bout de papier, Vol. 21, No. 3 (2005) — Summer/Fall 2005 // Été/Automne 2005, pp. 13–19
For better or for worse, the visit of Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel to Canada in November 1978 is remembered best for the visitor’s intervention in Canadian politics. In a speech in Toronto after his official business had been concluded, Begin urged his audience to put pressure on the government of Pierre Elliot Trudeau to move the Canadian embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. That controversial advice resonated in the subsequent general election in Canada, when Progressive Conservative leader Joe Clark endorsed the proposal in an apparent effort, with mixed results, to court Jewish voters. Though Trudeau reportedly was embittered by Begin’s action, the mood of the official visit had been remarkably friendly up to that point. The leaders disagreed about diplomatic acknowledgement of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, among other issues, but they seemed to get along well personally.
For the state banquet in Toronto, the Canadian prime minister and his advisers jettisoned the more restrained tribute to Begin drafted in the Lester B. Pearson Building in favour of a more vivid expression of Trudeau’s regard for the co-author of the Camp David accords. As Michael Shenstone, then Director General of the Africa and Middle East Division, put it, “our introductory page of praise for Begin has been replaced by four pages of the most fulsome (if harmless) panegyrics. “ After the banquet, but before the end of the visit, the Israeli Ambassador to Canada, Mordechai Shalev, informed the Canadian Ambassador to Israel, Edward Lee, that “Begin had told him his trip to Canada had been his most satisfying official visit since taking office. He also told Shalev that Prime Minister Trudeau’s speech at the November 9 dinner had been the warmest introduction he had ever received.”
The focus of our extracts is not on these public pronouncements but instead on the private exchanges of views. The first document is a scenario for the discussions prepared by Michael Bell of the Middle East Division and forwarded to the Prime Minister by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Don Jamieson. The other documents record what was said at the principal meetings during the visit. The originals may be found at the Library and Archives of Canada, Record Group 25, volume 9193, file 20-ISRAEL-9, part 11. bout de papier would like to thank Paulette Dozois of the Library and Archives Canada for identifying and locating the file.
November 2, 1978 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER
Visit of Prime Minister Begin — Scenario Brief
The purpose of this memorandum is to outline points that you might wish to raise in your discussions with Mr. Begin. In particular, you may wish to take this opportunity to express not only our gratification at the progress that was made at Camp David and subsequently, but our concern at the recently announced intentions of the Israeli government to “thicken” the settlements in the occupied territories and to move the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to East Jerusalem.
The basis of our concern is that, quite apart from any views we may have on these Israeli policies in themselves, the emphasis that they have been given at this time could endanger the negotiations now going on with Egypt as well as the prospects for broader negotiations on a general Middle East settlement, based on the Camp David framework. You will recall that Secretary of State Vance, in his recent message to me, felt very strongly that President Sadat had been put in an impossible position. He asked that we raise these matters with Mr. Begin and urge him not to proceed with his plans at this time. These issues are discussed in more detail hereafter.
General Nature of Discussions
There will be three opportunities for substantive discussion. These will be on November 6 (when you ride with Mr. Begin to 7 Rideau Gate following his arrival in Ottawa and at dinner in his honour that evening), and on November 7 (during your morning meeting). It is not expected that Mr. Begin will raise any bilateral issues, with the possible exception of El Al landing rights in Toronto, which is discussed at the end of this brief. Prime Minister Begin has a charming, courtly manner. He is very articulate, but rather inflexible. In general, despite occasional differences, Israelis are satisfied with, and appreciative of, Canadian policy on the Middle East dispute. We believe Mr. Begin shares this view. Our support in international fora which, in a number of respects, is more consistent than that of any other western country, apart from the USA, is particularly appreciated. If, however, you voice views at variance with Israeli policy, Mr. Begin will not hesitate to disagree. Nevertheless, he will expect and welcome a vigorous discussion of the issues at hand. Given our credibility with the Israelis, Canadian expressions of concern may have some impact.
