bout de papier, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2012) — Winter 2012 // Hiver 2012, pp. 17–21
Editor’s Note: As an independent voice of the Foreign Service, bout has a special responsibility to cover issues that concern the Foreign Service professionally, including those raised in Daryl Copeland’s thought provoking “30 years”. Daryl invites a response in his piece. Although time constraints were a factor, bout consulted among serving officers to provide one.
A burning platform
London cabbies are a great source of received wisdom. Over the past several years I have had occasion to focus test dozens of drivers drawn from this select group. I queried them about the reputation of diplomacy in general, and their impressions of diplomats in particular.
Their verdict?
Reduced to its most essential iteration:
Dithering dandies, hopelessly lost in a haze of irrelevance somewhere between protocol and alcohol…
For diplomatic practitioners, exposure to the mainstream view of cartoon caricatures in pin stripes or pearls riding high at public expense serves as a sobering reminder that any vestigial prestige and mystique once associated with the profession has worn off long since. More worrisome still, since at least Chamberlain’s ill-starred visit to Munich in 1938, diplomacy has come to be associated with weakness and appeasement, with caving in to power.
In other words, diplomacy’s debilitating image problems are matched by serious misunderstandings concerning the substance of the work. That said, however misleading the archetypes, popular perceptions of diplomacy are not entirely unfounded. Neither the profession nor its institutions have adjusted well to the exigencies of the globalization age.
It doesn’t help that so few foreign service officers have a clear sense of just how their work fits into the bigger picture. Simply put, diplomacy is a non-violent approach to the management of international relations which relies upon dialogue, negotiation and compromise. Doing it well requires empathy and understanding, a keen intellect, a capacity for political communication, and a very particular set of personal aptitudes. Book learning may be necessary, but it is by no means sufficient. Adaptability, self-awareness and life skills, more easily acquired through world travel than over the course of years of formal education, are crucial.
It took me a few postings — and decades — to develop a real appreciation for diplomacy. No one at DFAIT ever talked about it much. It is not on the curriculum at the Canadian Foreign Service Institute. It is largely ignored by Canadian universities and in the press. Yet the idea of diplomacy should be at the core of most everything that a foreign ministry does.
At DFAIT these days, it seems nothing could be further from the truth. Policy initiatives? Strategic advice? Intelligence generation? Innovative thinking?
No, as we all know a sidelined and marginalized DFAIT spends most of its time talking to itself rather than reaching out at home or abroad. The transactional has triumphed — at great expense. tries, our political leaders have developed an unfortunate habit of reaching for the gun as the international policy instrument of choice. Defence departments receive the lion’s share of international policy funding, while foreign ministries and development agencies struggle. This makes no sense in light of global circumstances and gives rise to serious distortions and misallocations. Western governments failed to learn the main lesson of the Cold War, namely that militaries work best when they are not used. Take the sword out of the scabbard, and it usually makes a dreadful mess.
Defence is primarily about power. Diplomacy is about influence. The most profound threats and challenges engendered by globalization — and in my view religious extremism and political extremism do not make the A-list — are not amenable to coercive military solutions. Generals and admirals, bombs and guns have their place, but at this point in the 21st century, it should not be centre stage. The best army cannot stop pandemic disease. Air strikes are useless against climate change. Alternatives to the carbon economy cannot be occupied by expeditionary forces.
The unresolved, transnational issues that today imperil the planet are neither territorial nor ideological. Diminishing biodiversity, resource scarcity and a collapsing physical environment afflict us all. In contrast, the probability that anyone reading this article will be caught up in a terrorist incident is slightly lower than that of drowning in the bathtub.
Bottom line? Security is not a martial art. Under prevailing circumstances, the military is both too sharp, and too dull an international policy instrument. Diplomacy, linked integrally to development, is our best hope.
