bout de papier, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1991) — Spring 1991 // Printemps 1991, pp. 8–10
As part of the Corporate Review process, a consultant was hired by the Department to study its organizational structure and management process. These he described as one of the worst in either the public or private sectors. The consultant focussed, inter alia, on appraisals and promotions, and described the Department’s human resources system as the most cumbersome and bureaucratic that he had ever seen. In particular, he noted that to predicate promotions upon performance appraisals which are essentially dishonest leads, inevitably, to serious managerial deficiencies.
These observations come very close to the heart of the argument that the promotion and appraisal process as practiced by this Department defy the principle of advancement by merit. The case against the status quo is compelling, and rife with implications for initiatives such as Public Service 2000. At a minimum, the issue is worthy of sustained reflection as we view the results of another promotional cycle.
Although this contravention of the merit principle is well-established, it warrants much closer examination than it was accorded in the Review. That senior management chose not to modify significantly the Department’s organizational structure, operating procedures or decision-making process despite overwhelming evidence that fundamental reforms are required is perhaps less than completely surprising. Few appear to have been shocked to discover that beneath the fancy wrapping, with the possible exception of a few innovative consular and immigration proposals, the package is essentially empty. All that remains — of any lasting significance — are the cuts, the preponderance of which involve support and working-level professional positions which appear to have been sacrificed to preserve the rich endowment of executive positions at headquarters. At the end of the day, however, it is the failure of the Department to rethink fundamentally the existing promotion and appraisal practices which may prove to be its Achilles heel.
For purposes of personnel administration, the Foreign Service Group, since consolidation in 1982, has been divided into four “streams”: Political/Economic, Commercial/ Economic, Social Affairs and Development Assistance. While these streams encompass a variety of activities, the Foreign Service Group remains, in law, a single occupational group. Herein lies the Department’s critical weakness.
The administrative convenience of limiting the area of competition by promoting on a stream basis virtually ensures uneven, inconsistent results across what is otherwise treated as an integrated area of selection. By its own admission, the Department does not cross-check among streams to ensure that uniform standards have been applied or that the most deserving candidates in the whole group have prevailed. There is no quality control between streams, since the weighted scores separating those promoted from those not promoted are wildly divergent from one stream to the next.
By the Department’s own measure, there is little question that relatively less qualified individuals from one stream are rewarded while more deserving persons in other streams are left to languish. Decisions concerning eligibility for promotion often turn on factors having nothing at all to do with merit. They are, instead, a reflection of specific conditions such as the number of vacancies which obtain within particular streams.
If the Foreign Service were composed of a range of different occupational categories, these aspects would not be so relevant. This is, however, a single consolidated professional group and despite differing work content, all Foreign Service Officers are judged according to the same selection standards and appraisal criteria. Although the Department operates a unified personnel management system, the notion of an integrated occupational group is nowhere in evidence when it comes to promotion. There are, moreover, no Exclusion Orders (or any other legal basis) which would allow promotion-by-stream by providing exemptions from the relevant provisions of the Public Service Employment Act.
In short, whatever its other virtues, the practice of promotion by stream results inevitably in the compromise of the merit principle. Accordingly, the practice must be considered ultra vires of the Act. The severity of this violation is, in itself, cause for considerable concern. That said, the situation existing within streams represents in many ways a more profound breach of established public service norms.
The Department’s system (like that of National Defence) of “appointment to level” is unique within the government and has attracted the interest of the PS 2000. If properly administered, this approach to managing a rotational cadre of employees might seem sensible. Regrettably, the system has degenerated into something of an annual ritual of annointment. There are no competitions. Those “eligible” (a group not to be confused with those technically “qualified” for consideration) are not accorded the opportunity to appear before a promotion board. Instead, the board meets; reviews the appraisals; discusses the list; and then decides who to advance according to highly inconsistent interpretations of merit which vary from one board to another. Candidates are not provided with access to the record of these deliberations. Reputation and personal knowledge play a role, as does other related information, which does not appear elsewhere but which is provided by the Personnel Branch. Mediated by these factors, decisions are otherwise largely based upon the reader’s estimation of the quality of an employee’s “paper trail” — accumulated performance appraisals.
To prosper even moderately, a supervisor must both personally like the individual under review, and be capable of writing an effective appraisal. Without both of these considerations being strongly in a candidate’s favour, there can be little hope of promotion. Where does merit fit into this? Perhaps as one of many variables, but often not at all.
Reliance upon interpersonal relations and other highly subjective instruments to arrive at important promotion decisions introduce an impressive variety of distortions. Moreover, these deficiencies have generated huge reservoirs of counterproductive frustration, anxiety and despair as the time between promotions creeps upwards and now averages over 10 years. If appointment-to-level is going to work effectively, the entire process must be as transparent, objective and fair as possible. In the Department of External Affairs, none of these terms apply.