Camp David and the Peace Process After preliminaries about the importance we attach to relations with Israel, you could begin discussions by congratulating Mr. Begin on the results of Camp David and the progress since towards a peace agreement with Egypt. Specific reference to the award of the Nobel Peace Prize would be appropriate. Canada has warmly endorsed the Camp David accords which offer the immediate prospect of a peace treaty with Israel’s largest neighbour, Egypt. Camp David also created a framework for negotiations on other fronts. Our view is that while this framework leaves many of the most difficult issues unresolved, it provides a good starting point for a process leading to a comprehensive settlement. (Tab 9, pages 2-3).. .: Mr. Begin may request Canadian intervention with key moderate Arab states to urge on them the benefits of involvement in the process. You could reply that our Ambassadors accredited to these countries are already under instructions to stress our positive assessment of Camp David and that we will not hesitate to do so in future as appropriate occasions arise. You could also mention that you plan to stress this theme in your Toronto speech.
Mr. Jamieson’s remarks to this year’s General Assembly that Canada would consider very seriously a request to make an appropriate contribution in the implementation of the terms of any agreements could be reiterated. (Tab 9, page 3). This will almost certainly mean our continued involvement in peacekeeping operations, but not necessarily on a larger scale than at present. Mr. Begin’s views on the role he envisages for peacekeeping, particularly outside the UN framework, would be most interesting.
Treaty with Egypt
You could inquire about progress in negotiations with Egypt, particularly the problem areas of the linkage of the treaty to the broader framework of Middle East negotiations and the phasing in of the full range of diplomatic and other relations. (Tab 8, page 1). The Israelis do not wish any linkage and want the immediate establishment of the full range of relations. Prime Minister Begin may provide a more detailed insight into the Israeli rationale. He might also provide his views on the extent of economic and commercial ties envisaged between the two countries.
Jerusalem
We understand from our Ambassador to Israel that the chief point Mr. Begin will wish to make to the Canadian government and publie during his visit here, is that it is time that we recognize the undivided city of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and move our Embassy there. It therefore seems inevitable that the subject of Jerusalem will come up. (Tab 7, page 2).
You may wish to reiterate that we consider the status of Jerusalem to be one of the issues under dispute, which can only be resolved, by agreement, in the course of a negotiated settlement. We have no intention of changing our policy at present and would consider any move in that direction at this time could only be a complication in the delicate negotiating situation that now exists. We believe that everything possible should be done to make it easier for President Sadat to persevere and King Hussein to join in the peace process. (Depending on the flavour of the discussion, you may or may not wish to go as far as to say, as the Americans have done, that we would, unfortunately, not be prepared to do business with the Foreign Ministry or the Prime Minister’s Office if they moved to East Jerusalem.)
Mr. Begin will probably respond with a vigorous defence of the Israeli contention that Jerusalem must never again be divided and that the question of its status is not open to discussion.
The West Bank and Gaza
You might then seek Mr. Begin’s views on the nature of any agreement that could be reached on the disposition of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. (Tab 8, pages 3-4). What does he envisage as the probable composition and scope of the Palestinian self-governing administration during the five-year transition period and subsequently, when a permanent arrangement is negotiated? What powers will it have in the field of security? How will this inter-relate with the Israeli presence in the territories, particularly in the security field? Could the scheme develop to provide Palestinians with a definite territory, or is the most that could be expected a functional sharing of authority between the Arabs and Israelis?
The Israeli Prime Minister might define Palestinian self-rule within fairly narrow parameters. If he does, it would be appropriate to ask how Mr. Begin thinks it possible that the Palestinians could be kept indefinitely in a quasi-colonial status under Israeli control, and how such a formula could be a basis for the enduring settlement which Israel needs.