Greasing the skids…
DFAIT’s network of missions abroad should provide the basis its comparative advantage vis-a-vis other government departments. Instead, by running down the geographic divisions at headquarters and adopting the “international platform” model abroad, local knowledge and regional expertise have been devalued. The vital connection to place is wilting on the vine, while turf wars are being lost to line departments with functional responsibilities. One colleague commented to me recently that the current approach looks like a plan for turning DFAIT’s facilities into a global door mat, and its personnel into a corps of overseas concierges, a slightly refined equivalent of the greeters at Walmart.
In a process which began under the rubric of Transformation, Canadian diplomatic missions are being remade into whole-of-government points of service overseas, with career diplomats often outnumbered by the employees of other government departments. That might be fine — except that too often those despatched are being exiled for reasons having little to do with their personal suitability for representational work abroad.
Prior to the current round of reductions, more people were finally being moved into the field — that was clearly needed. Yet this modest shift was accompanied by a new corporate design intended to migrate certain headquarters functions out to missions, a development which will almost certainly have the unintended but pernicious effect of forcing diplomats to behave even more like international policy bureaucrats. If limited numbers of DFAIT staff are called upon to write background and scenario notes, organize meetings and provide services not only to travelling Canadians, but also internally, there will be precious little time for actually doing diplomacy. Instead, those posted abroad will be consigned to their offices — exactly where they shouldn’t be — pushing paper and talking to others of their ilk about what might be going on outside.
That is a poor substitute for first hand experience, and a formula for turning allegations about the irrelevance of the foreign service into a self-fulfilling prophecy.
An unloved outlier within the firmament of government, and reduced to the role of landlord and common service provider to other government departments overseas, DFAIT is being degraded from within. Ambitious careerism, bureaucratic process and busy-work thrive, and have overtaken analysis and international policy leadership; the administrative tail is wagging the policy dog.
What, then, is left?
Substantial policy work has given way to the transactional. This has been expressed through the imposition of reorganizations; regulations; audits; performance and publications reviews; access to information and privacy requests, and so forth. Swathes of time are devoted to tasks such as the preparation of media lines and routine communications, briefing materials and parliamentary Q&As, not to mention the planning, coordination and implementation of incoming and outgoing visits. The provision of travel advice and consular assistance has become a boom industry in the wake ever more Canadian nationals travelling and living abroad, as has crisis management (SARS, BSE, HIN1, evacuations, natural disasters) in our increasingly inter-connected world. The need to maintain the physical and information technology infrastructure, with special attention to communications security, and to support the employees of other government departments has become a significant resource sink. And while there remains a skeleton crew devoted to policy work and the minimal maintenance of bilateral, multilateral and international legal obligations, today the centre of gravity has clearly shifted.
Whatever their merits, the preponderance of these sorts of activities is eclipsing the high end of DFAIT’s diplomatic potential. It is not so much that the mainstay of the business — relationship management with states, international organizations and global civil society — has disappeared entirely, but rather that it is being lost in the contemporary mix. The most recent “reform” project, Strategic Review II, whatever the packaging, proved to be little more than code for further cuts. Resource reduction masquerading as reform is disingenuous, if not dishonest, and in my experience almost never generates positive change. In pursuing such “reforms”, DFAIT has greased the skids for its long slide down.
…and a case unmade
Part of the responsibility must be borne by those who have held senior management positions. This group was apparently unaware of the need not only to stand up for their country abroad, but — when required — to stand up to their country at home. DFAIT executives, for the good of all, must make their case to decision-makers. The wholesale retreat from public diplomacy (PD) is perhaps the most egregious example of the damage Canada is doing to itself internationally.
DFAIT was once a pioneer and a leader in the PD field. Now, through the imposition of the “Message Event Proposal” pre-clearance requirement in advance of all public communications, DFAIT staff have been effectively gagged. This almost Orwellian requirement is especially debilitating as regards the use of social media platforms to connect directly with populations. Among the world’s leading foreign ministries, digital, or e-diplomacy is front and centre. Not so in the Pearson Building. Whereas a decade ago DFAIT was way out in front — remember the on-line Foreign Policy Dialogue? — today it trails the pack internationally.
