bout de papier, Vol. 28, No. 2 (2014) — Summer 2014 // Été 2014, pp. 34–36
As we approach the 75th anniversary of the start of the Second World War, bout de papier reproduces extracts from the diary of the Canadian Prime Minister, William Lyon Mackenzie King. Fifteen years ago, we published King’s account of the Cabinet meeting on August 24 1939, when the Canadian government decided in principle, as King put it, to fight “at Britain’s side.” The extracts below deal with the immediate aftermath of the German invasion of Poland and then the British declaration of war. As there were no minutes kept of Cabinet meetings at this time, the diary is the key source for understanding what happened in these momentous days (though seen through King’s eyes) and the combination of trepidation and resolve that characterized the reaction of the Prime Minister and his colleagues to events overseas. In late August, the Cabinet had been meeting almost daily (often for day-long sessions) to keep up with the developing crisis and to plan for Canada’s war effort. in contrast to August 1914, Parliament was summoned for a special session which effectively endorsed the government’s decision to go to war — not through a formal parliamentary resolution as such but by approval of the Speech from the Throne, which included the proposed commitment. Though Canada was officially at war one week later than Britain – when King George VI signed the Canadian proclamation on September 10, 1939 – these extracts convey the extent to which that decision was never in doubt, though the formality of a separate declaration was seen as an important constitutional milestone. The Diary, which is available on-line, is part of the William Lyon Mackenzie King Papers at Library and Archives Canada.
— Hector Mackenzie
Friday, September 1, 1939 Kingsmere and Ottawa
At 6.30 this morning, McLeod awakened me, saying that Mr. [Arnold] Heeney [Secretary to the Cabinet] was anxious to speak to me on the “phone. I asked him if the situation had become dangerous, and he said he thought it had. I then got Arnold on the phone and he told me that reports had come from the press that Poland had been invaded. There were all kinds of statements as to the critical condition matters had assumed. I told him to have Council summoned for nine…
I reached the East Block about 7.45, and met immediately with members of the staff. Heeney summarized the situation as it had come from despatches in the form of press bulletins. I then began the preparation of a statement to be issued by the Cabinet, based, in part, on what I had previously prepared and what [Ernest] Lapointe [Minister of Justice] had sent to me. Went over this in part with [O.D.]. Skelton [Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs] and Heeney later, and at nine o’clock sharp met with colleagues in the Cabinet, the only member not present at the beginning was [W. D.] Euler [Minister of Trade and Commerce], who, at the last meeting, was the one who said that nothing should be done without a full Cabinet, and I had pointed out the difficulty of getting members to be present when needed. I had suggested that none of them should be away this week. He was in Toronto and had to fly back. Did not arrive until noon, therefore, missed the morning proceedings, but was there when the final decision was made. Senator [Raoul] Dandurand [Minister without Portfolio] also arrived at twelve o’clock, so that when the final decision of the Cabinet was taken, every member was present.
I avoided all preliminaries and simply began by reading the order-in-council to summon Parliament for Thursday, the 7th. It had been previously arranged that we would allow a full week, but I decided on the way coming into the city that, having the news so early in the morning, it should be possible to have Parliament together on Thursday afternoon. Besides, I like the “7” as a day for Parliament to re-assemble. This order was put through without any question.
T next sought to put through the order under the War Measures Act, proclaiming that the situation of apprehended war had arisen, and had Lapointe read the proclamation. There was some discussion as to whether we should date back the apprehended condition of war to August 25th, or have it dated as of today. The order had been brought in as of today, but it was decided rightly to date back the period to August 25th, at which time we met and decided to purchase aeroplanes, and made other appropriations under G.G.’s warrants.
The next orders to be put through were those placing the Militia on active service, and also the Naval Service, and the Air Force. I was surprised. that some of these measures were not more in readiness and had to be changed somewhat at the last moment. The order regarding Militia and active service had been worded “beyond Canada”. It was agreed by all that we should not, at this stage, go beyond Canada. My presence in [Sir Wilfrid] Laurier’s Cabinet at the time of the drafting of the Naval Service Act helped me in being quite sure as to the nature of the provisions of that Act as to the disposition of the Naval Service in time of war.
Another measure to be put through was one giving authority to apply censorship in a variety of directions. There were one or two other measures to provide funds for payment of men called out on temporary service and other essential expenditures.
I then took up the statement to be issued to the press: Read over what I had been trying to draft in the morning and parts of what I had drafted before. I sought to get agreement, clause by clause, but it became apparent that the briefer the statement made at present the better it would be.
I should have mentioned that immediately the order-in-council had passed summoning Parliament, I went myself and gave the announcement to the press, so that word was out a few minutes after nine.