Settlements
A discussion of the West Bank (Mr. Begin will refer to “Judea and Samaria”) and the Palestinians would provide a natural opportunity. to reiterate our view that the establishment of Jewish settlements in this and other occupied territories has been and is an obstacle to peace negotiations. You might then emphasize our particular concern that recent Israeli announcements on expanding existing settlements make it even more difficult for President Sadat to proceed with the peace agreement with Israel without seeming to have abandoned completely the interests of the Arab world and of the Palestinians, as well as further reducing the possibility that King Hussein and moderate West Bank leaders will eventually join negotiations. (Tab 7).
You might also make the point that a peace agreement with Egypt will totally transform Israel’s security situation. Earlier wars could not have been fought without Egypt, and the other Arab states by themselves hardly pose a credible threat. Is it really in Israel’s interest to jeopardize this great advantage by insisting on its settlements policy?
Mr. Begin will disagree, perhaps angrily, with any criticism of his settlements policy, and may respond that Jews must always have the right to settle anywhere in the ancient land of Israel. A degree of understanding for this view would be appropriate given the history of the Jewish search for a homeland and their years of persecution. Balancing this, however, is the strong Palestinian perception of themselves as a national group deprived of their homeland and their concern (partly on the basis of their experience during the British mandate) that the spread of Jewish settlements will be a prelude to incorporating the territories into the Jewish state. The achievement of a durable and lasting peace will be dependent on the free acceptance of the terms of any settlement by a good majority of those directly concerned. You might ask how, given that they are anathema to the Palestinians, there can be a unilateral continuation of Jewish settlements if any agreement is to be negotiated and successfully maintained. You could also give, as our assessment, that there is virtually no possibility of Arab agreement to a peace settlement that either leaves Israel in control of significant amounts of land claimed or inhabited by Arabs, or gives unrestricted access to this land for Jewish settlements. If Mr. Begin defends the expansion of the settlements by saying that it involves only a few hundred families and should come as no surprise, you might suggest that, at this delicate moment, it is the perceived effect which is important.
Jordan and Syria
You might ask Mr. Begin for his assessment of Jordanian and Syrian attitudes to the negotiating process. (Tab 8, pages 1-3). We regard Jordanian participation as crucial if the West Bank/Gaza negotiations are to be pursued, and Mr. Begin might be asked how he thinks King Hussein can be induced to join in negotiations. Although Prime Minister Begin’s personal popularity is extremely high, he is under heavy pressure from his coalition supporters to make no further concessions and to dilute some already made. (Tab 4). You could point out there are serious risks to king Hussein in joining the negotiations — possibly even his regime and his life. You might ask whether there are any gestures that Israel might make to encourage King Hussein to take these risks.
You might go on to seek Mr. Begin’s views on the possibility of ever bringing Syria into the negotiating process. If Israel is unwilling to contemplate any more than a token return of Syrian territory on the Golan Heights, there would seem to be little for Israel and Syria to talk about.
Security
Any discussion of the Golan Heights might lead you to a broader discussion of the concept of security, along the lines of your speech prepared for the dinner on November 9. We certainly appreciate Israel’s concern for security. We can well understand Mr. Begin’s determination that Syrian guns will never again be trained on Israeli settlers from the Golan Heights. Is retention of Arab territory really the only way to protect Israel? Could not a combination of other measures give an adequate assurance of security? Do settlements make any real contribution to security? To this latter question, Mr. Begin will probably reply that they are a vital element in the defence system. You might then ask him for an explanation, as, in fact, they have only a limited self-defence capability and in a general conflict are a liability in the type of highly mobile warfare the Israeli Defence Force prefers. In the 1973 war, considerable time and effort had to be devoted to moving settlers off the Golan Heights in the face of the advancing Syrian Army.
Bilateral — El Al
The only bilateral matter which might be raised is the question of EI Al landing rights. For several years, El Al has sought landing rights in Toronto. Because of heavy traffic at Malton, El Al and other foreign carriers have been told that their applications will be considered only after the end of 1980, once a study has been undertaken. This summer, Israel offered to liberalize arrangements for Canadian carriers to fly charter to Israel if Canada would assure El Al that its application for Malton would be accepted after the 1980 study. The Israelis were told that advance assurances could not be given and that, in any case, charter arrangements were the responsibility of the CTC which would be happy to discuss any proposals.
