bout de papier, Vol. 22, No. 3 (2006) — Fall/Winter 2006 // Automne/Hiver 2006, pp. 21–22
I the field of the collection of intelli- here have been recent developments in gence outside Canada which have gone unnoticed by the press and public and which suggest that, at long last, the Canadian government appears to have decided to commit espionage. These developments are:
a) statements in a Senate Committee by the then Cabinet Minister responsible for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service b) certain recommendations in Judge
Gomery’s Second Report (Responsibilities and Accountabilities of Deputy
Ministers), c) last, but certainly not least, the defeat of Paul Martin’s government and its replacement by the Conservative government headed by Stephen Harper.
Unfortunately, these developments leave it unclear what espionage activities (if any) are now being carried out by Canada, by which government agency or agencies, under what authority (mandate) and to what purpose and effect? Moreover, it is not clear whether CSIS indeed has a valid mandate (Section 12 of the CSIS Act] to commit espionage by collecting intelligence outside Canada which is not “threat-related.”
The average Canadian simply does not understand the very important differences between foreign security intelligence and foreign intelligence. I believe these phrases first came into use during the McDonald Commission’s hearings. Unfortunately, they have only served to confuse the complex issues involved. I understand the first of these phrases means the collection of intelligence abroad directly related to some recognized threat to Canada’s internal security and that the second phrase means collecting intelligence outside Canada which is not clearly related to some threat to Canada’s internal security; that is to say, espionage. At the time these phrases first came into use there also was little or no informed discussion concerning the important differences between a Security service such as CSIS and an espionage service, which make it unwise to attempt to combine the two functions in one organization!
On 15 February 2005, Anne McLellan, then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, appeared before the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. The following is an excerpt from the record of the proceedings of the Senate Committee on that day, dealing with intelligence collection outside Canada (author’s underlining).
Defence, Issue 12, Evidence, February 15, 2005 (Page 21 of 27).
Senator Forrestall: I am trying to relate this to CSIS, in a sense, Minister, you have told us that you supported the requirement for a broader based CSIS collection capability offshore, both quiet intelligence – not threat related – and otherwise.
Have you been able to divert some additional funds for this activity? Is it showing up in a higher quality of work and improved work?
Ms. McLellan: I have made a budgetary request for this year. It remains to be seen whether the Finance Minister will see fit to fund my request. I have made a request that would permit the gathering of foreign intelligence. It is one of the things that I have talked about before and the fact that we live in a world where it is incumbent upon each one of us, as countries and allies, to ensure that we are doing our fair share, both in terms of being able to protect our own people and having that which we share under appropriate circumstances around foreign intelligence with our allies.
While CSIS does collect foreign security intelligence now, I have made no secret of the fact that I think they should collect more, I have made a budgetary request to that effect.
Senator Forrestall: If you need help, give us a call.
Ms. McLellan: I will.
The Chairman: I take it from that,
Minister, that CSIS will be collecting non-threat related intelligence?
Ms. McLellan: No.
The Chairman: I take from that that government has made a decision that foreign intelligence is properly the purview of CSIS and not some other agency?
Ms. McLellan: No final determination has been made in that regard. I am making a request for funding to collect more foreign security intelligence. I have not indicated where the locus of that gathering would be.”
These brief exchanges are very confusing. They appear to suggest Paul Martin’s government decided to collect more intelligence abroad, and that some of this activity, so-called “foreign intelligence.” involves the collection of intelligence not directly related to Canada’s internal security.
Apparently some participants in the debates in parliament and elsewhere were not well informed about the intricacies of committing espionage, which is not surprising since very few Canadians have such direct knowledge and, these few are rapidly dying off.
In 1942, I was the military intelligence officer in Canadian Military HQ in London responsible for seeking out in England Canadian Army personnel of all ranks with the qualifications (knowledge of European countries and their numerous dialects, signals expertise, training in small-arms equipment, etc.) which might make them useful to the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) to serve as British secret agents in German-occupied Europe (by the end of the war about 75 Canadians served in this capacity). At that time, in response to a British request, I had volunteered to join SOE as a prospective British secret agent. I was in a position to know a good deal about the nature of the secret intelligence gathering and sabotage operations of the Allies in Europe and how the secret agencies involved were trained and went about their difficult tasks and the very important differences in the nature of their work.
Technological advances such as global positioning devices, reliable satellite communications, much better “burst” radio transmissions, and greatly improved cryptology presumably have made life easier and theoretically safer for spies. First, however, they have to be selected, recruited, trained, and then regularly funded, instructed and protected, usually from considerable distances. Successful espionage remains a very special, complicated activity, calling for unusual agents with special aptitudes, skills, dedication and incentives. Moreover, it is particularly important for the political leaders and senior officials involved to possess in good measure the qualifications required to direct such unusual activities.
World War II secret intelligence operations were ruthless in their execution and the “peacetime” nature of a successful espionage service is not necessarily lawful. A good secret agent in carrying out his or her tasks sometimes has to resort to unpleasant methods to succeed (blackmail, subversion, bribery, entrapment, etc.). For example, using such methods to recruit citizens of the target country, possessing reliable knowledge of that country’s secret efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and reliable delivery systems. Some of those eager for Canada to have an espionage agency appear not to understand these unpleasant realities.
The Second Report of the Gomery Commission, and particularly Chapter Five, “the Responsibilities and Accountabilities of Deputy Ministers” could be relevant should the Conservative government decide to act upon Gomery’s recommendations and are serious about committing espionage.
Gomery’s recommendations would accord the head of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service the status, powers and responsibilities of a deputy minister, which certainly seems appropriate. However, it is to be hoped that due account is taken of the sharp differences in the relationship between most deputy ministers and their Minister and the rather different, delicate relationship between the head of CSIS and his Minister.
Gomery proposes that since deputy ministers have clearly defined administrative/financial responsibilities for running their department or agency, which their Ministers do not possess, they and not the Minister should be required to appear before a parliamentary committee to answer questions. Thus, the head of CSIS could be questioned by the Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons concerning his or her administrative/ financial responsibilities. On the face of it a reasonable recommendation. However, the head of CSIS should never be required to answer any questions concerning CSIS’s espionage activities, which must remain “top secret” and eventually the responsibility of the Minister concerned, since the decision to carry out such dangerous activities in other countries is a hostile act, with strong overtones affecting Canada’s foreign relations, and particularly should CSIS request that its secret agents be granted the protection of diplomatic immunity. Namely, that certain of its agents become members (pro tem) of Canada’s Foreign Service, with suitable diplomatic rank (Counsellor, First Secretary, etc.).
In such cases the Foreign Minister should be consulted in advance and give his/her consent since, in the event of a CSIS agent being unmasked, declared persona non grata, and expelled, it would fall to the Foreign Minister and not the minister responsible for CSIS, to deal with the awkward matter.
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 22, No. 3 (2006) — Fall/Winter 2006 // Automne/Hiver 2006, pp. 21–22. Read the rest of this issue →
