bout de papier, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2000) — Spring 2000 // Printemps 2000, pp. 52–53
BRITISH SECURITY COORDINATION: THE
SECRET HISTORY OF BRITISH INTELLI-
GENCE IN THE AMERICAS, 1940-45,
edited by William Samuel Stephenson,
introduction by Nigel West, Fromm Inter-
national, New York, 1999, 536 pp. $54.50
At the end of 1999, Canada Post issued a postage stamp commemorating William Stephenson, ’Intrepid,’ in its Millennium Collection. Ironically, the remembrance was for his inventions although he is better known for his role as a wartime spymaster. Few intelligence officers have received recognition on stamps for their exploits (Sorge and Philby were honoured on Soviet stamps).
This book is probably the most balanced and accurate story one could hope for on William Stephenson’s British Security Coordination (BSC), which he created and operated in the United States for most of the Second World War, with responsibility for British security and intelligence interests in the Western Hemisphere. Many books have already been published about Stephenson, most of them adulatory and several containing gross inaccuracies, if not outright fiction. This volume was written in 1945, as the war was ending. Victory was in sight and BSC was becoming less vital.
Stephenson wanted to record his accomplishment before destroying the BSC files. He commissioned, in turn, several of his staff to write an “official” history before destruction of the files took place. Stephenson had a clear vision of what the book should be since he went through various authors before he was satisfied. Much has been made of the file destruction by BSC after the history was written. In fact, British, American and Canadian records contain most of the story (though many of the files remain closed).
The book was written at Camp X, the secret intelligence training centre near Oshawa, Ontario. Twenty copies were originally printed, though half were ultimately burned in 1946. The rest had been given to Churchill, SIS, SOE, possibly the White House, and Norman Robertson, undersecretary of state for external affairs in Ottawa (this copy has since disappeared). Different authors of books on ’Intrepid’ have almost certainly had access to the BSC history, presumably through Stephenson. For reasons that have never been satisfactorily explained, Stephenson continued to rewrite BSC’s history for many years after the war. At least one author seemingly lifted whole passages nearly verbatim from the BSC manuscript. As the introduction to this edition highlights, that author also embroidered other facets of the story and, later, lost a libel suit. Access to the original account provided a tremendous resource for books on ’Intrepid’ but did not prevent embellishments about Stephenson for which corroborating evidence is not to be found in the initial text. This has served ultimately to tarnish the reputation and significant achievements of this extraordinary Quiet Canadian’
Nigel West was long rumoured to have possessed a copy of the BSC history. Its publication in 1998 in Britain under West’s auspices, nearly half a century after it was written, goes a long way to separate the real • Stephenson from mythical alter ego. But some mystery surrounds the publication. Why now and not ten years ago? I am aware of no official British comment on the book or sanction of its publication. One wonders how such things as copyright would have been overcome if a serious opposition to the publication had been registered by Britain (shades of Spycatcher!). The book does not present a glamorous view of intelligence work but more correctly captures intelligence accomplishments as the products of detailed staff work, elaborate logistical arrangements, and the engagement of a large number of persons, many of whom do not see the “big picture’ In that sense, The Secret History of British Intelligence in the Americas is not as exciting as earlier ’Intrepid’ books, but it more clearly records what actually happened. The book contains no footnotes and puts on trust the story it presents. It would take access to Allied archives to verify the entirety of the book but the text has the ring of truth. Where records are easily available, information in the book is supported by archival material. For example, reference is made on page 480 to an April 1942 conference in Washington between Britain, Canada and the US on SIGINT cooperation. Declassified minutes from the meeting are available in the US National Archives. Similarly, on page 448 reference is made to the recruitment of a Canadian to be tasked with handling communications problems for BSC. In fact, he is identified as Benjamin de Forest Bayly or Bayle, a Canadian academic, in documents in the American and Canadian archives. Countless other examples confirming details in the book, or filling out vague passages, can be found But these examples also highlight a weakness of the book. BSC staff are not named, which is curious for a manuscript that was not intended for publication. There is one notable exception: the name of William Stephenson appears and he is always referred to as WS. Was this an early effort by Stephenson to focus all BSC accomplishments on his own person? Did Stephenson intend this as an “official” history or a vanity remembrance of his exploits (and those of BSC)? And why the secrecy with names? The omission of names, on occasion done awkwardly, highlights the focus on Stephenson and questions the motivation for writing the book. Another annoying feature, one which is perhaps more understandable, is the brevity of the history. One is torn between viewing the book as a good story or as a primary source on British intelligence in the * / Americas. Too often, the book summarizes
• or illustrates a BSC activity with one or two examples. This fails to provide a full account of BSC. Indeed, it only magnifies the reader’s confusion about the real purpose of the book. A missing element in this intriguing tale is why and how BSC was created. The stories of Britain’s various wartime secret services are replete with bureaucratic intrigue and turf battles. Yet in the Americas, Stephenson seemingly had little difficulty uniting under his leadership not only SIS, SOE, security and various other organizations but also proved adept at gaining control of most (not all) British security/ intelligence operations in the Western Hemisphere. This is one part of the BSC story which might have been better explained. How was it that the different services were able to unite under the authority of Stephenson, who was nominally the SIS representative? Stephenson was able to coordinate the activities of all of these secret organizations while permitting their reporting lines to remain in place. This must surely have been a challenge. Unfortunately, little of this story emerges in these pages. In spite of some shortcomings, and questioning of Stephenson’s motivation, the book is a boon to those who wish to understand a remarkable facet of British-American relations. At its core, the BSC was one of the most effective undertakings of political advocacy whereby a clear goal was the shaping of another nation’s domestic policy without being caught out. The book makes very clear, and in adequate details, how BSC effectively swayed American opinion about the war raging in Europe. This is the story of shaping the thinking of the American body politic in a defined direction. Never mind that many American were favourably inclined towards the Allies (at that pre-Pearl Harbor time being Britain and Canada). The United States was neutral then, FDR faced a struggle in pursuing a pro-Allied policy, and Congress did not favour intervention on the side of the Allies. BSC executed a covert political advocacy program to influence the direction of U.S. policy – and it was evidently successful. Along the way, BSC ensured the security of British assets and interests and engaged in various forms of espionage. But history will probably assign to BSC highest marks for the dramatic role which it played in altering the thinking of a large nation by influencing the views of a select cadre of opinion-makers. In that sense this book describes diplomacy at its very best.
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2000) — Spring 2000 // Printemps 2000, pp. 52–53. Read the rest of this issue →
