bout de papier, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2007) — Spring/Summer 2007 // Printemps/Été 2007, pp. 5–8
There was a new prime minister in Canada, who had promised decisive action (“Sixty Days of Decision”) on a wide range of issues, including relations with the United States, which had deteriorated under his predecessor. The American president, who had been narrowly elected a few years before, agreed to an early summit; not in the formal setting of Washington but in the more congenial atmosphere of a family compound, where the Canadian leader’s predecessor had never set foot. Although the circumstances may have a familiar quality, the meeting in question took place more than 40 years ago between Lester B. Pearson and John F. Kennedy.
“All Canadian officials present,” one recalled, “were delighted with the instantaneous communication which was established between the Prime Minister and the President. It was apparent at the outset that they have an empathy on an intellectual as well as on a personality basis. This made the meetings informal and at times jocular, but also made it possible to cover much ground quickly, and to produce agreements and understandings with a minimum of delay.” The American records of the same encounter make it obvious that the positive impression was reciprocated. “General atmosphere talks excellent,” a telegram reported back to the Department of State, “with Pearson giving repeated evidence [of] his determination [to) create and sustain cordial and frank relationship between two countries whose destiny closely linked by history as well as geography, while maintaining Canadian identity and defending Canadian interests. “ As various published accounts have noted, Pearson’s considerable knowledge of baseball trivia was almost as vital to the rapport as his diplomatic experience.
An American account of the first day of discussions was published by the Department of State in its series, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XIII, West Europe and Canada (Washington, 1994), pp.1201-6. There are several Canadian documents dealing with the encounter in Hyannis Port, all on file 1415-40 in volume 5030 of the records of the Department of External Affairs (RG19) in Library and Archives Canada. The “Summary Report” reprinted below was selected for its combination of comprehensiveness and relative brevity.
Meetings between President John F. Kennedy and Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson at Hyannis Port, Mass., May 10-11, 1963 SECRET, May 15, 1963 SUMMARY REPORT As has been reported in the press and in the official communiqué, a copy of which is attached, the talks between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Pearson at Hyannis Port ranged over a wide field and covered a number of important questions of interest to both countries. The attached press release, dated May 7, 1963, indicates the general programme which had been agreed upon and the names of the officials on both sides who participated. AGENDA At the beginning it was agreed that insofar as an agenda would be followed the following subjects would be discussed on Friday afternoon, May 10:
Prospects for Disarmament and the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons Tests U.S.-Canadian Defence Matters Defence Production Sharing Proposals for Development and Further Utilization of Channels of Communication and Consultation between the United States and Canadian Governments Forthcoming Trade Negotiations in Geneva Inter-allied Nuclear force and Multilateral Force
Great Lakes Shipping Dispute was agreed that the informal agenda for Saturday morning, ay 11, should include the following topics:
East-West Relations Latin America Columbia River Oil Lumber Fishing (including Law of the Sea) Campobello Island Laos
Communiqué her topics were brought into the discussion from time to time th in the working sessions and at meal times.
(a) Nuclear Weapons Policy The Prime Minister said that on his return to Ottawa he would be in a position to send to the United States Government a note which would include a draft bilateral agreement based on the text previously under discussion between the two governments and designed to provide for the acquisition by Canada of nuclear warheads for use by Canadian forces. The Prime Minister specified the Bomarc Voodoo CF-104 and Honest John as intended to be covered by this agreement. He made it clear that owing to the need for full parliamentary discussion it would be some three or four weeks before the bilateral agreement could be concluded. The Prime Minister also said that once the bilateral agreement had been concluded it would be possible to go ahead with discussion of other aspects of the continental defence problem in which Canada had undertaken no commitment. [Three sentences omitted.] The Prime Minister made a later reference to the difficulties posed for the Canadian Government by USA interest in the dispersal of interceptor squadrons to Canada.
The President gave at the first working session and on a separate informal occasion an assurance that there would be joint consultation with Canada if the United States should at a later stage decide on a more modern weapons system to replace the Bomarc. It could be taken from his remarks that the same undertaking would apply in the case of other weapons systems in use by Canada. No indication was given by the President of whether and if so how soon the administration might be planning to phase out the Bomaro.
