bout de papier, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1993) — Fall/Winter 1993 // Automne/Hiver 1993, pp. 41–42
Deadly Illusions (The KGB Orlov Dossier
Reveals Stalin’s Master Spy) by
John Costello and Oleg Tsarev, Crown
Publishers Inc., Random House, New York,
220 nn 021 FN MAn
Reviewed by John Starnes
Deadly Illusions offers many things at once. It offers a much needed authentic documentary history of secret intelligence activities by both sides in the years prior to the outbreak of World War II and during the Cold War and a complementary history of the ruthless struggle behind the scenes waged by all the protagonists. Using material from German (Gestapo), British, French, US (FBI & CIA) and KGB archives, the book is a remarkable attempt to strip away the myths, and the inaccuracies, which have surrounded the intelligence activities of a number of countries over a period of several decades and to try to place them objectively in an historical context which can be understood by non-professionals. The authors have succeeded in writing an important book, and much credit is due to them for having had the vision to appreciate the importance of what they were attempting, and the perseverance and skill to see it through. It is a fascinating book of interest and of value to the average reader, and to scholars and professional intelligence officers everywhere.
The core story concerns Alexander Orlov (born Leiba Feldbin in Bobruysk, Byelorussia) and his quite extraordinary career as a professional intelligence officer in the U.S.S.R. and abroad, clearly revealed by the unprecedented release of documents from the archives of the First Chief Directorate of the former KGB (now the Russian Intelligence Service). The account of Orlov’s role as an “illegal” in Germany, France and England (in the mid-1930’s) makes fascinating reading, much of it based upon his cryptographic reports to the NKVD/KGB ’centre’ in Moscow. Particularly interesting is the account of his key role in the recruitment and running of Philby, Maclean and Burgess, among others. No less interesting is the description of the role he performed as NKVD chief in Spain in the summer of 1936. Nominally a political attache, he held the special rank of “major of State Security” with the authority of a general in the Red Army.
The book also provides a very cold look at the cynical manner in which governments systematically exploited one another’s weaknesses, and the nature of the methods they permitted in order to achieve their aims; political assassinations, ’liquidations’ for operational reasons and the skillful implementation of complicated deception and espionage operations (active measures). The authors make clear in a most credible way, that it wasn’t only the Russians who were engaged in such activities; every major power used such methods, with varying degrees of conscience, skill and success.
A very cold look at the cynical manner governments systematically exploited one another.
The book is well-written and well organized (given the evident difficulties Costello and Tsarev must have had in dealing with such a mass of complex material). In places, and especially in the earlier chapters, the writing is dense, even opaque at times. This may be due to the peculiar argot of espionage and the difficulties of translating Russian into colloquial English, e.g., p. 300; “The Spanish secret police careered out of control….”
The most important and interesting part of the book is contained in the ‘Afterword’, pp. 487-510. It is indispensable reading for those with questions concerning the motivation and operational intentions of Vladimir Kryuchkov, the hard-line Communist head of the KGB, when, in 1991 he encouraged the writing of the book and authorized the release of so many highly sensitive documents, including KGB operational cryptograms! On that score, I strongly recommend that these twenty-three pages should be read before the rest of the book. Indeed, the ’Afterword’ could have formed an integral part of the ’Foreword’
Canadian scholars of such matters will be interested to note the odd reference to Canada in Orlov’s story and in particular in 1938 when he sought to escape what appeared to be certain ’liquidation’ by NK VD assassins. Unable to contact William Bullit, the US Ambassador to France, in an effort to seek a safe haven in the United States, he then approached the Canadian Legation in Paris, where the Canadian Consul General, described by Orlov as a “friendly sort of man”, agreed to help him. Fortuitously he turned out to have been a former Canadian Commissioner for Immigration (sic). The Consul General wrote a letter of introduction to the Canadian immigration authorities, noting that the Soviet General was travelling to the United States on a diplomatic passport, and had asked permission to take his wife and sickly daughter to Quebec for a vacation before facing the summer heat of Washington. The ploy worked. He arrived in Montreal on the SS Montclare on 21 July 1938, being admitted as a non-immigrant for a two month period. He arrived with $60,000 US secreted in his hand baggage and his wife immediately opened a savings account with the Bank of Montreal (No. 300937), using the name Berg.
The book should effectively silence those in government in Canada (senior officials and politicians alike) as well as journalists and academics, who have scornfully dismissed threats of espionage from the Soviet Union. It is impossible to ignore the mass of documentation offered in the book, which illustrates very clearly just how widespread and how effective Soviet espionage activities have been for many years. One of the more interesting aspects of the release of so much material by the new Russian Intelligence Service (RIS) is the circumspect and responsible manner in which this has been done. They have refused to identify a number of their former agents, some of whom may still be active or could be re-activated. In doing so they appear to have remained true to the principles which guided Orlov when, in 1953, after ostensibly defecting to the United States, he managed successfully for ten years thereafter to protect the “Cambridge Group” of Soviet spies (Philby, Maclean and Burgess, etc.). The RIS has refused to name any of the members of the hitherto unknown “Oxford Group” of spies (some twenty odd), who are only identified by their cryptonyms. Principles aside, clearly these secret agents and the others the newly formed RIS are continuing to protect, must be regarded by them as valuable assets for future operations!
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1993) — Fall/Winter 1993 // Automne/Hiver 1993, pp. 41–42. Read the rest of this issue →
