bout de papier, Vol. 13, No. 4 (1996) — Winter 1996 // Hiver 1996, pp. 41–42
Contrary to the impression fostered by some journalists and the preferences of most sports organizations, politics and diplomacy have always played a part in international sports. In the modern Olympic Games that role has tended to increase with the financial and logistical demands, the assurances and cooperation required from all levels of government in the host country as well as the tremendous publicity and attendant emphasis on national performance.
In 1976, as the scheduled opening of the Olympic Games in Montreal drew nearer, a dispute between the Government of Canada and the International Olympic Committee over the participation of Taiwanese athletes escalated. The President of the IOC, Lord Killanin, threatened to move the games or to withdraw IOC sanction from the competitions in Montreal. Killanin employed pressure from sports organizations to try to get Canada to reverse its stance and comply with what he interpreted as a firm Canadian pledge to accept IOC criteria for national representation and participation. For the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Allan MacEachen, and his advisers in the Department of External Affairs, however, the more important consideration was Canada’s relationship with the People’s Republic of China. That priority was reflected in a brief for the Prime Minister, which we reproduce below.
One anxiety cited in that memorandum was that failure to respect the PRC’s position might lead to a full or partial boycott of the Montreal Olympics by nations sympathetic to the PRC. That concern prompted a series of meetings with Lord Killanin and IOC officials in the days and weeks before the Opening Ceremonies. When the representatives of the “Republic of China” in the IOC scorned compromises suggested by Canada and by the IOC, the issue of Taiwan finally receded. Unfortunately, that controversy was eclipsed by a boycott inspired by the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa, to protest at sporting links between New Zealand and South Africa.
Students of drafting at CFSI and elsewhere will note that, not for the first or the last time, the third of three options was recommended and endorsed.
This copy of the memorandum, which is now declassified, comes to us from Ted Kelly of the Historical Section of DFAIT, who discovered it on DEA file 55-26-Olymp-1976-3 PRC part 2 (National Archives of Canada, Record Group 25, Accession 1994-95/086, volume 66). On that file is a memorandum which indicates that Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau commented “I agree.”
Hector Mackenzie
CONFIDENTIAL
May 21 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER
SUBJECT: The problem of participation of the “Republic of China” (Taiwan) and the People’s Republic of China in the 1976 Summer Olympic Games
Purpose:
To advise you of the course of action that has been approved by the Secretary of State for External Affairs [Allan J. MacEachen] in dealing with this question, namely, to allow participants from the “Republic of China” to enter Canada and to take part in the Games under a designation other than “Republic of China” or one that includes the word “China”.
Background:
Taiwan, that is, the “Republic of China” Olympic Committee, is a member in good standing of the International Olympic Committee. The People’s Republic of China is not a member. For some time certain National Olympic Committees, for example those in Iran, Japan and Algeria, have been pressing the IOC to resolve this problem of membership by ejecting Taiwan, or the “Republic of China” as it is officially designated by the IOC, and making the PRC a member in its place. The last clear opportunity for the IOC to resolve this question before the Olympic Games in Montreal was at the IOC sessions during the Winter Olympics at Innsbruck in February. The IOC in fact did not come to grips with the problem. In discussion with officials of my Department at Innsbruck, Lord Killanin, President of the IOC, expressed the view that the PRC would not participate at Montreal.
I he issue:
Lord Killanin with considerable support from the IOC expects Canada to admit the “Republic of China” to take part in the Games on the basis of assurances from Prime Minister Pearson in 1965 and from yourself and myself in 1969 (see letters attached). To refuse to admit the “Republic of China” altogether would provoke a very strong reaction from the IOC which would claim that by this action Canada was not living up to its “word” and its obligations as the host country and was undermining the IOC.
