bout de papier, Vol. 21, No. 4 (2005) — Winter 2005 // Hiver 2005, pp. 17–21
Then use Cathaginia peace tre ly whose terms are so onerous that the next war becomes almost inevitable. A classic example often cited is the 1920 Treaty of Versailles (at least that’s how the Germans and John Maynard Keynes perceived it). The term actually takes its name from the treaty of 201 BC which ended the Second Punic War (P.W. II) between Rome and Carthage. The sixteen-year war had cost the lives hundreds of thousands of Roman citizens and allies and brought the Roman Republic seemingly to the verge of extinction. Like the victorious allies in Paris in 1919, the Romans wished to ensure that their defeated opponent would never again pose a threat. Carthage was stripped of its possessions in Spain; its navy was dismantled; its war elephants surrendered; and a seemingly crushing war indemnity of 300 tonnes of silver was imposed. Moreover, Carthage was forbidden to wage war, even defensively, without Roman permission.
This treaty was the culmination of a series of agreements concluded between the two emerging powers which illustrates the shifting balance of power between Carthage and Rome over the previous 300 years. Up until 264 BC, Rome and Carthage had been, more often than not, allies. Their spheres of interest did not intrude on one another and they were united in their desire to check the advance of Greek colonies and commerce into the western Mediterranean. As long as there was hostile space between Rome and Carthage, they could cooperate; however, this ended with the final defeat of King Pyrrhus of Epirus at Beneventum in 275, leaving Rome in control of Italy and most of Sicily subject to Carthage. Hostilities soon broke out (P.W. I) and lasted from 264 to 242. It was followed by P.W. II from 218 to 201 and the final struggle — P.W. III, where Rome’s aim, the total elimination of Carthage was achieved — from 149 to 146.
According to the Roman historian Livy, five treaties were concluded between Rome and Carthage, prior to 264. Three of them re summarized by Polybius who, in the 1-up to the third war, was given access to : Aediles treasury at temple of Jupiter on : Capitoline hill. This housed the Roman aty registry. The texts were inscribed, in tin, on bronze tablets.
The first treaty was dated to 508 BC the very year in which the Roman public was founded, after the expulsion the Etruscan Tarquin dynasty. Polybius raphrases its terms with the caveat that s written in very archaic Latin and even : archivists had trouble getting the exact aning. Its terms were as follows:
• Rome and its allies and Carthage and its allies will be friends.
• Roman ships will not land beyond “the Fair Promontory” (believed to be one of the capes on the Tunisian coast, northwest of Carthage), but if they are forced to do so, due to storms or enemy action, they will not buy or receive articles except those required to repair their ship or to make sacrifices. They must depart in five days.
• Roman merchants may trade in other ports of Carthaginian-controlled Africa and in Sardinia, but only in the presence of either the town clerk or herald. The Carthaginian state will ensure they get a fair price for their goods.
• Roman merchants trading in Sicilian ports controlled by Carthage will receive equal rights with other traders.
• Carthage will not injure any people from cities subject to Rome (a list of Latin towns stretching south to Terracina was included), nor any Latins allied to Rome. Carthage also agrees to avoid attacks on those Latin states which were not Roman allies, but if they do capture one of these towns, it will be handed over to Rome — intact. The Carthaginians will build no forts in Latium and if they land under arms, they will not spend the night there.
It’s clear that most of the treaty’s text was largely Carthaginian supplied boiler plate, something like the draft text of our Air Agreements or Double Taxation Agreements. The only blanks to be filled in by the negotiators would have been the areas Rome deemed to be under its control or within its sphere of influence. The newly established Roman Republic must have been pleased to obtain such recognition from a major power in the region; the Carthaginians would have been equally anxious to ensure the Romans respected their commercial monopoly over the shipping lanes west of Carthage. It may well be that the 508 treaty, in fact, replicated an earlier treaty between Carthage and the now deposed Roman monarchy. According to Aristotle, the Carthaginians were wont to conclude such treaties of friendship and commerce (symbola) with Etruscan city states — Rome would have been regarded as one of these. Italy, Spain and North Africa were important sources of minerals and other raw materials for the eastern Mediterranean. Carthage, a colony of the Phoenician city of Tyre, had made its fortune trading such western raw materials for eastern goods and luxuries. Carthage and its Etruscan allies had also succeeded in defeating Greek efforts to establish colonies in Corsica and points west. Above all Carthage wished to preserve its monopoly on trade beyond the straits of Gibraltar.