DIon].J[amieson].
Michael Bell (Middle East Division)
Memorandum to File: “Visit of Prime Minister Begin to Canada: Discussion of Middle East Situation,” GAM-838, November 16, 1978.
CONFIDENTIAL The small dinner party at 24 Sussex Drive on November 6 given by Prime Minister Trudeau in honour of Mr. Begin (guests included the SSEA, Mr. Lalonde and the USSEA resulted in an extensive and lively discussion on the Middle East situation, largely in the form of questions addressed to Begin, and his fairly lengthy replies, drawing extensively on Biblical references. The following summary is based on notes made by Ambassador Lee.
Israeli/Egyptian Treaty
2. Mr. Begin suggested several more weeks might be required before agreement was reached on the text of a treaty with Egypt. Much depended, he said, on the position adopted by Sadat in the next few days.
3. Mr. Jamieson asked what consideration had been given to an international peacekeeping role. The Israeli Prime Minister said the question had not been discussed in any detail at Camp David. He added, however, that he opposed any form of international guarantees.
West Bank/Gaza Strip
4. Considerable time was devoted to the future of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the Israeli presence there. Mr. Begin envisaged a self-governing Palestinian authority which would be responsible for the affairs of the Arab residents but which would share other areas of authority with the Israelis.
5. Suggestions were made by Canadian Ministers that recent Israeli moves to “thicken” West Bank settlements might make it more difficult for President Sadat to proceed with a peace agreement with Israel without seeming to have completely abandoned the interests of the Palestinians. It also might further reduce the possibility that King Hussein and moderate West Bank leaders would eventually join the negotiations. Mr. Begin replied that: (1) present plans envisaged the movement of only a few hundred families; (2) this was not provocative nor an obstacle to peace; (3) these settlements had nothing to do with the negotiations with Egypt; (4) as Prime Minister, he was subject to pressures within his cabinet to accelerate settlement activity; (5) Jews had a right to settle in “Judea and Samaria”, their ancient homeland; and (6) settlements are essentially for security. Although Canadian sympathy for Israeli security concerns was voiced, the suggestion was made that, having only a limited self-defence capability, the settlements might, in a general conflict, be a liability to highly mobile warfare. Mr. Begin responded that they were essential in countering terrorist infiltration into Israel’s main population centres.
6. In response to a query as to whether Israeli control of significant amounts of land occupied in 1967 did not make the achievement of a comprehensive peace virtually impossible as well as running counter to UN Security Council Resolution 242, Mr. Begin replied that 242 does not require Israeli withdrawal from all territories, only from “territories”.. He said that Israel would never contemplate Jordanian guns close to its population centres. When it was suggested that Arab weapons could reach these centres now, Mr. Begin drew the distinction between missiles, which could be intercepted, and heavy gun shells, which were not presently within range, which could not.
Syria
7. Mr. Begin said there was only the remotest possibility of bringing Damascus into the negotiating process, given Syrian hatred of the Jews.
The Military Threat
8. Mr. Begin expressed concern about the partial victory gained by the Rejectionists at the Baghdad Conference, and about the military might of a Syrian/Iraqi/Jordanian coalition against Israel. He agreed, however, that with Egypt removed from the equation, there would clearly be a qualitative change in the threat to Israeli security.
Oil Supplies
9. J Prime Minister Begin expressed concern about the situation in Iran, from which Israel receives 60-70% of its petroleum supplies. He mentioned that in 1975 an agreement had been reached with the USA in the context of the Second Sinai Disengagement Agreement, that the Americans would guarantee other sources of supply if the Iranian flow were cut. He said he had already instructed Foreign Minister Dayan to raise the question with the Administration
10. In the Washington negotiations, Egypt had expressed the willingness, Begin said, to sell oil to Israel from the Sinai fields at the market price, but there was, as yet, no agreement on guaranteed amounts.
