bout de papier, Vol. 16, No. 4 (1999-2000) — Winter 1999-2000 // Hiver 1999-2000, pp. 39–42
Perhaps the most momentous decision by a Canadian government in the twentieth century was the declaration of war on Germany that was signed on behalf of Canada by King George VI on September 10, 1939. That followed by one week the British government’s announcement that, as a result of the failure of the Nazi regime to withdraw its armed forces from Poland and as a consequence of Britain’s commitment to defend Poland, a state of war existed between the United Kingdom and Germany. Canada’s Parliament had been reassembled on September 7, 1939, and the course of action proposed by the government was effectively endorsed by the House of Commons when it approved the Speech from the Throne. Formally, then, this process upheld Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie King’s oft-repeated assurance to the public that “Parliament will decide” the critical issue of entry into war.
For King, that pledge had been a way to evade commitments in advance in foreign and defence policy. King had not shown his own hand and insisted that his Cabinet colleagues follow his lead. Especially before the Second World War, international disputes tended to divide Canadians. In this realm, King’s legendary caution reinforced his disinclination to undermine national unity in Canada. After the announcement of the Nazi-Soviet Pact on August 21, 1939, both war and the issue of Canadian involvement seemed unavoidable. In its wake, King put the question before the Cabinet as a matter of principle on August 24, 1939. Thus it was that meeting that decided that Canada would fight, as King later put it, “at the side of Britain.”
Formal minutes of Cabinet meetings were not kept until 1944 and even those later records are often vague or misleading. Though the deliberations of the Emergency Council (later the Cabinet War Committee) were more carefully documented, that body did not meet until after the decision in principle to go to war had been taken by the Cabinet. However, we do have a remarkably complete account of the views of Canadian ministers, thanks to that extraordinary private chronicle of Canada’s public life, King’s diary. There are only four members of the Cabinet who are not mentioned by King: Charles A. Dunning (the Minister of Finance, who had been absent ill for some months); James G. Gardiner (the Minister of Agriculture); Thomas A. Crerar (the Minister of Mines and Resources); and, Senator Raoul Dandurand (Minister without Portfolio). It seems appropriate, as we pass the 125th anniversary of the birth and approach the 50th anniversary of the death of Canada’s greatest Prime Minister — and for so long also its Secretary of State for External Affairs — that we print King’s version of how his government decided to go to war. The originals and typescripts of the Diary of W.L. M. King are part of the King Papers at the National Archives of Canada.
Thursday, August 24, 1939 Kingsmere and Ottawa
I was at the office by 11. On the way in, thought a good deal of the steps to be immediately taken by way of preparation for war. At the office, I indicated anew to [Arnold] Heeney [Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister] and [O.D.] S[kelton]. [Under- Secretary of State for External Affairs] the importance of our getting a proper staff to handle matters day by day, each being specially assigned to some duty.
I was appalled to learn from S[kelton]. that the Agreement which has been made between Russia and Germany has no “escape” clauses in it such as have been in other non-aggression pacts. It goes the length of binding Germany and Russia alike not to attack each other where either is helping some other country, or to ally themselves to any group of which another country — which is their enemy — may be a member. Thus it is proved beyond all question that Russia has completely deceived the British. The Russian Ambassador in London has been lying, and the negotiations in Moscow, doing the same; playing the most treacherous game that has every [sic] been played. I believe, by any nation. It bears out pretty much what I gave as my opinion as to what would happen, at the time I spoke to Skelton, the G[overnor] G[eneral, Lord Tweedsmuir], and Sir Gerald Campbell [the British High Commissioner in Ottawa].
I did not go into Council [Cabinet] till about 11.30; then went through a large volume of orders, waiting for [Ernest] Lapointe [Minister of Justice and Acting Secretary of State of Canada] to arrive on the noon train. Shortly after twelve, began to outline to the Cabinet happenings of the last two days. Began with my interview with the G.G., subsequent word with S[kelton]. over the ’phone, cancellation of the trip to Toronto; reasons which prompted me to issue the statement which I did in the morning. Asked the members to be critical of it if any of them felt I had assumed to much in making it without conferring with others. No one took any exception when I pointed out how much greater the effect was, coming yesterday, to what possibly would have been the case today, revealing, as it did, that we had anticipated the action of the British Parliament instead of following it, [Ian A.] Mackenzie [Minister of National Defence] and one or two others nodded approval. There was not, however, the outspoken approval that I would have liked to have had. Everyone being so afraid of the situation seems to be unable to utter a word.
I then read the despatches that have come within the last three days, and concluding by stating the position as being that of England having pledged her word to Poland to fight, though it is now clear that she will not have Russia as an ally, and may even have her as an enemy in a conflict. It is by [no] means clear that Italy will remain neutral but will probably fight both France and England. I then read the summary we received of the proceedings in the Commons in England, of [British Prime Minister Neville] Chamberlain’s speech and a desptach which indicates that in all probability the zero-hour might come tonight.
It was then half past one when I suggested Council should adjourn till three. I was kept a little at the office. Came to Laurier House [King’s residence]; had 20 minutes’ rest, and then lunch, and left at 3.30 for the Cabinet.
At the Council table, I said that while we were still in a calm frame of mind, it was advisable we should decide upon our policy in the event of war breaking out. That I had a clear idea in my own mind as to what it should be, but would like my colleagues to express their views first of all.
