses réflexions assez rapidement. Dès septembre 1995, le secteur se dotait d’un nouvel organigramme, modifiait la composition des directions et adoptait le concept de «bureau-pays» afin de favoriser au plus tôt une meilleure intégration des programmes politiques et commerciaux permettant ainsi une meilleure coordination des activités par pays.
Aujourd’hui et demain
Ce redéploiement des effectifs date aujourd’hui d’un an. Il est encore trop tôt pour évaluer l’efficacité du système ou pour porter des jugements sur les effets entraînés par le fonctionnement des nouveaux modules.
Cependant, à ce stade-ci, on peut quand même se permettre de prendre un certain recul face au travail que l’on accomplit au quotidien et tenter de poser un regard réaliste sur la nouvelle structure mise en place. Chose certaine, ça marche! Certes, quelques réajustements s’opèrent et continueront de s’opérer afin que chaque direction devienne de plus en plus fonctionnelle et que la distribution des tâches se fasse de manière équilibrée. En dehors de cela, il faut avouer que le nouveau système a le mérite d’offrir aux différents clients un service «à guichet unique» (comme on se plaît à le désigner). Ainsi toute clientèle, quelle qu’elle soit (ministres, postes, ambassades, secteurs, compagnies canadiennes, public, etc), a dorénavant plus de facilité à se retrouver dans les dédales de notre ministère et reçoit une attention plus personnalisée. Les rapports intersectoriels et interministériels s’en trouvent davantage coordonnés et le travail d’équipe, favorisé.
REO…au quotidien
Pour moi, à qui il fut donné d’expérimenter cette première année polycentrique européenne, j’estime qu’il valait la peine de plonger dans cet univers, même si, me ferez-vous remarquer, l’effet «RIO» n’a pas fait long feu. En effet, pour l’agent qui s’occupe des aspects pluridimensionnels de nos relations avec l’Espagne, le Portugal et même aujourd’hui avec Andorre, le boulot au jour-le-jour nécessite une vitesse de croisière qui laisse peu de temps pour l’évasion. En fait, REO au quotidien signifie: jouer à la femme orchestre en menant tous les dossiers de front, tisser des liens transatlantiques en jetant des filets allant au-delà du monde des pêches et, pour être plus terre-à-terre, répondre à deux clientèles et à deux types fort différents de sollicitations. Cela veut aussi dire: répondre à deux ministres. Pour ceux qui ont l’expérience des directions géographiques, vous savez pertinemment ce que cela peut représenter en termes de cahiers d’information, de notes, de correspondance, etc. Je m’arrête là et vous laisse digérer cet article sur «l’exotisme polycentrique» du secteur de l’Europe.
N’empêche que, vous en conviendrez, à défaut de châteaux en Espagne, le dossier «poisson» baigne dans l’exotisme…
Down Mexico Way — the LMR experience
The Mexico Division (LMR) was created in September 1995, bringing together under one division the political, economic and trade aspects of Canada’s relationship with Mexico.
LMR was established in response to a significantly enhanced set of relations between Canada and Mexico. While the NAFTA, which entered into force in January 1994, was undoubtedly the major catalyst for this new found relationship, Canada and Mexico also were establishing new relations and finding common interests in a variety of multilateral organizations that Mexico (the OECD, APEC, the WTO) and Canada (the OAS) had joined since the early 1990s. In addition, bilateral trade had increased from approximately $500 million in 1985 to over $6 billion in 1995, Canada was becoming one of Mexico’s main sources of foreign investment and the two countries had entered into over 50 agreements and MOUs on a wide variety of topics.
The LMR model of a country desk involves one division and one country. The political and trade responsibilities are largely undertaken by two separate sections each headed by a deputy director.
This is a model I strongly support. Some of my reasons are rather obvious. It is much easier to develop a coherent set of foreign and trade policies vis-à-vis a country when most decisions are taken by the person(s) who are closest to the relationship as a whole. For example when decisions on whether to support an export permit application have to be taken or when programs that have both trade and political objectives have to be implemented, the consultation process is simplified, conflicts are worked out at the director level in most cases, lines of communication with the Embassy are clear and the decisions generally can be taken more quickly. These benefits are particularly evident in areas that have both political and trade dimensions to them, e.g., environment and culture, and on trade policy questions.
A Mexico style country desk also can otter clients, both within government (DFAIT ministers, deputies, PCO) and outside (the Mexican Embassy and Government, business people, NGOs) one stop shopping — something most seem to appreciate once they’ve become accustomed to the new address. Finally, the preparation of visits, briefing books and Qs and As is simplified when all or most of the relevant “pieces of the puzzle” are located within one division. Even if some of the information lies elsewhere, LMR knows where to find it quickly and has a good sense of its relative importance in the grand scheme of things.
I also believe there are advantages to the country desk concept when, as with LMR and the China and Japan Divisions that preceded it, the units can focus their energies on only one bilateral relationship, albeit fairly complex ones. This is only possible, of course, where the size and nature of the relationship justifies a one country division.
LMR was also fortunate because it was established by bringing together officers on the political/economic and trade sides (three positions from LSR and four from LGT) who had been involved previously in Canada/Mexico relations and who continue to work primarily in their areas of previous specialty.
I know that some Directors and Director- Generals are strong supporters of the structure whereby one officer may be responsible for both the trade and the political aspects of one or more relationships. It not only takes the idea of integration down a further step, but it also prepares officers for more senior positions at headquarters and abroad where they will have to manage a variety of programs and issues. While acknowledging these advantages, I tend to believe that a division that has trade officers doing primarily trade related work and political/ economic officers being primarily responsible for political and economic activities continues to be the best route both for DFAIT’s clients and for the officers involved.
When they were hired, these officers usually expressed an interest in doing either political or trade related work, perhaps because they believed they were more suited to one or the other skill and personality sets that are commonly associated with trade and political stream officers. The traditional stereotype (one that CFSI and its integrated training approaches may be breaking down to some extent) suggests that political officers prefer preparing analytical pieces, while trade officers are more action oriented, i.e., more keen to close a deal than write up the trip report after.
When posted abroad, these officers also will most likely have either trade or political/ economic responsibilities at post, although this is not always so. (In LMR’s case, the two trade officers that were posted at the end of our first year went on to do trade jobs and the political officer who departed is doing a classic first posting political/economic job.)
Finally, our experience suggests that trade promotion and political activities often operate at a different pace and rhythm. Trade activities are planned a year or months in advance. They require significant lead times, monitoring of progress, (recruiting, set up), more travel and frequent contracting out for consultants. The political officers’ role is more often either reactive or analytical. It involves the preparation of Qs and As, memoranda to ministers and briefing notes and analyzing events or trends. While LMR experimented with having a junior political officer take on both the trade promotion and political responsibilities for environment, education and culture, in the end, to no fault of the officers involved, one or the other side of the activity tended to suffer.
If a melding of responsibilities is to work, all concerned must fully commit themselves to making it happen and officers must be available to step in and cover as required. In addition, if the Department is committed to such an approach, it will have to re-think its current practice of recruiting into separate streams and of managing its personnel along stream lines.
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Originally published in / Publié à l’origine dans bout de papier, Vol. 13, No. 4 (1996) — Winter 1996 // Hiver 1996, pp. 17–20. Read the rest of this issue / Lire le reste de ce numéro →