CONFIDENTIAL
Visit of Prime Minister Begin
Working Meeting — Tuesday, November 7, 1978
Present were:
Prime Minister Menachem Begin
Mr. Mordecai Shalev
Israeli Ambassador to Canada
Mr. Yechiel Kadishai
Head of the Prime Minister’s
Bureau
Dr. Reuven Hecht
Adviser to the Prime Minister
Brig. Gen. Ephraim Poran
Military Secretary to the
Prime Minister
Mr. Yehuda Avner
Adviser to the Prime Minister
Prime Minister Trudeau
Mr. E.G. Lee
Canadian Ambassador to Israel
The Hon. Don Jamieson
Secretary of State for
External Affairs
The Hon. Barney Danson
Minister of National Defence
Mr. Allan Gotlieb
Under-Secretary of State for
External Affairs
Mr. J.S. Roy
Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet
for External Policy and Defence
Mr. J.M. Fraser
Director, Middle East Division,
Department of External Affairs
Mr. Trudeau began by expressing his happiness that Prime Minister Begin had been able to make this visit to Canada. Mr. Trudeau went on to speak of his admiration for the way Prime Minister Begin has conducted policy and our deep feeling that the Israeli people have shown courage and skill in defending their homeland. They could go on winning wars, but it was better to win the peace. He admired the way in which Prime Minister Begin had brought peace closer.
We sometimes didn’t know, Mr. Trudeau continued, what Israel had in mind, but if it was a strategy for peace we applaud it. Some moves on the chessboard were difficult for us to assess, such as those involving “Judea and Samaria” or East Jerusalem. He had told Prime Minister Begin why we could not support these moves: they did not seem to us to be in the direction of attracting the other Arabs into negotiations. This said, Mr. Trudeau added, “you are the man on the spot,” and Israel had our sympathy and admiration if not always our understanding.
Mr. Begin then gave an outline of the origins and development of the present situation. Israel, he said, had wanted peace ever since its establishment. President Sadat, in a conversation with him at Ismailia, had claimed that Prime Minister Ben Gurion had wanted to force peace on the Arabs. This was not so. Israel had been under permanent attack from its neighbours during the first years of independence. Men, women and children had been killed, and there had been retaliatory attacks and counterattacks.
President Eisenhower’s representative, a Mr. Richardson, had tried to bring President Nasser and Israeli leaders together; nothing came out of it. Prime Minister Golda Meir had tried to get President Ceauceseu of Romania to arrange a meeting with President Sadat, but without success. At one point the Soviet Ambassador had awakened Prime Minister Eshkol in the middle of the night to tell him that Moscow had information that Israel was preparing to attack Syria. This was totally untrue.
“The acme of attacks” had been in 1956 and Israel had responded with the Sinai operation. As a result of threats from Bulganin, Mr. Begin went on, they had evacuated Sinai without a treaty but with the assurance of freedom of navigation through the Tiran Straits, which only lasted ten years. In 1967 President Nasser closed the Tiran Straits and Israel was surrounded by states allied in a pact against Israel The six-day war followed, with the Arab call to wipe Israel off the map.
As a result, Mr. Begin argued, Israel has been in Sinai legitimately. Israel had not attacked Egypt; it was the latter which had tried to destroy Israel. He had made this point to President Sadat.
Since then, Mr. Begin said, Israel had held out its hand for negotiations. In reply, the Arabs met at the Khartoum Conference and agreed on the “three no’s”: no peace, no recognition of Israel and no negotiations with Israel. Israel has been seeking, praying and yearning for peace; it has been denied. Mr. Begin then referred to Israel’s “grievous mistake” in 1973, when the Egyptians had launched an attack “masquerading as manoeuvres”. President Sadat said that his coming to Jerusalem was a historic move. To this, Mr. Begin said, he replied “I invited you” — a man who only four years earlier led Israelis astray and attacked Israel. President Sadat remarked that “strategic deception is permissible”, Begin’s reply had been that it was deception nonetheless. To choose the day of Yom Kippur, Mr. Begin went on, had been “morally abominable”. Israel had not been mobilized; the tanks were not in the right places. Israel was always outmanned and outgunned but should never be “outbrained”, and he hoped that this would never be so again.
