bout de papier, Vol. 11, No. 3 (1994) — Fall 1994 // Automne 1994, pp. 18–20
The Tiananmen Massacre in 1989. The Canadian Ambassador to China at this time remembers how the crisis was managed and offers his own personal views on human rights and trade relations.
66 s soon as the killing stops, we should return to China and make a financial killing in this lucrative market.” These remarkably insensitive comments by a Canadian businessman at the time of his evacuation from China just after the Tiananmen tragedy in 1989, were widely quoted by the media and became an emotional focal point for a debate which was to continue for years afterwards. The media, human rights activists and some members of the general public pointed to them as an illustration of the compartmentalized thinking of businessmen and the need to promote respect for human rights by linking human rights and trade. Others, including many businessmen, academics and government officials, were torn between revulsion over the recent brutality and the need to retain an objective, balanced and long-term engagement with China in order to pursue a host of Canadian interests there.
My own view has always been that it is important to conduct a comprehensive policy toward China, involving both trade and human rights as well as other economic, social, strategic and political objectives, but that we should be very careful in choosing the best means of achieving them. While an emotional response was very understandable in 1989, it was not a good basis for devising a long-term foreign policy, nor was linking trade and human rights an effective way to pursue either goal. This article reports on my personal involvement in trying to defuse this persistent tendency to emotionalism and linkage.
Emotionalism Soon after the evacuation of most Canadians from Beijing, as Canadian Ambassador to China, I was summoned to Ottawa to meet Minister Joe Clark and to appear before a Parliamentary Committee and some gatherings of Canadian stakeholders. Although the Minister was calm and objective about Canada-China relations, I found many others were very emotional on the subject.
People had been unusually affected by the vivid television coverage of the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square and their brutal suppression. The coverage had been massive and dramatic, if not very objective. Day after day, Canadian viewers had seen unforgettable images of hunger-striking, unarmed students, brandishing banners and symbols calling for an end to corruption and repression. Then came the grim finale, with tanks crushing all opposition and leaving a trail of carnage and shattered aspirations. Canadians naturally identified with the students and wanted to express their outrage at their treatment. Most had no sympathy with businessmen who wanted to continue doing profitable business with these butchers!
It was in this context that, after sounding out a range of Canadian stakeholders, Minister Clark decided to express moral outrage over the human rights abuses and then to strike a balance between high-minded internationalism and a tough assessment of our national interests. In typical Canadian fashion, we cobbled together a compromise based mainly on the realistic traditions of Machiavelli and Metternich but salted with Pearsonian idealism.
The main elements in Joe Clark’s policy statement on June 30, 1989, were as follows:
1. “Tiananmen Square and the subsequent campaign of repression have changed the relationship between Canada and China. The Chinese authorities have called for “business as usual’; this cannot be accepted.”
2. Do not isolate China. Existing links by government, industry and academics should be preserved. Focus on people-to-people exchanges.
3. Avoid programs which benefit the military or state propaganda apparatus.
4. Defer indefinitely high-level contacts with the Chinese Government.
5. Pursue human rights action in UN agencies.
6. Withdraw from three development assistance projects and defer some others.
7. Cancel one Export Development Corporation (EDC) project, apply the above criteria in considering new EDC projects and downgrade trade representation in Beijing ’in anticipation of an expected downturn in trade activity.”
Nowhere was the word “sanctions” used. It was also stressed that this was a first response and the policy would be reviewed in the light of changing circumstances.
I returned to my post in China ten days later satisfied that Canada had a good position that met the immediate need to express the outrage of Canadians at human rights violations by the current regime while preserving long-term links with China, a coun try of great importance to us economically, socially, politically and strategically. However, I had underestimated the lingering emotion which China would continue to stir in many Canadian (and American) breasts.
The first warning came when we announced an EDC loan for telephone equipment to China in the fall of 1989. This loan was clearly within the Minister’s guidelines. It had been approved before June 4, 1989, and did not support the military or state propaganda apparatus. Moreover, we had hoped that, by increasing telephone communications, we would encourage the spread of information and ideas and promote people-to-people exchanges.
We had underestimated public outrage. And we had some bad luck: just at that time, the international press discovered that the Chinese Government had installed special telephones for informers to report on any friends and relatives who had supported student demonstrations. They were instantly dubbed “fink phones” and presented as another example of Chinese evil and duplicity. The Canadian media immediately linked the two stories and gave the public the impression that the taxpayers were subsidizing the installation of the hated “fink phones.”
The next evidence of continuing strong emotion came on China’s national day in October 1989. As usual, the Chinese authorities invited diplomats and resident journalists to attend and official banquet at the Great Hall of the People. Few of us felt comfortable about attending that year but decided that protocol required it as long as our governments maintained diplomatic relations. The journalists decided they should go in case any newsworthy announcements were made. During the desultory meal, I wandered over to the area where the journalists were gathered. To my surprise, one Canadian journalist had dressed in mourning for those killed on June 4 and another, who dearly loved to eat, was refusing to do so on this occasion, stating loudly: “I don’t eat food served by people with blood on their hands.” So much for unemotional journalistic detachment!