After some discussion, I felt I had consensus of view of Council pretty fully, and as all had agreed to the policy of Canada being at Britain’s side in the event of her being obliged to go to war, I felt that the rest was secondary, and that the main thing was to get out a statement before war had actually been declared, so far as England was concerned. Fortunately, by the cables we were getting from the British Government, it was possible to know that in what the British Government itself had thus far given out, was that hostilities had broken out between Germany and Poland.
Later came the message which said that England was communicating with France with a view to notifying Germany that, if her forces were not withdrawn, she would then feel she was obliged to keep her pledge to Poland. This is the one and only ray of hope there is at the moment. It is just possible that if pressure may be brought to bear by Italy, and possibly by some of the German people themselves, a truce may be declared, the Poles having learned a lesson themselves. On the other hand, what I think makes this altogether impossible, is that [Adolf] Hitler [Chancellor and Fuhrer of Germany] apparently had a very quick meeting at the Reichstag, at which he declared that he would put on his uniform and would die before he would take it off. That he had named [Hermann] Goering [Reichminister of Aviation]
as his successor and [Rudolf] Hess [Deputy Fuhrer] to succeed Goering. He evidently has the idea that death may come to himself, as has been hinted he had, ere very long.
Fortunately, this position made it possible for us to call Parliament, and to state our policy before Britain was involved in war, and made clear that, meanwhile, everything had been done for the defence of Canada, and that more could not be hoped for in the way of effective co-operation than will be possible within the week’s communication with London. The statement is one of Canada voluntarily going to the aid of Britain as she stands for the defence of freedom, not her own freedom only, but the freedom of mankind.
Iwas somewhat surprised at how timid some members of Council were to declare that we were prepared to fight for freedom. I avoided using the words “solely for the defence of Canada”, though I brought in Canadian defences and our freedom. I should like to have gone further and made it part of the freedom of mankind. I was terribly shocked and surprised when I learned that President Roosevelt had told the press this morning that the U.S. ought to be able to keep out of the European war. It may have been tactics on his part, but, as some members of Council said, it will put him in a curious position when he comes and carries out his promise of defending Canada against any attack. It may be that he is preparing, and I imagine this is the case, a way to get the neutrality law repealed, and that would seem to be a strange way. I did not give the Cabinet Roosevelt’s statement until after I had read over the statement as I had it finally prepared, after going from the Council chamber to redraft the whole in conference with Skelton and Heeney.
In the Cabinet, I read the statement over twice. When I had finished it the first time, Lapointe said that it would satisfy him. I read it a second time and all were agreed. I was pleased that both Euler and Dandurand had reached the Cabinet in time to be present for this final decision.
I then had the press summoned, and met them in my office at one o’clock. Read over the statement to them, and gave them additional copies.
I then returned to the Council chamber and said to my colleagues Iwas immensely relieved in mind because of our complete unanimity. That I thought it made clear that we were expressing what will be the will of Canada and what she expected of the Government at this time. I then suggested an adjournment until four o’clock.
Imet my colleagues again shortly after four. Passed an order giving Council the prior word as to when and how the different departments are to operate under the censorship order passed this morning. I read over to Council the Chief of Staff’s memoranda as to Canada’s possible war contribution. Was surprised to find how much of it was devoted to possible expeditionary force. Council were much against that idea.
Spoke to [Ian] Mackenzie [Minister of National Defence] and others of getting suitable man as Acting Deputy Minister of Defence. Brought up question of possible national government. Took view that, for the present at least, better hold to our own administration; also spoke of necessity of amending election act so as to enable elections themselves to be held in three weeks if on during war times. Power thought this was going against all the different groups of Parliament, and seemed to think it was impossible to arrange. I stressed, however, the utter folly of having an election in war time, taking several weeks, and said I would not ask to have the life of Parliament prolonged beyond its constitutional term.
Read part of [Neville] Chamberlain’s [Prime Minister of the United Kingdom] speech to Council. Then adjourned until tomorrow at 11.30.
Saturday, September 2, 1939 Kingsmere and Ottawa
Went immediately into Council. Practically no communications had come in of any significance other than one indicating it was thought Germany was seeking a military alliance with Russia. Another significant word was that there had not been as much damage done in Poland as the press was reporting, which would seem to indicate that the Germans were trying to put themselves into the position of being in possession without having gone too far and then seeking stronger terms for settlement.
own feeling is that the British and the French have each been a little annoyed at the Poles and their delay in negotiating direct, though, naturally, they had not shown this, and are letting them see for themselves they must pay a little more attention to the wishes of those who guaranteed to stand by them against aggression.
I received a very nice cable from Chamberlain, saying how much his colleagues and himself had appreciated our statement and the position taken by the Government.