After 1973 there had been two disengagement agreements with Egypt, but the state of war continued. There was no free passage through the Suez Canal for Israeli ships. Then President Sadat said to his National Assembly that he would go to the end of the world to save the life of one of his sons (Mr. Begin noted that President Sadat liked to speak of the Egyptian people in this paternal way) – even to the Knesset in Jerusalem. Mr. Begin pointed out that it had only been a few months earlier that President Sadat had said he would be willing to lose 3 million Egyptians to kill one million Israelis.
When he had visited Romania, Mr. Begin went on, he had said to President Ceaucescu that he would like to meet President Sadat. President Ceaucescu had replied that it was perhaps too early for such a meeting, but he suggested it to President Sadat when the latter visited Bucharest. President Sadat had apparently made his decision while flying to Tehran from Bucharest. The American Embassy had conveyed President Sadat’s acceptance of the Israeli invitation, adding that he wished to receive a formal invitation, which was duly sent.
Mr. Begin then said that he wanted to make “a very important political remark”, and proceeded to relate President Sadat’s insistence in advance that he would ask for total Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and the establishment of a Palestinian state. Mr. Begin had replied that he rejected those two points unequivocally. Israel would never go back to the “aggression provoking” lines of 1967. The former Foreign Minister Abba Eban had, Mr. Begin noted, said that such a demand reminded him of Auschwitz. Similarly, a Palestinian state could never be accepted, since it would be a “mortal danger” to Israel. Even so, President Sadat was welcome to come to Jerusalem where he would be free to say whatever he wished. He did. Mr. Begin had replied, stressing that Jews had returned to the land of their forefathers to live. They had never wished to attack Egypt but had acted only in self-defence. After President Sadat’s visit, Mr. Begin continued, there had been the Cairo Conference which was “not serious”. Then, prior to the talks at Ismailia, the Israeli cabinet had elaborated a detailed peace plan. It envisaged Israeli retention of control over the Straits of Tiran to guarantee free passage and of the settlements in northern Sinai. Both were very important to Israel’s security. The plan also provided full autonomy for the population of the West Bank and Gaza, with Israel retaining certain necessary controls.
If Israel did not, “the PLO would take over”.
This plan was first presented to President Carter. It had been the only time, Mr. Begin noted, that he had taken the initiative to call on the White House. When he did, the Israeli plan was not only accepted but it was enthusiastically received by the Americans. Then came the conference at Ismailia, which Mr. Begin described as “the best Israeli- Egyptian meeting ever!” It had been marked by openness, friendship and good humour. President Sadat had said that it was the happiest day of his life — not because it was his birthday but because the meetings had been so successful. After talking warmly for several hours, Mr. Begin said, he and President Sadat had agreed on the formation of two committees, one to meet in Cairo, the other in Jerusalem. Mr. Begin observed that in Egypt President Sadat was sole ruler. His word is law. Details, however, are worked out by his advisers. The two leaders had agreed on a declaration of principles, which they wanted to publish. They had agreed “completely and in writing”, but at the last minute had been unable to agree on the treatment of the Palestinians in such a declaration. The talks were adjourned until the following morning when the Israelis had proposed that the two sides agree to differ on this point. President Sadat had accepted this proposal on the spot. The position of each side was read out (presumably with a view to including the two statements in the joint declaration).
Mr. Begin wondered why a declaration could not have been published covering the points on which they had agreed. It was President Sadat’s advisers, he said, who persuaded him that this could not be done when no agreement had been reached about the Palestinians. The Israelis had left Ismailia in friendship. Vicious personal attacks on Mr. Begin had come later, some of them blatantly anti-Semitic such as a reference to Mr. Begin as Shylock. The Israelis did not respond in kind.