There was emotion on the Chinese side too. Premier Li Peng had been to Canada and liked it. When I paid my farewell call on him in September 1990, he asked when Canada was going to normalize relations with China. I replied that he would have to be patient: “The Canadian people have long cared deeply about China and the wound of recent events will take more time to heal.”
China — referring to that famous trifle, the massacre of more than 2000 pro-democracy demonstrators in Beijing in 1989.” The editorial was accompanied by a cartoon showing a corpse waiting by a Canadian Human Rights Hotline. Unfortunately, the Canadian media approach to China is too often characterized by emotionalism and oversimplification of complex issues — the obverse of the rationality, pragmatism and informed, deeper factual analysis we need as a basis for Canadian policy formulation.
Linkage
In fiscal year 1989/90, the G7 group of major Western industrialized nations used their voting strength to block World Bank lending to China. This bothered the Chinese and the Bank management because the Bank was a major source of capital, technology transfer and management advice Then, to my surprise, he flushed, turned abruptly away from me and snarled: “You take all the time you want. We don’t need you!” This outwardly-phlegmatic leader clearly felt more strongly on the issue than anyone had ever imagined.
Emotion continues to creep into media commentary on this issue, even years later. During the recent visit of the Vice-Premier of China, The Globe and Mail presented a lead editorial on April 29, 1994, entitled “Principles for Sale.” It included such emotive passages as: “Canada is passionately, desperately keen to get in on the Chinese economic miracle, whatever the cost to its principles. None of the [Canadian] visitors so far has made a fuss about human rights, not even the Governor-General, who, instead of representing the ideals on which his country is founded, has descended to the level of microchip salesman … Foreign Minister André Ouellet has made it clear that he does not want to get ’bogged down by Tiananmen Square’ in his dealings with in the modernizing of the Chinese economy. This opposition was initiated by the USA but, by the accident of seniority at the World Bank Board, the Canadian director became the most visible spokesman for this G7 policy of economic sanctions.
After 1990, the G7 common line on China slowly fell apart. The Japanese pressed to drop this common G7 policy and began to normalize their bilateral economic relations with China. Gradually, the Europeans followed the Japanese lead. But in the USA, things were different. The Bush Administration was sympathetic to normalizing relations with China but had to face strong Congressional pressure to threaten China annually with the withdrawal of MFN [Most Favored Nation] trade status unless China improved its human rights performance.
With the election of President Clinton, the drama heightened because the executive branch joined Congress in using the threat of MFN withdrawal to try to obtain human rights’ concessions. Several senior officials, including the USA Secretary of State himself, visited Beijing in unsuccessful attempts to extract sufficient concessions from China to enable the USA to avoid the use of the double-edged sword of MFN withdrawal. Despite President Clinton’s recent switch on MFN, the question of linking trade and human rights continues to be debated among some members of the American Congress and the media.
In Canada, the Mulroney Government had begun to give greater emphasis to human rights as a central element of its global foreign policy approximately a year after Tiananmen. Indeed, in late 1991, Prime Minister Mulroney articulated a tougher human rights policy at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Harare.
The Chinese Government was puzzled why, as memories of Tiananmen receded in most of the world, Canada turned up its rhetoric on human rights. We did not subject Beijing to an annual Parliamentary debate on renewal of MFN status but we did give public reprimands to Chinese leaders or snub them on every possible occasion. China welcomed a renewal of Canadian ministerial visits but was unhappy when all these technical visits, aimed at promoting Canadian exports, began with a public scolding about human rights. They were also sensitive to the fact that, when Barbara McDougall was Foreign Minister, she always arranged her schedule to avoid senior Chinese visitors.
After I retired from the Foreign Service in mid-1992, the Chinese frequently asked me as an “old friend” to explain to them privately why Canadian policy toward them was hardening at a time when most other countries were moderating theirs and why Canadians thought their strange approach had the slightest chance of success in respect of either human rights or trade. As my interlocutors pointed out, China had never made a concession on human rights in direct response to public criticism from any foreigner (for reasons of national dignity, they made only goodwill gestures ostensibly based on domestic criteria). Secondly, Canada offered no exports which China could not buy with relative ease from our competitors, so we had virtually no leverage in linking human rights and trade talks.
Not only the Chinese were puzzled by Canadian policy. As an officer of the Canada Chinese Business Council in Vancouver, I was frequently questioned by businessmen and others interested in China about Canadian government aims and methods. What were Canada’s current objectives in China? Was human rights or trade more important? Why was the government bothering to send trade delegations to China if everyone knew they would be rendered ‹ ineffective by linking them to a public criticism on human rights? Why were we singling out China for public criticism when many other countries were also human rights’ offenders? Why was Canada not giving an unqualified signal to its exporters to plunge into the lucrative China market, like all our competitors? Could it not be argued that the best prospect for democracy in China was to have our businessmen promote trade, investment and improved management and technology, thus encouraging peaceful evolution along the lines of neighbouring Asian countries toward economic prosperity and the strengthening of an emerging middle class?