The treaty was not renewed until 348 BC. There had been a number of major developments in the intervening 150 years. For a time, Republican Rome had not been able to retain all the Latin territories listed in the 508 treaty, and had also undergone considerable political and social turmoil. While it had made some gains by the early fourth century BC — capturing the Etruscan city of Veii — it had also suffered severely at the hands of the Gauls in the 380s. By 348, however, Rome was recovering its position as the paramount power in central Italy, but still was a 1g way from dominating the entire ninsula — let alone the known world irthage — while making progress ring the fifth century in securing commercial hegemony over Spain had been less successtul in trying to nit Greek expansion in Sicily. In 480 legend says on the same day as the ttle of Salamis — a major Carthaginian ack on Syracuse had been defeated, d much of Carthaginian Sicily had been it. By the middle of the fourth century ¿, Carthage’s position was, like Rome’s, covering, although its Sicilian posses-ins were again under threat.
Under the terms of the 348 treaty:
• Rome and its allies and Carthage — including its mother-city Tyre and also Utica (to the north-west of Carthage) — and its allies will be friends.
• The no-sail zone, forbidden to the Romans, now extended from the Fair Promontory to Tarsea on the east coast of Spain near Cartagena (New Carthage). The Romans are forbidden to raid, trade or found settlements beyond these points.
• If the Carthaginians capture a city of Latium not allied to Rome, they may now retain any booty or slaves they take, but must hand the city itself over to the Romans. Should they capture any persons from a city which has a treaty of peace with Rome, but not allied to Rome (this seems to refer to some Etruscan cities such as Caere and Tusculum which had recently concluded such treaties), they may not bring them into a Roman harbour (presumably to sell as slaves) — if they do so, any captives shall be freed. A reciprocal provision applies to the Romans.
• If Roman or Carthaginian ships obtain provisions or water from a port under the other party’s authority, they shall not use these provisions to attack any person with which the other party has a treaty of peace or friendship.
• The Romans are now forbidden to trade or found cities in Sardinia, or on any part of the African coast. However in Carthage itself, or any part of Sicily ruled by Carthage, Romans may trade or do anything allowed a Carthaginian citizen.
It would seem, from the terms of this new treaty, that Carthage had become relatively stronger than Rome. However, clearly the treaty recognized the possibility that Rome might now be in a position to carry out piratical raids or found overseas colonies (as it had recently tried to do in Corsica — an area recognized as a no mans land between Carthage and the Etruscans). Of interest, however, are the reciprocal obligations on each party to respect peace treaties concluded by the other. The inclusion of Tyre, as well as Utica (nominally independent, but de facto part of a Carthaginian commonwealth extending from Tripolitania to the Atlantic) is also of interest, and confirms Livy’s dating of the treaty. Tyre had been a dependency of the Persians since the late sixth century. In 351 a Persian attack on Egypt had been bloodily repulsed and the cities of Phoenicia (modern Lebanon) had revolted. Independence was brief; by 345 Persian control was reimposed. Carthage, now far richer and more powerful than its mother city, had taken Tyre under its wing, including it as a party in symbola with the city states of Italy concluded during that time frame.
While Livy mentions a treaty in 306, Polybius seemed unaware of it. By 306 Rome was on its way to dominating the entire Italian peninsula, while Carthage had brought most of Sicily under its control. However, both faced challenges. The Romans were locked in a struggle with the Samnites, a powerful confederation of hill tribes in southern Italy and the war was not necessarily going in Rome’s favour. Carthage’s Sicilian enemies had engaged the services of a Spartan general, Timoleon, who was preparing to invade Africa. It is clear that one of the objectives of the 306 treaty was to ensure that neither party profited from any reverses that might be suffered by the other. Philinus — a Greek historian who presented the Carthaginian perspective (alas his work has not survived) and presumably had access to the Carthaginian archives — claimed there was a mutual commitment that Rome would not interfere in Sicily and Carthage would not interfere in Italy. Polybius denied seeing any such undertaking in the treaty series he examined. This has led to speculation that Rome’s “access to information” withheld the 306 treaty from him — because it contained this embarrassing clause. Rome’s intervention in Sicily in 364, which sparked the three Punic Wars, would have placed it in material breach of the 306 treaty. At the time Polybius was doing his research, the hawks in the Roman Senate, led by Cato the Elder (famous for demonstrating with a bunch of fresh figs that Carthage was only three days sail from Rome), were agitating for the final war to eliminate Carthage once and for all. Cato ended every speech in the Curia with delenda est Carthago — “Carthage must be destroyed.” Needless to say, the Romans needed all the moral high ground they could get.
That this mutual non-intervention clause existed seems to be confirmed by the next treaty quoted by Polybius. This was concluded in 278 when both Rome and Carthage were facing attack from Pyrrhus, King of Epirus. Pyrrhus had crossed the Adriatic to respond to pleas for assistance from the Greek colonies in southern Italy (threatened by Rome) and those in Sicily (threatened by Carthage). While Pyrrhus won a string of “pyrrhic victories” against both Rome and Carthage, he was unable to make substantial strategic headway as long as he had to fight on two fronts. The 278 treaty renewed all the terms of the previous treaty. However, to forestall Pyrrhus trying to defeat Rome and Carthage individually, the two states added a clause to the effect that they would only conclude a separate peace with Pyrrhus if it contained a clause allowing “ …each to enter the territory of the other to render military assistance if it is required.” This allowed a specific exception to the mutual non-intervention clause, in the treaty of 306, cited by Philinus.
