bout de papier, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2000) — Spring 2000 // Printemps 2000, p. 4
by John Hadwen
With the largest majority ever recorded, 85 per cent, and for the first time in 32 years, foreign service officers have rejected the Government of Canada’s latest pay offer. All efforts should now be directed to achieving a mutually agreed settlement but why did this crisis develop and how can it be dissipated?
The Why Ministers, departmental management and the Treasury Board did not appreciate the depths of the resentment arising from:
1. a series of financial reductions over the years (wage freezes, and inflation consequences) which produced the loss of salary comparability even to other elements of the Canadian Public Service;
2. arbitrarily lowered staffing levels accompanied in the same period by increased demands to meet additional commitments
(a) the latest geographic ones are the Sudan, Central Asia and African
[again], (b) fresh demands for a series of Team
Canada endeavours requiring unprecedented preparations, (c) urgent servicing of new levels of activity for six ministers in Foreign Affairs (The Hon. L. Axworthy), International Trade (The Hon. P. Pettigrew), International Cooperation (The Hon. M. Minna) Secretary of State-Latin America and Africa (The Hon. D. Kilgour), Secretary of State-Asia Pacific (The Hon. R. Chan), Secretary of State — Francophonie & Western Economic Diversification (The Hon. R. Duhamel), (d) additional thematic urgencies Human
Security, International summits (Hemispheric meetings approach).
DFAIT (and External before it) is now renowned as “The department that is not permitted or cannot bring itself to say no” and is forced to do “more with less” for changing masters over the years;
3. failure to reform the foreign service classification system which has become rigid and unable to meet changing needs;
4. prejudiced attitudes, passed on to the press and the public, towards the Canadian Foreign Service. These come from resentment that much of the work takes place outside Canada and is thought to involve luxury and privilege. No one believes now — but they did — that all that Canadians need to understand world affairs is to read the New York Times. Some still believe that all staff abroad live like foreign ambassadors in Ottawa.
At the same time that these elements applied, the dangers and complexities of world affairs grew. Not in order, refugee and immigration movements, concerns for the protection of Canadians travelling, civil wars, the claims of the environment, of population growth, fresh agricultural issues, drug threats, nuclear and conventional arms control problems, national cultural concerns, world market fluctuations, international crime — the list goes on and all over the world. We need to revisit Europe. Unpredictable disasters are everywhere. The Security Council and even the IMF and the IBRD need to be reformed Defence and foreign policy linkages have to be reconsidered. Evolving legal issues create fresh international pressures.
To meet these and many other challenges which Canadians, and their foreign service cannot ignore, while facing prejudice, reduced resources, and falling comparative pay scales, was too much even for carefully chosen, trained and motivated professionals. (Thousands of well prepared and qualified Canadians apply yearly often for less than 100 posts.)
No one has questioned the quality, the political impartiality and the energy of the foreign service members. This includes their families. However, as a group they have been abused beyond reason. We have lost many. We will lose more. The central agencies must recognize and accept this fact.
The requirement now is for:
1. substantially increased salary levels justified by unique programme demands;
2. classification and promotion procedures to be revised and made more generous;
3. additional staffing resources including the reinstatement of the junior political officer positions abroad;
4. the public service as a whole and the foreign service in particular to be defended. Antiquated attitudes should be rejected. The political leadership should play a role.
The dangers in failure to maintain the foreign service at the levels required by vital national interests have never really been assessed, but they are real.
Canada is not a great enough power to enforce our needs in world affairs. Who is going to employ our “soft power” unless it is the foreign service?
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2000) — Spring 2000 // Printemps 2000, p. 4. Read the rest of this issue →