With the election of the Chrétien Government in late 1993, Canada’s policy toward China shifted sharply. Roy MacLaren flew to Vancouver, within days of taking office as the new Trade Minister, to declare that the Government’s highest priority would be to create jobs through increased exports to places like China. Subsequently, Prime Minister Chrétien candidly acknowledged Canada’s limited ability to influence human rights in China, thereby opening himself to vocal criticism that he had little interest in this issue. Many people welcomed the new pragmatism and the de-linking of trade and human rights — but some wondered if the pendulum had swung too far and we were now stressing trade to the virtual exclusion of human rights.
International Trade and the New Conditionality I was recently asked to present my personal views on “international trade and ’the new conditionality “ to the Joint Parliamentary Committee reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy. My comments were phrased in global terms but were largely derived from my experience with China.
In principle, I believe it is right for Canada to encourage not only the liberalization of international trade but also greater respect for human rights, environmental integrity and humane working conditions because these are policies which Canada practices at home and believes will contribute to international peace and stability, sustained and balanced economic growth and enhanced quality of life. In practice, however, I believe that it would be counterproductive to seek these objectives by linking them. We should use appropriate means to pursue these disparate aims.
I say this because Canada is a middle-sized economic power, which does not have the capacity to force policy change on any other country. Indeed, it has a good record of solving international problems through
20 bout de papier Vol. dialogue and negotiation in multilateral fora rather than through imposing bilateral conditionality. Even super-powers have had great difficulty in forcing fundamental concessions from their trading partners through unilateral economic pressure.
We should also recall that human rights, environmental policies and working conditions are not regarded by most developing countries as legitimate international trade issues; such governance issues are deemed domestic matters or unfair trade barriers. Any attempt to impose trade conditions by rich industrialized countries may be viewed in the Third World as non-tariff barriers to protect their own high-priced local industries. The American-French initiative to link labour standards and trade at the recent world Trade Ministers’ meeting was widely regarded as a new form of big power protectionism and cultural imperialism wrapped in the colours of moralism.
Whether we like it or not, the definition of human rights tends to be very culture-bound. Most Asians believed the American version places too much emphasis on political rights and freedoms of individuals and not enough on the rights of the collectivity, especially the right to subsistence. Even former Japanese PM Hosokawa, an American ally, said on his recent visit to Beijing: “It is not proper to force a Western or European-style democracy on to others.”
My view is that Canada should chart its own course to pursue these issues. We should not be too closely associated with big-power bullying. We should adopt a multi-faceted policy along the following lines:
• First, we should de-link trade and governance issues in our bilateral relations with developing countries because linking is ineffective in obtaining results on any of the issues and casts doubts on our good intentions.
• Second, we should encourage, rather than threaten, these countries to pursue good governance as part of modernizing their economies. Moreover, we should concentrate on persuading their leaders in private discussions because it is usually only at the highest level in a developing country government where this type of decision can be made and because a private forum encourages dialogue and enables the other party to contemplate change without the public humiliation of bowing to a foreigner.
• Third, we should use the venue of meetings of the relevant international bodies dealing with human rights to make factual, public criticisms of all countries deviating from internationally-agreed standards of behaviour. We have found other governments to be more sensitive to public criticism in these multilateral bodies than in bilateral encounters. In addition, we would not be seen as imposing our Western standards or trying to gain trade advantages but, rather, stressing adherence to international obligations.
• Fourth, we should try to target our development assistance programs on governance issues using non-emotive titles like “public management, international law and human development” in order to foster gradual, non-disruptive change from within the developing countries.
• Fifth, we should work with developed and developing country representatives to reach a consensus on these issues in global and regional organizations.
In Conclusion During the lengthy and sometimes emotional public debate in Canada on our China policy, I had always argued that linking trade and human rights does not serve either interest. Instead, we should pursue both policies in ways that are less-dramatic and fashionable but have a better chance of success. Sometimes, however, I had felt quite isolated from the current thinking of politicians and bureaucrats in Ottawa. Was it a generation gap? Was it the influence of the businessmen and academics whose company I was now keeping? Or was it the pernicious atmosphere of British Columbia, that notorious den of unconventional thought and behaviour?
During my recent appearance before the Parliamentary Committee, I was therefore anxious to hear the comments of members, particularly my former Ministers, Senator Allan MacEachen, Kelleher and Carney. With non-partisan nods of approval from Parliamentary colleagues, Committee Co-chair MacEachen concluded that he felt comfortable with my position because it advocated the sort of balanced policies which Canada had usually followed in the past. Perhaps some witnesses would have been chagrined to be told that they had said nothing very original. But after thirty-seven years as a Foreign Service Officer, I found it reassuring to hear that one was considered to be in line with the thinking that had long stood Canadian foreign policy in good stead.
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 11, No. 3 (1994) — Fall 1994 // Automne 1994, pp. 18–20. Read the rest of this issue →