In Council I discussed the necessity of our amending the Elections Act so as to make possible an election in three weeks. Most of Council were pretty strongly with me, though many difficulties were asserted. I had Heeney phone Harry Butcher to come to assist in drafting a measure which I could discuss with the leaders of the other parties before Parliament meets. Also, advised all present to look over the debates of the special session in 1914, so as to be prepared for discussion in this session and further to see what might be necessary in the way of monies required for particular purposes as a budget will have to be brought down. Told [J. L.] Isley [Minister of National Revenue and Acting Minister of Finance] to have the budget ready for discussion in Council early next week. Also took up the question of price control, profiteering on sugar and other supplies. Matters regarding the Purchasing Board.
Spoke out strongly against the report made by the Chiefs of Staff as revealing that they had been really preparing for expeditionary force and had led the Government to believe that they have nothing of the kind in contemplation. Discussed the question of an expeditionary force. Mentioned what I had said to Sir Gerald Campbell [the British High Commissioner in Ottawa, who had suggested that the British government did not regard a, Canadian overseas contingent as a priority], and all were agreed we should not absolutely prohibit it, but not seek to encourage anything of the kind.
Sunday, September 3, 1939 Kingsmere and Ottawa
Took the phone in hand at 7.30. Got [Walter] Turnbull [seconded to the Prime Minister’s Office from the Post Office] at the office and asked him quietly what word had come in. He told me that Britain was at war; that Chamberlain had spoken to this effect in the House. I told him to arrange to have the Cabinet come together at 10.
I went straight to my office, talked with Skelton and Heeney about the most recent despatches, and began the preparation of something to say over the radio. It had been announced that the King would speak at one o’clock. They seemed to feel that I should follow Chamberlain and speak about noon before the King spoke. I took the opposite view that it would be better to wait until after the King spoke, and see how he phrased the statement as to war. Also I felt I would need time for preparation of the broadcast. My colleagues agreed with me when I brought up this point in Council, and it was arranged to have the broadcast at 5.30, and that Lapointe would read in French what Thad said. It was fortunate I gave this word to the press before. He later joined me in seeking the wording of an Order-in-Council regarding the putting into effect of the defence regulations. He then sought to have someone else do the translating. That they might not feel in Quebec that he was always the one that was being put into a position of participation in war. However, he accepted the situation very nicely. Raised no question once he knew the situation.
In the Cabinet, I felt that the first question to raise was that of my relations with the press.
We had considerable discussion in Council as to the exact position the Government and the country should take between now and the time Parliament authorised co-operation. I held to the language statement I had already made which was that all our measures at present would be for the defence of Canada. That we were at war in the sense of being liable to be attacked. That Britain was at war and, if attacked, we should take means of defence and should not go beyond the defence of Canada at present, or do anything in the way of attacking ourselves. We would have to take measures with regard to some aliens to protect against some internal difficulties and that all this should be done with caution and judgment.
I had indicated some things to [J. W.] Pickersgill [of the Prime Minister’s Office] and Heeney to go into the statement for the broadcast. They prepared something but I felt it was lacking in many essentials. It was abstract and academic, not coming into immediate contacts with the human situation, so began a statement of my own in my office, which I worked on between twelve and one while [Norman] Rogers [Minister of Labour] was getting ready the O. in C. regarding profiteering; Mackenzie taking up matters with his officials and other members discussing features of the existing situation. Dandurand, Euler and [Pierre Joseph Arthur] Cardin [Minister of Public Works] were the only members not present. Rogers by some chance said that while Euler was on the committee dealing with supplies that, of course, he was not present. I asked him why he said “of course” and drew the attention of colleagues to what I have said to Euler about the difficulty of counting on a full Cabinet at the time such was necessary; since his own statement that nothing should be done without a full Cabinet, he has been absent on the two occasions when it was really imperative he should be here.
I read over to my colleagues what I had written as to the nature of the issue and they approved it without a suggestion as to change. I had still to work out the latter part of the speech, which I did in the afternoon.
At one, with the radio in the Council Chamber, most of us listened to the King’s speech, which seemed to me wholly appropriate and well prepared. I could not but feel what his Canadian trip [the Royal Tour earlier in 1939] had meant to him in giving him the confidence needed for the present situation. I wish that on some pretext he and the Queen had made the broadcast I had suggested. It would have added another note of strength to the British position, which would have appealed strongly to all countries if made in the name of humanity. I recognized, however, at the time that the moment was not wholly opportune. It might have been done before the ultimatum was presented. It would not have saved the day, but it would have made Hitler’s position more untenable than ever.
Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 28, No. 2 (2014) — Summer 2014 // Été 2014, pp. 34–36. Read the rest of this issue →