I then began going around the Council table and asked Lapointe first of all if he would express his views. He said he would prefer to hear what others had to say first. I told Council I thought that, being the oldest members, we were entitled to that privilege.
I then asked [Joseph-Enoil] Michaud [Minister of Fisheries] his views, which were that we should stand by the statement I had made in Parliament. Abide by that, at all events, until we see what the situation further might demand.
[Norman McLeod] Rogers [Minister of Labour] thought that we should take all measures to meet the situation, as it develops, from hour to hour, and to be prepared to meet every eventuality. That if Britain became involved, there was no question as to what our position would be. All our resources, man power, etc., should immediately be brought to assist Britain. He agreed that the important thing was to keep the country united meanwhile. Personally, he would like an announcement made immediately, that Canada was prepared to give support to Britain in every effort she was making for peace; that, if these efforts i were not effective, we would immediately go into the war on Britain’s behalf.
[Charles Gavan] Power [Minister of Pensions and National Health] was not prepared to go as far as Rogers in issuing a blank cheque to Great Britain. He agreed that we would have to go into war but, meanwhile, should be careful not to state that view before the meeting of Parliament.
[Pierre Joseph Arthur] Cardin [Minister of Public Works] said he agreed with the view expressed by Power, that we should prepare, above everything else, for the safety of our own people and not enlarge on the declaration of yesterday.
[James Lorimer] Ilsley [Minister of National Revenue and Acting Minister of Finance] did not see how we could avoid a statement of our policy as to what we would do if war were declared; that we would stand with Great Britain. Would like to see a statement issued at once that Canada would participate if Great Britain found it necessary to go to war with [sic] Poland. He thought it was apparent that, under those circumstances, there could be only one policy, and that was to participate in the defence of Europe in the name of decency, etc. That the people wanted the government to say now what the country would do.
Mackenzie said he agreed with Ilsley, that Democracy was at stake, and that there should be an immediate declaration of policy. It was not the fact of participation that there could be any question about, but the extent of participation. These were matters which the government and Parliament would have to decide, e.g., the nature of co-operation, assistance to be given by air-pilots, supplies, munitions, financial support. He thought steps should be taken at once to safeguard vulnerable points in Canada and the coast, bridges, railway centres, etc. That this should be voluntary and not compulsory.
Lapointe broke in at the time Ilsley was speaking and said that he saw no purpose in making any preliminary statement as to our participation in the event of war. He disagreed with the view expressed by Rogers and Ilsley in that regard.
[William Daum] Euler [Minister of Trade and Commerce] said that he agreed with Lapointe’s view, that there was no purpose in issuing any preliminary statement; that it would not prevent war. He would be prepared to do anything for the defence of Canada. Did not feel it was our business to be too much concerned about what was taking place in Europe. He honestly held that view. He thought we should make clear there would be no conscription; that he detested war. Thought Danzig was a bad issue and that if there was no greater issue he would oppose sacrificing life for that purpose. He did not think there should be any public statement today.
[Norman Alexander] McLarty [Postmaster Generall was of the view that we were going to participate. He felt, however, that if we would come out with that statement today it would put sections of Canada into a bad position.
[Clarence Decatur] Howe [Minister of Transport] was of the view that Canada would have to participate and that we should have everything in readiness. As Lapointe had indicated, in replying to Ilsley, that he felt we should certainly go to the assistance of England and France if they became engaged in war, and that we would have to do so to the limit of our resources, but that, meanwhile we should say and do nothing that would divide the country. him further as to his views, but said, in summing up the situation, that I was immensely relieved to find that on the all-important matter of Canada’s participation in the event of Britain being drawn into war, we were of one mind and united. I said there appeared to be a difference of view as to the time at which we should state our policy. Some were for stating it immediately; others to await developments. I have been criticized for saying that Parliament would decide, impression having gained ground that I meant by that we would leave it to a sort of general discussion in Parliament, when Parliament was assembled, to see what the majority felt. That I had not meant anything of the kind, as they knew; that I thought the position to take lay between these two extremes and it was that we would not wait until Parliament assembled to announce our policy, but would, when summoning Parliament, let the country know what the policy was on the matter of participation, leaving to Parliament to decide the details of nature, extent of, etc. etc. Our views on these would be given to Parliament immediately it assembled and the government would stand or fall by its policy as stated.
I got general agreement and unanimity on this position. In the event of war we had now decided that Canada would participate. We had further decided that we would summon Parliament at the moment war was declared, or that it appeared that efforts for peace were certain to fail. At the same time, we would announce our policy with respect to Canada being at war; that Parliament could be brought together in at least a week, possibly less. If war was declared on Saturday, we would try to have Parliament meet at least the next Friday; if not on Saturday or Sunday, then on Monday next week. Parliament would decide on this.
The most difficult of the questions was what should now be said to the press. I thought it was well to let the public know that the Cabinet was united as to how we should proceed. Also, that we were proceeding with caution and taking every precaution to meet any and every eventuality. That the important thing in our minds was to keep Canada united and to trust the government, in the matter of seeing that all possible precautionary measures were being taken, and that we were pursuing the wisest and the best course in the light of the information we were receiving.
In the meantime, Departments concerned were taking all necessary precautionary steps; that, beyond this, I did not wish to enlarge on yesterday’s statement.
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 16, No. 4 (1999-2000) — Winter 1999-2000 // Hiver 1999-2000, pp. 39–42. Read the rest of this issue →