(b) Defence Production Sharing It was agreed that there should be consultations at the Ministerial level which might begin when Secretary [of Defense Robert] McNamara went to Ottawa for the Nato meeting. A subsequent visit by the Minister of Defence Production [Charles “Bud” Drüry] to Washington was also envisaged but no time for such a visit was mentioned. The President said that so far as Canada was concerned the Administration did not intend to make any changes in existing defence production policies with regard either to the waiving of the buy-America provisions of the F-104G programme. Some changes might subsequently be necessary, however, and in particular the Administration was reviewing the need for continuing with the Caribou programme for 1964-68 which “may not be renewed.” The President also said that no decisions on the “Caribou and these other matters” would be taken until the whole question had been brought once again to his attention and to that of the Prime Minister.
(c) Inter-Allied Force and Multilateral Force The Prime Minister said that on the assumption that agreement would be reached on the question of acquiring nuclear weapons for the use of Canadian forces the Canadian Government would be willing to participate in the IANF. He hoped that the discussion of IANF in NATO would not be pushed to an open break with France. It was stated by William Tyler, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs in the State Department that recent discussions with the French indicated that a formula would be found which the French could live with.
On the MLF the President said that he now felt very strongly in its favour although earlier he had been rather lukewarm. The Prime Minister said that the MLF was of less concern to Canada than to the European members and bearing in mind the extent of other Canadian defence undertakings especially in North America it would probably not be possible for Canada to participate. The President did not demur but asked for Canadian sympathy and understanding of the effort. The Prime Minister said that the Canadian Government would “make all the right noises” and “try to help you.” The President said he would be sending a brief on the MLF to the Prime Minister.
(d) Machinery for Communication and Consultation The Prime Minister referred to the various special arrangements for communication and consultation which had been established over the years including the Permanent]Joint Bloard on] DIefence] and joint Cabinet committees on economic matters and defence. He hoped that on the defence side the PJBD would concern itself with this at its meeting in June. He also hoped that the Cabinet level committees on economic matters and on defence could meet in the fall of 1962.
He also thought that individual Ministers (he mentioned particularly [Secretary of State for External Affairs] Mr. [Paul] Martin and [Minister of National Defence] Mr. [Paul] Hellyer) should visit their opposite numbers in Washington DC; such visits would of course be in addition to the meetings between Mr. McNamara and Mr. Drury mentioned above. The Prime Minister also referred to the importance of consultations through the PJBD and through the joint parliamentary committees. The President gave every impression of being personally favourable to the development of inter-governmental exchanges at all levels.
(e) Latin America This matter was raised by the Prime Minister who said that in the election campaign the Canadian Government had undertaken to give “sympathetic consideration” to joining the Organization of American States. The Prime Minister made it clear that no decision had been reached but that it was under careful consideration. Without concealing the Administration’s hope that Canada would find it possible to join the OAS the President did not press the Prime Minister for a commitment. The President’s final words were “on the OAS we will wait and see.”
The Prime Minister informed the President that the Canadian Government would maintain its diplomatic representation in Cuba but would do nothing to indicate support or sympathy for the [President Fidell Castro regime. The President expressed warm appreciation for Canadian assistance in the field of intelligence and of restrictions on Communist bloc air traffic to Cuba. (f) Columbia River Treaty It was agreed that the USA and Canadian Governments would undertake immediately consultations on the basis of the memorandum left by the Prime Minister with the President and that assuming agreement could be reached on the “clarification and adjustments” the Canadian Government would then approach the British Columbia Government. While the Prime Minister could not be sure that a satisfactory agreement could be reached with British Columbia he thought Premier [W.A.C.] Bennett might be a little easier to deal with than previously. If all went satisfactorily the Government would go ahead with a view to ratification of the Treaty plus any agreed protocol in Parliament.
The next move is presumably up to U.S. authorities who will wish to consider the Canadian memorandum and who will no doubt be anxious to respond with as little delay as possible.
(g) Territorial Waters and Fishing Zone The Prime Minister informed the President of the Canadian Government’s intention to have a 12-mile zone – three miles territorial and a further nine miles for fisheries. The Government recognized that there were certain U.S. treaty and historic rights which could not be altered without prior agreement. The President asked for discussions between U.S. and Canadian representatives and indicated that he would be taking a personal interest in this subject. In the light of the talks he might write the Prime Minister later. It was left that the talks should take place in Washington DC during the current week.