Clearly, something has been missed. Diplomacy can produce results by fostering genuine dialogue. When fed back into policy formulation and decision-making loops, the fruits of meaningful exchange can affect thinking and behaviour at both ends of the conversation. So it is that differences are narrowed and problems solved. Without the capacity to engage unscripted dialogue, however, diplomacy cannot deliver, and its comparative advantage over competing international policy instruments is lost.
I have seen no indication that this argument was forcefully put at a time when it might have made a difference. So, too, with the failure to articulate and advance a vision for the foreign ministry in the 21st century. Why not leave behind work on files better handled by specialized line departments in order to focus on the large, crosscutting issues such as climate change, distributive justice and management of the global commons? By rising up a couple of levels of analysis to serve as a catalyst, entrepot and network node equipped to manage the complex challenges of globalization, DFAIT could do something that is no one else’s job.
None of this is on the table. With so much of its budget fenced off or attached to specific programs, across the board reductions such as those contained in the March 2012 Federal Budget can only come from the operating funds. In a department already cut to the bone, this means amputating body parts — staff, missions, representational work, and the terms and conditions of service.
Quite apart from the fact that the economies are false, it is not a formula for engineering a supportive work environment, let alone for doing more and better diplomacy. So too with regards to patronage appointments, but political appointees don’t have to be disasters, and their impact need not be corrosive. The best have contacts, experience and a skill set which can add much to achievement of larger national objectives. Two of the best bosses that I have ever worked with — David MacDonald and Stephen Lewis — were appointees, but both were very effective as advocates and able as public servants. They were not timid, had excellent personal networks at home and abroad, and — critically — knew both how the system worked and how to work the system. They were never afraid to pull strings in order to get things done. Like so much else in diplomacy, the sensible and judicious use of such mechanisms is very much a matter of judgment and discretion.
Continuous learning?
At a personal level, what kernels of wisdom might I have acquired during the passage? For starters:
a diplomat’s most valuable assets are relationships based upon confidence, trust and
respect;
* the ability to swim like a fish in the sea of people is a hugely undervalued representational attribute; too many heads of mission flop around like fish out of water when outside their comfort zones;
* it is sometimes better to go down with all flags flying than to compromise a principle or submit to abusive authority. More broadly, I found out — usually the hard way — that about half of the decisions that really count in terms of career aspirations and outcomes can be ascribed to factors perhaps best described as personal and situational — who knows whom and what is going on where. Another thirty per cent or so of what happens tends to turn on matters of chance, luck and timing.
Typically, that means only the remaining twenty per cent of decisions are taken primarily on the basis of objective circumstances or on the strength of a business case. The so-called “performance management” process for executives, from which flow the coveted bonuses, works more like a popularity contest and is highly dependent upon who is present at the time. Meritocracy is not necessarily the defining feature.
A hierarchic structure, top-down social relations and resistance to change remained defining characteristics throughout my tenure. At a time of organizational flattening, there are today as many levels in the corporate structure as there were when I started out in 1981. In this rigid, cloistered environment, process inevitably dwarfs substance. Dissent is discouraged — often with a vengeance — risk is averted, while unquestioning loyalty and faithful service are rewarded.
A focus on looking inward rather than looking out means that ideas often are judged more on their provenance than their quality. Unless very senior officials are involved, failure is not treated as a learning experience. In contrast, blessing the received wisdom and running with the herd, often under the guise of team playing, leads reliably to advancement. I witnessed more than a few successful careers made by kissing up, kicking down, and specializing in making the boss look good. There is way too much fear and loathing, and not enough tolerance or curiosity on Sussex Drive.