The tradition of cloistered, back-room dealings is an embarrassing carry-over from days long past when the Foreign Service was much smaller and everything was done “entre nous”. These attitudes, and the activities which give them voice, are unacceptable in the late twentieth century. Supervisors are vested with a wholly inordinate influence over the professional prospects of those whose performance they evaluate. The system invites abuse, discourages initiative, and fosters submission. Small wonder that morale has plummeted and the Department is in a near-chronic state of crisis.
Appraising the abilities of Foreign Service Officers through extended, formulaeic and repetitive narratives is personally corrosive and serves mainly to provide promotion boards with exceptional discretionary powers. Appraisal language is grossly inflated, while constructive criticism is usually entirely absent. Mere mortals find themselves described in such blushing prose that it strains credibility. Most candidates sound so uniformly and stunningly competent that the use of criteria other than merit becomes not optional, but inevitable.
Even the slightest imperfection on this shimmering surface can set a career back dreadfully. The long “shadow effect” ensures that the fallout from a single uncomplimentary, or even neutral, appraisal will linger for years as the offending document is reviewed annually by different boards. There are no effective safeguards to protect the employee’s interest (written rebuttals are often ignored, and sometimes penalized), and candidates are otherwise denied the right to be heard. None of this is at all satisfactory.
As the body responsible for the care and nurturing of the merit principle, time is long overdue for the Public Service Commission to become actively involved. For starters, a panel of experts from outside the Department should examine a representative sampling of completed Foreign Service Officer evaluations and should present independent conclusions as to their integrity and utility. For example, improved and more objective evaluations could be achieved by having the drafts reviewed by open and accountable promotion boards restructured to include representatives from PAFSO, the Public Service Commission, and the private sector. These changes, combined with interviews of the top candidates, would assist in providing minimum standards of transparency, comparability and effectiveness.
Although good officers continue to advance through the ranks, this is more despite the system than because of it. The necessary connection between promotions and merit has been effectively severed. In addition, the top down, authoritarian approach to promotions has given rise to a host of unpleasant tendencies in the Department’s organizational culture. For example, employees must devote an inordinate amount of time to servicing and managing supervisory relationships. Right up the hierarchy, obsequious behaviour and excessive deference to authority are encouraged. Such attributes are hardly the stuff from which public sector excellence is fashioned.
Finally, there are a host of serious problems inherent in the nature of the appeal process itself. These bias the process entirely in favor of those promoted, and therefore contribute materially to decisions to drop appeals before they are ever heard.
In fact, the system is so hopelessly prejudiced against the appellant that the right of appeal is, to all intents and purposes, impossible to exercise. The simple act of declaring one’s intent to appeal carries significant career and financial implications both for the appellant and for those whose appointments are at risk, and gives rise to huge amounts of acrimony, opprobrium, and resentment. In the unlikely event the appeal is upheld, the results tend to achieve more harm than good by striking down, or at the very least, significantly delaying the promotions of not one individual but an entire group of colleagues. Even at that, there is no guarantee that the appellant will be promoted if and when the board is reconvened.
In the Department of External Affairs, appeals are a punishing zero sum game. There is no reasonable prospect of achieving a remedy commensurate with the complaint. Even if there were, the price is much too high to be borne by any single individual. There is no justice in this.
With such daunting disincentives, it is amazing that anyone would stay the course of an appeal: very few have; none have survived unscathed. Again, it is most surprising that representatives of the Public Service Commission seem never to have wondered why so many appeals are dropped before they are heard. A thorough investigation of the records on their part would produce some very interesting reading, particularly in the form of a comparative, inter-departmental statistical survey. Such scrutiny should have been exercised years ago.
The existing appeal process clearly was designed for regular Public Service competitions and is not appropriate to the Foreign Service at all. Individuals cannot be expected to exercise the right of appeal when they will be pitted automatically against the combined resources of an entire Department and they will be confronted by the unbridled hostility of their peers. This is simply not unreasonable, it is unacceptable since it renders the right of appeal effectively meaningless. At a minimum, adequate legal, financial and research assistance should be made available to the appellant to help balance this asymetry. At present, there is no relief — only the prospect of incurring crippling legal fees while injuring one’s colleagues. This is more than enough to terminate prematurely even the strongest case.
Given that the merit principle is under siege, that the appeal process offers scant potential for redress, and that the Corporate Review came up empty-handed, the time seems ripe for the Public Service Commission to take an active interest. The PSC is mandated to serve as the merit police of the Public Service. In this Department, however, there have been no signs even of a watching brief, let alone a more thorough investigation. The closest examination is warranted, preferably in advance of the next round of annointments which in their turn will be similarly disputed by those not promoted
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1991) — Spring 1991 // Printemps 1991, pp. 8–10. Read the rest of this issue →
