bout de papier, Vol. 6, No. 4 (1989), pp. 40–41
No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the
United States, and the Origins of North
American Air Defence, 1945-1958 by
Joseph T. Jockel, University of British
Columbia Press, 1987, 160pp. $25.00
The NORAD agreement, Canadian diplomat and scholar John Holmes has written, “was the logical culmination of defence arrangements on which both countries had been working for a decade, a compromise, acceptable to the times, between the logic of efficiency and political caution.” Based on an exhaustive examination of an extensive collection of military and diplomatic documentation, much of which has only been recently declassified, historian Joseph T. Jockel’s new account of the evolution of Canada-U.S. air defence co-operation ultimately leaves us with the same broad interpretation. As Jockel states in his conclusion, for both Canada and the United States “NORAD arose out of a specific, functional, military interest,” though during the planning sessions which led up to its creation, American military and diplomatic negotiators were keenly aware of “how sensitive the issue of command and control” over Canada’s defences was for Canadians. But while the question of why NORAD was formed presents little mystery, precisely how it was created has long remained unclear. What this new book provides is a detailed study of the incremental moves taken by the Canadian and American military establishments, which were both keenly aware of the “sensitive issue of command and control,” as both countries inched towards establishing a strategic arrangement of often underestimated significance.
Concerns about national autonomy invariably arise in debates over major bilateral issues between Canada and its superpower to the south. No Boundaries Upstairs offers readers an historical case study of how the sovereignty issue was dealt with in an important and sensitive aspect of Canadian-American relations. Did the Canadian government, Jockel asks, “freely enter into air defence arrangements with the United States? Or was it pressured by its ally to the south into erecting air defences, into allowing U.S. installations on its soil, and into placing the air defences of the RCAF under the operational control of an American general, all regardless of Canadian interests and desires?” Pragmatism, Jockel demonstrates, guided strategic planning; while the Soviet threat was jointly considered, no major decisions were made without reference to both political and military objectives on both sides of the border. cance, neity elected anime i is soi.
Diefenbaker hastily approved the continental r aelence proposal under pressure nrol eneral Charles Foulkes. then Chairman ( the Chiefs of Staff. Nonetheless, the NORAD agreement reflected the practical limits of Canada’s sovereignty within a shared military arrangement with the United States. The impetus for NORAD, had come from both sides. Canadian as well as American military analysts had long been aware of the growing nuclear strength of the Soviet Union and clearly recognized, by early 1950’s, their shared interest in continental defence. Consequently, as Jockel points out, the groundwork for the formation of a joint command center was laid in the years preceeding NORAD’s formal creation with the installation of radar-warning systems in both countries and the drawing up of specific standing orders which authorized border crossings for both air forces. These mutual defence measures were carried out as joint tasks involving a high degree of bilateral military collaboration.
Jockel clearly demonstrates two broad patterns which emerged in the evolution of Canadian-American continental air defence arrangements. First, continental air defence integration, from the formation of the Military Co-Operation Committee in 1946 to the completion of the Mid-Canada and Distant Early Warning Lines in the mid- 1950’s, developed as a series of small steps rather than giant leaps toward shared defence arrangements. The exchange of diplomatic notes in 1958, which gave NORAD’s inception formal recognition, marked the end of a gradual convergence of air defence forces on both sides of the border, not a new beginning. The second pattern Jockel reveals is that the individual proposals which led up to NORAD were initiated and first approved by both the American and Canadian military establishments, not by their diplomatic representatives nor by their respective political overseers. The “RCAF and USAF together,” Jockel states, “constituted the driving force behind the incremental integration of the two national air defence efforts into a single operating system. They initiated all of the proposals for cross-border tactical co-operation and shepherded them all through the process of obtaining approval from the national political authorities.”
But it was not always smooth sailing within each of the military hierarchies as they made adjustments for increased emphasis on air defence in the nuclear age. Technological advances had removed an effective first strike capability from both sides of the Cold War standoff. Canada simply had to accept that fact, or adopt a radical and highly provocative course of non-cooperation with the United States, a policy which was never seriously considered.
Throughout the intensification of the Cold War, Canadian and American military officials maintained strong co-operative ties without direct political encouragement or interference. They viewed military problems from similar perspectives and conflicts which did take place, as noted, were more often internally-based than between the two countries. In fact, as soon as Diefenbaker approved the proposed joint air defence command system, a prolonged and difficult struggle developed between the Department of External Affairs, which wanted the agreement formalized in writing, and General Foulkes, who resisted efforts to codify in diplomatic terms what the military establishments of both countries had already formulated as strategic doctrine. Foulkes did not want the agreement formalized in a manner which would likely reveal the clear distinction which existed between NORAD and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a distinction Foulkes had deliberately blurred when presenting the proposal to George Pearkes, the new Minister of National Defence.
But External Affairs remained annoyed at the lack of formality and even its new minister, Sidney Smith, as Jockel states, “gently admonished” Pearkes by pointing out that important decisions affecting Canadian-American relations were usually recorded by diplomatic note exchanges. It would take almost a year, until 12 May 1958 to be precise, before the disputed note exchange took place. Meanwhile, much bickering and confusion reigned in the House of Commons during debates on NORAD as the facade of a NORAD-NATO connection, which Foulkes was the first to seize upon, became part of Diefenbaker’s rhetoric. NORAD, Diefenbaker stated in the Commons, was “a further step in achieving the agreed NATO objectives.” But obviously, and Pearson saw this plainly, it did not follow that shared objectives between NORAD and NATO created a shared entity.
Foulkes and Diefenbaker continued to flog this regional planning group as the key to understanding the supposed connection between NORAD and NATO. The strategic objectives of these two official bodies were the same, so the argument went; therefore — voila! they were the same. But, as we might expect, the American military establishment would have balked at any scheme which linked continental air defence with the defence of western Europe. It was one thing for the United States to have to integrate Canadian participation in continental air defence in recognition of Canada’s territorial sovereignty, but quite another to have to bring in the prying eyes, and maybe the alleged loose tongues of all other NATO allies. As Jules Léger, then Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, informed Smith, “it would not be possible for Canada unilaterally to declare that NORAD is a NATO command; United States agreement to this concept would be essential and… the United States military are not prepared to implement such a concept at the moment.”
While Jockel’s descriptions of the actions taken by key individuals in creating NORAD are accurate and clearly presented, the interplay of individual personalities and private motivations is seldom explored. The story behind General Foulkes, for example, as a pivotal figure on the Canadian side who persisted in carrying this agreement through to completion is never fully brought to life. The reader is left wondering why Foulkes believed so strongly and pushed so hard for the NORAD concept. Nevertheless, No Boundaries Upstairs remains a useful study of how Canada, as a small power, entered into a controversial strategic partnership with the United States. Many critics of the NORAD agreement charged that sovereignty had been lost; at the same time, supporters replied that, in fact, it had been preserved. Jockel concludes by observing that the “consultative relationship” on which NORAD was originally based was “both unhappy and shortlived.” This was most apparent during the Cuban missile crisis when the Canadian government was afforded no special treatment by the Kennedy administration. “The United States,” Jockel sums up, “had indeed always seen Canada as a small power, and it had conducted its defence relationship with Ottawa accordingly.” NORAD represented nothing more than a strategic relationship based on shared interests. It did not change Canadian-American relations — it reflected them. Jockel demonstrates this with care and precision. And, on that basis, his efforts succeed admirably.
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 6, No. 4 (1989), pp. 40–41. Read the rest of this issue →