By way of illustration, DFAIT’s inadequate preparation for its stewardship of the Afghanistan file offers particularly powerful testament. The Canadian International Council has published a series of articles on the theme of “What went wrong in Afghanistan?”. That organization, and the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute have launched initiatives on “Lessons Learned”. Has DFAIT addressed these issues meaningfully? The full story may never be told — with so many parties implicated there is no appetite for a searching retrospective —- but it is clear that by any reasonable measure, the objectives of the mission were not achieved.
Books will never be written about the enduring legacy of the Kandahar PRT, or the innovative leadership displayed by Canada in pursuing alternatives to defence-dominated counterinsurgency and pacification. In such a militarized environment, insecurity thrived and diplomacy was near impossible. Scarce resources were diverted, self-service rampant and criticism, for instance concerning the handling of Afghan detainees, was blatantly stonewalled. Whistleblower Richard Colvin did not suffer the same fate as Peter Van Buren at the U.S. Department of State, but by any measure this was not DFAIT’s finest hour.
Tough questions go unanswered: did DFAIT officials assess carefully the disastrous implications of long-term involvement in the “graveyard of empires”, and hence to recommend against the plan being pushed by the military; if not, why not? Did they warn of what joining the global war on terror might mean for the security of Canada and Canadians, or of the damage to this country’s once-admired internationalist brand? We certainly live with the results.
Finally, it is often remarked that some large organizations have a tendency to bend, fold and even mutilate those within them. While it is quite possible that there is something inherently twisted about bureaucracies in general, I believe that this observation is particularly apt in reference to foreign ministries. Long service and an insular culture result frequently in employees taking on the values, voice and affectations of the institution. For that reason, over time I no longer recognized the personalities of many of those with whom I started. Former friends and colleagues became strangers. Sure, people change, but regretfully this is something quite different. All of those years of slow cooking in the foreign ministerial cauldron seem to have a particularly profound effect on perceptions and behaviour — corporate cloning perhaps?
Turning the page
Too bleak? I hope so and I would be the first to welcome a comprehensive rejoinder refuting the arguments set out here.
I should add that while critical, I support DFAIT’s efforts to change and evolve. The descent into genteel oblivion can be reversed, but getting there will require both budgetary support and a more strategic, determined and committed effort than has yet been attempted. Diplomatic performance can be dramatically improved, but not without gutsy leadership, radical reform and serious reinvestment. A new narrative is needed, as is an improved prescription for a smarter, faster, more supple approach to the way we work.
Happily, there are many items on the positive side of the ledger. The Professional Association of Foreign Service Officers has made enormous strides, and now clearly serves the interests of its membership rather than those of management. Salaries, benefits, and many of the terms and conditions of foreign service have improved markedly as a result. Fascinating issues and smart people abound. And the opportunities to travel, live, work, and represent Canada abroad are priceless. It was all of this, and more, that kept me coming back for three decades.
In all, quite the journey. There were many highs: Thailand was a dream come true, and I used one of my formative experiences there to construct the prologue for Guerrilla Diplomacy. The posting to Ethiopia in the midst of famine and civil war was like working in a theme park for the four horsemen of the apocalypse. Participation in the (long extinct) exchange program with Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade in New Zealand exposed me to the experience of working for someone else’s government, and began close association which continues to this day in my teaching, public speaking and consulting work. Doing intelligence analysis for Central and Southeast Asia as the Cold War ended provided an intriguing window on a changing world. Winning the Canadian Foreign Service Officer Award for advancing the interests of the profession — rather than just doing my job — has been a source of enduring satisfaction.
Securing approval for my book project — an epic undertaking in itself — and the subsequent teaching gig at the Munk Centre built nicely upon the foundations laid during my secondment as National Programme Director at the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in the late nineties.
Low points usually involved conflicts with bosses and various battles with “the system”. Even at that, the experience of taking on — often in full, frontal assaults — a number of abusive senior managers, none of whom were accustomed to dealing with (very) active resistance, taught me the importance of resilience, resourcefulness and strategic planning.
