bout de papier, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1994) — Summer 1994 // Été 1994, pp. 30–31
Not unlike the GST, the radical and fundamental reorientation of the Foreign Ministry in New Zealand may be a bellweather for what is to happen in Canada.
Rolling Thunder Down Under
For much of the past decade, New Zealand’s public sector has been subject to the political equivalent of carpet bombing. Much of what was once here is gone. Few found cover. “Rationalized,” privatized and drastically downsized in the wake of the liquidation of entire departments, the apparatus of government is less than a shadow of its former self.
The re-invention of the state was undertaken in the context of a much wider programme which would make the likes of Milton Friedman blush. Social programs have been slashed, subsidies eliminated and unions broken. Taxes have been cut (especially for the wealthiest), markets deregulated and investment requirements streamlined. Unemployment remains high, but the economy is otherwise improving. Supporters of this line see flowers growing from the craters; radical adjustment, they claim, has left New Zealand fit to compete in the global marketplace. Critics recoil at the damage to the social fabric and anguish over the high human costs.
30 bout de papier Vol. virtually undisputed — of the scope and intensity of these changes makes compelling reading for Canadians. Around the mid-eighties, New Zealand was running headlong into an abyss of collapsing public finance, spiralling debt, and reduced productivity and earnings. Insolvency loomed Faced with the inability to fund the status quo and stripped of its long-cherished role as farm for UK, necessity was invoked as the mother of invention.
The structure and mandate of the foreign ministry was rigorously reviewed, and the subsequent re-orientation has been fundamental. Not unlike the GST, this may prove a bellweather. New Zealand’s “No Frills Diplomacy” should therefore be of interest to practitioners of foreign policy in Canada.
Looking West: Catch the Rays of the Rising Sun
In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), the imperative of advancing New Zealand’s international competitive position has been enshrined as the over-arching goal. While the Trade Development Board is charged with the provision of close commercial support to New Zealand business abroad, MFAT establishes the priorities and proffers the policy guidance. The Government is committed in particular to demonstrating that New Zealand is both in, and of, the Asia-Pacific region. No Appalachian-style backwater, this, but a worthy partner well able to hold its own on anyone’s terms. Although the commitment to regional integration seems more widely held among decision-makers and opinion leaders than the general public, much has already been accomplished
The nineties have seen the Asia-Pacific region emerge as everybody’s darling, but many aspirants have been unable to get beyond lip service offered in pursuit of a receding horizon. In New Zealand, officials, politicians, and businesspeople is creating new patterns of thought and behavior. Tourism is booming, investment relations are flourishing, and trade with Asia is expanding at about twenty percent per year. A determined attempt is being made to diversify New Zealand’s traditional dependence on Australia and Europe by exploiting opportunities in the neighbourhood. New Zealand is niche marketing itself throughout the region, and the audience has shown itself receptive.
Eliminate the Guesswork
Within government, and certainly in the case of MFAT, resources have been marshalled in support of clearly defined interests and objectives. Each year Ministers are offered a selection of policy options, and choose those they wish pursued. Failed contenders are not funded and, at least in theory, are dropped from the list of active files. For the current year, the first priority among the “outcomes desired by the Governments” is to “improve conditions for New Zealand trade and economic growth, in particular through further development of relations with East Asia… “ To a degree which would astound most Canadians, diplomatic assets are deployed in direct, and, to a considerable extent, exclusive support of New Zealand’s economic and trade interests.
Private sector culture and values are pervasive throughout the bureaucracy. Delayering has been embraced, senior officials are accessible, and desk officers serve as country or functional programme managers in all but name. The language of performance contracts is omnipresent. In the preamble to MFAT’s “Projected Output Performance for 1993-94,” for example, reference is made to a “comprehensive range of systems and procedures … designed to ensure that outputs of all classes are delivered to agreed specifications” The outputs are then listed specifications. With Other Countries; Interests in International Institutions; Official Development Assistance, Consular Services; and so forth), described in detail, and costed. There is never any reason to doubt what anyone should, or should not be doing.