Mr. Begin then spoke briefly about Camp David. President Sadat had come there with a document which Mr. Begin had analyzed in the presence of President Carter, who had said that it would be unacceptable to the United States. Mr. Begin had told President Sadat that it was unacceptable to Israel. Then began the negotiations, in the course of which there had been 23 drafts before an acceptable text finally emerged. Mr. Begin later learned that at one point President Sadat had threatened to pack his bags and leave; he had not been aware of this at Camp David.
The Camp David agreements had been attacked in Israel, sometimes quite violently. Mr. Begin thought they were good agreements. They involved sacrifice. To give up the Israeli settlements in Sinai for the sake of peace “will be a pain in my heart until the day I die”. The main commitment at Camp David had been for Egypt and Israel to negotiate a peace treaty “inviting other parties to do the same”.
Turning to the negotiations in Washington that had followed Camp David, Mr. Begin said that “today” (November 7) there was a draft agreement that was “basically good”. It covered military details, including Israeli withdrawal in two phases. Diplomatic relations would follow withdrawal to the El Arish line, and it had now been agreed that the exchange of ambassadors would take place within a month. The Suez Canal would be open to Israeli shipping as soon as the treaty came into force.
Other matters under discussion included oil (what would happen if the Shah were overthrown and Iran’s supply of oil to Israel were cut off — as might be the case if fanatical Moslems or Communists took over?), and financial questions. Israel was seeking a low-interest long-term loan of $3.37 billion from the United States to pay for the withdrawal from Sinai. The cost of building two military airfields in the Negev to replace those given up in Sinai would be paid outright by the United States. The rest, including the cost of resettling those who would have to leave the Israeli settlements in Sinai and of dismantling Israeli installations and _moving men and equipment, would be covered by the American loan. Secretary of State Vance had indicated that a loan would present fewer problems for the United States. Congress had become very touchy on the subject of massive financial grants, given American economic problems. There were still problems in the Washington negotiations, but Mr. Begin was hopeful. He would like to see the agreement signed before the Nobel prizes were presented in Oslo, but he cautioned against impatience. The conflict had gone on for 60 years, and negotiations to end it had to deal with all the details.
Going on to discuss the wider negotiations that might follow an agreement between Egypt and Israel, Mr. Begin said that Jordan did not want to join the negotiations. “Not yet,” the American Assistant Secretary of State, Harold Saunders, had told the Israelis. Israel had agreed that President Sadat might negotiate in place of Jordan to set up the arrangements for Palestinian autonomy. There would be an exchange of letters on this subject, rather than language in the text of the treaty.
Mr. Trudeau commented that Prime Minister Begin made the process sound very easy. Mr. Begin replied that it would not be easy but was feasible.
Mr. Jamieson said he presumed that the argument hinged not so much on the terms of the treaty between Egypt and Israel as on the question of “linkage” and the degree of importance that President Sadat would attach to it. Clearly President Sadat did not wish to be portrayed as having abandoned the larger Arab cause.
Mr. Begin observed that sometimes words became phantoms. What was this “linkage”? The Americans said that there was no juridical linkage but that a “political” linkage did exist. Mr. Begin asserted that there was neither, but rather a “linkage of continuation”. Egypt and Israel would exchange letters agreeing to discuss modalities within a month of concluding their treaty. (In the press conference that followed Mr. Begin spoke of a month after the treaty had been signed and ratified and the instruments of ratification exchanged.)
Mr. Jamieson asked whether this meant that Israel would proceed unilaterally with arrangements for autonomy, or was there a role for Egypt.
Mr. Begin replied that Israel was prepared to conduct negotiations even without Jordan. They had sometimes considered unilateral steps, but autonomy did have to be accepted by those who would exercise it, and “PLO supporters have pistols”. There should be agreement with Egypt or with the local people, and some people in the West Bank did favour autonomy, but had been intimidated by threats.