But the PRC, although it is unlikely now to participate in the Games, expects Canada to oppose the entry of participants from the “Republic of China” and thus to live up to what the PRC would regard as the obligations Canada assumed in recognizing and entering into relations with the PRC. To allow in the “Republic of China” as such could produce a sharp reaction from the PRC and also from many of its supporters. This point was put by the All China Sports Federation to our Embassy in Peking in November 1975 in these terms: “while PRC participation in the Olympics is a small problem, it would be a very large problem in our bilateral relations if the Chiang clique were allowed to march into the stadium with their phony flag — surely the people of our two countries and participants from many countries would be outraged and relations between our two countries would be seriously damaged.” The Chinese Ambassador presented a Note to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs on May 17, 1976 requesting that the Canadian Government refuse entry to any Taiwanese Olympic Team, whatever it might be called
The Options:
(a) to take no action and by doing so to allow the entry of a team designated
“Republic of China”;
(b) to refuse entry to a “Republic of China” team; or (c) to allow entry to a team on condition that it is designated as something other than “Republic of China” or “China”, and that it will not use the flag, anthem or symbols of the “Republic of China”
Analysis of Options:
Option (a) would be welcomed by the IOC. But this position would expose Canada to the risk of an adverse reaction from the PRC which could possibly take the form of threatened or real boycotts of certain events or of the Games as a whole at the last minute by PRC supporters in the Olympic movement. This could hamper the successful holding of the Games, and could lead to damage to Canadian commercial and political relations with the PRC.
The Austrian authorities chose option (a) for the 1976 Winter Games and there is no evidence that, despite mild Chinese protests, there has been any damage to PRC/Austrian relations. This precedent strengthens the case for this alternative. However, the Austrian situation differs from the Canadian in two important respects. First, the PRC’s Third World supporters will be much more fully represented at the Summer Games than at the Winter Games, thereby increasing the risk of boycott if the PRC decides to draw on this support. Second, Canada’s bilateral relations with the PRC are far more extensive than Austria’s and the PRC probably expects more of Canada because of Canada’s relatively forward position on developing relations with the PRC.
Option (b) would strengthen Canada-PRC relations by indirectly helping the PRC in its efforts to participate in the International Olympic movement. Such a decision would be consistent with Canada’s policy of making special efforts to reduce Chinese isolation and bringing the PRC into international institutions, and as well would eliminate the risk of pro-PRC boycotts at the Games. However, the IOC and many international sporting elements would see this as serious interference with the Games and it is conceivable that the IOC might threaten to cancel them.
With either Option (a) or (b) the successful holding of the Games could be jeopardized. In either case the Government could be subject to criticism at home and abroad for bringing this situation about.
Option (c) is a compromise formula. The fundamental argument in its favour is that it represents the application to the Olympics of our existing policy of dealing with the Taiwanese. We do not restrict people-to-people contacts between Canadians and Taiwanese for humanitarian and commercial reasons. We permit the entry of persons from Taiwan including sportsmen to take part in conferences, sports events, and other gatherings provided they do not proclaim themselves as representatives of the “Republic of China”, display “ROC” flags or other emblems, or propagandize on behalf of the “ROC”.
The PRC authorities know from experience that we refuse entry to Canada to Taiwanese government officials and discourage contacts in Canada or in Taiwan between Canadian and Taiwanese authorities because such contacts can lead to compromising the Canadian Government policy of non-recognition of Taiwan and of recognition of the PRC. But they also know that we do not refuse entry to other Taiwanese who are prepared to abide by our conditions. This position would meet Canada’s obligations to the PRC in the matter of recognition and the PRC authorities have acquiesced in it in the past though grudgingly.
Though they would protest, we believe the Taiwanese in the end would probably agree to this sort of conditional entry; if they do not it would be necessary to deny their entry to Canada.
As for the IOC this position allows the Taiwanese to participate in the Games but it may not meet that body’s basic concern about their members being allowed in unconditionally to take part. Precedents do exist for “Republic of China” participation in the Olympics under a designation such as Formosa, and the “ROC” did not have unrestricted use of the name “Republic of China” until the Olympic Games in Mexico in 1968. The concession on nomenclature is the least the IOC could do for Canada which must meet not only the obligations of host country to the Olympics but also its obligations in international relations. But the possibility of a strong reaction from the IOC and from some international and Canadian sports organizations cannot be discounted.
Conclusion:
Taking these arguments into account the Secretary of State for External Affairs has selected Option (c). It assigns equal weight to the importance of maintaining reasonably good relations over this issue with both the IOC and the PRC, and for this reason it is the most defensible position whatever happens this summer. The final consideration supporting this Option is that if we alter our policy towards the “Republic of China” for the sake of the Olympics what are we left with as a policy after the Olympics?
I plan to meet on May 26 with Mr. James Worrall, representative of the International Olympic Committee in Canada, to inform him of this decision and to request the cooperation of the IOC in carrying it out.
M[itchell]. S[harp].
[Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs]
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 13, No. 4 (1996) — Winter 1996 // Hiver 1996, pp. 41–42. Read the rest of this issue →