The act of publishing annual foreign policy objectives — in the budget, annual report and operational plans — makes some form of heightened accountability virtually inevitable. Indeed, accountabilities are assigned all the way down the hierarchy, from the CEO to desk officers, with responsibility for specific “outcomes” and “outputs” deliberately delineated. The CEO, for instance, is “responsible for the management of the Crown’s investment in the Ministry” and “for the production of all classes of outputs listed in the Statement of Projected Performance”. In my case, I was presented with a letter a few days after arrival stating my duties and responsibilities and referring to key tasks “set out on pages 3-5 and 14 of the division’s operational plan.” The existence of clear standards immensely simplifies performance measurement and adds a welcome degree of objectivity to the otherwise odiously subjective task of performance appraisal.
Sharpen the Focus
In addition to the emphasis on internal economy, this up-front style concentrates the mind, and, for those charged with charting the direction of the ship of state, forces a process of sobering, and often harrowing selection. It allows politicians to buy only the policy advice and services they want, and, in a world of limited resources, enforces a form of market discipline. Ministers get no more than they pay for, the CEO is charged with producing the goods, and those at the working level are offered concise guidance on how their time is to be spent. Both posts and divisions are evaluated bi-annually by the (ADM level) Senior Management Group against stipulated benchmarks, and the results are factored into the appraisals of Heads of Mission and Directors. Indeed, mid-year reviews are mandatory for all employees. Meanwhile, an Audit Department tracks and evaluates both operational and financial performance and reports annually to Parliament.
We’re Here to Help
In the interim, efforts to court the business community continue apace. The Ministry’s Business Communications Coordinator works full-time to establish effective linkages and ensure that the message is getting out. Corporations wanting “information on the economy or market it is targeting”, or that “have a problem with access,” or “want to know about future opportunities or link up with Government programmes” are enjoined to talk to Ministry representatives. All officers spend much of their time dealing with exporters associations, bankers, consultants, and businesspeople of every stripe. Officials are regularly despatched across the country to promote an awareness of MFATs services and expertise.
It is a profoundly different approach to the conduct of diplomacy, one far removed from the conventions of Parsonian internationalism. That said, in the absence of luxuries such as export credits and tied aid, the imperative of working harder on cooperative economic promotion did not take long to emerge as one of few options.
Sweetness and Light?
Among other effects, this system empowers elected representatives, facilitates public scrutiny and encourages a focussed, even strategic approach to diplomatic enterprise. The extensive planning and consultative mechanisms, however, carry high administrative overheads. Critics are quick to point out, moreover, that the new order has arrived with a host of strings attached, both ideological and practical. Without going into the many arguments as to why or why not certain biases may be necessary or appropriate, suffice it to say that human rights advocacy, large scale development assistance, and the pursuit of political liberalization — major aspects of Canadian foreign policy — do not figure centrally in this dispensation.
Those uncomfortable with the corporate orientation have also observed that it constitutes an integral part of the bundle of public policies which has broken up national unions, rolled back social programmes, reduced health care and social security benefits, redistributed wealth upwards and generally retrenched across the board. At best, clear cutting in the guise of strategic pruning; at worst, slash and burn. Members of groups least able to articulate or defend their interests have been seen to underwrite the costs of a programme whose benefits have been delivered elsewhere.
It allows politicians to buy only the policy advice and services a world of limited resources, enforces a form of market
A Common Future?
The results of New Zealand’s recent national election suggest that there remains much unease over the pace and direction of change, and no consensus on future directions. It must be said that relative to perhaps 80% of the rest of the world, important elements of the welfare state remain intact, and the more flexible, dynamic approach has provided some obvious public dividends from a value for money perspective. For what it’s worth, the “reforms” have been widely applauded in the foreign ministry, though that may be less than indicative in terms of the vox populi.
Viewed from the Antipodes, the extent to which events in New Zealand appear to have prefigured the continuing debate in Canada is striking. If New Zealand’s experience is any guide, thought might be given to exploring means by which social and economic objectives could be achieved complimentarily, and governments made lean without getting mean.
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1994) — Summer 1994 // Été 1994, pp. 30–31. Read the rest of this issue →
