bout de papier, Vol. 8, No. 4 (1991) — Fall 1991 // Automne 1991, pp. 47–48
Sovereignty or Security: Government
Policy in the Canadian North, 1936-1950
by Shelagh D. Grant, Vancouver: University
of British Columbia Press, 1988, 385 pp.,
$29.95.
This book has been eagerly awaited since 1982 when Ms. Grant first presented her views in a paper entitled The Northern Nationalists: Crusaders and Supporters of a ’New North’: 1940-1950. Without trying to be condescending, this is a competent book and one that will be of particular interest to those concerned with joint Canadian- American defence planning and the question of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. From the perspective of the more general reader, this detailed study of the struggle to assert Canadian sovereignty in the North against almost overwhelming continental and international pressures provides insight into the fragile nature of Canada’s being.
Practitioners of foreign affairs will find some aspects of this book particularly fascinating. Indeed, they will marvel at the sections dealing with the role played by Malcolm Macdonald, the British High Commissioner during World War II, in alerting the Canadian Government to the challenge that American military involvement in the North represented. Rarely do diplomats insert themselves so daringly into the affairs of their host country. Clandestine meetings with the Prime Minister, secret briefs to the Canadian Cabinet, and the like, all of which are amply documented by British and Canadian sources employed in this study, are nothing short of remarkable. Diplomats, then and now, can only dream of such an influential role.
Unfortunately, the book is not without flaws. Perhaps its major drawback is its lack of methodology. This is old school history in that it plods chronologically through the official, albeit extensive, government documentation. This volume should have been soundly grounded in political economy and, amazingly, contains much of the evidence upon which such an analytical framework could have been supported; British and American designs on Canadian uranium, petroleum, air routes, and the like. This valuable information, however, is not properly tied together with, in some instances, disastrous results. For example, David Bercuson in his review of the book has accused Ms. Grant of “a conspiratorial view of history”. He bases this opinion on Ms. Grant’s use of internal U.S. Air Force documents which advocate American seizure of certain uninhabited northern islands. Correctly, Bercuson points out that these are “think pieces” “ not the stuff of policy, and therefore, not the kind of evidence to support Grant’s view of American designs in the Canadian North. Sadly, what we have here is not necessarily an incorrect view, but a poor selection of evidence to support this view. A better use of Grant’s ample evidence of the economic motives for American activities in the Canadian North could have made her point with greater impact and would have protected her from the academic nitpicking of “eminent” Canadian historians. After all, as the British colonial period for Canada so aptly demonstrates, “informal” Empire is often the most profitable.
Another area in which this book is somewhat flawed, and one that will be recognizable to any bureaucrat, is its lack of understanding of the mechanics of government. For example, Grant is astonished when after the 1945 election a change in Minister did not result in a change in rhetoric. The new Minister’s speeches were “almost identical to those of his Deputy Minister’! For those of us whose trade is to write briefing and speaking notes for politicians and senior bureaucrats this does not come as any great shock. Bureaucratic inertia, as John Diefenbaker well knew, was and is a major problem and is one which any historian must understand.
The problem of Ms. Grant’s lack of understanding of the mechanics of government is compounded by her tendency to adopt the “Great Man”, ’, or in this case “Great Men” theory. By basing her book on her “Northern Nationalists” ’, we get what British Empire historians would have termed the “official mind” of Canadian interests in the North. Unfortunately, British history would indicate that the gap between what the “official mind” thought and the practical realities of a situation was often significant. Or to put it more simply, “Great Men” appear only when circumstances allow them to appear. Grant’s “Northern Nationalists” were unquestionably a dedicated lot, but in the last analysis they were a small group of intellectuals operating in a context that allowed them only minimal latitude. Again, we have a solid reason for wanting to place this study within the context of political economy.
The British Empire theme is also one that is neglected in this study. Indeed, Canadian historians generally fail to place their work into the broader context of British colonialism which continued to influence Canadian policy-making long after Canada had achieved nationhood. Yet that context was clearly there and existed in the minds of Canadian bureaucrats either consciously or subconsciously. Often Oxbridge trained these mandarins who then operated a colonial system of British making. The mentality of the Canadian versus the British variant is often indistinguishable. Ms. Grant notes, for example, that in the 1930s the by-word of northern administration was “without expense to the department”. At precisely the same time the British Empire was being governed with “due regard for economy”. Moreover, the recurrent theme of “northern exploitation for southern benefit” with which the “Northern Nationalists” took issue was little more than a variant on the British model of imperialism. In the Canadian context it is based upon the phrase “for the purposes of the Dominion” and we all know where the centre of gravity of the Dominion is located.
In the last analysis, this work reminds me of one of those many graduate school pieces that are rushed to print under the publish or perish dictum. Often these competent pieces need a few years to simmer — years in which their authors can acquire the additional insight, not to mention distance from graduate school, that allows their work to be spun into historical gold. A
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 8, No. 4 (1991) — Fall 1991 // Automne 1991, pp. 47–48. Read the rest of this issue →
