bout de papier, Vol. 11, No. 4 / Vol. 12, No. 1 (1995) — Spring 1995 // Printemps 1995, pp. 88–89
CANADA’S ENEMIES. (SPIES AND SPYING
IN THE PEACABLE KINGDOM) by Graeme
S. Mount, Dundurn Press, Toronto, 158 pp.,
$24.99
Reviewed by John Starnes
Canada’s Enemies is a curious collection of apparently unrelated stories about espionage carried out against Canada, and quasi-espionage activity carried out by Canada abroad from 1900 on. The book is well-written and some of the stories are interesting and amusing, but it is ’neither fish, flesh nor good red herring’. It is difficult to escape the impression that it was written in part to satisfy the author’s interest in intelligence and security matters. Whether this is sufficient to produce a book on such a specialized, complicated subject is another matter. I found the system of end-notes awkward to use and generally unsatisfactory and the list of abbreviations irritating. It is unfortunate that Mount was unable to include in the bibliography the excellent book by John Bryden, M.P., about Canada’s wartime and post-war involvement in communications intelligence activities. Both books were published about the same time. Had Mount been able to read Bryden’s book he might know more about communications intelligence matters and have avoided some of his uninformed comments about ciphers. He could also have benefited from reading the slightly expurgated history of the Examination Unit by its acting director G. de B. Robinson and the history of CBNRC bout de papier 1 Review / Critiques
’s Enemies (Spies and Spying in the Peaceabl reviewed by John Starnes
’ or For Worse: Canada and the United States da and the United States: The Politics of Par. reviewed by Donald Barry v. The Crooks, the Politicians, the Mounties,, reviewed by John Starnes
George Costakis: A Russian Life in Art reviewed by Marshall A. Crowe written by Kevin O’Neill, a former director, made public in 1989/90 under the Access to Information Act. His various comments about the Examination Unit (which for some reason he dubs the WEU) would have been better informed My principal criticism, however, concerns the chapter entitled “The Futility of the Dupuy Missions: Vichy-France and Canada 1940-42,” and the author’s conclusion that “Vichyite diplomats and consular officials in Canada … were able to do more for their cause than Dupuy … could do for the Allies in Vichy France.” Mount may be right. The truth is probably to be found in the archives controlled by the SIS. Unfortunately, it seems quite unlikely that any of the relevant documentation will be released by the SIS in the foreseeable future.
Pierre Dupuy was my first boss in External Affairs when, in 1944, I was seconded from the Canadian Army and worked for him in the Canadian Legation to the Allied Governments in London. I got to know him well and, despite his maddening disregard for security precautions and administrative detail, I came to like and admire him. I often have thought that Agatha Christie must have had Pierre in mind when she created Hercule Poirot!
From my knowledge of him at this time I believe that he may have carried out various intelligence tasks in Vichy for the British about which the authorities in Ottawa were unaware. Pierre had a romantic streak in him, and the idea of conducting clandestine, dangerous activities for the British would have appealed to him. If I am right, Dupuy was operating in Vichy on at least two levels; overtly, at the diplomatic and consular level, and at a completely different, secret level, on behalf of the British intelligence and authorities. The success of his missions in terms of the “Allied cause” cannot be assessed properly without knowing what secret activities he carried out for the British and how successful they may have been. Additional support for my theory is to be found in volumes I & Il of EH. Hinsley’s “British Intelligence in the Second World War,” and officially authorized history. For example, on page 277 (Vol. I) it states that the problem which bedevilled relations with the French, “ ’…was made all the more intractable by the failure or the inability of the SIS to make a clear division of responsibility between two of its own sections – that which dealt with de Gaulle’s Free French SIS, and that which was trying to revive contacts in Vichy France and establish a British network there.” I believe one of the tasks given Dupuy by the British could have been to assist their efforts to re-establish a British intelligence network in Vichy. Mount also appears to offer support for the theory when he quotes from a lengthy interview which the historian Raymond Tournoux had with Dupuy, decades after his Vichy missions. Mount writes; “Dupuy told [Tournoux] that when he went to Vichy he was on loan to the British government; he did not really travel there as a Canadian agent. Much of what he learned he reported directly to Churchill, some to Mackenzie King. Some he included in other reports.” Although at the time Pierre gave me no hint of having been given such a tricky assignment, I remember being struck by the fact that he had so many acquaintances among various British intelligence agencies, many of whom I had come to know in 1942-43. At that time I had responsibility at Canadian Military HQ in London to seek out in the ranks of the military, suitable potential recruits willing to volunteer to work in Europe (mainly in France) as British secret agents. Once they were identified and agreed to work for SOE, SIS or some other such British agency (e.g. MI9 — the escapers organization) my job was to arrange for their delivery to the British and, if they were found suitable, to prepare the necessary paperwork for their transfer, etc. In the process I met quite a number of officers from various British secret intelligence agencies. I remember being surprised to meet some of them again at superb lunches and dinners given by my new boss. I was, of course, intrigued and drew my own conclusions. Mount states (page 78) that; “Pierre Dupuy was not allowed to use the cipher (sic), and this was a serious matter. Diplomats depend on ciphers for sending messages that might fall into the wrong hands or otherwise be intercepted.” I think it would have been a serious matter if Pierre had been given the ciphers. He would have been quite incapable of using them. In the legation, for example, all such communications were encyphered for us by Canada House and despatched to Canada by marine cypher. Moreover, I am not sure what ciphers he would have used. The only such device in the legation was a large, heavy book entitled Government Codes and Ciphers issued by the British. The system was quite unsophisticated and could quite easily and quickly have been broken by skilled cryptographers. The British could have given him a set of “one-time pads” of the kind issued to their secret agents in Europe. I do not think they would have done this for obvious security reasons, and they probably would have known he was not competent to use them.
An additional reason in support of my theory lies in the fact that following his Vichy missions Dupuy was honoured by being made a member of the Order of St. Michael and St. George, the kind of recognition usually reserved for those who have given signal service to the Crown. If the British had regarded Dupuy’s missions as failures it seems unlikely they would have proposed such an honour since, at the time, the acceptance by Canadians of non-military honours from another country was frowned upon by the Canadian authorities. The British could quite easily have done nothing!
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 11, No. 4 / Vol. 12, No. 1 (1995) — Spring 1995 // Printemps 1995, pp. 88–89. Read the rest of this issue →