Mr. Begin then raised certain bilateral issues: (1) Economic Relations Israel had a negative balance in its trade with Canada. Israel was a very small country and Canada a very large one. Would Prime Minister Trudeau instruct his colleagues to sit down with the Israelis at the forthcoming meetings of the Joint Economic Committee and try to adjust the situation? Israel had many products that were sold to the United States and should also have a market in Canada. Mr. Trudeau said that he would tell his colleagues to work for an increase of trade in both directions. If the balance shifted to Israel’s favour we would not object. We did not think in terms of having balanced trade with individual countries, but rather in multilateral terms.
(2) Boycott The treaty with Egypt would provide that all boycotts be ended. The Baghdad Conference, on the other hand, had called for increasing the boycott. Mr. Begin noted that it was not a boycott against Israel, but against any firm doing business with Israel. It was illegal and immoral to blacklist firms that did not obey the rules of the boycott, and some firms did obey. He urged that measures be taken so that Canadian firms would not be frightened by the Boycott Office in Damascus.
Mr. Trudeau replied that the Government was sympathetic to the Israeli point of view and had worked out in negotiation with the leaders of the Canadian Jewish community — the Presidents of the Canada-Israel Committee, the Canadian Jewish Council, etc. — what the Government proposed to do by way of legislation. In particular, the legislation would make it compulsory for Canadian firms to declare any involvement they might have with the boycott. The Government had also agreed not to accept negative certificates of origin.
Mr. Trudeau said that he had the assurance of these Jewish leaders that these measures were what they wanted at this time. This did not exclude requests for further modifications later on — perhaps in one or two years. No doubt they would have preferred a more elaborate and a more penal policy, but in the present context Mr. Trudeau hoped that they would confirm to Prime Minister Begin that they were satisfied. Mr. Begin expressed his appreciation.
(3) Invitation to Prime Minister Trudeau Mr. Begin extended an invitation to Prime Minister Trudeau to pay an official visit to Israel. Mr. Trudeau was happy to accept the invitation but indicated that he would not be able to go until after the next election
– inshallah!
(4) Landing Rights in Toronto The question of El Al’s longstanding request for landing rights in Toronto having been raised by Mr. Begin, the Israeli Ambassador, Mr. Shalev, suggested that a joint committee might meet and discuss the matter. Could they not at least agree on an approximate time in the future when such rights might be granted? Mr. Shalev noted that there had been progress in Israel towards granting permission for charter flights from Canada. It would help if the Israelis could have a clear idea of when landing rights in Toronto might be available.
Mr. Jamieson agreed that a committee might go into what the Government’s future plans were. Mr. Trudeau noted that land had been acquired for a new airport but that the Ontario Government would not agree to it.
Mr. Jamieson raised the question of the United Nations and said that he wished to tell Prime Minister Begin that we were active in efforts to keep the U.N. under control on anti-Israel resolutions. Two had come up the previous day (November 6). We were prepared to stand alone with the United States or even by ourselves if necessary. He suggested that it would be helpful if Israel were to make strong representations with other friendly countries. Mr. Jamieson hoped that we could get through this year’s General Assembly without something too disruptive. Mr. Begin observed that the United States had taken a strong line and expressed appreciation for Canadian support. Mr. Jamieson noted that the hard-line Arab states were trying to use the United Nations forum as a counterweight.
Mr. Danson asked if the role of a third-party peacekeeping force had been discussed. Mr. Begin said that it had. The Camp David agreements provided for peacekeeping forces at Sharm El Sheikh and in northern Sinai (El Arish). Otherwise the Sinai would be demilitarized except for one Egyptian mechanized division. As to what would happen if the Soviet Union vetoed proposals to set up these peacekeeping forces, Mr. Begin said that this possibility had been discussed with the Americans, who had some ideas for ensuring that there would be an international force. He did not say what they were.
Mr. Begin expressed thanks for the Canadian contribution to Middle East peacekeeping forces. He stressed that there must not be a repetition of the events in 1967 when President Nasser had ordered the U.N. to remove its forces and U Thant had obeyed. Unless both Israel and Egypt agreed on their removal the forces should remain unless there was a positive vote of the Security Council (in which the veto would apply) to remove them.
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