This was the only subject on which there was a clear disagreement and the President said he thought it would be preferable to clarify the respective positions in the communique rather than pretend that agreement had been reached. Sentences 3, 4 and 5 of paragraph 13 in the communique were dictated during the meeting by the President in consultation with the Prime Minister. (h) SIu Labour Dispute The President said he had been in touch with Mr. [George] Meany [President of the American Federation of Labour and the Congress of Industrial Organizations]. He thought it would be useful to get Mr. Meany and Mr. [Claude] Jodoin [President of the Canadian Labour Congress] together. The Prime Minister said that Mr. [Alan] MacEachen [Minister of Labour] had been trying to arrange a meeting with United States Secretary of Labour [Willard] Wirtz and Mr. Meany. It was agreed that a meeting of the four should be arranged as soon as possible.
(i) Trade (i) General The President said that trade had been covered about as fully as was at present possible during Governor [Christian] Herter’s [former Governor of Massachusetts and Secretary of State; President’s Special Representative for Trade Negotiations] visit to Ottawa. The Prime Minister said the Canadian Government hoped for the success of the forthcoming talks in Geneva and he had told Prime Minister [Harold] Macmillan [of the United Kingdom] that the Canadian Government accepted the principle of the linear cut. Nevertheless full application of the linear cut would cause difficulties for some sectors of Canadian industry. In the coming trade negotiations it would be Canada’s task to convince the United States that concessions to be offered by Canada would be adequate compensation for any exceptions secured by Canada. It would not be Canada’s fault if the Geneva talks were (ii) Investment The Prime Minister informed the President that the Canadian Government intended to establish a Canadian development corporation, one purpose of which would be to help Canadians buy into industrial companies in such a way as not to invite legitimate criticism from the United States. The President listened attentively but did not comment. (ill) Lumber The President confirmed that the Administration would be opposing the lumber marketing bill and inquired whether a proposal by Senator [Wayne] Morse [Democrat, Oregon] for an inter-governmental study group on bilateral trade problems might have useful application in the lumber context. The Prime Minister did not take a position on this latter idea but emphasized the Government’s hope that no step would be taken in the United States which would affect Canadian lumber exports.
(iv) Oil It was agreed that high level talks should take place on oil matters and the President indicated that he would follow this matter personally through Mr. [Myer] Feldman of the White House staff [Deputy Special Counsel to the President]. There was no specific reference to the projected visit to Washington of the Minister of Trade and Commerce [Mitchell Sharp] on oil matters but such a visit would be entirely consistent with the outcome of the Prime Minister’s conversation with the President. (V) Cheese The Prime Minister referred to the U.S. quota on aged cheddar cheese and asked the President to give consideration to raising the quota to enable Canadian cheese exporters to compete on fairer terms with their counterparts in other cheese exporting countries. The President read from a memorandum which stated that any increase in the U.S. quota for Canadian aged cheddar would lead to an increase in purchases of U.S. cheddar by the commodity credit corporation.
(vi) Uranium The Prime Minister spoke of the serious difficulties experienced by the uranium industry in various parts of Canada, including Elliott Lake. He pointed out that the discovery of uranium deposits in some parts of the United States had substantially limited Canadian exports. The President said that the U.S.A. uranium industry was feeling similar difficulties: he mentioned particularly the three hundred million dollar contract with South Africa. He said that the Administration was investigating the possibility of cancelling that contract by means of compensation in other commodities, including food.
The Prime Minister agreed with [US] Ambassador [to Canada w. Walton] Butterworth that uranium was particularly hard hit in the present period of transition and that demand for uranium could be expected to rise with the development and ultimate production of nuclear energy for power purposes.
The President raised economic assistance in the context of the India consortium and went on from there to express the hope that the Canadian Government would be able to increase its aid expenditures generally. The Prime Minister reviewed considerations which would make any major increase impossible at this time but said that the Government hoped shortly to restore last year’s cut in aid appropriations. Until the domestic economic position in Canada had improved however it would not be possible for Canada to do substantially more. The Prime Minister said he was personally interested in the idea of further efforts in the field of economic and technical aid to the Caribbean area.
(k) Civil Aviation It was agreed that early talks were desirable. The President thought that these should be in the first place conducted by technical experts but that before such talks were completed or broken off the matter should be brought again to himself and the Prime Minister.