Rome and Carthage also agreed that should such mutual assistance be provided, each party would pay for its own ground troops, but that Carthage would supply the ships for the outward and return journeys and that, if required, Carthage would supply naval support to the Romans. Carthaginian sailors, however, would be exempt from engaging in land combat. While this clause would seem to lay an additional obligation on Carthaginians, they had no wish to encourage the Romans to develop a navy (and history would prove their concerns justified).
The refusal of Rome and Carthage to sign a separate peace with Pyrrhus led to his final defeat by the Romans. His prophesy on leaving Sicily, that he was leaving it to be fought over by the Romans and Carthaginians, was soon fulfilled. In 264 Rome was drawn into conflict with Carthage by a group of renegade Italian mercenaries and, after 23 years of warfare and the loss of 700 ships, emerged victorious. With the last Carthaginian fleet defeated in 241, the Carthaginian commander on Sicily, Hamilcar Barca, and his Roman counterpart, Catulus, agreed on the following terms:
• The Carthaginians and Romans shall be friends on these conditions, pending ratification by the Roman people.
• The Carthaginians will withdraw from all Sicily, and shall not make war on Hiero (the ruler of the Greek state of Syracuse) or attack the Syracusians or their allies.
• The allies of either party shall be safe from attack by the other.
• The Carthaginians shall return to the Romans all prisoners of war without ransom.
• Neither party shall levy any contribution, erect any public buildings or enlist mercenaries in the territories of the other, or receive the allies of the other into friendship.
• Carthage had to pay an indemnity of 2200 talents [30 tonnes of silver] within twenty years.
The Roman Assembly did not immediately ratify these terms, sending out a ten-man commission which added the additional conditions (which Carthage accepted) having the payment period of the indemnity, levying an additional payment of 1000 talents — to be paid immediately and requiring Carthage to evacuate all islands between Italy and Sicily.
Four years later, the Romans, taking advantage of a revolt by Carthage’s unpaid mercenaries, accepted an invitation from mercenaries stationed there to seize Sardinia. When the Carthaginians made preparations to retake Sardinia, Rome declared war. Carthage, unwilling to pursue hostilities, agreed to cede Sardinia and to pay an additional 1200 talents to Rome.
With Sicily and Sardinia lost, Carthage began to concentrate its efforts on expanding its control over southern Spain, a region rich in agricultural produce and minerals. The Romans made it clear they would not tolerate any Carthaginian expansion north of the Ebro river. In actual fact their line in the sand was at Saguntum, a town well south of the Ebro, which had concluded a treaty of alliance with Rome. In 219, Hannibal, the Carthaginian commander in Spain, besieged Saguntum. The Saguntines appealed to Rome for help. The Romans sent a delegation to Hannibal and told him to desist. He refused and took the city. A Roman delegation was then sent to Carthage issuing an ultimatum — either disgorge Saguntum and hand Hannibal and his staff over to the Romans or consider themselves at war. The Roman side cited the clause in the 241 treaty whereby each party’s allies were safe from attack from the other. The Carthaginians argued that this only applied to those who were allies at the time the treaty was concluded, the Romans argued it did not matter when they became allies. War ensued. Hannibal led his army and elephants over the Alps to inflict a series of crushing defeats on the Romans, but in the end Rome prevailed. Defeated on its home soil, Carthage had to capitulate under the terms of the “Carthaginian Peace” of 201.
Thus a series of treaties, originally designed to ensure Rome and Carthage would not intrude within each other’s areas of interest, had ultimately led to two long and debilitating wars. Carthage, now confined to the North African coast, retreated from any foreign ambitions and fell back on the agricultural wealth of its hinterland. The war indemnity was paid off in record time. In the end that did not satisfy the Romans. In 149 — on the pretext that defensive Carthaginian actions against incursions by Rome’s Numidian allies violated the 201 treaty — the Romans demanded that Carthage disarm completely. When Carthage complied, the Romans ordered that Carthage be razed and the population resettled far inland. At this point the Carthaginians concluded that they had no choice but to rearm as best they could (the women of Carthage sacrificed their hair to make catapult springs) and resist. Remarkably they held out for three years. In the end the Romans breached the walls of Carthage. Fighting raged from house to house through the blazing high rise blocks of the inner city. When the last pockets of resistance were quelled, the Romans razed what remained, sewing salt over the ruins, to symbolize that Carthage would never rise again. The site is now a suburb of Tunis, favoured by the diplomatic community. Perhaps deep under some Staff Quarter rest tablets with the Punic versions of the treaties Polybius cited.
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 21, No. 4 (2005) — Winter 2005 // Hiver 2005, pp. 17–21. Read the rest of this issue →