Loyal opposition is not easy…I sometimes felt like the lone ranger, riding the high sierra. But I was never bored. And I am especially grateful that those thirty years equipped me with the professional contacts, knowledge and experience required to re-invent myself for an excellent life after DFAIT.
As we move inexorably into the messy, dynamic, asymmetrical world order which is heteropolarity, governments will need diplomacy — and diplomats —- more than ever. There simply are no military solutions to the vexing range of transnational issues which constitute the globalization threat set. To address these sorts of challenges, complex balancing, knowledge-based problem solving, and genuine dialogue remain the best tools in the shed. Tempus fugit: I hope a new generation of Canadian diplomats outperforms my own — we need it.
Daryl Copeland, a former Canadian diplomat, is an educator, analyst, consultant, and the author of Guerrilla Diplomacy: Rethinking International Relations. He is a Senior Fellow at the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, and holds teaching appointments at Ottawa, East Anglia (London Academy of Diplomacy) and Otago (NZ) Universities. For more information and commentary, visit www. ouerrilladiplomacy.com.
Other voices, other perspectives
Canada’s Foreign Service has always had a strong culture of conformity, never more so than today. ; The response to Daryl’s piece had to be gathered on a non-attribution basis to help ensure a more meaningful dialogue.
The simplistic view of London cabbies and others on the diplomacy and its practitioners says more about cabbies than about the profession — we are more likely to change perceptions by playing our professional role adroitly than by diverting our limited resources to those who cherish their stereotypes.
Do younger FS lack a real appreciation of diplomacy? There has been positive change: the Department is developing an impressive cadre of young officers imbued with specialized language skills, and training is more demanding — some recent recruits complain of too many courses at CFSI. The real challenge may come later: can we keep them?
Do we expect too much from senior management? The retreat from Public Diplomacy may be a painful issue for many, but communications today are controlled by PMO, from the Minister down, and the government is not interested in giving Ambassadors or missions leeway in communications including the social media; unless that changes, it is not a battle that DFAIT (or any other part of the bureaucracy) would win.
Daryl’s view that “a sidelined and marginalized DFAIT spends most of its time talking to itself rather than reaching out at home or abroad” is widely shared and the triumph of the “transactional”, as he put it, is certainly a key problem in today’s foreign service.
So too is the contention that DFAIT is being degraded from within, and that “bureaucratic process” has overtaken analysis and international policy leadership, ditto “resource reduction masquerading as reform”.
The complaint that “swathes” of time are spent on media lines, briefing materials and so on is understandable (and never more frustrating than when major visits are cancelled at the last minute or painstakingly crafted Cabinet documents are never used), but these are core responsibilities — the problem is not necessarily the time devoted to them, but the lack of coordination with the centre that might avoid wasted effort.
Similarly, is it realistic to think DFAIT could play a lead role on issues like climate change that the government clearly has decided to control tightly from the centre, or to nurture a culture of risk management when it seems equally clear that the government doesn’t want it?
The question the article raises by implication is whether this reduced and constrained Foreign Ministry isn’t, in fact, what the government wants? If that is not what many FS signed up for, the time may have come for them to consider their options. By the same token, if the government decides that it needs broad international support to achieve key goals, it may discover that while it cut diplomatic resources and potential, others in the BRIC and ambitious states like Turkey (whose Foreign Minister just visited Canada at the time of writing) acted otherwise and will have displaced Canada as a preferred partner at diplomacy’s high table.
Given that OGD representation at missions is part of the new normal, DFAIT’s challenge is to maximize its potential – if lateral transfers from OGDs were required to study with CFSI prior to a posting they might prove a more valued asset for all concerned, coordinating training with departments like DND might offer other benefits.
The aptitudes that Daryl believes need to be more thoroughly instilled in new FS (adaptability, self-awareness, life skills) need to be complemented by the most important ot all (for ail of us): judgment — but the more limited the FS experience becomes, the more difficult it will be to in still.
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2012) — Winter 2012 // Hiver 2012, pp. 17–21. Read the rest of this issue →