(1) Campobello Island On the Prime Minister’s suggestion the President agreed that the United States and Canadian Governments should accept an offer from the owner of President Roosevelt’s former summer home and property on Campobello Island in New Brunswick. During the meeting the President and the Prime Minister communicated with Congressman James Roosevelt, Senator [Edmund] Muskie ([Democrat,] Maine), Mr. [Armand] Hammer, owner of the property [with his brothers, Harry and Victor], and Premier [Louis] Robichaud [of New Brunswick]. Agreement of all concerned was secured in time to permit an announcement separate from the communique to be made on May Il. (m) Middle East The Prime Minister said that he was concerned about the possibility of an Israeli move into the west bank of the Jordan if there were a pro-[Gamal Abdell Nasser [President of Egypt] revolt in Jordan resulting in King Hussein’s overthrow. The Prime Minister said he was most anxious to prevent a repetition of the events of 1956. He wondered whether there was any way in which the existing U.N. supervisory machinery could be extended to forestall an Israeli attack. If the U.S. and the U.K. thought well of the idea Canada could perhaps take an initiative which might perhaps be more effective if it did not come from a major power. The President said that the situation in the Middle East was the “major foreign policy problem” of the moment. The difficulty was that it was impossible to control developments in Jordan. Moreover he thought it might be that Israel was looking for an excuse to attack Jordan.
The President said that the trouble was that public opinion in the west was such that there would be a lot of sympathy for Israel if it decided in an emergency to move into Jordan and the situation had been made worse by the inclusion in the communique announcing the new U[nited] A[rab]. Republic]. federation of a reference to the liberation of Palestine. In these circumstances the U.S. would be in a most difficult position since for reasons of public opinion it could not make a move against Israel or openly assist Nasser. Nasser might thus well turn to the U[nion oflsloviet]S[ocialist]R[epublics] for arms.
In conclusion the President said that somehow Nasser had got to be made to feel that the maintenance in power of King Hussein was in Nasser’s interest. The second essential was somehow to make sure that Israel would not be making an atomic bomb.
(1) Laos The President said that the Soviet attitude on Laos was very unsatisfactory particularly with regard to the activities of the I[nternational].C[ommission for].S[upervision and] C[ontrol in Laos]. He said that at an earlier stage the Administration had thought the instructions to the Canadian representative on the Commission were being interpreted in a legalistic way; more recently, however, their concern on this score had been dissipated.
The Prime Minister said he was aware of earlier U.S. misgivings about the Canadian position in Laos. He referred to the message from the Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary [of State Dean] Rusk and drew attention to Mr. Martin’s personal experience of and interest in the Laotian problem. In reply to the President’s question the Prime Minister said that Prime Minister Macmillan had expressed general concern about the situation in Laos.
(o) Nuclear Test Ban The Prime Minister said that without knowing the scientific facts and seeing them in relation to security needs, it was difficult to make policy judgments. He had the impression, however, that Prime Minister Macmillan was more optimistic than the U.S. Administration about the degree to which scientific advances had reduced the importance of international on-site inspection. The President acknowledged that the situation today represented a substantial change from that of two or three years ago insofar as detection was concerned. British Government scientists in their last visit to Washington had, however, agreed that some on site inspection was still necessary.
While agreeing with the Prime Minister that the positive elements in [USSR] Premier [Nikita S.] Khrushchev’s latest note ought not be to rejected, the President expressed doubt as to the prospects of there being any significant give in the Soviet position. The negative attitude reflected in the Soviet reply to recent U.K. U.S.A approach suggested that the Russians might be about to resume atmospheric tests. The Prime Minister emphasized that either success or failure in the nuclear test ban negotiations would have results far beyond the immediate issue. It was hard to convince public opinion that there was much reality in the difference between three on-site inspections and seven.
The Prime Minister again expressed the hope that the opportunity for talks on a nuclear test ban in Moscow would not be foregone. He thought it was essential to keep plugging away. The President reiterated the U.S. government’s interest in an agreement and pointed out that the Administration was much readier to move forward than were Congress and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Prime Minister said that Canada would warmly support and back up the continuing efforts of the Administration in its efforts to secure an agreement although it did not expect the U.S.A. to accept any arrangement which would prejudice its security.
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2007) — Spring/Summer 2007 // Printemps/Été 2007, pp. 5–8. Read the rest of this issue →
